# Strategic Defence Review

## Annex Documents

**FICHA CATALOGRÁFICA DEL CENTRO DE PUBLICACIONES**

**STRATEGIC** Defence Review / [foreword by José María Aznar, preface by Federico Trillo-Figueroa]. — [Madrid], Ministerio de Defensa, Secretaría General Técnica, 2003. — 2 v. ; 24 cm. — Contiene: v. 1, I. General overview. II. Basic criteria ; v. 2, Annex documents.

NIPO 076-02-174-1. — D.L.M.-21268-2003

ISBN 84-9781-008-2 (tomo 1). – ISBN 84-9781-009-0 (tomo 2). – ISBN 84-9781-007-4 (obra completa)

I. Aznar López, José María, pr. II. Trillo-Figueroa Martínez-Conde, Federico, pr. III. España. Ministerio de Defensa. Secretaría General Técnica, ed.

Defensa Nacional / Defensa estratégica / Seguridad nacional / Fuerzas Armadas / España / S. XXI

Edita:

MINISTERIO DE DEFENSA
SECRETARÍA GENERAL TÉCNICA

© Editor 2003

Título original: Revisión Estratégica de la Defensa
Traductor: Dr. David Blanch

NIPO: 076-02-174-1
ISBN: 84-9781-007-4 (obra completa)
ISBN: 84-9781-009-0 (tomo II)
Depósito Legal: M-21268-2003
Imprime: Imprenta Ministerio de Defensa
Tirada: 2.000 ejemplares
Fecha de impresión: abril 2003

# INDEX

A. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS ..... 117

B. RISKS AND SCENARIOS FOR SECURITY AND DEFENCE ..... 129

C. MISSIONS AND TASKS OF THE ARMED FORCES ..... 157

D. CAPABILITIES OF THE ARMED FORCES ..... 185

E. HUMAN RESOURCES OF DEFENCE ..... 217

F. MATERIAL RESOURCES OF DEFENCE ..... 249

G. NORMATIVE AND ORGANISATIONAL CONSEQUENCES ..... 297

H. THE PROCESS BEHIND THE STRATEGIC DEFENCE REVIEW ..... 321

# ANNEX

# A

# NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS

# INDEX

## NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS


**I. INTRODUCTION** ..... 121

**II. VITAL INTERESTS** ..... 122

**1.- Spain's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and constitutional legal order** ..... 122

**2.- The life, liberty and prosperity of the Spanish people** .. 122

**III. STRATEGIC INTERESTS** ..... 123

**1.- A contribution to stability projection through NATO and the European Union** ..... 123

**2.- Maintaining peace and balance in the Mediterranean area** ..... 123

**3.- Maintaining freedom of exchange and communications** ..... 124

**4.- Security in the supply of basic resources** ..... 124

**5.- The disappearance of terrorism** ..... 124

**6.- The recovery of sovereignty over Gibraltar** ..... 125

**IV. OTHER SECURITY INTERESTS** ..... 125

**Achieving, in a manner that reflects solidarity, a stable international order of peace, security and respect for human rights** ..... 126

***a. Solidarity of action with the international community*** ..... 126

***b. Contributing to the cause of peace and liberty*** .... 126

# ANNEX A
# NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS

## I. INTRODUCTION

By historical and cultural legacy, every nation has certain goods and values that it recognizes as **national interests**, which constitute the basic aspirations of the Nation in the international order and are foundational to the well-being and prosperity of its citizens. Accordingly, the Spanish Constitution includes a proclamation of the will of the Nation in its preamble:

- To guarantee democratic coexistence within the constitutional and legal framework, according to a just economic and social order.

- To protect all Spaniards and Spanish peoples in the exercise of human rights, culture, traditions, languages and institutions.

- To assist in strengthening peaceful and effective cooperation among all the peoples of the World.

Along with these, certain **national security interests** exist and are important enough to merit a defence effort, if circumstances required it. These may be classified as **vital, strategic** and **other interests**.

**Vital interests** are those that Spain is willing to protect and defend, when necessary, from any risk or threat that would affect its survival as a nation. These are the constituent elements of the State that must be preserved intact in the face of any aggression.

There are also interests of particular importance due to their decisive contribution to guaranteeing the vital interests, which are therefore known as **strategic interests**.

In addition, there are various types of **other** national **interests** derived from Spain's position in the international community, its sense of solidarity, its contribution to the cause of peace and liberty, and its relations with nations of the same historical and cultural community.

## II. VITAL INTERESTS

Like every sovereign nation, Spain defends certain interests basic to its survival, the constituent elements of the State that must be preserved intact in the face of any aggression. These include the peninsular and extra-peninsular territory, with its aerial and maritime spaces, the population, the sovereignty, the independence and the constitutional legal order.

### 1.- Spain's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and constitutional legal order

These values form the foundation upon which the State stands, ensuring its recognition as such and the freedom of action necessary as a single political, social and economic entity.

### 2.- The life, liberty and prosperity of the Spanish people

Our nation should enjoy living conditions and opportunities for prosperity that correspond to the dignity and lifestyle of the Spanish people, within the context of our geographical and cultural setting.

## III. STRATEGIC INTERESTS

Particularly prominent among our strategic interests are those derived from Spain's geographical situation and maritime condition, which receive special attention within our Foreign Policy due to their significance and permanence.

### 1.- A contribution to stability projection through NATO and the European Union

The era when a local conflict in a small European region could become a global conflict seems to have passed, along with the Cold War threats to European safety.

However, the delicate and complex **European construction process** can be influenced by weaknesses in the links between EU member countries, and by the degree of stability in the **non-EU European countries**. The conflicts in these countries may have consequences that extend to the European Union, generating new conflicts, decreasing the possibilities of integration, and ultimately impacting the internal stability and progress of the member countries.

Spain should contribute to international operations in a manner coherent with its national interest objective of achieving a position of greater influence in the international community, especially in the field of **shared security**.

Spain also supports the development of **confidence building measures**, especially regarding arms control.

### 2.- Maintaining peace and balance in the Mediterranean area

Due to its geographical location, extensiveness and projection possibilities, Spain can project a great influence over

the Western half of the Mediterranean, especially the Straits of Gibraltar and its accesses. Given the importance of this sea for global and European interests, this potential should be clearly recognised and consistently supported within the shared security framework.

### 3.- Maintaining freedom of exchange and communications

**Free commerce at a global level** is the basis for the expansion of the world economy, which brings peace and stability. As markets expand, new riches are generated, creating new jobs and facilitating the diffusion of the values we defend.

The **Spanish economy**, like that of the world, depends on freedom of exchange and communications, which Spain must make every effort to maintain. Defence resources can effectively contribute to protecting this freedom through Spain's participation in International Organisations and Alliances, and by an external presence that demonstrates the industrial capacity of Spain and the quality of its personnel and defence products.

### 4.- Security in the supply of basic resources

As a land of limited basic resources, Spain relies quite heavily on what it receives from the outside, especially for **the supply of its energy resources**; the absence of which would strangle the Spanish economy and seriously endanger the present progress, peace and stability. For this reason the supply of these resources is considered a top interest, from their various production sources to arrival at Spanish distribution centres.

### 5.- The disappearance of terrorism

Terrorism constitutes a direct attack on the lives and democratic liberties of the citizens as well as the justice, peace and

well-being sought after daily with great effort. It can also threaten the sovereignty and territorial integrity of countries.

According to our constitutional legal order, the fight against **internal terrorism**, in particular the terrorist group ETA, corresponds to our State Security Forces and Corps.

Since the tragic events of September 11, the whole world has seen increased Armed Forces participation in facing this new risk of **external terrorism**.

### 6.- The recovery of sovereignty over Gibraltar

Spanish opportunities and interests in the **Straits of Gibraltar** are particularly relevant; not only because of our territories in that zone, but also because Gibraltar is a key point in global maritime traffic and the imposed presence there is foreign to us. This directly affects our population, territory, maritime space and, in sum, our interests of every sort, depriving Spain of the role that corresponds to it.

The recovery of Spain's historical right over Gibraltar and **key role in that zone** constitutes a first magnitude interest, relating to the effectiveness of our Armed Forces' missions in that area, nationally and as members of the Atlantic Alliance.

## IV. OTHER SECURITY INTERESTS

Although these are not priority objectives of the defence effort, as they are not directly related to Spanish security, they are an element of the State's external action and may at times require the involvement of Armed Forces or military personnel units. Humanitarian aid and peace mission participation in certain remote regions may fit within these interests.

**Achieving, in a manner that reflects solidarity, a stable international order of peace, security and respect for human rights**.

Spain is fully committed to achieving a more stable and secure international order, convinced that its security is closely linked to that of the surrounding countries, to those that share the same societal model and to those that fall within our sphere of interest.

In this context, it is important to emphasize:

### *a. Solidarity of action with the international community*

Spain defends **values** characteristic of Western civilisation and **common** to both the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance. One of the most prominent values is solidarity with peoples in situations of extreme poverty or need due to natural causes, geographical location, underdeveloped political systems, or a lack of necessary resources in the face of grave shortages.

To the extent of its resources, Spain must have the capability to demonstrate that it will make great efforts to help those requiring assistance.

### *b. Contributing to the cause of peace and liberty*

Societies require liberty and peaceful living conditions for development, in order to dedicate the majority of their resources to the individual well-being of their citizens. These conditions are threatened if the **factors that hinder them**, such as human rights abuses and extreme poverty, are allowed to advance.

One of Spain's top interests is actively participating in **conflict prevention**, by understanding the causes and adopting measures necessary to avoid the development of conflicts.

As a mid-sized power, **Spain's actions** will be determined by its evaluation of the conflict, the manner in which it affects Spanish interests, and the geographical distance from our country to the conflict scenario.

# ANNEX

# B

# RISKS AND SCENARIOS FOR SECURITY AND DEFENCE

# INDEX

## RISKS AND SCENARIOS FOR SECURITY AND DEFENCE


**I. SECURITY RISKS** ..... 133

**1.- Principal Risks** ..... 134

*a. A large-scale attack on the national territory* ..... 134

*b. The terrorist phenomenon* ..... 134

*• External terrorism* ..... 135

*• Internal terrorism* ..... 136

*c. Territorial claims, specifically concerning Ceuta and Melilla, and the islands and rocks* ..... 137

*d. Limitations to the exercise of sovereignty* ..... 137

*e. Conflicts of interest between States* ..... 138

*f. A lack of basic supplies* ..... 138

*g. The existence and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (NBQR) and their delivery systems*.... 139

*h. Low intensity regional conflicts* ..... 140

**2.- Other risks** ..... 140

*a. Transnational delinquency, organised crime and drug trafficking* ..... 140

*b. Extraordinary and uncontrolled migratory movements* ..... 141

*c. Cyber attacks* ..... 143

*d. Natural and human disasters* ..... 143

*e. Negative effects of globalisation* ..... 144

*f. Regional instability* ..... 145

*g. A disappearing climate of confidence, security and cooperation* ..... 146

*h. Nations with a democratic deficit* ..... 147

**II. SCENARIOS OF ACTION FOR THE ARMED FORCES** ..... 148

**1.- National territory** ..... 149
**2.- The Euro Atlantic space** ..... 150
**3.- The Mediterranean and its surroundings, with special emphasis on the Magreb** ..... 152
**4.- Ibero America** ..... 153
**5.- The Middle East** ..... 154
**6.- Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly Equatorial Guinea** ..... 154
**7.- Asia-The Pacific** ..... 155

# ANNEX B

# RISKS AND SCENARIOS FOR SECURITY AND DEFENCE

## I. SECURITY RISKS

Security risks have always had a **cohesive effect**, creating the need to **develop new policies** for preparing and protecting populations, deterring the enemy and planning responses to certain contingencies.

The concept of risk has a clearly **dynamic meaning** that evolves with the strategic context, vulnerability factors and the capability to meet them. It is therefore **necessary to evaluate periodically the risks and threats** to international society.

The monolithic, massive and potentially immediate **threat** of a surprise attack on the West by Warsaw Pact Armed Forces disappeared with the end of the Cold War, and was replaced by **new risks** of a multidirectional and complex nature, difficult to foresee or analyse. September 11 transformed security **risks into genuine threats**.

The **traditional threat** in a bipolar world was specific, symmetrical and territorial. In the globalisation era, **new risks and threats** to security are vague, asymmetrical and not necessarily territorial.

These **new risks or asymmetrical threats** are non-conventional, seeking to exploit the vulnerability of a country while reducing its security. They have one **common denominator**: they are generally caused by non-state, diffuse

actors who rely on support from failed States and attack a country's institutions, communications, infrastructure, territory or, above all else, its population.

Consequently, **Spain** considers that at present there is a broad **range of emerging risks and instabilities that are difficult to foresee**, and that directly affect its security since they contain the necessary elements to **generate threats** when the will to carry them out is present. There is a suspicion or at least a chance that these may materialise.

These risks affect Spain's **national interests** and those of **our allies and partners** in the security and defence International Organisations. In our estimate, these risks balance out when collective interests are involved, either within our own borders or in the framework of **shared security**. Spain should be prepared to face these risks as they materialise, whether in times of peace or of crisis and conflict.

The **principal risks** requiring direct Armed Forces intervention, along with **other risks** that could require it, are examined below.

## 1.- Principal risks

### *a. A large-scale attack against the national territory*

As pointed out, a large-scale conventional aggression in the **short or medium range** is unlikely, but the **long-range** possibility of an aggression against national or allied territory cannot be discarded, as the aggravation of other risks could produce an unfavourable change in our environment.

### *b. The terrorist phenomenon*

Terrorism should be analysed separately as it is a distinct phenomenon.

Given the technological development of Western conventional capabilities, the likelihood of **non-conventional threats** has risen. A potential adversary may conclude that there is little to be done in the conventional arena, and seek more advantageous forms of conflict. Military advantage might be sought through the use of arms and procedures expressly prohibited by international agreements, through terrorist acts, or methods and procedures that are morally and culturally unacceptable to our society. The media may even be used to exploit Western anxiety over unacceptable numbers of civilian or military casualties, thus taking advantage of expectations of minimum collateral damage.

Like many of the new risks, this phenomenon is present on **two levels**: external and internal.

- ***External terrorism***

This sort of terrorism acts outside the borders of its host country or within it against the interests of other countries. "Acts" are understood as armed activity, such as attacks, sabotages, murders and kidnappings.

These actions are often directed against **the West**, and frequently against **the USA**, as its key representative and principal power. Hence that country's concern, having suffered in the last few years a series of aggressions that culminated in the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. This was the most severe example of external terrorism and a turning point of such magnitude that it has qualitatively and quantitatively changed the cooperation between nations against terrorism and its sponsors. This cooperation is indispensable given the complexity of terrorist networks and means.

**Other aspects** to consider in relation to international terrorism are those that add an element of instability. Among these are mercenaries and highly sophisticated materiel from the Cold War period, and new technologies that can be used to locate materials for use in terrorist attacks.

- **Internal terrorism**

Born within a State and acting against it, this category includes terrorist organisations such as **ETA** in Spain, the **IRA** in Great Britain, the **"November 17th Movement"** in Greece, the **Red Brigades** in Italy, and sporadic domestic terrorism in the **USA**. This form of terrorism may have **international links** for providing support between groups, or for the use of training grounds or hideouts, but it is essentially different from external terrorism. Spain is sorely familiar with this form of terrorism, as it is the main threat to our society.

Internal terrorism must be combated on **two fronts**. The **political front** works to allow a free and peaceful exchange of ideas, while the **police front** uses all the means available to a modern State. Basic citizen liberties must be guaranteed through clear and effective police and judicial action, creating specialised groups for this purpose, dedicating significant resources to them and seeking international support.

In this long struggle the State must stand firm, never giving in to extortion. It is also important to be watchful of the linguistic subtleties used by terrorist groups, their supporters or other unsuspecting participants who in good faith may be led to believe that these groups are willing to yield in exchange for peace. In sum, the main weapons to face this problem are **firmness**, police and judicial effectiveness, guaranteed citizen liberties and the exercise of full democracy.

Defence against this risk is the direct responsibility of the **State Security Forces and Corps**, with possible interventions by the **Armed Forces**, depending on the country, and subject to prior **Government** approval.

### *c. Territorial claims, specifically concerning Ceuta and Melilla, and the islands and rocks*

The **rejection of the borders** between States, due to the way they were established as a consequence of natural formations, wars between states, ancient treaties, or any other form that is not accepted by one of the parties, creates a permanent risk of violence between them. Small, local border disputes can degenerate into full-scale armed conflicts.

The subtle, slow and uninterrupted flow of people across the border, along with the acquisition of goods and properties within our territory, may lead to difficult **irredentist** situations.

Recent history provides clear examples of this in **Southeast Europe**, where movements of this variety have caused bloody conflicts requiring extensive resources to end violence that is often of an ethnic sort.

Moroccan claims on **Spanish** territories in North Africa could possibly cause this risk to materialise.

The **Armed Forces** can use its deterrence capability, encourage confidence measures and arms control, and provide adequate military crisis management to help **avoid conflicts resulting from these risks**.

### *d. Limitations to the exercise of sovereignty*

The long contention over **Gibraltar** is a thorn in the relations between United Kingdom and Spain. Both countries approach the

negotiations from a Western perspective, as democratic, friendly, allied States with common interests that supersede the dispute. Still, this contention permanently hovers over **Spanish-British relations**, which are inevitably affected by it. The very positive progress in bilateral relations between both countries allows us for the first time to sense the possibility of a solution to the problem.

Along with the **limitation** to Spain's freedom of action in foreign policy, there are economic, financial, judicial, social and other **risks** created by the British colonial presence on Gibraltar; which reaches its most defined expression in the **Defence realm** due to the air and naval base located there.

As a result, defensive **strategic operations** can be carried out in the Straits and surrounding areas without Spanish participation. Among other things, this directly affects Spanish sovereignty over the Peninsular maritime space; requiring Spain to maintain an operational capability sufficient to retain control over the Straits.

### *e. Conflicts of interest between States*

An inherent risk for every state is that another State's interests coincide with its own, when these are by nature exclusive. This is especially significant when consolidating certain **areas of influence**.

The Armed Forces can help reduce the effects of these risks by encouraging **confidence measures**.

### *f. A lack of basic supplies*

Spain and other Western countries depend on **basic resources** such as petroleum, gas or strategic minerals in such a way that any possible interruption of their supply may create a serious upheaval in national life.

The global production of these basic resources is concentrated in a limited number of **geographical areas**. The lines of distribution, which include gas and oil pipelines, cross specific zones and geographical points such as the Mediterranean Sea, the West Coast of Africa and the Straits of Gibraltar.

The high concentration of these distribution lines in our territorial waters becomes an additional risk in the event of environmental and ecological dangers that could affect our own national territory, waters and space, as well as our exclusive economic zones. All of this increases the potential harm derived from this risk.

As in the past, the Armed Forces can help **reduce the risk** of interrupted supply by intervening to ensure its continuity.

They can also aid in **preventing the risk** of environmental catastrophes, and participate –when required– in **limiting their effects**.

### *g. The existence and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (NBCR) and their delivery systems*

The **globalisation of communications and international commerce** have allowed countries and non-state organisations to threaten other governments by gaining access to technology and materials with the objective of building weapons of mass destruction, thus violating International Law.

Although in recent years there has been a reduction in the number of nuclear weapons, there is great uncertainty about their use. The dismemberment of the Soviet Union led to the appearance of other nuclear powers, and new States have developed their own nuclear weapons, constituting a risk that could reach global proportions.

The **risk of proliferation** of weapons of mass destruction (NBCR) is significant for Spain, especially in the Mediterranean area. By supporting arms control, confidence measures, international cooperation and maintenance of a credible deterrence capability, the Spanish Armed Forces may contribute to reduce arsenals of weapons of mass destruction and impede the use of these weapons for any reason whatsoever.

### *h. Low intensity regional conflicts*

When risks are aggravated, low intensity regional conflicts can easily expand beyond their geographical area, especially in **regions of greater instability**.

Thus, nationalist tendencies may emphasise distinctive ethnic, religious or cultural markers in order to strengthen the identity of a certain people against others. This can **break the ties that bind States together** and even modify existing borders; causing the conflict to spread beyond their borders and constituting a clear risk against peace and regional stability.

Various measures should be developed to avoid these effects. In this effort, the Armed Forces can contribute significantly to **crisis management**, and especially to peace maintenance.

## 2.- Other risks

### *a. Transnational delinquency, organised crime and drug trafficking*

The **phenomenon** of organised transnational delinquency is clearly **on the rise**, and has managed to establish itself in many nations. It is dedicated principally to drug trafficking, but also to arms contraband, clandestine immigrant traffic, prostitution, gaming, money laundering and even the contraband of nuclear material.

There is no respect for human life in this type of delinquency, which alters both national and international norms of coexistence, disturbing economic growth and destroying the hope of material and intellectual progress in countries that suffer its consequences.

Nowadays **international mafias** are enormously and increasingly powerful. They tend to relate to one another, weaving extensive networks, abusing the legal instruments that the State of Law offers for their defence and moving each year tremendous amounts of money.

**Spain** is especially vulnerable due to its geographical location and special links with some of the countries that generate this serious risk. The primary and most worrisome area of mafia action in our territory relates to **drug trafficking**; and here the Armed Forces have been providing the largest amount of assistance to the State Security Forces and Corps.

### *b. Extraordinary and uncontrolled migratory movements*

Apart from the two risk factors already mentioned, ethnocultural/religious differences and clashes between different cultures, illegal immigration is fundamentally a consequence of **economic and demographic imbalances** between developed and developing countries.

**Economic imbalances** cause less-favoured populations to see richer ones as a goal in themselves rather than a stimulus to improve their own national capabilities, leading some people to make their main objective that of reaching at any cost what they perceive as a paradise. Relations between **rich and poor countries** can also be perceived by the latter as a relationship between oppressors and oppressed.

When the basic resources in developing countries are exploited without the corresponding improvements in their developmental level and lifestyle, or when third-party countries take advantage of them in strategically exceptional situations, entire people groups may be led to famine when their vital resources are gone, or to ruin once their **geostrategic situation** is no longer interesting.

Driven by desperation, the **struggle for survival** can lead to brutal human rights violations, massive migratory movements with their trail of suffering, and general disruption of peace and security. We cannot remain indifferent to this even when its effects do not directly impact our territory or population.

The Armed Forces can help reduce the effects of this risk factor through military crisis management instruments or by assisting when the civil authorities require it in humanitarian aid operations or civil crisis management.

The **demographic expansion** that significantly affects countries with limited resources results in strong internal movements that cause instability and may go beyond their borders. To survive, large human contingents may in desperation attempt to reach a place where living conditions are acceptable.

These massive migrations may occur near our borders and even reach our territory, where it would be necessary to **maintain stability** while not remaining indifferent to suffering. This stability could be endangered by chaotic or disorderly arrivals of large human contingents.

Demographic expansion is a phenomenon that the Armed Forces can do nothing about, but they can intervene when dramatic consequences materialise. Given their means and resources, when necessary they can assist in channelling the

movements of human contingents and provide the support they need to survive. However, such activities will always be the competence of public civil institutions, and their ideal instrument for this task: the State Security Forces and Corps.

### *c. Cyber attacks*

The global world economy depends on **a broad exchange of information**, which, if interrupted would cause problems comparable to those that arise from alterations in the flow of basic resources.

This type of threat involves two areas of strategic vulnerability. First, the normality and security of an advanced society is seriously shaken when there are attacks on the systems regulating its **basic infrastructures** (such as sabotaging public services, paralysing the railroad network, interrupting the supply of electricity to a large city).

Therefore all basic infrastructures that depend on complex computer and communications systems must have sufficient **protection elements** in order to neutralise these types of aggressions.

Second, a **penetration of the** Armed Forces communication, command and control **network**, the national crisis management system or intelligence databases may be a direct threat to national security. The Armed Forces must have the necessary capabilities to impede any sort of cyber aggression that might threaten national security.

### *d. Natural and human disasters*

**Natural disasters**, such as droughts, earthquakes, floods, fires, landslides, rain or snow storms, may threaten individuals'

lives and well-being, causing irreparable harm to the population and the territory, and thus affecting the national interests.

The same may be said of **accidents** at industrial or construction sites, explosions, toxic leaks, nuclear accidents, broken dams, electricity plant malfunctions, etc.

Also to be considered are **medical risks** such as epidemics or mass poisoning due to the consumption of contaminated food or liquid.

All these risks can affect security and should be considered as possible areas of action by the Armed Forces, if only for assistance.

In collaboration with **Civil Protection means**, the Armed Forces can use their resources to assist when natural disasters and certain aggressions against the environment occur, such as those that require immediate engineering projects, speedy movement of large numbers of people, fire extinction or urgent set-up of refugee camps.

### *e. Negative effects of globalisation*

Globalisation may act as a **risk multiplier,** given that it facilitates exchanges of every sort, allowing risks to spread very rapidly, some of them affecting us.

Among these risks we find some that require only the **globalisation of communications** or of **human movement** for their generation and diffusion. The emphasis here is on cases related to ideas that are contrary to freedom and human rights or that use violence as a form of expression and of generalised rejection of our society's achievements. Other possible risks are environmental catastrophes due to global commerce and people movements that can spread epidemics.

The Armed Forces can help reduce the intensity of these risks by collaborating with the Civil Authorities responsible for crisis management, through tasks of Civil Protection or in support of the State Security Forces and Corps.

### *f. Regional instability*

The regional instability phenomenon is basically linked to problems at two significant levels: ethnocultural and religious differences, and clashes between cultures.

**Ethnocultural and religious differences** often result from ancestral hatred and may erupt in violence, murders and massive upheavals that violate the most basic human rights.

These differences are often linked to **territorial claims**, and act in a manner similar to geological fault lines. Their effects vary from local conflicts of limited intensity and consequence to conflicts that may affect several nations. Lately, these sorts of differences have been a factor or a cause in a good number of conflicts between and within states.

Different ethnic groups and cultures often have different religions. The two are often intertwined, making the distinction between ethnocultural and religious differences even harder. The situation is particularly serious when these two factors together are added to some territorial link in a climate of intolerance.

In this situation the Armed Forces can intervene by separating the parties involved, controlling their activities and means and basically imposing peace before violence or its consequences spread across borders. For this purpose **military crisis management** can be an instrument of great value.

In addition, history shows that more developed cultures try to impose their achievements on less-favoured ones, using one pretext or another. This causes clashes that are frequently bloody, as well as regional instability that occasionally may even affect the interests of other geographically remote nations.

The rapid acquisition of technical innovations designed for developed countries by nations with low technological and cultural development may produce situations where they are unable to equally assimilate the **cultural and technological advances** that proceed from countries exporting modern technology. Ultimately this can bias progress towards military innovations and create the temptation to use them.

Aside from the importance of our own deterrence capability, the Armed Forces can facilitate the assimilation of technological advances, intervening in arms control and the export of dual-purpose technology. Through Defence Diplomacy there are also possibilities of **collaboration** with countries of a different culture in areas such as training, teaching, increasing mutual familiarity, facilitating mutual understanding and creating an environment of trust in order to overcome motives for confrontation.

### *g. A disappearing climate of confidence, security and cooperation*

For more than fifty years, the threat to Western Europe forged a **climate of confidence, security and cooperation** among European countries and with the United States, best exemplified by the Atlantic Alliance. This helped Europe to leave behind the rivalries that had made its landscapes the scenario of successive armed conflicts during almost 400 years.

This peace during the Cold War era led to levels of economic development and European integration that were unthinkable 60 years before. A good example of this is the European Union.

But when the common threat and its cohesive effect disappeared, there arose the possibility of an economic regression and potential decline in the level of well-being. This might cause one member to seek leadership while another sought to abandon ship, inevitably resulting in the loss of hard-earned trust and possible **rebirth of ancient secular rivalries**.

On another level, the end of the Cold War brought about **confidence and security-fostering measures**, especially related to arms control among the members of the former blocks. The application of these has led to a gradual, significant reduction in the size of weapons arsenals and a halt in the arms race. Loss of confidence would be a very serious risk as it could cause a new arms race, which is totally undesirable.

In order to avoid distrust, the Armed Forces should encourage **participation** in as many multinational units and activities as resources permit. Manoeuvres, exercises, courses and detachments can all contribute to strengthen ties and increase reciprocal trust.

### *h. Nations with a democratic deficit*

Nations governed by a system of democratic liberties have adopted a **series of conduct norms**, with rights and duties that affect all members. With common basic principles, groups of nations can share ideals, enhancing development and the well-being of their citizens.

But when nations with a democratic deficit enter the arena of those governed by democratic principles, **this constitutes a serious risk as they do not show respect for the same principles**, such as respecting human rights, established borders, and international treaties. Such countries feel they have little to lose in provoking other countries, because there is little chance of retaliation in kind.

A credible Armed Forces deterrence and immediate effective intervention capability contribute to keep countries with a democratic deficit from being tempted to act against our interests or those of our allies.

## II. SCENARIOS OF ACTION FOR THE ARMED FORCES

Any strategic formulation of the possible **areas of projection of our security and defence** must include, along with an analysis of the general scenario, specific references to those areas that affect Spain's vital interests and decisively impact its security, thereby requiring top political and military consideration.

In consequence, our preferred **areas of action** are:

**National:** specifically, the peninsular and extra-peninsular territory under our sovereignty, including aerial and maritime accesses.

**Regional:** specifically, national action in the European context where political, military, economic, scientific and cultural cooperation have their highest expression; especially in the context of the European Union, the Western European Union (WEU) and other international organisms such as NATO, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe.

**Global:** derived from our commitments to the international community, especially in the context of the United Nations as a consequence of treaties and agreements; according to our historical and cultural links and our economic interests.

It is not easy to make a detailed list of the problems that affect or may affect in coming years the strategic scenario of national interests; but it seems convenient to classify **geostrategic scenarios and areas of interest**:

- National territory.
- The Euro Atlantic space, where the transatlantic link is particularly prominent.
- The Mediterranean and its surroundings, with special emphasis on the Magreb.
- Ibero America.
- The Middle East.
- Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly Equatorial Guinea.
- Asia-The Pacific.

## 1.- National territory

The **national territory** is a geostrategic area of first magnitude interest since it is a constituent element of the State, along with the population and the public powers. Our Constitution has entrusted the defence of Spain's territorial integrity to the Armed Forces and declared that they are to guarantee Spain's sovereignty and independence, thus demonstrating the priority of this scenario above any other.

## 2.- The Euro Atlantic space

The **Euro Atlantic space** is defined by the dual nature of our strategic perspective. We have defined for ourselves a **European vocation**, while we also maintain an **Atlantic vocation**, primarily manifested in the so-called **Atlantic link**.

Europe transcends any geographical concept, expressing an historical, social and cultural identity. The historical cradle of Western civilisation, it transmits and promotes the values that define Western civilisation today.

Spain is convinced that the **European Union** will not advance toward profound and effective historical integration unless it has a **common foreign and security policy**, along with credible and autonomous security and defence capabilities in accord with the goals set by Union's citizens. This should not compromise the commitments that each of its members maintain with the Atlantic Alliance. Thus, the security and defence system supported and promoted by Spain is principally set within the NATO-EU axis.

A large part of **Europe's 21st century defence** will involve ensuring the transparency, trust and adequate consultation mechanisms between NATO and the EU, while developing a solid nucleus that avoids duplications. The European Security and Defence Identity is fundamental to making this security axis a reality.

It is very likely in the political realm that the Central and East European nations will **progressively incorporate** themselves into the Euro Atlantic international organisations.

**The Balkan region** will continue to be in transition, with sporadic and recurring conflictiveness. The strategic panorama in

this region will continue to be marked by crises: some requiring regular armed forces with **military capabilities**, and others requiring forces with **police and public order capabilities**. Spain considers it a duty to be available for intervention in the resolution of these crises once legal, political and ethical requirements have been met according to International Law.

The **Atlantic link** is the expression of a basic interdependence forged during the 20th century between the United States and Western Europe. Any threat, risk or crisis that affects one side is unavoidably transmitted to the other. This **structural interdependence between both shores of the Atlantic** impedes any fundamental antagonism among the essential interests of Western Europe and the United States. The key to understanding Spain's strategic link with the United States lies in our European identity.

The **bilateral relationship established between Spain and the United States** in 1953 signified the opening of Spain to the outside. Since then the relationship between Spain and the United States has become consolidated and normalised through various political circumstances in areas such as politics, commerce, culture, defence and security. For Spain this relationship has all the significance due a country that is the primary global reference point and has a prominent voice in every important international decision.

Aside from the general links of the Atlantic Alliance, Spain currently maintains a **Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement** with the United States that is renewed periodically. In the past its significant political content involved international support for Spain in external relations. Today it focuses on cooperative defence relations between two sovereign nations on an equal plane.

## 3.- The Mediterranean and its surroundings, with special emphasis on the Magreb

**Stability** in the Mediterranean region is a key area of action for Spain and for international organisations such as NATO, the EU and the OSCE.

In spite of the economic, demographic and sociocultural differences, both sides of the Mediterranean are clearly and increasingly interrelated in a globalised world. This would suggest the need to assume **an integral security focus** including multilateral cooperation measures running both horizontally between states and vertically in diverse areas such as the economy, development, the environment, etc.

In this regard Spain favours **dialogue and multilateral cooperation** between the countries in the region, especially with the **Magreb**, as this helps consolidate a safer and sounder Europe. Spain considers that the dialogues begun within these international organisations are very positive, and that they should develop in a compatible and complementary fashion in order to create a true culture of peace and stability in the region.

Although security in the Mediterranean is a regional question, it may be reinforced in the strategic realm through **bilateral relations** and cooperation with non-State actors such as **non-governmental organisations**.

So there is an **objective basis** for Spain's active participation in all initiatives directly related to security in the Mediterranean area and the Magreb. This serves to create the **transparency and confidence** needed among the Mediterranean basin countries in order to achieve the security and well-being of their people.

## 4.- Ibero America

It is important to highlight the enormous significance of Spanish relations with **Ibero American countries** in recent years. Spain is closely linked to Latin Americans through common traditions, culture and especially a common language. Spain is sensitive to the current interest in the Latin American context, and promotes that interest in Europe from a privileged position based on historical links.

Spain forms a **natural bridge between the two shores of the Atlantic** and is committed to the economic and social challenges that Ibero America faces, making great efforts in the areas of cooperation and aid whenever the need arises.

On a **bilateral level** Spain is open to all Ibero American countries, offering loyal cooperation and support with the best intentions. There is already a notable effort to increase **Spanish presence** through political cooperation, along with an obvious increase in the penetration of our economic interests through investment.

But in political and strategic terms, Spain's most important contribution involves participation in **reconciliation and pacification processes**, which are still necessary. Given the value Spain places on peaceful relations with all peoples, our country is especially receptive to any peace-building and maintenance process in Latin America that enhances security.

In addition to traditional missions guaranteeing national security and sovereignty, Spain is already sharing valuable lessons with Ibero American countries from our experience in the area of new missions for the Armed Forces: stability projection, peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.

These things lead us to strengthen **cooperation with the Armed Forces** of Ibero American countries, especially in brainstorming tasks, and in fostering attitudes and programmes that facilitate conflict resolution and a durable and stable peaceful order.

## 5.- The Middle East

The Middle East is deeply influenced by the **Arab-Israeli conflict**; where the lack of a solution to the Palestinian and occupied territories questions have often led to spiralling conflict with unforeseeable effects. This is becoming the longest running conflict of the contemporary era and decisively affects the entire Middle East, extending its shadow over both shores of the Mediterranean. As a shore country committed to regional security and stability, Spain is not far removed from the events in this area. For this reason Spain supports all **multilateral cooperation initiatives** that might promote peace in that region.

## 6.- Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly Equatorial Guinea

The situation of Sub-Saharan Africa appears confusing and worrisome. Many of the world's least developed countries lie in this area, their progress limited by extremely high foreign debt.

Migrations, sickness, ethnic conflicts, civil and interstate wars, poverty, underdevelopment, environmental degradation, natural catastrophes and political corruption are recurring issues in this area with no obvious immediate solution or prospect of improvement.

**International organisms** have insufficient resources to face this situation and globalisation seems to confine the African population within its own underdevelopment.

There are few African countries that escape this situation, and even those rich in natural resources find themselves suffering from lesser or greater **internal conflicts** and endemic post-colonial corruption.

Spain is historically linked to **Equatorial Guinea**. Factors that potentially cause instability there are ethnic differences, a lack of social structures, which complicates the consolidation of State institutions, economic structural deficiencies, a lack of transparency in public management, the internal political panorama and conditions of extreme poverty for a very large part of the population.

## 7.- Asia-The Pacific

This region hosts many of the present world security problems and a majority of the questions left unresolved from bipolarity and the World Wars.

Asian **societies** are **very diverse**, ranging from those based on traditional agriculture to those with a technology-based economy. A few more or less Western-type democracies coexist alongside a majority composed of **authoritarian regimes**. This area also boasts a majority of the world's active Communist regimes –even though they seek integration with the **world capitalist market**– and the largest number of States with **nuclear weapons**.

Consequently, power games and the balance of power are more diverse and unpredictable here than in other parts of the planet. Economic globalisation and partial westernisation, especially influenced by North America, must interact in an **immense area** with settled historical identities and great military power.

Added to this is the lack of **regional organisations** with effective competence in matters of security and defence. Regional organisations such as the **ASEAN** (Association of South East Asian Nations) or the **Pacific Community** have mainly deepened in economic, financial and commercial aspects, while scarcely advancing in political and security issues.

Until recently Spain had an insufficient and very **limited presence** in the area. Still, a reasonable relationship with certain countries has been established in the field of military education, and some achievements have been made in the defence industry.

Given this situation, Spain seeks to increase its Asian-Pacific presence and hopes to define and design a specific "Asian dimension" for its external action. A **Framework Plan for Asia and the Pacific** has been developed that includes initiatives in the political, economic and cultural areas as well as security and defence, cooperation for development, and human rights.

Finally, the most relevant instability factor is the existence of States that host international terrorism, which provoked the armed intervention in **Afghanistan**. Spain participated in this intervention, manifesting its unequivocal commitment to peacekeeping and the defence of International Law in the present global war against terrorism.

# ANNEX

# C

# MISSIONS AND TASKS OF THE ARMED FORCES

# INDEX

## MISSIONS AND TASKS OF THE ARMED FORCES


**I. INTRODUCTION** ..... 161

**II. MISSIONS AND TASKS OF THE ARMED FORCES**.. 162

**1.- To impede any type of aggression and respond to it if necessary** ..... 163

*a. National Defence operations* ..... 164

*b. Operations within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance* ..... 164

*c. Operations within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)*..... 165

*d. Multinational Defence operations* ..... 166

**2.-To contribute militarily to international peace and stability** ..... 166

*a. Peace and humanitarian aid operations* ..... 167

*b. Confidence and security building measures, arms control and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction* ..... 169

*c. Defence diplomacy* ..... 170

**3.- To contribute with other State institutions and Public Administrations to preserve citizen security and well-being** ..... 172

*a. Assistance in critical emergency and catastrophe situations* ..... 172

*b. Evacuating citizens* ..... 173
*c. Supporting key areas of the national economy* ..... 173
*d. Supporting scientific and technological progress* .. 173
*e. Supporting the State Security Forces and Corps*.... 173
*f. Transport support for State activities* ..... 174
*g. Search and Rescue* ..... 174

**III. CHART OF THE MISSIONS AND TASKS OF THE ARMED FORCES** ..... 174

**IV. THE ARMED FORCES AND THE NEW TERRORIST THREAT** ..... 178

**V. THOUGHTS ON MILITARY INTELLIGENCE**. ..... 183

# ANNEX C

# MISSIONS AND TASKS OF THE ARMED FORCES

## I. INTRODUCTION

**Article 8 of the Spanish Constitution** establishes the primary reason for the existence of the Armed Forces:

"*The Armed Forces, consisting of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, have the mission of guaranteeing Spain's sovereignty and independence, defending its territorial integrity and its constitutional legal order*".

The **Preamble of the Constitution** emphasizes the will of the Spanish Nation to "protect all Spaniards and all the peoples of Spain in the exercise of their human rights, cultures and traditions, languages and institutions", and to "collaborate in strengthening peaceful relations and effective cooperation among all the peoples of the earth". For this purpose the Spanish Armed Forces will participate in upholding international Treaties and Resolutions proceeding from International Organisms. The final responsibility for safeguarding them lies with the Parliament and the Government, as stipulated in Article 93 of the Constitution.

As a consequence, the ultimate purpose of the **Armed Forces' activity** is to help further the national interests and protect the Spanish people. Other State organisms and institutions also share this objective.

In order to achieve these objectives in an interdependent and **globalised world**, we must collaborate with friendly countries and

certain international organisations, through alliances and bilateral agreements.

The present environment is characterised by strong interrelations between geographical areas and interests of the various actors, the need to respond rapidly to the succession of events, and the emergence of risks and threats that disrupt the stability necessary for promoting national interests. The capacity to anticipate events is essential for the Spanish Armed Forces (SAF) to respond to them in a correct and timely manner.

In this new scenario of actors sharing objectives and activities, the distinctive features of the SAF include not only the use of arms as required by the situation but also permanent availability and capability to act in a multinational framework.

## II. MISSIONS AND TASKS OF THE ARMED FORCES

It is important to note that the **general missions** of the SAF are not exclusive. They may coincide in time and be executed simultaneously.

In addition, the order in which the missions are listed does not presuppose a hierarchy of priorities. This is variable and determined by the Government. As representative of the will of a majority of society, it is responsible for deciding what needs to be done and in what order.

Each of the general missions has specific derived missions that in turn can be broken down into military tasks.

The most demanding missions must determine the capabilities required, while the remaining missions will be carried out with the means available in each case.

The **general missions of the SAF** are:

1. To impede any type of aggression and respond to it if necessary.

2. To contribute militarily to international peace and stability.

3. To contribute with other State institutions and Public Administrations to preserve citizen security and well-being.

We now proceed to develop each of these **general missions**, the possible **missions derived** from them and the specific **tasks** within each one.

### *1.- To impede any type of aggression and respond to it if necessary*

To impede any type of aggression, the SAF must **prevent**, deter and carry out any other action that might contribute to crisis control and armed conflict avoidance. This includes, as a last recourse, any preventive armed action.

Whenever preventive or deterrent measures fail, it will be necessary to have a versatile and flexible force immediately available and capable of rapidly **responding to the aggression**.

Our commitments to respond appropriately to an aggression against the basic security interests of Spain or of friendly countries could require coordinated use of all available national resources.

The existence of alliances should not rule out a **unilateral response**, since activating the joint mechanisms involved in a **collective response** might produce an unacceptable delay, given the speed of events and their impact on national interests. In the present geopolitical context it is fundamental to have armed forces

with high availability in order to unilaterally face possible aggressions against national security.

In the area of external defence, the SAF must face **conventional threats** as well as **asymmetrical ones** such as external terrorism. This must be done within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance and eventually in Europe's Security and Defence framework.

This implies a **broad security and defence concept** involving not only national and allied space, but also the defence of our interests wherever necessary.

In consequence, the Armed Forces have the following **missions derived** from this general mission:

### *a. National defence operations*

These operations involve:

- Unilateral actions aimed at prevention, deterrence and crisis management. Among these are the surveillance, control, and protection of national territory and Spanish maritime and air space.

- A military response to an armed attack on national territory or interests.

- Actions to guarantee the safety of our lines of communication and the free transit of raw materials and energy resources.

### *b. Operations in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance*

Spain considers NATO as the main framework for collective Allied defence in the event of an armed attack. **Article 5 of the**

**Washington Treaty** is a clear statement of transatlantic unity that expresses the Allies' commitment to mutual assistance if attacked.

As a result of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Alliance decided to activate Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty for the first time in its history, reflecting the **political and military support of all the Allies, including Spain**, for the operation led by the USA in **Afghanistan**. This is a clear sign that external terrorism has become a true threat to the **international community**, which must use all the means necessary to respond to it.

### *c. Operations within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)*

The ESDP is an element of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) that has changed considerably over the last few years. The Treaty of the European Union determines in this respect that the CFSP progressively include **a common defence policy** that might lead to a **common defence** if the European Council so decides (Article 17).

As European integration continues, the EU may reconsider Article 5 of the **Modified Brussels Treaty of the Western European Union (WEU)**, which establishes the mechanism for armed response in the event of an aggression against its member States. Since this Treaty has not been formally renounced, the possibility of carrying out this commitment within a future European Union defensive framework still exists.

In the June, 2002 European Council of Seville, a **declaration** was adopted **on the contribution of CFSP, including ESDP, in the fight against terrorism**, establishing the following **priority actions**: to **develop a common evaluation** of the terrorist threat

against its members; and determine how to **protect** against terrorist attacks both the Armed Forces deployed in EU crisis management operations and civilian populations of member States.

### *d. Multinational defence operations*

These are actions intended to re-establish a certain status quo through prevention, deterrence and armed response.

These operations will be carried out in regional conflicts, within the framework of defensive alliances, bilateral agreements, ad hoc **coalitions of nations** or other security and defence international organisations.

### *2.- To contribute militarily to international peace and stability*

In this globalised and international 21st century society, Spain's interests go beyond our national space, requiring a strong commitment by the national security and defence mechanisms to safeguard these interests wherever they may be.

Given the indirect contribution of peace and stability to protecting national interests, this general mission involves the will to **impede the appearance of crises**, that may affect national interests, or, **to stop crises in their initial phases**, limiting as much as possible their harmful effects on our Nation. This is complemented by a firm desire to contribute effectively to international peace and stability.

In this regard the Armed Forces will carry out their prevention activities using cooperation, stability projection and deterrence criteria. **Stability projection** has a powerful preventive effect due to its benefits to the population and the geographical area. The

reasoning behind **deterrence** is to convince a possible aggressor that the possible benefits desired come at too high a price.

These **preventive actions** can also be employed in **distant geographical areas**. The priorities for action will be directly linked to our national interests and voluntary involvement with security structures.

In consequence, the **derived** Armed Forces **missions** from this general mission are:

### *a. Peace and humanitarian aid operations*

**Peace operations** result from the International Community's desire to maintain peace and achieve security in a certain state or region. The International Community's decision to participate in Peace Operations may result in diverse actions using peaceful means or minimum force with the goal of eliminating threats to international peace and security.

These very **complex operations** require the Armed Forces of several states to jointly execute a mandate by a coalition or group of states or by one of the **international organisations** that oversee security (UN, NATO, EU, OSCE). They call for a custom-designed force and command structure set up for a specific mission, acting in cooperation with governmental or non-governmental civil organisations.

The International Community works through one or several of these security organisations, depending on their specific means and capabilities. In general, the **UN** oversees Peace Operations and related actions, delegating them to the security organisations it deems most appropriate for each case. Due to its capabilities and experience, **NATO** is a very adequate organisation for conflict

intervention and peace enforcement. The **OSCE** has more experience in conflict prevention, preventive diplomacy, re-establishing peace and organising and monitoring free elections. The **EU** is a regional security organisation that has inherited the Western European Union's approach, and has recently adopted the **"Petersberg missions"**. The Amsterdam Treaty of the EU defines these as **humanitarian and rescue task, peace keeping task, and task of combat forces in crisis management**, including **peacemaking**.

Also within these missions are possible actions against **external terrorism** by the Armed Forces of member states. For certain cases, intervention under **NATO** will be completely in line with the Washington Treaty and the 1999 Allied Strategic Conception. There is still debate concerning other possible actions by the **European Union**, which may need to take on new missions beyond the established "Petersberg Missions".

Armed Forces **humanitarian aid operations** seek to provide humanitarian assistance and ensure the supply of first-necessity goods and materials to a population that has suffered a natural catastrophe or any calamitous situation, which may or may not be the result of armed conflict.

The Spanish government participates in Peace Operations within the framework of security and defence organisations and in coordination with other states. In contrast, humanitarian aid operations may be carried out either **bilaterally or multilaterally**, in immediate response to a request for aid by the government or governments affected. As with peace operations, humanitarian aid operations are generally in cooperation with civil governmental or non-governmental organisations, and always with the consent of the state involved.

The **distinction** between peace missions and humanitarian missions is very nebulous and the two may often overlap. An example of this is the fact that "humanitarian and rescue missions" are listed alongside "peace keeping missions", under the same category of Petersberg Missions.

Successful peace and humanitarian aid operations require **civic-military cooperation** (CIMIC) between the incoming military forces and the civil authorities, organisations and population of both the sending and receiving countries.

### *b. Confidence and security building measures, arms control and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction*

Spain actively participates in the various international arms control and disarmament forums, upholding a policy of **transparency among states** as a means of maintaining security in Europe and increasing stability in our geopolitical surroundings.

In the area of **conventional arms control**, the measures for confidence and security building put forth by the **OSCE** are listed in the **Vienna Document, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the Treaty on Open Skies, the Ottawa Convention on the prohibition of the use of anti-personnel mines** and the corresponding arms control agreements included in the **Dayton Accords**.

Spain upholds a policy of **non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction** (nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological) and their delivery systems, which implies adopting measures towards greater control over dual-use technologies and the export of missile technology.

The various treaties Spain has entered into regarding arms control require our Armed Forces to facilitate **inspections** in our country by other states and international organisations, and to verify in turn that other states fulfil their commitments. The Armed Forces also collaborate in **verifying** other agreements on arms control such as the **Chemical Weapons Convention**.

The **September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks** have special relevance for security policies and arms control, especially regarding measures for controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Although it is too soon to determine its full impact on the new missions of the Armed Forces, the new arms control policy under construction will undoubtedly require new application formulas and missions, which include verification and arms control.

### *c. Defence diplomacy*

This is the set of Armed Forces tasks based on dialogue and cooperation, intended to create an **environment of confidence** and contribute to the **prevention, control and eradication** of **conflicts**.

Defence Diplomacy takes place through the contacts of the Minister of Defence and other high civil servants in the Ministry of Defence or through involvement of the **Defence Counsellor's Offices**, with friendly countries or international organisms. Since the creation of the Secretariat General for Defence Policy by **Royal Decree 64/2001**, the Ministry of Defence has been working on reforming the present laws regarding Defence Counsellor's Offices, to include both the Defence **Attachés** in **bilateral embassies** accredited to other nations (and formerly dependent on the Chief of the Defence Staff), and the Defence **Counsellors** accredited to **international organisations** such as the UN, OSCE, NATO, and EU, (who answer to the Directorate General for Defence Policy).

In consequence, all the Defence Attaché Offices[1] have been standardised and will now be termed **Defence Counsellor's Offices**[2]. They will depend on the Minister of Defence via the **Secretariat General for Defence Policy**, while continuing to **coordinate** affairs with the **Chief Office of the Defence Staff, the three Service Chiefs of Staff and other top officials of the Department**.

In summary, the new Defence Counsellor's Offices undertake **tasks characteristic of Defence Diplomacy**, traditionally defined as the following: signing cooperation protocols between Ministries of Defence; receiving ships or VIP visits; exchanges between schools, military staff or units; participation in combined exercises, and all general initiatives that promote greater understanding and transparency between Ministries of Defence and the Services of the countries involved.

Along with this network of **Defence Counsellor's Offices**, there is a larger **Spanish military presence** of various ranks among the **staff of international military organisms**. These include NATO's many headquarters, its Military Committee and specialised agencies, Allied Commands, the Eurocorps, the various International Forces, etc. All of them will continue to be directly subordinate to the **Chief of the Defence Staff**.

This reorganisation will contribute to the **maximum development** of our **Defence diplomacy**, benefiting our interests and our foreign policy; which is reflected in a proper functioning of the **Foreign Policy Council** according to the principles of its Directive 1/2000.

---

[1] Translator's note: the Spanish term is Agregadurías de Defensa.
[2] Translator's note: the Spanish term is Consejerías de Defensa.

### *3.- To contribute with other State institutions and Public Administrations to preserve citizen security and well-being*

In an increasingly interdependent society, the State must preserve citizen security and well-being. Although this responsibility lies mostly with other State institutions, the Armed Forces **under government orders** may contribute with its organisation and means.

Therefore, the main SAF **missions derived** from this general mission are:

#### *a. Assistance in critical emergency and catastrophe situations*

This involves the use of military capabilities and personnel for maximum **coordination and effectiveness** in supporting civil emergency plans and Civil Protection in catastrophic situations in national or foreign territory.

This also includes fighting fires, aiding in natural or ecological/environmental disasters (either natural or provoked) and situations of dire need. Support will be primarily focused on sanitation, supply distribution, the establishment of infrastructures, surveillance of areas susceptible to environmental aggressions or ecological harm, and possible clean-up and recovery.

In this context, military capabilities may also be used to support **Civil Protection and Autonomous Community authorities** in the event of NBCR threats to the population.

Various large-scale catastrophes have demonstrated the need to increase Armed Forces cooperation with the various State Administrations in actions to control and alleviate the effects of these tragedies. Experiences of military collaboration in the

**management of national emergencies** confirm the need for urgent legal reform at various levels to increase effectiveness.

### *b. Evacuating citizens*

This involves actions to evacuate non-combatant nationals or citizens of Allied or friendly countries. Normally these actions will take place in a **multinational context**, in support of citizens of several different countries; but it is also important to anticipate the possibility of a **unilateral action** in support of Spanish citizens.

### *c. Supporting key areas of the national economy*

These activities seek to ensure the economic functioning of sectors of the economy considered critical for our country, such as fishing, farming, sanitation and transport.

### *d. Supporting scientific and technological progress*

This mission involves exchanges and support of Research and Development in the areas of cartography and oceanography along with aerospace, hydrodynamic and other dual-use technologies.

Here it is important to emphasize those activities that are related to **developing the Spanish defence industry**, increasing our market segment by introducing new products, signing agreements, etc. A policy that favours this industrial sector will bring important benefits to other segments of the Spanish economy, helping it to be increasingly dynamic and competitive.

### *e. Supporting the State Security Forces and Corps*

This involves the use of military capabilities to complement the actions of the State Security Forces and Corps in their fight

against drug trafficking, organized crime, external terrorism and massive illegal immigration. The SAF can also assist with other activities such as ensuring the maintenance of essential services.

### *f. Transport support for the State's activities*

This mission requires the capability to transport governmental authorities on State affairs and to cooperate in other emergency activities when so requested by other Ministries (transporting transplant organs, returning cadavers, etc.).

### *g. Search and Rescue*

The SAF are primarily responsible for developing this mission in Spanish air space as well as the air space assigned to Spain by the International Civil Aviation Organisation, in conjunction with other State organisms.

## III. CHART OF THE MISSIONS AND TASKS OF THE SAF

A partial list is presented here for greater clarity, detailing the **general missions** and their **derived missions**, which are then subdivided into **assignments**.

| MISSIONS AND TASKS OF THE ARMED FORCES | | |
|---|---|---|
| **GENERAL MISSIONS** | **DERIVED MISSIONS** | **TASKS** |
| **TO IMPEDE ANY TYPE OF AGGRESSION AND RESPOND TO IT IF NECESSARY** | ***NATIONAL DEFENCE OPERATIONS*** | • Surveillance, control and protection of land, sea and air space<br>• Territorial defence<br>• Protection of lines of communication |
| | ***OPERATIONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE*** | • Operations within the context of collective defence (Art. 5)<br>• External terrorism |
| | ***OPERATIONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (ESDP)*** | • Common evaluation of the external terrorist threat (military intelligence)<br>• Protection of deployed forces and civil population from terrorist attacks |
| | ***MULTINATIONAL DEFENCE OPERATIONS*** | • Operations with ad hoc coalitions<br>• Operations under other International Security and Defence Organisations |

| MISSIONS AND TASKS OF THE ARMED FORCES | | |
|---|---|---|
| **GENERAL MISSIONS** | **DERIVED MISSIONS** | **TASKS** |
| **TO CONTRIBUTE MILITARILY TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY** | ***PEACE AND HUMANITARIAN AID OPERATIONS*** | • Preventive diplomacy<br>• Peace making<br>• Peace keeping<br>• Peace enforcement and re-establishment<br>• Peace consolidation<br>• Humanitarian assistance in a bilateral or multilateral framework<br>• Support for governmental and non-governmental organisations<br>• Combat external terrorism |
| | ***CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES, ARMS CONTROL, AND THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION*** | • Arms control and disarmament<br>• Inspection of units or physical spaces in other countries<br>• Verification |
| | ***DEFENCE DIPLOMACY*** | • Bilateral relations<br>• Multilateral cooperation<br>• Presence abroad |

| MISSIONS AND TASKS OF THE ARMED FORCES | | |
|---|---|---|
| **GENERAL MISSIONS** | **DERIVED MISSIONS** | **TASKS** |
| **TO CONTRIBUTE WITH OTHER STATE INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS TO MAINTAINING CITIZEN SECURITY AND WELL-BEING** | ***ASSISTANCE IN CRITICAL EMERGENCY AND CATASTROPHE SITUATIONS*** | • Fire fighting<br>• Civil emergency plans<br>• Civil Protection (NBCR)<br>• Action against natural or environmental disasters |
| | ***EVACUATING CITIZENS*** | • Evacuating non-combatants |
| | ***SUPPORTING KEY AREAS OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY*** | • Support for fishing, farming, sanitation and transport |
| | ***SUPPORTING SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS*** | • Cartography, oceanography, aerospace and hydrodynamic industries, and dual-use technologies<br>• Support for the Spanish defence industry |
| | ***SUPPORTING THE STATE SECURITY FORCES AND CORPS*** | • Combating external terrorism<br>• Extraordinary and uncontrolled migratory movements<br>• Combating organised crime and drug trafficking |
| | ***TRANSPORT SUPPORT FOR STATE ACTIVITIES*** | • Supporting other Ministries<br>• Official and state travel |
| | ***SEARCH AND RESCUE*** | • Air Rescue Service (S.A.R)<br>• Maritime rescue<br>• Land rescue |

## IV. THE ARMED FORCES AND THE NEW TERRORIST THREAT

External terrorism is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon, as demonstrated by the **terrorist attacks** of **September 11, 2001**.

In order to face this threat it is necessary to have all **State capabilities** available and to promote **international cooperation**, recognizing the great potential of the Armed Forces in the struggle against terrorism.

For this reason the **Strategic Defence Review** now considers the fight against **external terrorism** as one of the **new activities** of the Armed Forces, within each of the three general missions and their corresponding **derived missions**. They are:

- To impede any sort of aggression and respond to it if necessary, developing specific operations within the framework of the **Atlantic Alliance** and the **ESDP**.

- To contribute to international peace and stability, specifically through **peace and humanitarian aid operations**.

- To contribute with other State and Public Administration institutions to the preservation of citizen security and well-being, specifically by supporting the **State Security Forces and Corps.**

**Spain** is, thus, in agreement with its partners and allies that the Armed Forces can play a **key** but not solitary **role** in the fight against external terrorism, especially in destroying the logistics and infrastructure of international terrorist groups. The Armed Forces face the enormous challenge of acquiring, **by the**

**year 2015**, rapid and flexible deployment and sustainment capabilities for the necessary military operations at the conflict site.

Since September 11 the **transatlantic and European security agenda has been updated**, which in turn has affected the adaptation of the Armed Forces to this new threat. Both processes are interrelated.

While they may vary in some aspects, there is underlying agreement behind the policies of the main **international organizations** in which Spain participates – the United Nations, OSCE, NATO, and European Union.

The **United Nations**, due to its universal nature, has encouraged all member countries to adopt legal measures to activate control mechanisms for halting the free movement of capital linked to international terrorism.

**Resolution 1373 of the UN Security Council**, dated September 28, 2001, listed recommendations for all member countries and offered the necessary advice for success in these control measures. **Resolution 1377** of November 12, requested that States intensify their efforts to eliminate international terrorism.

There has been a turning point since then as **joint actions by the international community** have disrupted terrorist movements.

As a pan-European organisation, the **OSCE** passed a **plan of action to fight terrorism** in Bucharest on December 4, 2001. This plan is very useful for preventive actions to combat terrorism; promoting measures that encourage transparency in the national arms import and export markets, exchange of information, and

ratification of conventional arms limitation agreements by its members.

The "defence against terrorism" was already contemplated as a new mission by **NATO** in the **1999 Strategic Conception**, and has since received greater attention and priority.

This overcame the distinction debated in the 1990's between a **traditional** collective defence **mission** of the Alliance, (art. 5 of the Washington Treaty) and the **new** NATO **missions**, labelled outside area missions, non-Article 5 missions or crisis response operations. September 11 has effectively eliminated the distinction between **"internal security"** and **"external security"**, since terrorist attacks are not limited by borders. The Armed Forces must have the capability to prevent, deter, impede, defend and protect against terrorist attacks.

The **Prague Summit** of November, 2002 was a turning point in the transformation of NATO, which adopted a **military conception** expressly recognising the **fight against terrorism** as a new NATO mission and as a manifestation of the Alliance's determination **in the following areas**:

- **Acting against terrorist attacks or the threat of attacks**, directed from the outside against Allied populations, territories, infrastructures and Forces.

- **Providing assistance** to national authorities in treating the consequences of a terrorist attack.

- **Supporting operations** by the EU or other Allied international organisations or coalitions.

- **Deploying the necessary forces** to carry out these missions whenever and wherever necessary.

- The type of action will depend on the threat and the imminence of a terrorist attack, and may require a **preventive action**.

Within the **European Union**, just 10 days after September 11, the **European Council** declared in a Plan of Action that terrorism is a true challenge to European and world security, and that the fight against terrorism would be a priority EU objective. On December 27, 2001, the Council adopted a **common position** that clearly defined a concept of "terrorist acts". This concept may affect the Second Pillar of Defence as well as the Third and First Pillars.

During its **European Union presidency** in the second semester of 2002, **Spain** spearheaded a **Declaration of the contribution of the CFSP, including the ESDP**, in the **fight against terrorism**. This was adopted at the **European Council of Seville**, and establishes the following priority **areas of action** for the Union, involving Armed Forces in:

- Reinforcing agreements to **share information**, developing situation evaluations and quick-reaction alerts.

- Developing a **common evaluation** of the **terrorist threat** against member states or forces deployed outside the Union in crisis management operations of the ESDP, including the terrorist threat of **weapons of mass destruction**.

- Determining the military capabilities required to **protect the forces** deployed in EU crisis management operations from terrorist attacks.

- More extensive study of the use of military or civil capabilities to **protect a civil population** against the effects of terrorist attacks.

The **European Convention**, at the request of several countries including Spain, may consider adopting the **"Petersberg Plus" missions**; broadened to include using defence capabilities against external terrorist attacks. This new reflection process concerning the conception of the Petersberg missions –defined ten years ago in a different context– must contemplate defence adaptations in a new environment of insecurity.

This vision is shared by several European Countries and other institutions such as the **Western European Union Assembly**, which issued a **report in May, 2002**, stating that the fight against terrorism should be included in the list of Petersberg missions; thus becoming a responsibility of the European Union.

The **European Union's Institute for Security Studies** in Paris is carrying out comparative studies regarding the debate over broadening the Petersberg missions to include the fight against external terrorism, and the European capabilities in this field. The final objective of this would be a **European Defence Book** integrating the "inputs" of the Union's member countries.

From another perspective, Armed Forces participation in fighting the terrorist threat has been broadened to include several **forms of action**, among which are the following:

- **Anti-terrorism**. This is the set of defensive measures dedicated to obtaining intelligence, identifying possible threats and preventing terrorist action.

- **Counter-terrorism**. These are actions of an offensive nature, from deterrence to responding to terrorist attacks or threats, including the possibility of preventive attacks.

- **Consequences management**. This is the set of measures and possible actions intended to limit or reduce the consequences of terrorist attacks on the population, developing emergency plans and humanitarian assistance.

- **Military cooperation**. This is the set of measures intended to improve co-ordination between international organisations and partner and allied countries.

## V. THOUGHTS ON MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Military intelligence is absolutely necessary in military operations at every level of command, and has gained greater relevance as a consequence of the new threats that have appeared.

The **September 11, 2001** events have demonstrated the devastating effect of a well-organised terrorist attack, capable of producing strategic effects.

**Military intelligence** is understood as the set of actions directed at obtaining and analysing adequate information for production and diffusion of relevant and timely intelligence, providing the corresponding commands and authorities, and both national and Allied operational structures, and the various planning organs, with the necessary elements for decision-making in everything related to planning and use of the Armed Forces in situations of peace, crisis or conflict.

As a consequence, military intelligence results from the integrated analysis of all the information available, which requires the most modern means of Human Intelligence **(HUMINT)**, of Images **(IMINT)** and Signals **(SIGINT)** as well as Intelligence from open sources **(OSINT)**.

Therefore the **Armed Forces Intelligence Centre (CIFAS)**, acquires special relevance as a central element of the rationalisation process in military intelligence, configuring a veritable integral system of Intelligence for the Armed Forces. CIFAS is presently in an implementation phase and will allow full integration of the military information effort along the lines of the military intelligence models of the Allies, oriented towards optimum exploitation of means available.

The new military Intelligence Structure is created to provide effectiveness in the process of international crisis management and help prevent or, if necessary, face conflicts in the best possible conditions.

# ANNEX

# D

# CAPABILITIES OF THE ARMED FORCES

# INDEX

## CAPABILITIES OF THE ARMED FORCES

**I. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE CAPABILITIES OF THE ARMED FORCES** ..... 189

**II. EFFORTS OF THE ARMED FORCES** ..... 190

**III. DESIGN AND CAPABILITIES OF THE ARMED FORCES** ..... 193

**1.- Joint Capabilities** ..... 195
**2.- Land Force Capabilities** ..... 199
**3.- Naval Force Capabilities** ..... 205
**4.- Air Force Capabilities** ..... 209

# ANNEX D

# CAPABILITIES OF THE ARMED FORCES

## I. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE CAPABILITIES OF THE ARMED FORCES

Two basic factors determine the capabilities necessary for the Spanish Armed Forces to achieve the **missions and tasks** established in the **scenarios of action** foreseen by the Strategic Review of Defence:

The need for a **level of self-sufficiency** adequate for accomplishing their constitutional mission under any circumstances while guaranteeing the necessary freedom of action for the government, regardless of collective defence mechanisms.

**Harmonic participation in shared security and collective defence schemes**, within the context of membership in international security and defence alliances and organisations; fulfilling the agreements and the role that corresponds to our national potential.

A comparative analysis of both factors leads to the conclusion that meeting the requirements for harmonic participation within the framework of the international alliances and organisations will equip our Armed Forces with the necessary self-sufficiency to face our national defence alone.

This implies that any study to determine the number and size of our Armed Forces will correspond to the **"level of ambition"** set by our political leaders; that is, the current or future

commitments made by the Government to the military structures of the Atlantic Alliance, the European Union's "Principal Objective", or other international security organisations.

## II. EFFORTS OF THE ARMED FORCES

Directly related to **national Defence Operations**, attaining an **adequate level of self-sufficiency** involves giving priority to planning, conducting and sustaining **joint military operations** independently and in solitary, **in a context of action that is not combined**. The Armed Forces should also meet other requirements to fulfil the important missions entrusted to them within the national arena.

Alongside these efforts, a minimum capability is required in order to carry out **crisis management operations that include humanitarian aid** –either through coalitions or alone– within the broad mission of ensuring a **military contribution to international peace and stability**.

Another important obligation is to **contribute with other State and Public Administration Institutions to preserving citizen security and well-being,** carrying out those missions and activities as determined by the competent authorities.

Given this conceptual frame of reference, the analysis of missions and activities, the possible scenarios for action of our Armed Forces and Spain's **"level of ambition"** for participation in **operations within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance** and in **the European Security and Defence Policy** (3.5% of the NATO global force requirements –similar to our economic contribution– and 10% of the total EU "Headline Goal" forces); our Armed Forces must be prepared to make the following **efforts**:

- **On a joint level**, by establishing and using a **headquarters** along with the necessary structures and systems, the Spanish Armed Forces should be able to:

  - Plan, conduct and sustain **national defence operations**.

  - Plan and coordinate our specific contribution to international or multinational organisations for **collective defence and crisis response missions**, by conducting the necessary activities in order necessary to project, control, sustain and recover the forces involved.

  - Plan, coordinate and provide **host nation support** for Allied forces operating in or passing through our territory.

- **Land forces** must protect the national territory and maintain a forward presence in extra-peninsular Spanish territories. In addition, though **not simultaneously**, they must have the capability to:

  - Participate in the full spectrum of **crisis response missions** for an **indefinite period of time**, in **two theatres** distant from each other and from national territory, rapidly deploying **one Brigade in each of them**, with the necessary combat and logistics support; or **two Brigades** and the required combat and logistics support **in one single theatre with a Division Headquarters** capable of commanding a multinational force.

  - Participate in the full spectrum of **collective defence and crisis response missions** for a **continuous period not longer than six months**, rapidly deploying **an Army Corps level Headquarters** capable of activating a multinational Land Command Component, and **a Division** with the

required combat and logistics support in a theatre far removed from national territory.

• **Naval forces** should ensure the defence and control of waters under national sovereignty, and participate in the full spectrum of **collective defence and crisis response missions** in scenarios far removed from the national territory by making the following efforts **simultaneously**:

- **Leading a Naval Component** capable of integrating multinational naval forces, providing **an aero-naval Projection Group based on an aircraft carrier**, with the required escorts and support ships, and an **amphibious component** with the capacity to project **a Marines Brigade**; which should be sufficient to constitute an expeditionary force operational for two months in any of the maritime areas of interest, within a radius of 3600 miles.

- Participate in operations at **two theatres** separate and distant from each other, providing **two escorts** to each of them continuously.

- **Permanently maintain two mine counter measures vessels** as part of a multinational mine-clearing force, with the capability to lead it.

- **Simultaneously** maintain **two submarines** operating in **two theatres**, one distant and the other close.

• **Air forces** should guarantee an integrated national air defence and participate in the full spectrum of **collective defence and crisis response missions for an indefinite period of time** in scenarios far removed from the national territory. To meet these conditions and lead efforts if necessary, the following is required:

- To develop operations in **two theatres**, deploying a multirole combat aircraft squadron to each, with the required air transport means, combat and logistical support; while contributing with support means in a third theatre.

- To collaborate in **strategic air transport**, sustainment and logistical support of forces deployed far or near, carrying out air-transport combat actions if necessary. The deployment of forces must be sufficient to permit the transport of a fighter Squadron and a light Tactical Group with its respective support to 3700 km distance within six days.

- To contribute to **NATO's European Integrated Air Defence System** (NATINADS), with air defence means and an Integrated Air Command and Control System fully compatible with the ACCS-NATO; guaranteeing surveillance, control and defence of our air space and reinforcing the Integrated Airborne Warning and Control System through participation in the NAEW Force.

## III. DESIGN AND CAPABILITIES OF THE ARMED FORCES

For the efforts just described to materialise, the design of the Armed Forces must include the **necessary resources** to acquire the capabilities for an efficient and sufficient operational level.

Although there are well-known exceptions, recent operations involving Spain could lead to the conclusion that the design and capabilities of the Armed Forces should be oriented towards peace maintenance operations. This would be completely inadequate. The broad spectrum of missions in the Review require that the organisation, materiel and training of the Armed Forces be

sufficient to face the **most demanding circumstances**. This would certainly enable them to meet other lesser demands as well.

The design of the Armed Forces should combine **national needs**, derived from the inescapable requirement of adequate self-sufficiency, with the demands for harmonic participation in **shared security and collective defence organisations**, and the capability for participation in operations led by other international organisations (UN, OSCE, etc.).

The Spanish contribution to these organisations will be evaluated according to Spain's level of participation and the degree to which our units meet the **high standards required** for successfully operating in today's complex scenarios; which involve sophisticated equipment, high technology weapons systems, sufficient training, etc. Units with insufficient training or operative capabilities would be a hindrance to the command they serve under, and they may be discredited.

The "**Prague Capabilities Commitment**" that complements the prior NATO **Defence Capabilities Initiative**, as well as the EU **European Capabilities Action Plan**, seek to provide shortly the military capabilities necessary for these organisations to carry out their missions. Multinational cooperation in specific projects can effectively solve certain shortages that cannot be met by individual nations. Guided by this, Spain plays an active role in both initiatives.

The development of military capabilities within these international organisations is closely linked to their development at a national level.

The Armed Forces are faced with limited **financial resources** for meeting the extensive needs involved in obtaining these

capabilities; which requires defining and prioritising these needs and establishing time frames for meeting them. An adequate **planning process** is essential for distributing the available resources in a harmonious and rational manner, so as to complete, maintain and acquire capabilities for maximum joint performance of the whole.

Based on the Strategic Review, the following paragraphs describe the most relevant capabilities and related needs to be considered in long-range defence planning.

## 1.- Joint Capabilities

Joint capabilities are built on **systems directly dependent on the Chief of the Defence Staff**, including command and control, intelligence and electronic warfare; or on the interaction of each Service's specific capabilities in **joint operations**.

Though all Armed Forces capabilities have been determined and developed from a joint perspective, this section will focus exclusively on capabilities developed in **joint structures**, or that require a substantial contribution from two or more Services.

Real-time situation awareness, faster decision-making cycles and automatic information processing and distribution permit **information superiority**. This flow of information requires robust, sustainable, high capacity, static and deployable CIS infrastructures. Special priority must be given to the compatibility of tactical communications systems in order to guarantee an effective Command and Control within multinational formations. The short-term goal of joint **Command and Control** capability should be advanced by designing, installing and equipping the aforementioned Headquarters with the capability to activate a joint operational command adequate for the efforts required at this

level. For this it will be necessary to empower joint systems such as the Satellite Communications Segment (SECOMSAT) and the Joint Intelligence System for Defence (SICONDEF), while modernising the Joint Military Telecommunications System (SCTM). New capabilities must be acquired in the short run to develop a **joint Command and Control System** that would replace the existing system, incorporating the corresponding Deployable Communications Modules (DCM) to provide support and cover for force projection operations. This system will be compatible with those of our partners and allies, using **ISTAR** to cover surveillance, intelligence, reconnaissance and target acquisition needs in real time, which are indispensable to integrated military command and control at all levels. This system integrates various elements, from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on a tactical level to space-based capabilities in the specific realms of the three Services.

In peace, crisis or conflict and at all levels of command, in operational missions the Armed Forces must have the **military intelligence** sufficient for decision-making, early warning, planning and operational direction support, and unit safety.

To become homologised with our allies, the significant human, material and economic resources that the Armed Forces commit to intelligence should be **rationalised** into a single system, integrating and coordinating the means and resources presently managed by the functional intelligence systems of the three Services and the Defence Staff (EMAD).

Consequently, the **Armed Forces Intelligence Centre (CIFAS)**, dependent on the Chief of the Defence Staff, will become the key element of this integral system, meeting in a rigorous and timely fashion the intelligence needs of the Armed Forces, in peace, crisis or conflict.

CIFAS will form part of the national intelligence community and will cooperate with the intelligence structures of Allied countries and the international defence organisations involving Spain.

Modern military operations have demonstrated the relevance of the use of electromagnetic energy as an additional variable in military planning. Strengthening the SANTIAGO program would broaden the capability for **Electronic Warfare**, contributing to electromagnetic superiority and its effective national or Allied use.

In any theatre of operations, superiority over the adversary from the beginning is as important as arriving quickly. The first phase of **projection capability** requires rapid transport based primarily on strategic air transport of projectable units; immediately followed by heavier forces that are mostly transported by land or sea. These last troops deploy more slowly but provide the permanence and sufficient combat power for any military action.

The **Strategic Transport** needed for projection will correspond to Navy and Air Force programmes, with additional agreements and procedures to complete this transport capability using civil airplanes, ships or Land transport means whenever necessary.

Certain strategic and operational military objectives require **special operations** with ever more demanding technology and training requirements. Developing joint capability for these operations requires special forces instructed and equipped for these operations within each Service, but available for use under a joint command structure.

The present means are insufficient to adequately respond to the risks that threaten our **capacity for survival**. Diverse means of attack along with the uncertainty of place and time and the relatively small cost of certain weapons of mass destruction require **the Armed Forces to substantially increase their NBCR means of defence**. In addition, some of our surrounding countries possess ballistic missiles. This would suggest that acquiring **Missile Defence Systems** to strengthen our capacity for survival will be a necessary mid-term objective. In the short run, we plan to cooperate in Allied theatre missile defence programmes.

In the short run **joint logistical support** will continue to be based on each Services' specific capabilities. For purposes of rationalisation and economy, logistical functions will be centralised in the future, as operational needs allow. The **medical capability** has already been centralised for the **SAF at the hospital level**. There are plans for **medical care during military operations** to be carried out using each Service's specific capabilities under a centralised joint command.

In addition, various Armed Forces capabilities must be developed in order to **provide support** to the **population** and the **civil authorities** in areas such as logistics, medicine, and NBCR protection in the event of emergencies, catastrophes or crises of any sort; along with providing **host nation support (HNS)** to Allied forces deployed or supported in our territory.

At present, the Armed Forces needs to develop a **force generation capability** for obtaining and enlisting the human and material resources necessary to sustain military operations. This requires a **force generation system** that allows the Services to permanently maintain their operational capabilities and act within established time constraints.

## 2.- Land Force Capabilities

Land Force structure will be designed to articulate the elements of operational formations as required by the possible scenarios. For this purpose **the Army will be structured around its Operational Capabilities**. Each capability must be built on concepts and doctrine, generated by combining personnel, training, equipment, logistics and structure, and aimed at a strategic, operational or tactical effect.

Permanently integrated within the corresponding organic units, these capabilities will be articulated in Operational Organisations that meet the basic criterion of **modularity**.

- **Manoeuvre**

The two aspects of **Land Manoeuvre** are Surface Manoeuvre and Airmobile Manoeuvre, the latter of which should take place in full cooperation and coordination with the former.

The land platforms (tanks and combat vehicles) and airmobile platforms (helicopters) involved in Land Manoeuvre require the most modern and effective firepower in order to strike from the greatest distance as quickly as possible, with the necessary power and precision to establish superiority over the adversary; thereby achieving decisive results with the least amount of loss, harm or collateral damage.

**Land Manoeuvre is** built around the balanced use of **armoured, mechanised, light, medium and special forces**.

Future Land Forces will also be based on the most appropriate balance between these types of forces, determined by their **increased projection capability**, according to the demands placed on the Army. This involves developing the **"speed effect"**,

consisting of rapid projection of a force capable of gaining a time advantage over the adversary, thus obtaining and maintaining the initiative. More powerful forces capable of resolving the conflict must follow with a **"decisive effect"** if the crisis progresses unfavourably, or if it has high intensity from the very beginning.

Therefore, **Surface Manoeuvre capability** must be acquired in the short or mid-term with **next generation tanks and combat vehicles**, through the Leopard tank and Pizarro infantry combat vehicle programmes. In the long term, current armoured personnel carriers (BMR) should be substituted for similar next generation ones designed for strategic transport.

**Airmobile Manoeuvre** provide capabilities essential for Land Force actions in most scenarios. An **airmobile brigade** would be a significant element in the new Land Forces due to its decisive contribution to force projection. Along with the organic solution, in the short term Airmobile Manoeuvre capability should be increased by purchasing a **new generation of attack helicopters** equipped with the adequate technological advances, and replacement of the **transport helicopter** fleet with technologically advanced platforms through the NH-90 helicopter programme.

Recent events have demonstrated the need for Land Forces to maintain an **advanced presence** equipped with the necessary capabilities, and a **command organisation** capable of **integrating reinforcements**.

- **Fire Support**

Given that clashes occur at greater distances, technological advances must be incorporated into material and equipment in order to provide the **maximum range, all-weather use and, above all else, precision**, to minimize collateral damage.

Short-term plans to increase **Fire Support capability** will materialise by acquiring a next-generation artillery howitzer, under the 155/52 REMA howitzer programme. Long-term objectives should include multiple launch rocket systems and new means of rapid and exact target acquisition.

Spain's geographical characteristics and extra-continental extension necessitate the maintenance of **coastal defence** capabilities. These means should include high mobility, anti-ship missile potential, all weather technology, and ability to coordinate with the Navy.

- **Anti-air Defence**

Anti-air units must be able to respond to classical threats from hostile aviation and to a growing number of new aerial systems such as ballistic missiles, helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles.

**Anti-air Defence** should be empowered by accelerating present equipment programmes for anti-aircraft artillery.

- **Information**

For those with the means of detecting and identifying the adversary beforehand, land manoeuvre will occur on an increasingly transparent battlefield. Conflicts will begin at greater distances and require firepower with greater range and precision. **Information superiority** is increasingly vital for developing all sorts of combat and non-combat operations.

The need for the real-time **intelligence** demanded by today's operations requires short-run purchases of new **Intelligence capabilities** to complete and increase the present capabilities of the Tactical Intelligence System (SITAC); incorporating new

sensors, unmanned aerial vehicles and remotely piloted vehicles (UAV/RPV), which are in high demand by NATO and the EU. All this should be integrated in **a global command and control system**, using **ISTAR** (intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance) to coordinate the various activities in this field.

- **Electronic Warfare**

Systems that render enemy communications inoperative are as important as those that permit the direction of our own operations. An **Electronic Warfare capability** should permit offensive and defensive actions that give a definite advantage in military operations. It should also contribute to joint capability and complement the intelligence capability mentioned in the prior paragraph.

- **Special Operations**

In military operations, it is necessary to undertake a series of activities with the purpose of meeting objectives that range from strategic to tactical; involving the capacity to operate in any geographical or temporal setting by means of specialised actions that either meet these objectives or enable other forces to do so. This **Special Operations capability** also contributes to other capabilities such as HUMINT.

- **Command and Control**

New **Command and Control** technologies allow forces to gain an initial advantage over a less advanced adversary (asymmetrical confrontation). Information superiority gives all command levels precise knowledge of their own and their adversary's situation.

This requires a **global CIS system** that links all command levels. For this purpose, the Army must improve its Command and Control capability in the short run by developing the second phase of the Army Command and Control System (SIMACET) and updating the Basic Area Network (RBA) programme.

To maintain control over the effects of our combat actions, it is necessary to **empower operational Headquarters** for Brigades and Divisions, as well as High Readiness Forces Land Headquarters (HRF(L) HQ). Spain is also committed to making these operational structures capable of integration with units from **the military services of other countries**. This requires that Command and Control systems be completely **interoperable** with those of our allies in means, procedures and desired effects. Material, technical and doctrinal interoperability also need to be fostered.

- **Mobility/counter-mobility**

**Tactical mobility/counter-mobility** will continue to be a key component of land manoeuvre. **Sufficient means** are required to ensure the mobility of our land platforms while hindering the adversary's mobility, increasing effectiveness in manoeuvre and protection of our own forces.

- **Protection**

Weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism add a new dimension of threat, along with the fact that the technology to manufacture biological and chemical agents and their means of delivery are now not only in the hands of States but also in the hands of suprastate groups and organisations.

Sufficient attention must be given to **individual and collective means of protection and decontamination**. **NBCR**

**Defence capabilities** should be incorporated in the short run to provide the Army's equipment programme with the full spectrum of **Nuclear, Biological, Chemical and Radiological defence means**.

It is clear that **force protection capability** continues to be of vital importance. Our combatants must have optimum equipment, vehicles and materiel to ensure maximum survivability. The **zero casualties** concept is used as a reference point in planning due to the demands of our society.

- **Support**

New conflicts require a sufficient number and type of **logistics units with the same projection potential** as the force they support. **Modularity** is increasingly important for providing specific support to each situation, and permitting progressive reinforcement or redeployment as the crisis requires.

The **medical assistance** provided during military operations should be similar to that received on national soil. This requires adequate medical personnel, field hospitals equipped with the most modern on-site medical assistance and capable of accompanying forces, and a chain of evacuation that facilitates transport to an adequate hospital or to national soil in the best possible conditions and the shortest time. Therefore, a deployable Field Hospital is a short-run **Medical Support capabilities** objective.

Finally, within the context of joint capabilities, Land Forces in particular must be equipped with the **capacity to provide support to the population** and the **civil authorities** as well as **host nation support**.

## 3.- Naval Force Capabilities

Naval capabilities constitute a necessary and valuable contribution to the joint effort in the maritime setting, offering specific capabilities to a joint or combined Command within a global and integrated vision.

The basic criterion for **the Naval Forces must be an orientation towards projection operations**, as described in the conceptual phase of the Strategic Defence Review.

The expeditionary nature of the Navy is manifest in the inherent characteristic of **strategic mobility**. In the free environment of the sea where there are neither borders nor requirements for diplomatic authorisation and where the presence of forces is an exclusive function of the political will of the government, the naval force may appear suddenly on any scenario and disappear at will. In sum, the Navy possesses a high degree of availability, mobility, flexibility and radius of action.

Along with its expeditionary potential, Naval Command and Control facilitates coordination of operations and trustworthy, permanent links between **tactical level** command at the scene of action and **operational level** command, and sometimes even with **strategic level** command, which is normally land-based. In addition, there is enormous **interoperability** with Allied units and the **reconnaissance** elements that facilitate the activity of land command.

The capabilities of the Naval Force structure offer the clearest and most straightforward definition of the role it must play in the new strategic scenario.

Six **naval capabilities** have been identified. Although there is some overlap due to the multifunctional quality of certain units, each can be considered individually. These will materialise via the corresponding principal programmes of F-100 Frigates in the short run and S-80 submarines, LHA class multifunctional ships and the logistical AOR ship in the mid- and long run.

- **Projection**

The **Projection Capability** is understood as the real possibility of transporting naval action and its influence over land to the chosen littoral scenario; developing its freedom of action and sufficient permanence, while cooperating in the projection and sustainment of forces from other Services. Given the present conditions, this **is the primary capability that the Navy can offer to joint and combined strategy** for the near future.

Projection capability is an effective element for deterrence, crisis management and conflict response in our joint military strategy. This comes in the form of **naval platforms** capable of acting from sea to land, such as:

- **A command and control ship** capable of housing a multinational, high-readiness Headquarters.

- **Amphibious ships** especially designed to project Marine Infantry troops and equipped with the adequate Command and Control systems for directing amphibious operations.

- **An aircraft carrier** with the latest air operations control systems, and an naval air unit composed of short take-off, all weather capability planes, and multi-use naval helicopters.

- **Platforms equipped with surface-to-surface missiles**, and some artillery for coastal action.

- **A strategic projection ship** capable of projecting Marine Infantry or Army troops along with their materiel and armament.

There are **three subordinate capabilities** or enablers to projection capability that ensure a safe, effective and sustained action: **protection capability**, **freedom of action capability** and **operational logistical support capability**.

- **Protection**

**Protection capability** is the power to **ensure the survival** of projection units in any scenario, and of national troops on land, in the face of any threat. Basically, this is provided by **oceanic escorts**, which should be frigates equipped with the latest technology and with anti-air and surface-to-surface missiles.

- **Freedom of action**

The **capability to act freely in any theatre of operations and especially in littoral scenarios** depends on the ability to **neutralise** any possible threat that might endanger projection units in coastal waters and difficult spaces.

This capability is provided by **submarines** and by **countermine forces**, two very different platforms with one same purpose. Thanks to their discreet, almost invisible presence, submarines can observe and inform on littoral activities, making them significant instruments for obtaining **intelligence**. Future submarines will have an Air Independent Propulsion System and the capability of launching missiles over land.

- **Operational logistical support**

The **operational logistical support capability**, in the form of **logistical ships**, is the capacity to ensure **sustainment** of operations. These ships multiply logistical self-sufficiency for naval units and provide support for other Services' units or Allied naval forces.

- **Maritime action**

The fifth capability is exclusively national. **Maritime action capability** is the set of capabilities the Navy offers to the State for protecting the **national maritime interests** at sea and helping maintain citizen peace, security and well-being, in cooperation with other State institutions.

Composed of the set **of naval resources and units deployed along the Spanish littoral**, its commitments include naval presence and surveillance of our maritime interests, exercise of sovereignty in territorial waters and cooperation with other State institutions that have maritime jurisdiction in: policing, combating marine contamination, scientific research, hydro-graphic tasks, maintenance of underwater archaeological treasures, search and rescue and civil protection tasks.

- **Early Warning**

The sixth capability is **the Navy's contribution to the early warning system**, in the form of **military intelligence** operations. From a joint perspective, this is the strategic basis for conflict prevention. It is defined as the ability to obtain and analyse maritime intelligence, provide situation reports concerning our maritime interests, and protect national or Allied forces or civil elements by control or preventive measures. This could include

the use of the special operations Navy units that constitute the **Special Naval War** capability.

This capability is especially valuable in combating and eliminating **asymmetrical threats**, with their new international dimension. Although the arena for combating these threats is not uniquely naval, the accessibility and elusiveness of maritime traffic is often useful in asymmetrical threats. With government approval, Naval forces can undoubtedly make a great contribution in this area.

This last capability will include the following elements:

- **Intelligence gathering equipment** on ships, aircraft or Navy Installations.
- Specific **naval platforms** dedicated to **obtaining intelligence** at sea.
- Naval units prepared for **maritime interdiction** operations including detecting, tracking and inspecting suspicious ships.
- Units capable of planning and executing **special operations**.

## 4.- Air Force Capabilities

In the new strategic scenario, the Air Force will increase its involvement in humanitarian aid, crisis management or conflict prevention operations. These are radically different from traditional deterrence or general territorial defence activities, but do not exclude them. Thus, the **Air Force must be balanced**, including: out of area projection capability, the capacity to sustain prolonged operations, high readiness, the capability to impose the

technological superiority of its weapons systems, and the capacity to rapidly integrate in or lead multinational units.

In order to fully adapt to the new environment, the following **operational capabilities** will be central to the Air Force in the coming years:

- **Command and Control**

In order to improve its **Command and Control capability** in the short run, implantation of the **Integrated Air Command and Control System (SIMCA)** must be completed on a national level, in coordination with the **Air Command and Control System-NATO (ACCS-OTAN)**. This will guarantee the Air Defence function, which is key to security. Participation in the NATO Integrated Aerial Defence System (NATINADS) and in the NAEW Force does not imply giving up the possibility of acquiring our own airborne early warning systems (AEW) in the future.

Another short-run necessity for ensuring operational flexibility in far removed scenarios is the acquisition of Deployable Communications Modules capable of supporting two simultaneous aerial detachments. In the long run this will involve acquiring Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC) platforms for conducting aerial operations and Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR).

- **Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR)**

**ISTAR capability** is essential for Air Force action as it guarantees information superiority for all types of combat and non-combat operations.

To ensure maximum warning time and preparation for **military or terrorist aerial threats**, it is essential to have intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, along with warning, operational and tactical evaluation capabilities. Obtaining the real-time intelligence required for current operations will necessitate acquisition in the short run of next generation tactical air reconnaissance equipment capable of all-weather operations and new sensors with multiple capabilities for full spectrum functioning. Unmanned aerial vehicles are a mid-run objective.

Based on accumulated experience, the first doctrinal studies for integrating aerial means and their **space element** have been completed. Space-based means will have a decisive influence on all types and levels of conflicts. Information from space will at all times be utilised by joint and multinational operations. This **integration of aerial means and their space element** will improve the capability for surveillance, reconnaissance, weapons launch and navigation, communications, and monitoring of environmental factors affecting land, maritime, aerial and space operations. Analogous to control of airspace, the **control of space** will be a future factor in guaranteeing freedom of action.

- **Electronic and Acoustic Warfare**

The **Capability for Electronic and Acoustic Warfare** should be attained in the mid-run by modernising the current platforms that carry out these functions, and developing and acquiring new equipment and means to complement them. In the long run they will be replaced with more technologically advanced platforms.

While maintaining their traditional role in anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare, the **Maritime Patrol aerial components** must also incorporate new roles that include obtaining

information, supporting combat operations and participating in offensive missions. Their next generation of platforms must have the capability to fulfil these requirements.

- **Precision combat**

Several subordinate capabilities are linked to guaranteeing the execution of **Precision Combat Capabilities** in a safe, effective and sustained manner. These are: **Offensive and Defensive Air Operations Capabilities, Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) Capabilities** and **Special Operations Capabilities**.

The **Offensive Air Operations Capabilities** will involve offensive aerial means based on multirole combat platforms, capable of day/night operations, in low-visibility and adverse meteorology, and equipped with precision-guided short or long-range air-to-surface weapons for any type of ground targets.

The **Defensive Air Operations Capabilities (active and passive)** will involve three complementary elements: land-based **air defence means** with high readiness SAM missiles with electronic identification systems, multirole **air combat means** equipped with next generation air-to-air weapons, all-weather capabilities, able to simultaneously strike multiple targets with high success, and **protection and redundancy of Air Operations Centres**.

In order to insure the continuity of these **Offensive and Defensive Air Operations Capabilities**, which are critical to any Air Force, it will be necessary in the long run to begin the corresponding technological studies and international agreements for defining both the successor to the F-18, that is the **Future Air Combat System (FACS)**, and the outcome of the foreseeable programme for updating the EF-2000.

After 2020, the **FACS will be the key element in Air Force combat and deterrence**. It will include manned aerial platforms, unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAV) and unmanned reconnaissance air vehicles (URAV).

The Air Force should identify potential Allied partners to help it develop and maintain an adequate **Suppression of Enemy Air Defence Capability** in its platforms, while looking into the possibility of using UCAVs on certain missions, linked to the FACS.

The **Special Operations Capability** employs specialised forces to strike or neutralise a series of special interest targets. These forces would be responsible for obtaining HUMINT, supporting CSR operations, and identifying or neutralising offensive air forces targets under difficult circumstances. They must be capable of day/night operations within enemy-controlled territory and have adequate (precise and lethal) weapons for the mission as well as discreet and secure CIS equipment.

- **In-flight Refuelling**

The **In-flight Refuelling Capability** extends the reach, load, permanence, time and flexibility of aircraft, allowing the Air Force to rapidly deploy its air combat means and operate at considerable distances for extensive periods of time. This allows us to fulfil the commitments we have with various multinational organisations. With few exceptions, the current Air Force combat aircraft have this capability and the new platforms will extend it to the latest tactical and strategic transport airplanes.

- **Sustainment**

**Sustainment Capability** extends to all activities related to the use of force, ensuring or denying the possibility of operations and

permitting prolonged deployment of diverse air units to locations far removed from their logistical centres. For this reason it is indispensable for **the Logistical System 2000** to achieve **full operational status** as a decisive factor in guaranteeing the combat level of the force. This will also ensure interoperability with other national systems and optimise the modernisation process of Air Force systems and equipment.

- **Deployment and Mobility**

To improve **Deployment and Mobility Capability**, actions should be taken to optimise strategic air transport means and other logistical capabilities that allow deploying, sustaining, rotating and redeploying the Air Force Expeditionary Level that has been committed, along with other forces. There are two related subordinate capabilities that ensure its secure, effective and sustained development: **Projection Capability** and **Air Deployment Support Capability**.

For **Projection Capability**, the **Strategic Air Transport** potential will be greatly increased in the long run via the important A-400M military transport airplane programme. **Tactical Air Transport** should permit whole units to be moved from their principal bases towards the theatre (deployable or air-transportable units) while also facilitating intra-theatre movements for repositioning forces and guaranteeing logistical flow of operations and executing specific disembark or special air operations.

The **Air Deployment Support Capability** should be increased by reorganising the various support units into a single larger unit and incorporating additional combat support elements. The continual increase in demands and commitments requires modular and flexible units with potential for multiple rotations over time.

- **Survival and Protection**

In order to increase the **Survival and Protection Capability** of the Force, **self-protection systems** must be incorporated in all combat platforms and in combat support platforms operating in hostile environments. **Installations security** efforts should be increased, especially in deployment, equipping them with NBCR protection capabilities, explosives deactivation systems, deployable fuel deposits, fire protection systems and rapid repair of critical infrastructures.

# ANNEX

# E

# HUMAN RESOURCES FOR DEFENCE

# INDEX

## HUMAN RESOURCES FOR DEFENCE

**I. INTRODUCTION** ..... 221

**II. THE ARMED FORCES MODEL** ..... 222

**III. ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION** ..... 225

**1.- Personnel** ..... 225
**2.- Legal Norms** ..... 226
**3.- Organic Structure** ..... 227

**IV. PERSONNEL POLICY** ..... 227

**1.- Definition and Objectives of the Personnel Policy** 227
**2.- Bases of the Personnel Policy** ..... 229
**3.- Principles of the Personnel Policy** ..... 229
**4.- Key Aspects of the Personnel Policy** ..... 230

**V. MEDIUM AND LONG-TERM PLANNING** ..... 230

**VI. PERSONNEL PROCESSES** ..... 232

**1.- Overview** ..... 232
**2.- The Personnel Planning Process** ..... 235
***- Most relevant lines of action in the mid- and long-term*** ..... 236
**3.- The Personnel Recruiting Process** ..... 237
***- Most relevant lines of action in the mid- and long-term*** ..... 238
**4.- The Personnel Integration Process** ..... 241
***- Most relevant lines of action in the mid- and long-term*** ..... 242

**5.- The Personnel Management Process** ..... 243
***- Most relevant lines of action in the mid- and long-term*** ..... 244
**6.- The Personnel Training Process** ..... 245
***- Most relevant lines of action in the mid- and long-term*** ..... 246
**7.- The Process of Returning to Civilian Life** ..... 247
***- Most relevant lines of action in the mid- and long-term*** ..... 248

# ANNEX E

# HUMAN RESOURCES FOR DEFENCE

## I. INTRODUCTION

**National Defence Directive 1/2000** establishes that the goal of the Defence Policy is to "provide Spain with an effective instrument for deterrence, prevention and response to permanently ensure our sovereignty and independence, national integrity and constitutional legal order, protecting the life, peace, liberty and prosperity of the Spanish people and our national interests, wherever they lie".

It also establishes that one of the key lines of our Defence Policy is to "complete the implementation and consolidation of the **professional Armed Forces model**, with special attention given to the education and training of the soldiers, sailors and marines, as well as improving their quality of life".

Success depends particularly on the **Armed Forces personnel**, its most important element and key asset; who individually and collectively contribute to achieving the prior objectives. This does not preclude the important role carried out by **civilian personnel** serving in the Ministry of Defence. Therefore we must:

- **Recruit and retain** the best possible personnel from a diverse, open and competitive society.

- **Train, motivate and equip** them adequately.

- **Manage** them carefully, ensuring that their needs and the needs of their families are attended to, recognising the sacrifices that Armed Forces service requires of them, and attempting to **harmonise the needs of the Service with personal interests**.

- **Develop career models** that motivate and integrate them into the Armed Forces, fostering a sense of significance and the internalisation of its objectives and interests, while providing adequate qualifications and lifestyle.

## II. THE ARMED FORCES MODEL

The final objective of full professionalisation is to build and consolidate a professional Armed Forces model:

- With human resources perfectly integrated in an effective and efficient **joint organisation**.

- **Flexible** and thus capable of rapidly adapting to the changing needs of our times.

- **Operative**, in accord with Spain's role and international commitments and with the performance expected by Spanish society.

The **Joint Parliamentary House of Congress-Senate Committee** Report, passed by the Full House of Congress on May 28, and by the Full Senate on June 9, 1998, may be considered as the foundational document for the professional Armed Forces model. It establishes the following:

- **A size defined by the missions** assigned to the new Armed Forces, numbering between 168,000 and 150,000 professional military personnel.

- Adaptation of **civilian personnel** serving the Military Administration to the full professionalisation requirements of the Armed Forces model.

- A **reserve and mobilisation** system that allows progressive and selective filling of ranks for the Services or generation of forces if necessary to meet security and defence needs.

This Armed Forces model represents a profound change from the prior "mixed" model, and gives greater attention to **occupational aspects** of the military service record. This necessary factor should not hinder the relationship between the military institution and its members, through personal adherence to its **characteristic values**: primarily, serving Spain within the framework established by the Constitution and the Law.

The latest technology is of no use without the most critical factor of sufficient, well-trained and highly motivated **personnel**, along with leaders at the various organisational levels who ensure the successful completion of assigned tasks. While our personnel must be capable of operating the most complex weapons systems, they participate in both the heritage and the continuance of a glorious **military tradition**, where standards of courage, discipline, comradeship, loyalty, a spirit of sacrifice and other moral values form a lifestyle.

**In the area of human resources planning**, a significant effort is required to reduce the number of officers while recruiting and retaining professional military soldiers, sailors and marines in order to meet the necessary quotas.

An equally important complementary aspect involves achieving the best possible performance of **civilian personnel** serving in the Ministry of Defence. Civilian personnel will now

play a more prominent role in the daily life of the Armed Forces, complementing its activities and assuming some of the commitments formerly carried out by military personnel.

The adaptation to professionalisation requires a profound and detailed **analysis of the necessary numbers** and their corresponding **professional profiles** (categories, professional groups and specialties), as well as training to meet the demands of the **new roles**. The criteria that must inspire this adaptation involve:

- Redefining policies for **obtaining civilian personnel**.
- Empowering organisational personnel **retention** policies, which involve continuous formation and professional promotion as key elements in their development.
- Planning and ordering **human resources**.
- Adequate and sufficient **staff** for Service needs.
- Adequate and effective **professional adscription** of personnel.
- Identifying and evaluating **job positions**.
- Personnel **mobility** processes.
- **Evaluation** of job positions and adjustment of existing lists.
- Rationalising and simplifying **work methods**.

Lastly, it is important to make an effort to **incorporate** sufficient numbers of **volunteer reservists** to provide supplementary human resources, and establish regulations concerning all aspects of the various groups of reservists listed in **Law 17/1999**.

## III. ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION

Presently, we are in a **period of transition** from a "mixed" Armed Forces model to a totally professional model. As of December, 2001, there are **no longer any** Compulsory Military Service **conscripts**; since the Government moved up the date initially set (December, 2002) for concluding the Military Service requirement. This completed an important phase in the transition towards a professional model.

### 1.- Personnel

a) The **military personnel** situation has the following characteristics:

- Numbers of **officers** should be close to the **legal maximum** by the **year 2014**. It is important to increase the number of non-career military officers[3].

- Numbers of **professional military soldiers, sailors and marines,** which are presently below the objectives, and will be increased by applying specific plans to recruit and retain. A great effort will be necessary in order to reach the objectives of this model.

- The need to **fully internalise and adapt** to the professional Armed Forces model, recognising the role of professional military soldiers, sailors and marines as full-status professionals in the Armed Forces.

- The need for **high motivation** among all the professional military groups, becoming proud and aware of their role in our society.

[3] Translator's note: Militares de complemento.

b) The features defining the current **civilian personnel** situation are:

- A **continual decrease** in the number of **civilian personnel**, with a net decrease of 4267 over the last three years (involving an increase of 805 permanent civil servants and a decrease of 5012 non-permanent personnel). In the professional Armed Forces model, civilian personnel must take on new tasks, requiring a reconsideration of their **number**, training and specialty **characteristics**.

- Personnel distribution by **branch, rank levels and groups** is heterogeneous. The current distribution in units and the training system are not ideal for meeting future challenges.

- **Restrictive legislation**, particularly the Single Collective Agreement concerning civilian personnel, that limits and slows down personnel processes, especially those related to mobility and changes in activity for adapting to the professional Armed Forces model.

- Difficulty in providing adequate **professional training** for the needs of new roles to be carried out.

c) A supplementary contribution of human resources still to be defined and specified, at least in the area of **volunteer reservists**.

## 2.- Legal Norms

Since **Law 17/1999** of May 18 on the Armed Forces Personnel Structure, there has been **continuous development** of the legal norms that form the legal framework for all aspects of human resources and enable recruiting, training and service in the Armed Forces.

### 3.- Organic Structure

The organic structure has been in a **rationalisation process**, to reduce the present Ministry of Defence structures in order to make more efficient use of limited human and budgetary resources.

## IV. PERSONNEL POLICY

### 1.- Definition and Objectives of the Personnel Policy

In order to achieve a professional Armed Forces model it is necessary to have an **adequate personnel policy**. This involves the coordinated set of all actions related to the necessary human resources: planning, recruiting, incorporating, training, managing and returning to civilian life.

Its **main objective** must be to satisfy the human resources needs of the Services in the following ways:

- The **human element** should feel its value as the key component of the Armed Forces and should identify with the National Defence objectives.

- Establishment of **procedures** for selecting, training, promoting and assigning posts that allow each person to occupy the post for which they are best qualified.

- An **educational** system that serves as the key instrument for developing the required Armed Forces human resources and facilitating subsequent integration into civilian life.

- Developing a **personnel assistance** system to satisfy personnel and their immediate family needs, given the particular characteristics of a military career, and provide

the adequate balance between well-being and professionalism.

With a view to an integrated military personnel policy, **Law 17/1999** of May 18 on the Armed Forces Personnel Structure, and its normative development, constitute the basic legal framework for the military profession. This Law is applied in conjunction with the development of the annual Cyclical Plans for officers, soldiers, sailors and marines.

The **Cyclical Plan for personnel** is the set of periodical actions to ensure continuity and permanent information on the degree of adaptation to Law 17/1999 and its related regulations, along with the norms regulating civilian personnel.

Similarly, **civilian personnel** providing services in the Ministry of Defence should sense their value as a key part of the professional Armed Forces model. The personnel policy should ensure this by meeting the same needs for them as for military personnel.

Their activity is regulated by:

- **Law 30/1984** of August 2, on Measures to Reform the Public System, modified by Law 22/1993 of December 29, concerning permanent civil service personnel.

- **The Single Collective Agreement** for the State Administration's Labour Personnel, concerning civilian non-permanent personnel.

- It will be applied within the Ministry of Defence according to the development of the **annual civilian personnel Cyclical Plans**.

## 2.- Bases of the Personnel Policy

The **process** for achieving a professional Armed Forces model requires:

- Obtaining quality, flexible, operational and adequately sized **Armed Forces**, highlighting the Defence concept as an expression of solidarity and involving an international perspective.

- Establishing a **mindset** among these professionals regarding the personnel policy and Armed Forces model that has been adopted.

- **Reorganising** the deployment of the Services to adjust it to the new security and defence scenario, with special attention to the concepts of functionality, flexibility, operability, reduction of force numbers, and new weapons systems and technology.

- **An adequate personnel management system** requiring good organisation and full capability to adapt to change.

- Support for **integrated management** of resources and incorporation of new technology.

- **Personalised management** to foster enthusiasm and interest, seeking to harmonise the priority interests of the Armed Forces with the legitimate interests of its personnel.

## 3.- Principles of the Personnel Policy

The personnel policy will be based on the **principles already established and defined**, which involve the following management criteria: personalised, joint, flexible, transparent and

interactive, decentralised, based on new technologies, providing incentives for merit and capability, involving rigorous human resources planning, and attentive to morale and well-being.

### 4.- Key Aspects of the Personnel Policy

Key aspects of the personnel policy are:

- **Cultivating and obtaining**: actively collaborating with society to encourage a national defence conscience through a defence culture. This involves attracting, recruiting and providing quality training for highly motivated personnel.

- **Sustain and retain**: providing personnel with a gratifying, stimulating and fulfilling profession while creating an environment that encourages service personnel to continue their commitment.

- **Recognise and support**: providing retired and reservist personnel and their dependents with help and support, within the budgetary constraints, recognising their labour and dedication.

## V. MEDIUM AND LONG-TERM PLANNING

The model adopted should be established and implemented in the **mid-term** by reaching the objectives specified for all aspects related to personnel, as defined in the personnel processes.

**Long-term** objectives will seek to maintain the model adopted, with the maximum numbers of **officers** allowed by law, and of **soldiers, sailors and marines**, as determined by the Budget Law credits.

In regards to **quality**: military personnel should be capable of managing and operating increasingly complex material resources; civilian personnel will effectively aid the National Defence interests and needs; infrastructures will be increasingly adequate for the model selected and the organisation will be adapted to optimise human resources.

The following is a **human resources framework** to be considered for the long run:

- After two more five-year cycles of regulation level staff size, **adapting the numbers of officers** to the legal requirement, these numbers will be as close as possible to legal maximum for each Service, branch, rank level and post after the year 2014, according to the approved distribution, including the **prescribed percentage of non-career officers**.

- The professional Armed Forces model will be established with the numbers of **professional military soldiers, sailors and marines** authorised by current legislation, in accord with defence needs and budgetary possibilities. However, it is important to set a staff reference size that should coincide with the maximum legally authorised number.

- An adequate number of **civilian personnel** should be maintained and distributed so as to contribute significantly to the successful functioning of the professional Armed Forces model.

- Procedures will be established for a **supplementary provision** of human resources so that each of the various groups can fit their intended purpose.

**Other aspects** to be considered are:

- Completion of the normative development of Law 17/1999, adapting it to the changing Defence needs.

- Finalisation of the reorganisation process.

- \An economic framework that will permit the maintenance of the professional Armed Forces model.

Thus, the **long-term vision** is based on the mid-term implementation of the professional Armed Forces model. Long-term activities are directed at consolidating and improving Armed Forces operability in all aspects related to personnel that have been specified in the established personnel processes.

A **Management Plan for Human Resources** will identify mid-term objectives and long-term activities.

As mentioned, in order to obtain professional Armed Forces it will be necessary to apply a **Personnel Policy** that serves as a reference point for translating human resource needs into practical and obtainable policies and programmes using the means available.

The Management Plan for Human Resources will provide general criteria and **coherent lines of action**, not only for completing the professionalisation process but also for obtaining Armed Forces capable of meeting future challenges.

## VI. PERSONNEL PROCESSES

### 1.- Overview

**The processes** are sets of interrelated and supervised activities entrusted to a group of people or organisms in order to

reach a goal. These people or organisms may be subordinate to diverse authorities. The activities related to personnel develop around fundamental processes that constitute the sets of activities that affect all personnel.

**Personnel processes** should be developed based on the underlying principles of the legal norms regulating all personnel serving in the Ministry of Defence.

**Rigorous application of Law 17/1999** and its legal norms, as well as the set of norms that articulate the relationship with civilian personnel, should allow the Armed Forces to satisfy the following needs:

- Effectively acknowledging that **people** are the foundational element of the whole organisation.

- **Integrating** people with the organisational objectives. People should internalise those objectives as their own responsibility and realise the importance of their work and the extent to which it contributes to achieving those objectives. In turn, the organisation must seek to harmonise its objectives with the interests of its people.

- Establishing a plan of action for **obtaining and retaining** personnel to ensure sufficient quantity and quality for meeting foreseeable mid-term unit and installation needs.

- Establishing a procedure for **evaluating, selecting and classifying** personnel so as to assign the right job to the right person. This procedure should be considered as one more element of integration.

- Satisfying the **needs** of the units while also taking personnel needs into account.

- Considering **training** as a fundamental tool for both obtaining quality people and facilitating the **return** to civilian life for those who do not continue in the Armed Forces. The possibility of a smooth return to civilian life is a powerful influence in the personnel recruiting capacity.

- Taking into account that the Armed Forces activities generate or give rise to a series of **specific personnel needs** that should be supported or met by adequate personnel assistance, as in other allied countries.

- Finally, implementing new **resource management procedures** to ensure a level of efficiency similar to more advanced civilian or military organisations.

The **fundamental processes** in relation to personnel are:

- Planning.

- Recruiting.

- Integration.

- Management.

- Training.

- Return to civilian life.

Though **independent from one another**, these processes are **intimately related**, since decision-making and actions in a certain process may have profound repercussions on other processes. Although **military personnel** involve very distinct groups of people, they have uniformity under one same set of regulations. When these are applied to **civilian personnel** in the department, it is sometimes difficult to fit them in the established processes.

## 2.- The Personnel Planning Process

The personnel planning process is the set of activities that take place after the decision on long-term Armed Forces numbers has been made, and before these individuals are incorporated into the distribution plan. It includes the **following activities**:

- Activities that enable prescribing and planning long-term personnel needs, and participating in the assignation process, which includes monitoring distribution of the total numbers among each of the Services.

- Activities for maintaining **updated** organic **lists** in each unit, centre and organism.

- Activities necessary for determining **annual cyclical plans** for officers, soldiers, sailors, marines and civilian personnel; to allow gradual adaptation of the existing numbers to those set by law for the long-term. These cyclical plans will include the promotion order and selection process for the appropriate management of ranks.

- Actions intended to define and develop a **professional career path** for civilian personnel.

- Activities that determine the destinations for the **annual personnel assignments**.

- Activities intended to **distribute civilian personnel** adequately using the corresponding mobility mechanisms.

- Activities to determine the **reservists needed**, categorising and establishing the sets of **organic posts** to be occupied by the various reservist groups or including posts that reservists can occupy in the organic staff lists.

- ***Most relevant lines of action in the mid- and long-term:***

- **Attain the numbers of rate of cadre** established for each annual cycle, in each Service, branch, rank level and post.

- **Attain the numbers of soldiers, sailors and marines** established for each annual cycle, in each Service, specialty, post and category.

- **Maintain quotas for passing into the reserves** upon individual request, permitting a rapid adaptation of the numbers to those established in the regulations.

- **Adjusting** available **civilian personnel** to the new needs of the Armed Forces. The staff numbers must be set according to need and personnel must be restructured to optimise the use of human resources.

- **Make available** in each annual cycle the **staff lists for all destination** units, centres and organisms within the Ministry of Defence, including autonomous organisms and international organisation delegations; adjusted to the numbers of organic staff and adapted to the established priorities.

- **Apply the Cyclical Plan for Actions in personnel matters** to ensure adaptation to Law 17/1999 and its regulations in the shortest possible timeframe.

- **Make available organic staff lists, catalogues and lists of posts** for all units, centres and organisms in the Ministry of Defence, including autonomous organisms and international organisation delegations; adjusted to the numbers set by legal limits and adapted to their assignments.

- **Redefine the rate of cadre,** making it analogous to surrounding countries.

- **Continue** with a policy of access to **permanent posts** for professional military soldiers, sailors and marines, until the maximum authorised number is reached, within the context of the specific job destination criteria and the Service needs. The rate of incorporation should permit attainment of a permanent position in the mid-term of their service, with adequate flexibility.

- **Maintain** an updated Operational Plan for Human Resources concerning the **Ministry's permanent and non-permanent civilian personnel**.

- **Empower the figure of the non-career military officer and reservist** as an adequate means to ensure constant interaction between society and the Armed Forces. Non-career military officers allow greater flexibility in determining and adjusting staff numbers, obtaining significant numbers in adequate proportion to the total numbers of officers.

- **Develop programmes that span several years**, to guarantee additional human resources for the defined objectives and within the foreseeable economic resources.

## 3.- The Personnel Recruiting Process

The personnel recruiting process involves the **following activities**:

- **Recruiting**, in order to obtain sufficient quantity and quality people to cover the prescribed **staff positions and job posts**.

- **Recruiting**, in order to obtain sufficient quantity and quality of **volunteer reservists** as prescribed by defence planning.

- **Institutional information** that is as specific and far-reaching as possible, prior to recruiting activities.

- **Selection** that permits the incorporation of personnel in sufficient quantity and quality.

- **Incorporation of temporary and volunteer reservists**, as proposed by the Ministry of Defence and authorised by the Government; and the declaration and incorporation of **compulsory reservists** as established in articles 178 and 181 of **Law 17/1999**.

- ***Most relevant lines of action in the mid- and long-term:***

• **Recruit** the necessary number of young, highly prepared and motivated individuals to maintain the operational capability of the Armed Forces through:

- Adequate **coverage of the annual quota of positions** for both career and non-career officers.

- **Maintain** the established numbers of professional military **soldiers, sailors and marines**.

- **Maintain** an adequate number of **civilian personnel**.

• Create, maintain and perfect the **specific plans in cooperation with each of the Services for recruiting individuals**. This implies prioritising, establishing and developing the specialised and full-time job of recruiting within a perfectly coordinated, focussed and directed effort.

- Perfect and complete the system of **selection by aptitudes**, extending its application to all selection processes.

- Introduce and develop the **concept of qualified and voluntary reservists** and develop the procedures for incorporating additional human resources in an agile, constant and timely fashion.

- Prepare **Spanish society** for the appearance and role of reservists, using this figure to create and consolidate a link with society.

- Establish procedures, cooperation and agreements at all levels with the **employers of the reservists** in order to achieve full cooperation in recruiting.

- Present service in the Armed Forces as an **attractive job offer** due to its intrinsic characteristics, adequate, competitive pay, good possibilities of promotion, and good support for those terminating their commitment to the Armed Forces.

- Achieve and maintain a **good ratio of the number of seekers to the positions available** in order to improve the quality of human resources:

- **Establishing specific plans for recruiting** career and non-career officers as well as professional military soldiers, sailors and marines. They will continue to be a critical and decisive factor in maintaining this Armed Forces model.

- Increase the recruiting pool by **investigating new potential groups** for non-career officers and professional military soldiers, sailors and marines. This will improve the quality by creating a broader collective of candidates for the available positions.

- **Investigating** and possibly activating **new ways** to make this profession attractive to groups that until now were not targeted for this offer, such as students.

- **Investigating** ways to **promote membership in certain units** where service conditions are particularly unpleasant or require greater dedication.

- Obtain the classification of **essential public service** for this Department's activities. This is very important for retaining civilian personnel, since it would increase the reinstatement rate percentage established for all Public Administrations.

- Focus **civilian personnel hiring** activities and efforts on specialised personnel groups whose jobs cannot be outsourced.

- Establish measures that positively influence the **recruiting and retention of civilian personnel** such as better complementary pay and possibilities of professional promotion.

- Evaluate and perfect the established criteria and procedures for incorporating the model of **temporary and volunteer reservists** into the Armed Forces, to supply additional human resources.

- Establish a greater link between the Armed Forces and certain reserve elements, especially **volunteer reservists**. Through involvement in exercises and other activities, they could reach **greater integration** in the Armed Forces and greater readiness for use in a short time frame.

## 4.- The Personnel Integration Process

The process of personnel integration is the set of activities that develop the general personnel policy and orient it towards the objectives of the organisation while encouraging individual participation and responsibility. The full professionalisation process along with the need to improve efficiency will significantly transform the **relations between organisation and individuals,** closing a gap between the two, which may have existed at some point. It will be necessary for individuals to internalise the organisation's objectives in order to meet them and in consequence, the organisation must promote measures that contribute to this. The process of integration covers all the activities related to these **measures**. In summary they are:

- Activities to discover the **motivation factors** of each of the groups of people linked to the Armed Forces within the Ministry of Defence along with activities to improve performance by increasing motivation.

- Activities to facilitate the **retention** of individuals within the organisation to ensure adequate quality by selecting and promoting the very best.

- Activities to establish **lines of communication** between the organisation and its members, providing adequate channels for ensuring the flow of pertinent information. In the case of civilian personnel, this would involve particular attention to the institutions representing workers' interests.

- Activities providing **assistance to active personnel** in aspects related to personal and family life in the Armed Forces.

- Activities to ensure the development of personnel regulations that satisfy **organisational objectives** while acknowledging the **interests of its personnel**.

- ***Most relevant lines of action in the mid- and long-term:***

- Assign the activities related to overall coordination of personnel motivation to one single organism.
- Determine the factors that **motivate military personnel**, providing means to evaluate and apply corrective measures.
- Create **Personnel Advisory Councils**, consolidating their functions to establish effective communication channels between personnel and the organisation.
- Increase the **relationship and communication** between personnel and organisation in order to improve factors contributing to a commonality of objectives.
- Improve **social services** and coverage with special attention to **reserve or retired** personnel.
- Optimise the resources used in implementing the **Social Action Plan for Civilian Personnel**.
- Adapt the **Quality of Life Plan** to the professional Armed Forces model.
- Strengthen measures for enabling the **purchase of housing** by Armed Forces members and provide other support measures for **mobility**.
- Standardise the **specific regimes of the General State Administration civil servants and the Armed Forces personnel** in regard to average pay, pensions, personnel assistance, etc.; while adjusting for the unique

characteristics of the military career and the singularity of its commitments.

- Improve the **percentage of** civilian and military personnel **retention**, helping to consolidate a quality professional Armed Forces model through adequate evaluation, classification and selection of personnel.

- Establish **objective criteria** for evaluating, selecting and classifying personnel.

- Establish a **tutorial system** for keeping personnel informed of their situation in regard to selection processes and providing counsel about their professional future.

- Finalise the **normative** development of human resources, establishing the necessary modifications to adapt to the changing reality of the Armed Forces and its environment; maintaining the fundamental personnel policy criteria established by these legal norms while allowing for other situational factors.

- Develop these legal norms together with **information processes** that provide understanding of their repercussions on personnel integration.

## 5.- The Personnel Management Process

The personnel management process is composed of activities that permit an adequate coverage –in quantity and quality– of job destinations, post lists and overall numbers. It includes the following **activities**:

- Activities that provide sufficiently qualified military personnel in order to adequately **staff** units, centres and organisms.

- Activities that update and adequately supply the **lists of posts for permanent civil servants and the numerical requirements for non-permanent personnel**.

- Activities that permit access of personnel to various **courses** according to service needs.

- Activities aimed at **promoting** personnel to the various jobs and handling changes in situations.

- Activities to update the **data** corresponding to Armed Forces personnel.

- ***Most relevant lines of action in the mid- and long-term:***

- **Improve personnel management** through measures to provide training and skills for those involved in personnel policy or human resources management; as well as providing incentives for commitment and permanence in these tasks.

- **Manage** and support personnel effectively in accord with the **established legal norms**.

- **Attain** an adequate level of adscription to posts among the **civilian personnel**.

- **Improve** the civilian personnel benefits by reordering and reclassifying certain **posts**.

- **Forecast** the **number of vacancies** with sufficient anticipation, decreasing the percentage of active service personnel without an assigned permanent post and reducing the average time before a person can occupy a permanent post.

- **Optimise** human resources performance by **outsourcing**, liberating units, centres and organisms of all tasks that can be safely carried out by specialised companies.

- **Finalise** the implementation of the **Ministry of Defence Personnel Information System (SIPERDEF)**, improve its performance and provide simulation assistance, with greater emphasis on personnel management in all processes.

- **Establish generic models and career profiles** for the various groups of military professionals in order to provide all Armed Forces military personnel with a guide for combining effective professionalism and personal satisfaction, taking into account both Service needs and individual aspirations.

## 6.- The Personnel Training Process

The personnel training process is composed of the set of activities aimed at providing and maintaining adequate preparation for Armed Forces personnel. It includes the following **activities**:

- Activities that ensure the **quality and control of education**.

- Activities that ensure **coordination and updating** of study plans and programs.

- Activities that ensure that personnel joining the Armed Forces receive the **training** needed to adequately perform in their jobs. The quality of this education is a valuable personnel recruiting tool that also enables service leavers to be in the best possible condition for an adequate and prestigious **return to civilian life**.

- Activities that ensure **continuing education** for certain posts.

- Activities that provide the necessary education for **top management posts** in the Armed Forces.

- ***Most relevant lines of action in the mid- and long-term:***

- **Revise the Study Plans and Programmes**, adapting them to the new strategic conceptions, to participation in multinational structures and to the characteristics of current operations; **keeping** their technical and humanistic aspects **updated** according to the real needs and requirements of the Armed Forces and of National Defence. Their structures and contents should be modified to facilitate their **standardisation with civilian degrees**.

- **Continue** the process of **adapting military education** to respond to the demands of the professional Armed Forces model.

- **Optimise** the available training resources to **improve the professional preparation of civilian personnel**.

- **Avoid redundancies** of the various education types and maintain quality control by: analysing results, measuring the effectiveness of personnel that have undergone these training courses, continuously evaluating units and systems, and carrying out a **comparative analysis** with surrounding military services in operations, exercises and cooperative endeavours.

- **Achieve an adequate homogenisation and ordering of the final product** of military education and training, regardless of the means of access.

- **Obtain full equivalence**, for all levels and ranks of military education or training, with the degrees in the general education system that have corresponding characteristics.

- **Maintain** an adequate quality in the **Staff Courses and Preparation for Brigadier-General/Rear Admiral**, in order to face the new needs of the Armed Forces and strengthen understanding of the Services and of joint action.

- **Train civilian personnel** for necessary Armed Forces tasks that cannot be carried out by military personnel.

- **Develop civilian personnel training courses** within the Armed Forces, specifically designed for their roles and independent of the degree requirements and continuous education provided by the Public Administration.

- **Maintain only the necessary and indispensable teaching centres**, eliminating unprofitable centres and consolidating to achieve efficient management.

- Maintain **agreements and cooperation to enhance military teaching**, to benefit a national defence culture and to foster exchanges with surrounding countries.

- Transform the **training provided by the Armed Forces** into one of the most appealing factors for young Spaniards when joining the Armed Forces as non-career officers or professional military soldiers, sailors and marines, and for businessmen and the Administration when hiring service leavers.

## 7.- The Process of Returning to Civilian life

The process of returning to civilian life is composed of the set of activities aimed at facilitating the return of professional non-

career military personnel when they leave the Armed Forces, having reached the maximum service time or age limit. It includes the following **activities**:

- **Professional** counsel for job seeking.
- Job placement assistance through **agreements and cooperation** with other Ministries and companies.
- Facilitating the return to the labour market by providing **specific courses** for this purpose.
- ***Most relevant lines of action in the mid- and long-term:***

- Continue with the present **support programmes** for incorporation of military soldiers, sailors and marines into the labour market.
- Establish support programmes for **incorporation** of **non-career military officers** into the labour market.
- Determine **other possibilities for incorporation** into the labour market in the Administration and corporate realms.
- Include professional non-career military in the **Ministry programmes for fostering employment**.
- Apply the measures envisioned in the Fifth Final Disposition of **Law 17/1999,** extending it to other groups such as the **non-career military officers**.

# ANNEX

# F

# MATERIAL RESOURCES FOR DEFENCE

# INDEX

## MATERIAL RESOURCES FOR DEFENCE


**I. THE ARMAMENT AND MATERIEL POLICY** ..... 255

**1.- Introduction and Features of the Armament and Materiel Policy** ..... 255

***a. Introduction*** ..... 255

***b. The Armament and Materiel Policy*** ..... 256

- ***Purpose*** ..... 256
- ***The Frame of Reference*** ..... 256
- ***More Centralised Decision-making*** ..... 257
- ***Centralised Direction and Decentralised Execution*** ..... 257
- ***Joint Logistics*** ..... 257
- ***The "Single Client" Concept*** ..... 257
- ***Multi-disciplinary Analysis*** ..... 258
- ***An Overview of the Concepts of Armament and Materiel*** ..... 258
- ***Timeframes for the Process*** ..... 258

***c. R+D Policy*** ..... 259

- ***Introduction*** ..... 259
- ***R+D Policy in the Area of Defence*** ..... 259
- ***The INTA*** ..... 260

**2.- Armament and Materiel Needs** ..... 261

***a. Introduction*** ..... 261

***b. The DCI, the PCC and the ECAP Framework*** .... 262

***c. Current Principal Programmes*** ..... 263

***d. New Principal Programmes for Armament*** ..... 263

***e. Candidate Principal Programmes*** ..... 264

**3.- The Armament and Materiel Acquisition Process** 264
*a. Armament and Materiel Planning* ..... 264
*b. Programming Armament and Materiel* ..... 265
*c. Budgeting Armament and Materiel* ..... 267
• *Changes in the Budgeting Process* ..... 267
• *Changes in Procedures*..... 268
• *Assuming Loans* ..... 268
• *Budgetary Execution and Modifications*..... 269
• *Complementary Actions* ..... 269
*d. Procurement of Armament and Materiel*..... 269
• *Restructuring the "Programme Offices"*..... 270
• *Creation of an Armament and Materiel Programmes Management Office* ..... 271

**4.- The Operational Phase: Logistic Support** ..... 271

**5.- Financing New Weapons Systems**..... 274

**6.- Other Aspects of the Armament and Materiel policy** 276
*a. Necessary Synchronisation of Activities* ..... 276
*b. Reorganisation of the DGAM*..... 276
*c. Personnel Training* ..... 277
*d. Support for the Spanish Defence Industry* ..... 277

**II. A POLICY OF STRENGTHENING INFRASTRUCTURES**..... 279

**1.- Introduction** ..... 279
*a.- Specific Infrastructure Features* ..... 280
• *Components* ..... 280
• *Disinvestments* ..... 280
• *Conditioning Factors* ..... 281
• *Information*..... 281
• *Organic Aspects* ..... 281
• *NATO Infrastructure* ..... 282
• *Environment* ..... 282

*b. Infrastructure Policy Proposals* ..... 283

**2.- Disposal of Assets Policy** ..... 284

*a. External legal norms*..... 284

*b. Internal legal norms* ..... 284

**3.- Integral Management of the Infrastructure Resources**..... 285

**4.- Coordination of the Infrastructure Policy** ..... 286

**III. COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS (CIS) POLICY** ..... 288

**1.- The Impact of CIS on Defence** ..... 288

**2.- Specific Requirements for Defence**..... 291

**3.- The Ministry of Defence's Management Plan for CIS** ..... 293

# ANNEX F

# MATERIAL RESOURCES FOR DEFENCE

## I. THE ARMAMENT AND MATERIEL POLICY

### 1.- Introduction and Features of the Armament Policy

#### a. *Introduction*

**The Armed Forces professionalisation process** has been accompanied by a sizeable economic effort intended to provide the best possible equipment, as needed. This effort has caused a slow but continual **increase in equipment and maintenance expenses**.

The Ministry of Defence has habitually made **efficient use of these resources**. This is manifest in the acquisition and adequate life-cycle maintenance of systems and equipment that are sometimes very complex and occasionally require prior development. Budget allocation reaches almost 100%, allowing units to complete the missions assigned to them by the Government, such as the recent deployment in Afghanistan, which was hardly foreseeable a few months prior.

The Ministry also faces **new and important challenges** due to the growing needs of the Armed Forces resulting from our full integration in the **Atlantic Alliance** military structure, our participation in the **European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) objectives**, and our increasing presence in multinational operations. A few other factors include: the increasing complexity and cost of new weapons systems, increasing technological and

industrial implications, the development of an R + D policy, and the need to cooperate more and more with other governments in order to procure weapons and materiel.

Given this, the Ministry of Defence must seek greater resources within the confines of economic and zero deficit policies, while attaining **maximum efficiency in the use of scarce resources**.

### *b. The Armament and Materiel Policy*

The Armament and Materiel Policy is developed in a unique sphere with very particular characteristics. Certain **basic concepts** must be defined to increase understanding and facilitate application. The following may be highlighted:

- ***Purpose***

The purpose of the Armament and Materiel Policy is to **meet the material needs** of the Armed Forces as determined by National Defence Planning.

- ***The Frame of Reference***

Full integration in the **European Union** and in regional **defence organisations**, along with the political objective of **creating a** competitive and technologically advanced **defence industry within the European Union**, should be permanent reference points for Spain's Materiel Policy in order to operationally and industrially attain the suggested level of **compatibility and complementarity** for international cooperation. Its **frame of reference** is defined by **NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative and Prague Capabilities Commitment, and the European Union's European Capabilities Action Plan**.

- ***More Centralised Decision-Making***

The new policy should progress towards more centralised decision-making, especially in resource allocation. **The authority of the Central Organ is key to the policy**, as it controls all logistic processes to ensure convergence for obtaining economies of scale, optimising processes at a national level and increasing interoperability among the three Services.

- ***Centralised Direction and Decentralised Execution***

**Two diverging principles** must be in equilibrium for centralised decision-making and joint action. On the one hand, **centralised and integrated decision-making** is necessary to achieve the best possible economies of scale and convergence with the technical and political tendencies of the Ministry. On the other hand, the **execution of activities must be decentralised** and transferred to the level with the most information and criteria for carrying them out. A realistic approach also requires avoiding solutions built around extensive organisational and personnel resources that are beyond what is available.

- ***Joint Logistics***

The new policy should progressively guide processes towards **joint action** in organisational and procedural logistics, establishing only technically necessary differences between its components (the three Services, the Defence Staff, and the Central Organ).

- ***The "Single Client Concept"***

The Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces should act as **"a single client"**, obtaining economies of scale by taking advantage of the enormous potential as a preferred client. They

should also act as an **"intelligent client"**, up to date with **"state of the art"** technology and able to correctly evaluate costs.

- ***Multi-disciplinary Analysis***

**Multi-disciplinary teams** of experts should be involved in the overall logistic rationalisation process, studying its operational, technological, industrial and economic aspects along with all other related factors.

- ***An Overview of the Concepts of Armament and Materiel***

In order to include all the elements that compose weapons systems, the subject of the Armament and Materiel Policy will be: all ground, naval, aerial and special **equipment, platforms and systems**, whatever their task; **integrated command and control systems; auxiliary equipment** of any sort; **maintenance; consumable supplies** required for operation; and **combatant equipment** (uniforms, field rations, camp supplies, etc.).

- ***Timeframes for the Process***

In order to help prepare the Armed Forces for the future, overall factors should be projected over a **timeframe** that accounts for **very long-term** needs (25 years). The **long-term** timeframe (up to 15 years) serves as a basis for general planning of needs. The **mid-term** (6 years) will be used for detailed programming of the use of economic resources. Finally, the **short-term** (up to 2 years) will permit determination of budget needs and programming adjustments.

The new Armament and Materiel Policy developed around these timeframes should be preceded by **R + D Policy** considerations to determine the context and permanent criteria for the activities involved in its **four phases: planning,**

**programming, budgeting and execution**. This last phase includes activities carried out over the life cycle of the materiel, especially **procurement, logistic support and retirement**.

### *c. R + D Policy*

- **Introduction**

Today's accelerated technological advances require a continual research and development effort in the modernisation process of the Armed Forces.

Apart from purchasing modern equipment and systems for the units, long-term needs should be forecasted in order to **maintain the technological capability** that underpins the efficiency of our forces and allows **interoperability with our allies**. Therefore, R + D Planning should be closely linked to long-term Armed Forces Needs Planning.

A second objective of R + D investments is to **significantly contribute to strengthening the industrial and technological Defence base**, allowing us to reduce our foreign technological dependency.

- ***R + D Policy in the Area of Defence***

The R + D Policy, the specific activities for implementing it and the current R + D programs are all included in the **R + D Management Plan (PDID)**, approved by the Secretary of State for Defence.

Most of this policy's defining **features** will continue to be valid, such as the focus on a limited number of technologies, incorporation of dual-use technologies, and coordination with the National Research, Development and Innovation Plan (I+D+I). Other features

have gained importance since the Review, such as the need to improve international cooperation and cost reduction techniques.

Although the initial PDID policy is still valid, **the Plan will be updated along two main lines of action**:

- A clearer line will be drawn between **research programmes** (intended to increase scientific and technological knowledge) **and development programmes** (intended to develop weapons systems or equipment prototypes). The latter will be closely linked to new planning, programming, budgeting and acquisition processes for armament and equipment, to be covered later in this annex.

- The priorities established so far (technology associated with combatants, design of platforms, weapons and sensors, and command and control systems) will be revised to include the needs of new systems (NBCR defence, precision-guided munitions, etc.).

All previously initiated activities remain valid and will continue after the Review. Significant among these is the establishment of **La Marañosa Technological Institute** as a replacement for the present DGAM centres.

- ***The INTA***

The National Aerospace Technical Institute (INTA) is the main Defence Research and Development centre in Spain. Due to the quality and calibre of its scientific and technical personnel, the legal framework for its activities, and its relationship with the university and private enterprise, its activities often extend beyond the sphere of the Ministry of Defence to include **overall R + D in Spain**.

The following are **INTA's priorities** for selecting Research and Development projects:

- Contributing to the modernisation of Armed Forces weapons systems and equipment. INTA's participation in the SPAINSAT and X-TAR Defence Communications Satellite programmes, the HELIOS I and II and PLEIADES Earth Observation Satellites, and the SIVA Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Project should all be mentioned due to their importance.

- Participating in international projects to acquire new technologies (Arianne Programme, Astrobiology Centre).

- Participating in projects that allow development and optimisation of technologies already available through INTA (Integrated Management Systems, SIVA).

- Participating in cooperative projects with other public research organisms, universities and companies related to defence and new aeronautical technology (EF-2000, A-400M).

## 2. Armament and Materiel Needs

### *a. Introduction*

The capabilities defined and the shortfalls detected during the Strategic Review will guide the **Military Defence Planning Cycle**, which will translate these shortfalls into weapons programmes for equipping the Armed Forces.

These programmes are organised into **three separate blocks**. The first group includes **Current Principal Programmes**: those that are already financed and presently in

the procurement phase. The second group includes **New Principal Programmes for Weapons**: those that do not yet have financing but have priority status in the Ministry of Defence and are presently in the programming phase. Their operational, logistic and economic aspects will be specified and incorporated –once they are financed– into the list of Current Principal Programmes. The last group includes the list of **Candidate Principal Programmes**: those considered priority by the Ministry of Defence and likely to be financed, depending on the economic panorama.

### *b. The DCI, the PCC and the ECAP Framework*

The programmes just mentioned are the result of a complex, analytical process by which the Ministry of Defence provides answers to the operational needs defined in the **Strategic Defence Review**; which has established as one of its developmental **coordinates** the full **integration of Spain in the defence organisations of our geopolitical area**. Through a planning process similar to Spain's Defence Planning Directive, these organisations –particularly NATO and the European Union– specify their needs in three documents: the **Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI),** the new **Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC)**, and **the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP)**; which list the main shortfalls of member countries in their contribution to common defence and crisis management.

As a fundamental part of its voluntary involvement in these two organisations, Spain participates in these initiatives to supplement its material capabilities with weapons programmes that go beyond purely national interests to directly link with the capabilities plans of NATO and the EU.

### *c. Current Principal Programmes*

- **Eurofighter:** The objective is to have a multi-role aircraft (with air superiority and ground attack) that can meet the challenges of the next 20 years.

- **F-100 Frigate:** Developed to complete the Navy's escort unit needs, it provides anti-air capability and balances out the Naval Force.

- **Leopard Tank:** This program seeks to meet interoperability requirements with some Allied Services while updating the present armoured vehicle fleet.

- **A400-M Transport and Refuelling Aircraft:** The objective is to obtain the strategic transport and in-flight refuelling capabilities, the lack of which has complicated our force projection.

### *d. New Principal Programmes for Armament*

- **Combat Helicopter:** a multi-role combat helicopter for fire-support missions, protection and anti-tank combat, capable of all-weather combat and real-time gathering and transmission of intelligence.

- **S-80 Submarines:** to provide expeditionary Naval Force protection, obtain intelligence, support land operations and gradually replace the current submarine fleet.

- **NH-90 Multi-role Transport Helicopters:** to update the transport helicopter fleets of the three Services, unifying the present diversity of makes and models.

- **LHA Class Ship:** the future Strategic Projection ship, with air/sea, amphibious and strategic transport capabilities.

- **In-flight Refuelling:** to increase the operational capability of the Air Force.

- **Pizarro (second series):** to complete two more mechanised Infantry Brigades and four Cavalry Squadrons, which concludes the procurement of this equipment for heavy units.

### *e. Candidate Principal Programmes*

- **Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs):** a multi-role platform for all three Services and the Military Staff, providing intelligence, stand-off jamming, communications relay, target acquisition, etc.

- **Air Armament for the Eurofighter:** to equip these aircraft with air-to-air and air-to-surface short-, mid- and long-range missiles.

- **Communications, Command and Control Programmes:** to update the Basic Area Network (RBA) and the Army Command and Control System (SIMACET).

- **Air-transportable Ground Combat Vehicle:** A new, armoured and air-transportable vehicle is needed to increase Land Force projection capability.

## 3. The Armament and Materiel Acquisition Process

### *a. Armament and Materiel Planning*

Given the time requirements of the most important programmes, the Ministry of Defence should orient its armament and materiel activities within a very broad time frame. A **Long-term Armament and Materiel Plan is necessary**, not to

determine future economic resource needs, but to establish a general direction for future use of foreseeable resources.

Set within a **long-term timeframe of 15 years**, revisable to 20 or 25 years, the broad perspective of this plan should: provide direction for research programmes, allow sufficient foresight for determining the necessary development and acquisition programmes, organise maintenance activities and interface with current programming through the corresponding revisions that are initially set for every two years.

Elaborating the plan will require consideration of foreseeable resources with a realistic prediction of their tendency along with the long-term needs listed in the current **Joint Force Objective (OFC)**. Other factors to be considered include the technological and industrial horizon, possibilities of international cooperation, and the programming tendencies in vogue at that moment.

Given the responsibilities of the **Secretariat of State for Defence** in these matters under current legislation, this plan will be formulated and revised by the Directorate General for Armament and Materiel **(DGAM)**. The Defence Staff **(EMAD)**, the Service **Headquarters** and the **Ministry's Directing Organs** will also actively participate in formulating this plan, which will not require formal approval due to its advisory and non-executable nature.

### *b. Programming Armament and Materiel*

The programming phase determines which **specific** mid-term acquisition and maintenance **programmes** to develop and the resources available to each. This key phase involves the most important decision-making within the overall scheme of armament and materiel policy.

The programming will be specified in a document labelled **Mid-term Armament and Materiel Programme** (PRAM). Once approved, it will have a six-year validity and will be revised at least yearly.

The **purpose of this phase** is to obtain a precise and realistic distribution of the foreseeable economic resources for the next six years, satisfying the mid-term OFC needs as much as possible. These factors and the foreseeable resources will have the greatest impact on programming, though the other factors mentioned will also be considered when analysing the planning and direction established in the Long-term Plan.

The **programming method** starts with the operational capabilities that the OFC considers necessary for the mid- and long-term, transforming each of the mid-term needs into one or several possible procurement or maintenance programmes. Each programme will then be analysed comprehensively to determine its real viability, its full implications and its costs. Finally, programmes will be selected for initiation and their conditions determined, according to available resources.

Of the three activities listed, the second is particularly important. **The comprehensive analysis of each programme** allows for a precise and clear decision on what items to procure in each case, their cost, timeframe and implications. This requires a detailed examination of the future user's operational requirements –which must be approved by the Defence Staff, – the number of units to acquire, their date of entry into service, possible benefits of prior development, possibilities of international and industrial cooperation, the estimated cost and duration, forecasts on future logistic support, impact on the other programmes, and other questions of similar importance. This comprehensive analysis is the basis for any future decision on the programme.

The development of the programming process as well as the formulation and updating of the PRAM will be the responsibility of the **DGAM**, with the active participation of the **Defence Staff**, the **Service Headquarters** and the appropriate **Directing Organs.** Unlike the Long-term Plan, the PRAM requires **formal approval**, involving the acceptance, rejection, postponement or modification of existing or proposed programmes. For this reason, all versions will be sent by the DGAM to the Secretary of State for Defence, who will send it to the Minister for approval after consulting with the Chief of the Defence Staff**.**

### *c. Budgeting Armament and Materiel*

#### • *Changes in the Budgeting Process*

Certain changes are necessary in the **current budgeting process**, including the following:

- To recognize that the **Ministry of Defence Budget** is unitary, not the sum of resources envisioned by and for each separate Service.

- To establish a clear procedure for **linking the Budget with the OFC**, so that the latter is not subordinate to the former when budgetary changes might alter the OFC.

- To **unify criteria** regarding "armament and materiel", "maintenance", "living and functioning", especially in everything related to fuel, clothing, food and war reserves; defining what is to be categorised as Living Expenses, Operational Expenses, or Modernising the Spanish Armed Forces; and whether they are to be classified in Chapter 2 or Chapter 6 of the Budget.

- To study the need to **restructure budgetary services** by reducing them to one for each of the Services, and to establish coordination and control measures to provide the DGAM with adequate information.

- To evaluate the current **functional structure**, creating new functions that are coordinated with the economic structure of the Budget, resulting in clearly specified use of approved resources.

- To strengthen **functional relations** of the various Commands and other Service Directing Organs with the Directorates General of the Secretariat of State.

- ***Changes in Procedures***

Programming provides the necessary information for participating in **preparing the Annual Budget Bill**, so that the assigned budget for armament and materiel is the result of approved programming.

The **DGAM** will be responsible for coordinating the armament and materiel section of the Budget Bill draft, sending it to the Directorate General for Economic Affairs **(DIGENECO)**, and for making any final changes. The DGAM will also be responsible for the decisions taken during the execution of the budget, when significant differences arise between the budget for a certain program and the actual contracting. All adjustments will be communicated to the DIGENECO for budgetary monitoring and control.

- ***Assuming Loans***

An in-depth study of loan procedures should be carried out for **two purposes**: to standardise the loan criteria in the Armed

Forces, and to reclassify into Chapter 6 expense items that are presently in Chapter 2 and whose nature or the nature of their service may be considered an investment.

- ***Budgetary Execution and Modifications***

For greater transparency in management, budgetary changes proposed by the **Logistic Commands of the Services** to the DIGENECO should be previously communicated to the Directing Organs in charge of the various policies within the Department, as they could alter OFC and Management Plan programmes or guidelines.

- ***Complementary Actions***

Although armament and materiel is not the only area of acquisitions, the Rationalisation Task Force on contracting recommends moving towards **Centralised Contracting** in order to meet the criteria established in the June 6, 1997 Agreement of the Council of Ministers, which approved the Government Programme for implementing a Public Purchases Policy.

The implementation of **Analytical accounting** would link the **Budget** with the **Management** process, in order to examine discrepancies that arise throughout the fiscal year and obtain sufficient information for subsequent decision-making.

Finally, the **unification of the Services management processes** should continue in order to achieve homogeneity in work systems and procedures.

### *d. Procurement of Armament and Materiel*

Armament and Materiel Programmes that have been included in the Budget move on to the **contracting phase**. Some countries

have created independent organisations due to the enormous size of their yearly Defence purchases. The Defence Procurement Agency of Great Britain is an example of this, and manifests the great complexity of the issue. Good contracting is central to "better buying" and can result in significant budget savings, which is a basic objective of efficient resource management.

It is important to remember that in an imperfect market it is not always possible to know the real cost of a system beforehand, and **diversity of contracting norms** results in diverse procedures, such as the Law for Public Administration Contracts, the American System (FMS), multi-national contracts, or contracts managed by agencies (NAMSA, OCCAR, etc.). This is complicated by a high number of contracts extended over excessive amounts of time with price increases or reviews and a very complex process of management and monitoring.

The acquisition of each important weapons system or piece of equipment, that is, each armament or materiel programme, is handled by a **"Programme Office"**, generally located in a Logistic Support Command or Head Office, under the direction of a Programme Chief selected for this purpose. The Secretariat of State for Defence oversees the most important programmes via a **Monitoring Committee** headed by the Director General for Armament and Materiel (DIGAM).

This system needs some significant overall changes in structure and functioning, including:

- ***Restructuring the "Programme Offices"***

The current **"Principal Programme Offices"** should be restructured along the following lines:

- Weapons systems and **specific equipment families** will be under one Office. Each office will be responsible for all Ministry of Defence acquisitions in its area, not just those related to its own Service. The DGAM will establish the necessary norms for efficient and uniform functioning in the entire Ministry, along with centralised control of the technical, economic, industrial and cooperative aspects of acquisitions.

- **The Programme Offices will functionally depend on the DGAM** for the development and acquisition phases of each programme, in a manner yet to be established.

- ***Creation of an Armament and Materiel Programmes Management Office or Other Similar Organism***

In order to develop the above-mentioned functions, an **Armament and Materiel Programmes Management Office** or other similar organism may be created. It would have the **legal characteristics** of State Societies or Autonomous Organisms. Its **objective** would be to manage the Programmes entrusted to it and to centralise as needed the current Principal Programme Offices for Armament and others that might eventually be incorporated. **Functionally it would depend** on the DGAM. Its **personnel** would be obtained from the Headquarters, the DGAM, the Autonomous Organisms associated with the Ministry and by hiring civilian personnel.

## 4.- The Operational Phase: Logistic Support

**From the time that materiel enters service until it is retired, an incessant logistic activity** occurs around it. This principally involves maintenance and supply tasks. In this document only the basic lines of actions concerning maintenance will be discussed.

Weapons systems maintenance is of **vital importance** to the Armed Forces, not only **due to the quantity of human and material resources** involved, but also **due to its impact on the effectiveness and operability** of the Force.

Currently, **each of the three Services has its own independent maintenance organisation**. In general terms these organisations carry out their maintenance activities on **three levels**:

- Within their own **units**, where actual maintenance of the various weapons systems is carried out. This requires a maintenance echelon **directly** linked to the Force structure and thus organically set within the unit.

- In its **industrial installations** –parks, arsenals, armouries or dockyards– to carry out more complex technical maintenance. These installations were originally created for technical reasons that are no longer relevant.

- In the **private industry** sector, as decided by each Service.

In summary, there are **three areas of action** within the **Armed Forces**, one for each Service, and each of these has **three distinct levels**: the organic level in the units, the industrial level in each Service and the external level in Industry.

To optimise the logistic maintenance activities in such a fragmented and complex scenario, **important reforms** must be progressively put into practice through the following proposals:

- Concerning the demand for maintenance, the current maintenance structure by Services should be replaced with a **maintenance structure by families of weapons systems**, which should produce important economies of scale in a very short time.

- Concerning the supply of maintenance, the **industrial situation of the three Services should be unified and the overall panorama should be rationalised**, including the external realm; thus generating economies of scale, avoiding redundancies and eliminating excess capacity.

- In regards to maintenance by **private industry**, criteria and actions for outsourcing should be unified so that the Armed Forces are considered as **a single client**.

- Finally, **a powerful software tool** is necessary for the decision-makers who need adequate information to manage and rationalise such a fragmented and complex structure. This would provide a clear picture of each scenario and of the global panorama, and assist in identifying redundancies and shortfalls, evaluating the efficiency of the various organisms against established and objective criteria, and in making internal or external comparisons.

The creation of a **Maintenance Management Office** or similar organism will be considered for implementing the proposals mentioned, and for managing and rationalising the entire process. It would be **legally constituted along the lines of State Societies or Autonomous Organisms**. Its **objective** would be to **gradually coordinate all the Maintenance Activities, rationalising them into one continuous process for each family of weapons systems**. Its **management** would follow the principle of **"centralised direction and decentralised execution"**. **Functionally it would depend on the Directorate General for Armament and Materiel**. The **Headquarters** would carry out the necessary organic and functional changes so that its maintenance organisations would depend on the new Management Office. **Personnel** for this Office would be drawn from the **Secretariat of State for Defence** and the **Headquarters**, who would adjust their numbers in accord with the

new commitments and meet personnel shortages by hiring technical assistants as needed.

The Maintenance Management Office **will particularly oversee the rationalisation of the industrial maintenance capabilities** of the Armed Forces, objectively comparing their efficiency with that of private industry and **outsourcing unprofitable activities or those that are not restricted for operational or strategic reasons**. All of this together should provide maximum performance in the logistic activities for Service operations.

## 5.- Financing New Weapons Systems

The capabilities derived from **Spain's international commitments** in the **NATO** context and in the **European Security and Defence Policy** must be defined theoretically, but also financed. The question arises as to whether the long-term financial projection of the State Budget will allow the Armament Programmes necessary to meet those objectives. There is already a significant level of commitment with the four large Principal Programmes that are underway (F-100 Frigate, LEOPARD Tank, EUROFIGHTER aircraft and the A-400M transport airplane).

- **The current Chapter 6 commitment level** of the Ministry of Defence Budget is already quite high due to the 2002 delivery of some of the **Principal Programmes** units and the beginning of the 10 annual payments for these Programmes. This annual assigned quantity will go to pay the portion of the price not advanced by the Ministry of Science and Technology, and to repay the Public Treasury the amount it had advanced. So significant amounts will be charged to Chapter 6 in the year 2006 in order to pay for the Principal Programmes.

- The process of procuring a new weapons system begins with a **long-term financial projection** that considers **all the economic factors influencing the life cycle**: procurement, logistic support and retirement.

- **Loans within Chapter 6 of the Budget are the ordinary financing source** for programmes. In addition, the Ministry of Defence has extraordinary resources once infrastructure investment needs have been met, resulting from sales operations carried out by the **Infrastructure and Equipment Management Office (GIED)** and the **Armed Forces Housing Institute (INVIFAS)**. Worthy of mention here are several extraordinary operations such as the named "Operación Campamento" carried out by the GIED and the possibility of new financial instruments provided by a new law on State Assets (sale and lease back, sales of multiple goods, sales of construction rights, etc.). Another source of extraordinary financing takes the form of **advance funds provided by the Ministry of Science and Technology** to national industry, particularly for programmes with an important technological innovation component. These allow the Ministry of Defence to pay for weapons systems over a maximum period of 10 years once they enter into service.

- The advances provided by the Ministry of Science and Technology are refunded to the Treasury by the companies involved. This should **level out** the expected curve based on the long life cycle of the Principal Programs being financed (25-30 years); providing resources in Chapter 6 of the Defence Budget, which along with ordinary or expected extraordinary income would allow new programmes to begin.

- An optimistic forecast of both ordinary and extraordinary budgetary income, the possibility of disposing of certain financial assets, and **levelling out the refund curve** on the Ministry of Science and Technology advances will allow the initiation of the priority programmes required by the Strategic Review, and coverage of our current infrastructure investment and Principal Programmes commitments.

## 6.- Other Aspects of the Armament and Materiel Policy

### *a. Necessary Synchronisation of Activities*

Certain external landmark events must be reflected in the **developmental phases of the Armament and Materiel Policy**, in particular the publication of the OFC, the elaboration of the Budget Bill, and its approval.

Over time each of these processes has a **feedback effect** on the others; the execution process has significant effects on the programming process and this in turn affects the planning of forces.

### *b. Reorganisation of the DGAM*

The new and complex commitments involved in the new Armament and Materiel Policy require a reorganisation of the DGAM, as the Directing Organ in charge of implementation. This does not involve much substantial change in the **organic structure** outlined in Royal Decree 1883/96, which is still generally considered valid, although current studies will add new insight to this. Rather, the intention is to adapt the **current organisation of its Sub-directorates General** to the new demands, along with its work methods and personnel availability. This adaptation should also be extended to the **Defence Infrastructure and Equipment Management Office**.

The increase in personnel availability will be obtained principally through the already mentioned **creation of Management Offices** and hiring of temporary technical assistants according to programme needs. This reorganisation should permit the DGAM to function effectively until the Ministry has **a single centralised location**, allowing for deeper organic reforms.

### *c. Personnel Training*

It is necessary to develop and implement **a training plan** so that the direction and management organs, the program offices and the logistic installations that require it may have adequately trained personnel for managing all sorts of programmes. To ensure its coherence with the bases of armament and materiel policy, the training plan will be **the same for the three Services** and will take into account the practices and work methods of Allied countries and multinational programmes. Thus, a common doctrine in these areas will gradually be developed within the Ministry of Defence, allowing technical management and facilitating increased participation in multinational programmes.

### *d. Support for the Spanish Defence Industry*

Defence policy requires adequate **technological and industrial support**. The Ministries of Defence in surrounding countries are seeking to develop this in several ways.

At present Spain's defence industry constitutes a **moderately sized but notably efficient sector**, especially in certain technological and market niches. The Ministry of Defence seeks to continue supporting the development of this sector while respecting all business decisions that are taken. This facilitates the equipping of our Armed Forces and an effective Spanish

contribution to European Security and Defence Policy and transatlantic cooperation in this area.

This support could be specified along **three different lines**. The first could be labelled **"institutional"** and consists of facilitating the integration of Spanish companies into the international market through governmental agreements with other countries. Prominent among these due to its importance is the **"General Framework Agreement"** for restructuring the European Defence Industry, which has Treaty status. It is in an advanced phase of development and has been signed by Germany, France, Italy, Great Britain, Sweden and Spain. Alongside this is the recent **"Declaration of Principles"** agreement between the **United States and Spain,** which will soon begin its development. Activity will continue in these areas and in other lower-level areas such as the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD), the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG), the Joint Armaments Cooperation Agency (OCCAR), and others that may arise in the future, especially in the sphere of the European Union.

A second line of support is industrial cooperation under the umbrella of **foreign armament and equipment acquisition programmes**. This, along with efforts by the companies themselves, has been a particularly effective instrument for improving the Spanish technological and industrial base. The Ministry of Defence Policy will continue to make the greatest possible use of the existing Spanish industrial capabilities within a competitive framework. Specifically, this policy will pursue **three objectives**:

- **Consolidation** of strategic industrial sectors.

- Achieving the necessary **self-sufficiency** both in the Armed Forces and in industry to support the acquired systems during their life cycle.

- Developing an **industrial base** capable of participating in international programmes when Spain is involved.

Finally, a third line to promote is the **support of exports**. Military equipment acquisition tends to take place between governments, whose role is as significant as that of the providing companies. In addition, the countries acquiring weapons systems require **support from the user Armed Forces** for training in the use and life-cycle maintenance of these systems. Under these conditions, a long-term international presence of our companies will only be feasible with the support of the Ministry of Defence.

For this purpose it will be necessary to **create a specific organisation** with the flexibility and capability to develop the various activities required: making industrial cooperation proposals to other countries, managing the support provided by our Armed Forces to those of other countries, negotiating and monitoring multinational cooperative agreements, etc.

In general, the support of the **Ministry of Defence**, and **other components of the Administration**, will help maintain and improve the technological and industrial capacity of our defence industry. This will benefit the Armed Forces and the **entire society** both **quantitatively** –due to the volume of production and the number of jobs directly and indirectly involved– and **qualitatively**, since the companies in this sector are among the most technologically advanced in the nation.

## II. A POLICY OF STRENGTHENING INFRASTRUCTURES

### 1.- Introduction

The Ministry of Defence's **Infrastructure** policy is carried out through the **Infrastructure Management Plan**, according to

Planning Directive 38/96. This plan is revised bi-annually and deals with the Mid-term and Short-term. The latter involves two phases: The Annual Recommended Infrastructure Programme (PAIR), and the Annual Infrastructure Programme (PAI), which is executed in the annual budgets.

### *a. Specific Infrastructure Features*

The particular features of the Infrastructures and their Management Plan have to be considered individually and within the framework of **centralised** direction and **decentralised** execution of resources:

- ***Components***

The Infrastructure is composed of two parts: **Grounds and Installations**. The Grounds are acquired by direct purchase for a specific need and require only environmental maintenance. Installations are acquired by annual or pluri-annual construction contracting, carried out on Defence grounds and requiring maintenance tasks.

The multiplicity and scattered distribution of the installations has resulted in decentralised contracting by some twenty **contracting organs**.

- ***Disinvestments***

A fully professionalised Spanish Armed Forces requires modernisation of the available infrastructure resources; resulting in the current **process of concentration of units** and organisational **rationalisation of structures** in the Services. These processes have had a direct impact on State-owned Ministry of Defence properties, and some have no further military use. Once they have lost their usefulness or interest for the Ministry,

the GIED begins the complex and screened process of selling these properties.

Thus, infrastructure **disinvestments** reduce expenses and provide funds for subsequent investment. **Coordination** is needed between investment planning and the Services' plans for short/mid-term vacating of installations.

- ***Conditioning factors***

The Joint Force Objective (OFC) has no conditioning or directing stipulations for **obtaining infrastructures**. **Each Headquarters determines its own needs** in light of: the size, quality and availability of the Force needed to meet the Operational plans; the existing infrastructure and economic resources; and the Infrastructure policy proposed by the DIGENIN and approved by the SEDEF. The redundancies or inefficiencies that might arise from the Headquarters' introspective determination of their own needs are corrected in the DIGENIN planning process for determining joint needs.

- ***Information***

The necessary information concerning geographical situation, structure, state and capacity of the infrastructure is almost entirely located in the Headquarters. The information available to the DIGENIN is sparse, fragmented and difficult to utilise for obtaining the overall perspective needed.

- ***Organic Aspects***

The organisational structure of the DIGENIN allows an overview and understanding of all phases, from determining needs to maintenance to retirement disinvestments. The organic

**Infrastructure of the Services** adopts very diverse forms and extensiveness.

- ***NATO Infrastructure***

The NATO infrastructure requirements in our national territory follow planning **channels** (NATO Security Investment Program) and **financing that are outside the DIGENIN**, which is informed of general proposals and forward planning as well as periodically being informed of current and approved activities.

- ***Environment***

The Environmental Policy, along with its norms and specifications, is associated with the Infrastructure Policy. The plans and programmes of the latter determine the activities to be carried out using Defence resources or on Defence grounds and installations in order to **protect and recover environmental conditions**. The Ministry of Defence Environmental Policy is based on the concept of **sustainable development**, which is compatible with the Armed Forces mission and directed towards achieving the current legislative objectives for preservation, protection and recovery of environmental conditions.

The environmental effort has an organisational structure and seeks to implement environmental management systems (SGMA) at every departmental level. It can be outlined in four broad points or objectives:

- **Creating awareness.** To increase individual and collective SAF awareness in this area through training, education and information programmes.

- **Energy.** To limit and conserve energy, researching and utilising less contaminating and renewable energy options.

- **Protection of the Natural Environment.** To prevent fires and preserve ecosystems in forests and other Defence properties, especially the large firing and manoeuvre ranges.

- **Improve Environmental Quality.** To reduce waste dumping and contamination by reusing, recycling and renewal, processing waste in the most adequate fashion to reduce its impact on environmental quality.

This set of activities seeks not only to lessen the environmental impact of Defence activities but also to **continuously improve** environmental parameters in all military installations.

### *b. Infrastructure Policy Proposals*

In order to optimise use of the available resources for providing adequate Armed Forces infrastructure as established in National Defence Directive 01/2000, a **"Plan to Impulse the Infrastructure Policy"** has been designed to strengthen the philosophy of **centralised direction and decentralised execution**, within the possibilities and particularities of the SAF infrastructure. Three areas of action are proposed:

- **Infrastructure Disinvestments**, strengthening the Policy of DISPOSAL OF ASSETS.

- **Infrastructure Investment**, optimising the integral Management of RESOURCES.

- **Control and Coordination** of investment and disinvestments, creating a Committee for MONITORING the Infrastructure Management Plan.

## 2.- Disposal of Assets Policy

To speed up infrastructure disinvestments it is necessary to **modify** both the external **legal norms** that slow down the disposal procedures for non-necessary Defence infrastructure, and the Ministry's own norms that lengthen the process of declaring an installation redundant.

### *a. External legal norms*

The **Impulse Plan** has proposed legislative changes to **speed up the process of disposal of property assets** under the Ministry of Defence, to generate extra-budgetary resources for financing Departmental Plans and Programmes.

The changes proposed would principally affect the **State Assets Law**, a legal norm that is presently being modified. The Ministry of Defence will propose that it include all legal institutions already found satisfactory in the private legal arena of property sales processing (global sales of properties, transfer of urban development rights, lease contracts with a purchase option, sales of litigation goods, etc.).

### *b. Internal Legal Norms*

Proposals for **stabilising and speeding up disinvestments** include: drastic reduction of the current processing time, complete planning of the asset disposal process, initiation of activities to physically and legally clear the properties and avoidance of excessive formalities by using procedural control mechanisms for disinvestments.

With this proposal, properties that are foreseen as unnecessary for both the current year and for the short- or mid-term will be declared as such, activating the disposal process and reducing it to

less than half the current time required. For this purpose, the Headquarters and possibly the Central Organ's Management Centres will elaborate annually a list of proposed properties **that are deemed unnecessary in a period of approximately three years**, to include in the **Properties Plan**.

This proposal would result in internal Ministry norms to **Expedite Property Disposal Procedures and Impulse the Infrastructures Policy of the Ministry of Defence**.

### 3.- Integral Management of the Infrastructure Resources

These resource management proposals begin a top-down planning process described in the **Infrastructure Management Instructions** proposed in the Impulse Plan. The process will begin with an **Infrastructure Plans Coordination Document** that will specify the General Objectives of Long- and Mid-term Plans and Annual Infrastructure Programmes, their **critical factors and performance indicators**, the economic panorama and annual budget forecast, the **priority criteria** and the timeframe for execution. The outcome will be the approval of the **Management Plan for Infrastructure in the Mid- and Long-term** (6 and 15 years) and the execution of the corresponding **Annual Infrastructure Programmes**; which once approved will indicate the infrastructure budget for each of the Ministry of Defence components. Each phase of the process will close with an **Annual Control of the Management of Infrastructures**, which will permit adjustments and corrections, resetting the process.

In addition, the planning and programming method to be used by the **Headquarters will be standardised, encouraging advance contracting and avoiding reprogramming**, which is derived from deficient planning, among other things. More information will be available for greater awareness of the

extension and conditions of infrastructure, allowing for greater control. This facilitates a more effective and efficient centralised direction and decentralised execution of management.

**Integral management** as described here, and including the definition and implementation of the Defence environmental policy, will span the **four phases** in which infrastructure is considered as a resource. Procurement, maintenance and retirement are taken into account in each of these phases, which are:

- The directing phase: establishment of the Long- and Mid-term Infrastructure and Environmental **Policy**.
- Planning and determining **needs**.
- Annual programming and **budgeting**.
- **Execution**.

Coherent with the lines traced, integral management will also include **means and mechanisms for monitoring and controlling** the prior phases. This will ensure a speedy and adequate reaction and will benefit the management of resources and disinvestments plans and procedures.

To finalise the integral management process, the Impulse Plan will provide the means to ensure and reflect effective coordination with the management of NATO Infrastructure in national territory.

## 4.- Coordination of the Infrastructure Policy

Activities derived from the Asset Disposal Policy or disinvestments are closely linked to activities based on

Resource Management or investment. They require **coordination** by an appropriate **monitoring** organ capable of making decisions and taking the necessary corrective or affirming action as anomalies are detected, with the involvement of the affected organisms.

Given their complexity and weight, **this monitoring organ** will also **monitor and control** the Asset Disposal Plan and Resource Management.

Consequently, the **Impulse Plan** will propose the creation of a **Monitoring Committee for the Infrastructure Management Plan**. It would select and direct **actions** based on the degree of progress or fulfilment of the Properties Plan (that forecasts and lists unnecessary properties), the Infrastructure Management Plan, the Programmes, Operations and Projects, for:

- Immediate or deferred **promotion or refocusing** of the asset disposals that have been forecasted.

- Immediate **reprogramming** of the appropriate construction projects.

- **Modification** of Programmes and **alteration** of the appropriate Infrastructure Plans, in conjunction with the annual or bi-annual Infrastructure Meetings.

This committee will be headed by the SEDEF and composed of the Infrastructure authorities for the Directing Centres and Headquarters.

There will also be a proposal for a **Supervising Commission** within the Committee to act as an auxiliary organ for the assigned tasks.

# III. COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS (CIS) POLICY

## 1.- The Impact of CIS on Defence

The transformations in modern societies due to new technologies have carried over into the realm of Defence. Communications and Information Technologies influence Defence in areas such as:

- **Planning and management of telecommunications and information resources**, with shorter life cycles than those of other resources (i.e. armament and materiel and infrastructures) and different procurement procedures that generally affect the entire organisation. This implies that specific needs should be coordinated with and subject to corporate requirements.

- In addition, the possibility of rapid recognition of the needs of any organisational element will allow **shorter time frames** for procurement of resources.

- Emphasis will be placed on the **use of forces** capable of projection and action in diverse scenarios. Instead of placing heavy equipment on the field, projected forces will be able to establish a **network** in their area of responsibility, allowing control of a physical theatre (ground, air or even maritime) and **information superiority**. The equipment to be installed will be composed of a set of networks capable of gathering, transmitting, processing and disseminating information as well as directing a set of intelligent and precise weapons systems. These forces will be assembled ***ad hoc* and composed of modular components adapted to the specific type of operation**. These forces will

generally operate in theatres that lack infrastructures, in contrast with the Cold War era's fixed infrastructures, static force organisation and rigid concepts of use.

- Given the possibility of rapidly transmitting information to the very lowest levels, **military Command and Control** decision-making will be based on networks. In this **new way of exercising command**, scattered networks give new value and autonomy to subordinate levels. At the same time, the command will have a more complete information and exact understanding of the situation. Traditional hierarchical structures will need to be complemented with horizontal structures that allow coordinated action of heterogeneous forces and systems.

Future command organisms will also handle all sorts of **real-time information** with lighter means and more scattered deployments, providing higher degrees of survivability.

- **Political feedback**: the availability of information provides an overall view of the crisis or conflict, facilitating the capacity for real-time response. With few exceptions, actions during crises will be of a **multinational nature**. Crisis resolution will be increasingly agile and adapted to the situation as it involves the participant nations in joint decision-making. **Decision-making processes will be supported by simulation systems**; immediate feedback will be available concerning the consequences of decisions.

- **Coherence with national politics**: one of the Government's key priorities has been to **help Spanish society adjust to new technologies**. This was the purpose of the late-1999 "Government Initiative for Developing the Information Society-INFO XXI: The Information Society for Everyone".

This Initiative is part of the **Action Plan INFO XXI** covering normative measures and specific promotion and investment activities that involve over 300 different actions and projects along three main lines:

- Promoting new technologies.
- Empowering the Spanish electronic administration.
- Access to the Information Society.

The Ministry of Defence's participation in this Initiative has been channelled through the **Management Plan for Information and Telecommunications Systems**, one of the 21 most significant actions of the INFO XXI Plan.

- **Contributing to the policy of professionalising the SAF**. The dual axis of **modernisation-professionalisation** is the key to the Armed Forces (SAF) new model. Modernisation depends heavily on support for the use of new technologies to multiply operational capability and reduce force numbers.
- **Obtaining the greatest efficiency from costly weapons systems**. The importance of communications and information systems in the effective use of weapons systems is increasingly evident. Due to their complexity and the rate of action, information must be provided in "real time", then simultaneously processed and adequately disseminated using **integrated and interoperable** systems.
- **Benefiting from our participation in international actions**. Currently, external interventions almost always occur in a multinational setting, where each nation provides different types of forces according to its

possibilities and the directives set in its national policies. The relative weight of each nation in the multinational force does not depend solely on the volume and quality of the forces it assigns.

Regardless of a nation's combat equipment or the quality of its officers, it will always play a secondary role if unable to **lead a multinational unit**. As a result, the effort in assigning forces is not rewarded with a capacity to influence decision-making, diminishing this nation's visibility in the overall multinational force. Leadership is tied to the capability to provide CIS from the command level in consideration all the way down through the subordinate levels.

If our nation aspires to a leadership role in an international mission, it must be capable of commanding a multinational unit and providing the necessary information and telecommunication systems. The development and use of these systems strengthens the role of our forces within multinational coalitions and yields the maximum "**political profit**" from the effort.

## 2.- Specific Requirements for Defence

**The particular features of the Ministry of Defence** are a very important factor to consider when implementing these technologies. As part of the State Administration, the Ministry of Defence has some of the same characteristics as other Ministry Departments in regards to functioning procedures, relations, etc. But it also has other unique characteristics that should be highlighted:

- A **very complex structure** that must harmonise the Service Headquarters authority over Force organisation and preparation, the operational responsibility of the Defence

Staff, and the Central Organ's authority to direct and develop the various sector policies.

- The need for **its own telecommunications** to serve the operational systems and to facilitate integration and interoperability with equivalent NATO systems and with national systems of other organisms (Office of the Head of State, Ministry of Interior, etc.). Other telecommunications systems are also needed for the rest of the management systems (logistics, economics, infrastructure, etc.), similar to those of other Ministries.

- The Information Systems used in management and operational command and control must be **integrated and interoperable with the systems used** by NATO.

- **Complex weapons systems** –aircrafts, frigates, submarines, tanks, etc.– that carry the latest technological advances, acting in real time and compatible with the systems of our allies.

- **Security.** In this Ministry, security cannot be ignored. A global security policy must be established due to the need for high levels of information protection, especially in certain areas.

Given the rapid evolution of the Information and Communications Technologies, it is understandable that **some degree of scattering and isolation would currently exist among the systems used**, hindering their maximum performance. The current challenge is to integrate these systems, achieving interoperability and organising the available information for use as **a decision-making tool**, providing each command level and situation with the essential and priority data.

## 3.- The Ministry of Defence's Management Plan for CIS

The Ministry of Defence's **Management Plan for Information and Telecommunications Systems** is part of the Government actions established within the INFO XXI Action Plan for the 2001-2003 period, developed by the General State Administration for the Information Society and New Technologies. The purpose of the CIS Management Plan is to **establish the Ministry of Defence Policy for Information and Communications Technology (ITC)**, determining needs and defining and prioritising the actions necessary for that policy.

Responsibility for the execution of this policy corresponds to the **CIS Management Plan Commissioner**, under the Secretariat of State for Defence. The Commissioner will direct, manage, and monitor the CIS Management Plan, along the **following main lines**:

- As with other State Administration organisms, and companies of significant size, the Ministry of Defence handles classical resources (personnel, economical, infrastructure, etc.) in a very set way. In the new strategic situation, **information is considered as another resource, moreover, a strategic one**, and therefore of equal and sometimes greater significance than the others.

- **Technical personnel** are indispensable due to the growing needs in these technological areas. The various organisms involved in the Ministry of Defence should determine the real overall needs for technical personnel and define their profiles. In addition, it is particularly important to establish a **career model** and create an effective motivation plan to make this field attractive.

- **Investments** in information and telecommunication systems should stay at the **priority levels** of the last few years. Given the constant rate of technological innovation, only an extensive effort to implement these systems will provide adequate results.

- Given the predominance of ICT use in the **civil realm**, it is important to take full advantage of **the evolution of the market**, avoiding in-house development as much as possible. This would optimise economic management and facilitate rapid adaptation to changes in this field.

- As with other areas in the Ministry of Defence, **outsourcing of services** should be promoted except in operational or strategic areas as defined on a case-by-case basis.

- **A new global security policy** should be defined for integrating all aspects of information and telecommunications technology. Consequently, a **Ministry Security Plan** should be developed along with a structure to manage it.

- As with other resources, **a specific organic structure** must be created to direct and execute Department policy on Information and Telecommunications Systems. Similar to the civil arena, this structure will decisively influence the organisation's functioning procedures, introducing structural changes to effectively meet needs.

- **Planning and management organs for the CIS realm** should be developed **in the Defence Staff and in the three Services** in order to consolidate this new structure. Critical to this is the creation of specific organs responsible for CIS and its security within each field.

- **Information systems** should be developed using **functional** criteria. They should support the functional areas involved, not the various departmental organic structure centres.

- The Ministry should have a **single Global Telecommunications Network** composed of **two domains**. **One domain** will be composed of our own resources integrated into a Military Telecommunications System to serve command and control. **The other domain** will be composed of external resources that form a general-purpose corporate network.

- **Two extensive area networks** should be established to form a **software platform**. **The first** will support command and control and should be capable of interconnecting with the tactical environment, with similar NATO systems and with the necessary sensor network. **The second** should support all information systems that are not specifically for command and control and be extended to all installations.

- There should be a **single technical direction** of the various systems and networks **in the entire Department**. Except for those systems related to Command and Control under the responsibility of the **Chief of the Defence Staff**, the direction and management of the Departmental networks and systems should also be centralised.

- The Ministry of Defence must develop **tight coordination** in this area. To **avoid duplications or gaps**, the guidelines prescribed by the CIS Management Plan should not be overlooked in the Department Directing Centres when preparing the Management Plans.

# ANNEX

# G

# NORMATIVE AND ORGANISATIONAL CONSEQUENCES

# INDEX

## NORMATIVE AND ORGANISATIONAL CONSEQUENCES


I. BASIC CRITERIA OF NATIONAL DEFENCE AND MILITARY ORGANISATION ..... 301

1.- Conceptual Framework for Defence and Security 302

2.- National Defence Organs..... 303

3.- National Contribution to Security and Defence .... 305

4.- Armed Forces ..... 306

5.- Higher Organs of the Armed Forces ..... 308

II. BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE SERVICES..... 311

III. INSTITUTIONAL REPRESENTATION ..... 315

IV. PERIPHERAL STRUCTURE OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ..... 317

V. FOREIGN REPRESENTATION OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ..... 319

# ANNEX G

# NORMATIVE AND ORGANISATIONAL CONSEQUENCES

The preparation of the Strategic Review involved an acceptance of the need to renovate the organisation of National Defence and the Armed Forces, as well as the structures of the Services, the peripheral organisation and the Department's foreign representation. As a result, **a series of Royal Decrees** have been approved and a **bill** is currently being developed with the following criteria:

## I. BASIC CRITERIA OF NATIONAL DEFENCE AND MILITARY ORGANISATION

Since the enactment of **Organic Law 6/1980** (of July 1), regulating the Basic Criteria of National Defence and Military Organisation, which was reformed in **Organic Law 1/1984** (of January 5), **profound and radical changes** have taken place that have decisively impacted the organic concepts and criteria defined and developed there.

The **strategic environment** has changed substantially over the life of this law, mainly due to the disappearance of the Cold War geopolitical blocks and the development of a new international relations framework.

In this time, Spain has joined international Security and Defence organisations and alliances, and since 1986 has been a member of the European Union, which has progressively assumed responsibilities in the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Since the early 1990's, Spanish Armed Forces have participated in **missions outside our borders**, becoming an effective instrument of Foreign Policy.

Our **Armed Forces** have also experienced a series of structural changes over the last 20 years that have influenced their missions and their deployment scenarios.

The multiple factors involved in this new situation require a revision of the legal framework regulating the **basic criteria of National Defence and Military Organisation**.

The following criteria have been determined for establishing the new conception of National Defence and Military Organisation:

## 1.- Conceptual Framework for Security and Defence

- **National Defence** is the essential element of national security, representing the disposition and integration of the necessary actions to protect the national interests in the face of risks, threats or aggressions that require the **use of the Armed Forces.**

- Our country's involvement in **shared security and collective defence** commitments with our allies places responsibility on the entire State.

- **The response** to current or foreseeable security risks and threats must be **proportional** to their size, seriousness and extent.

- When the **concept of Defence is associated with the broader concept of Security**, which covers all the defensive implications of the former, it is known as **Security and Defence**.

- The fundamental purpose of the Security and Defence Policy is to contribute to **achieving the national objectives** by maintaining stability and countering the risks or threats that might affect these.

- The **Armed Forces form a basic pillar** in the construction of Security and Defence, a flexible instrument with capacity for action wherever needed and according to Government guidelines.

- **The Defence Policy,** as the **fundamental component of the Security and Defence Policy,** contributes to achieving Security and Defence Objectives via its own objectives, organisation, potential and Armed Forces preparation, as well as through large programmes for procuring capabilities.

## 2.- National Defence Organs

- **The King** exercises **supreme command** of the Armed Forces, and other powers described in the Constitution, the Royal Ordinances and the rest of the legal order concerning National Defence.

- The Parliament approves the **laws** and the corresponding budgetary appropriations **for Security and Defence** and controls Governmental and Military Administration actions. They also debate the general features of Security and Defence, or Defence Policy.

- The Government **determines** Security and Defence Policy, and **determines and directs** Defence Policy. It also directs the Military Administration.

- The President of the Government **directs** the Security and Defence Policy, and sets the directives that establish its

objectives and basic lines of action, as well as those needed for participation in collective defence and shared security organisations.

- The President of the Government **directs wartime actions and manages crises**, or contributes to this through involvement in security and defence organisations and alliances.

- As director of the Government's actions, the President **has authority to direct the actions** of the Armed Forces.

- The Minister of Defence is responsible for **developing and executing the Defence Policy**, defining and formulating the planning process to ensure the common efforts of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defence organisms towards Security and Defence.

- The Minister of Defence **directs the actions of the Armed Forces** under the authority of the President of the Government, exercising the normative powers and disciplinary actions established for the direction and execution of Defence Policy. This position in the Government also involves directing the Military Administration.

- The **National Security and Defence Council** is the official advisory and consultative organ of the Government, to inform His Majesty the King and advise the President of the Government in matters of Security and Defence.

- **His Majesty the King** presides in the Council when it meets to inform him, and the **President of the Government** presides over it otherwise. This Council is composed of:

Vice-Presidents (when this office is occupied), the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Interior, the Chief of the Defence Staff, and the Secretary of State Head of the National Intelligence Centre.

- The Council will assist the President of the Government in **directing war efforts** or armed conflict and in **managing crises**.

- The Council will **advise** on any **Security and Defence** matters as requested by the **Government**, and on the broad guidelines of the Defence Policy as established by the Ministry of Defence.

## 3.- National Contribution to Security and Defence

- **Civil Preparation** is one of the basic components of National Defence and involves supplying all sorts of resources that are not strictly military. It will be carried out through **Civil Emergency Planning**.

- The additional participation of citizens in National Defence shall be based on a **principle of contribution** that is **proportional** to the risk or threat that must be met, through incorporation of temporary, voluntary or compulsory reservists as established by law.

- The supply of material resources for National Defence should be regulated by law to facilitate the **acquisition, rental, mobilisation** or other provision of additional resources required by the Armed Forces.

- The contribution to Security and Defence by State Security Forces and Corps, Autonomous Community Police Forces or any other local police should be facilitated by

coordinating regulations to allow the integration and effective participation of these corps.

- In times of peace the Civil Guard answers to the **Ministry of the Interior**, except when carrying out **missions of a military type** assigned by the Government or the Ministry of Defence, who would have the authority in that case. The Civil Guard will answer exclusively to the Ministry of Defence during times of war or armed conflict and throughout the entire duration of a siege.

- Industry involved in Defence interests is a **fundamental element** for guaranteeing the procurement of military capabilities.

## 4.- Armed Forces

- **The Armed Forces** –composed of Army, Navy and Air Force– are the essential element of National Defence and a basic pillar in establishing Security and Defence. They will possess the necessary flexibility to develop the capacity for action wherever needed, following the guidelines set by the National Government.

- Understood as **one single entity**, the Armed Forces will be an integrating force for the actions of each of its components, without negating the distinctive qualities and traditions of each. In addition, the Common Corps are jointly available to the entity as a whole.

- The **regime regulating military personnel** will be established by law and will include staff posts, rank levels, positions, promotions and incentives, entry and retirement, and military education.

- The Armed Forces will be organically structured within the Ministry of Defence and its **organisation** will be coherent with the following principles:

- **Joint action**, the basic principle of action and organisation for the Armed Forces.

- Flexibility.

- Functionality.

- Regeneration capability.

- Capability of each Service to adapt to the environment in which it operates.

- Working towards a higher good by harmonising Armed Forces objectives and personnel objectives, with the former prevailing over the latter.

- Orienting the organisation towards preparing and providing units for use in specific, joint or combined missions assigned to the Armed Forces.

- The Armed Forces will be organised into **two structures**. The **organic structure** is to prepare the Force, and the **operational structure** is to use the Force in assigned missions. The organic structure must be ready for operational activation through an agile, straightforward and effective process.

- The Services will be set up with the maximum **uniformity** in their basic organisation while honouring as much as possible the **traditions and distinctive qualities** of their own forms of action.

## 5.- Higher Organs of the Armed Forces

- The Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), directly subordinate to the Minister of Defence and assisted by the Joint Defence Staff, will be the main **military advisor to the Government**, assisting the Minister of Defence in the framing and execution of the operational aspects of the Defence Policy.

- The Chief of the Defence Staff will be the **national military representative** in international security and defence organisations.

- Under the direction of the President of the Government and Minister of Defence, the Chief of the Defence Staff will be responsible for **military strategic direction** and **command of the operational structure**, assuming the role of Operational Commander of the Armed Forces. The Chief of the Defence Staff will direct the operations through a subordinate authority, the **Operations Command**, with the support of the necessary joint auxiliary command organ, specialised support organs and adequate technical means.

- Advised by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, the Chief of the Defence Staff **informs** the Minister of Defence of all Service needs and elaborates the military documents resulting from the general Defence Policy guidelines, which are then submitted to the Minister for approval.

- Within the Ministry of Defence framework, the necessary cooperative and **collaborative** relationships will be established between the Chief of the Defence Staff –with the corresponding higher organs– and the directing organs involved in the development of Chief of the Defence Staff's responsibilities.

- In addition to supervising the Armed Forces as its Operational Commander, the Chief of the Defence Staff is empowered to provide the Services with general guidelines to direct their **preparation for operational use**.

- Subordinate to the Chief of the Defence Staff, the **Chief of the Operations Command** will direct the Land, Naval and Air Forces necessary for operational missions in times of peace, crisis or war. This Command will oversee the exercises needed for joint and combined training and evaluation of the standing operational plans. An operational Joint Defence Staff will assist in this process.

- **The post** of Chief of the Defence Staff will be filled by a highest-ranking General in the Armed Forces, who will have the maximum seniority during tenure in this post and standing equal to a Secretary of State. The assignment and termination of this post will be carried out as stipulated by law.

- If for any reason the Chief of the Defence Staff is temporarily unable to carry out this role, the most senior member of the High Council of the Armed Forces will temporarily **step in** to this role.

- The **Army, Navy and Air Force Chiefs of Staff** will command the organic structures of their respective Services; subordinate to and answering directly to the Minister of Defence, whom they will advise and inform regarding the general condition of each of their Services and on matters related to particular features and traditions involving morale.

- The Service Chiefs of Staff will be responsible for the organisation and preparation of their respective Service within the criteria established by the Department so as to consistently guarantee that the necessary units and command and support organs are **assigned** to the operational structure. They are also responsible for overseeing the morale of the personnel in their respective Services.

- They will advise and inform the Chief of the Defence Staff on the degree of **effectiveness and preparation** of their Service in regards to the assigned resources and any needs as well as the repercussions of all this on the Defence Policy.

- Within the framework of the Ministry of Defence, the necessary **coordination and cooperation** links will be established between the Service Chiefs of Staff and equal or higher posts in the Departmental organs that are involved in the development of the responsibilities of the former.

- **The posts** of the Service Chiefs of Staff will be filled by a highest-ranking General of each Service. Assignment and termination of these posts will be carried out as stipulated by law and they will have standing as Under-Secretaries.

- If for any reason one of them is temporarily unable to carry out this role, the most senior subordinate Lieutenant General or Admiral will temporarily **step in** to this role.

- **The High Council of the Armed Forces** will be the official advisory organ for the Minister of Defence and the Chief of the Defence Staff in matters relating directly to the overall strategic situation and the Defence Policy. Its advice should

be considered mandatory in the cases specified by legal norms.

- The High Council will be organically structured within the Ministry of Defence and **presided** by the Minister, or the Chief of the Defence Staff when the Minister is absent. It is **composed of** these two and the Service Chiefs of Staff. Other civilian and military authorities from the Department may also attend, depending on the subject matter. It will have a **permanent work office** whose head will act as Secretary of the High Council, in accord with the established terms.

- The High Council will **advise and inform** in matters related to the general strategic situation, evaluation of possible threats, strategic management of operations, maximum efficiency of the Armed Forces, impact of the Defence Policy on the Armed Forces, planning for procurement of capabilities, joint doctrine and norms to be applied in the representation of the Military Institution.

## II. BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE SERVICES

Since the 1970's the three Services have progressively adopted structures that are increasingly functional while reducing the territorial aspect of their organisations. It is now time to completely overcome geographical factors, which in past centuries determined the structure of our Armed Forces, replacing them with **functional and operational factors**. Thus, in the last few years various normative regulations concerning the Services' organization have replaced territorial parameters with functional ones: the Army's META, RETO, and NORTE Plans; the Navy's Organic Law; and the Air Force's Organisation Plan.

The transformation of the territorial structures requires applying **efficiency, economy and functionality criteria** that allow the current territorial organisms to be concentrated in other functional ones with responsibilities for training, use and support of the Force. The commands involved will be liberated of any functions not directly related to their key responsibilities.

Since the current territorial structures are to disappear and it is necessary to transfer some of their activities to the Force Support, it is convenient to have a **more flexible structure** with greater capacity for adaptation to the particular form of action of each of the Services. All this should take place within a common framework under the centralised direction of the ministry of Defence's higher organs, which should permit as much homogeneity as possible and always facilitate joint action.

A Royal Decree on the Basic Organic Structure of the Services has been approved based on the **following criteria**:

1. The Army, Navy and Air Force will be composed of **Headquarters, Force and Force Support**, under the command of their respective Chiefs of Staff.

2. The **Headquarters** will be composed of a set of organs that constitute the human and material means necessary to assist the Chief of Staff in the exercise of command.

3. **The Force** is the set of human and material means intended or organised with the principle objective of preparing themselves to carry out military operations. This involves training and evaluation of units, and personnel instruction in the cases where this is required due to particular features or forms of action.

4. The organisation of the Force and its structure will follow **criteria for operability and effectiveness** on a specific, joint or combined level, adjusting also to its particular forms and means of action. The **organic structures** constituted within the Force will generally follow this model: **Command, auxiliary organ for Command, and Units.**

5. The three Service Chiefs of Staff will maintain their respective Forces with a form of organisation and deployment that always ensures their availability for total or partial **assignment** to the Joint Operational Command of the Armed Forces.

6. The **Force Support** is the set of organs responsible for directing, managing, administrating and controlling the material, financial and human resources assigned to each of the Services, as well as the logistical support activities that enable the life and functioning of units, centres and organisms.

7. Force Support will carry out the appropriate actions to provide its respective Services with what they need to **fulfil their commitments**, while giving priority to the commitments of the higher common or joint organs.

8. Force Support will be structured into **organs relating to the following areas**:

- Personnel.

- Logistical support.

- Economic affairs.

- Information and telecommunications systems.

  These areas may be **grouped** according to the needs of each Service's form of action, depending on the homogeneity of the activities developed.

9. The organs constituted will **functionally** depend on the Ministry of Defence's managing organs in the areas involved.

10. Answering directly to the Chief of the Defence Staff, the Commands or Head Offices of Force Support in the **area of assigned human resources** will have the main responsibility for directing, managing, administering and controlling personnel along with management, personnel assistance, health and education.

11. Answering directly to the Chief of the Defence Staff, the Commands or Head Offices of Force Support in the **area of logistic support and assigned material resources** will have the main responsibility for directing, managing, administering and controlling the material and logistic support, handling acquisition, re-supply and provisioning, maintenance, transport, infrastructure, information and telecommunications systems, weapons systems and construction, as well as base and barracks support, to the extent that each Service has specific authority for these activities.

12. Answering directly to the Chief of the Defence Staff, the Commands or Head Offices of Force Support in the **area of the assigned financial resources** will be principally responsible for the direction, management, administration and control of this resource and of contracting and accounting. They will also be responsible for the technical

draft of the Budget Bill and centralisation of all information for forward planning and execution of programmes such as the Budget. They will also administer the financial resources not expressly assigned to any other organ.

## III. INSTITUTIONAL REPRESENTATION

The representation of the Military Institution has been closely linked to its territorial structure. The possible **void** created by its disappearance should be filled. The process of replacing the territorial structure with a functional one must be done while maintaining certain traditional locations in order to give **the Armed Forces a visible presence in the entire national territory**.

Traditionally, each of the Services has been represented separately and this should be changed, given the conception of the Armed Forces as a single Institution.

It seems appropriate to maintain titles such as the **General Captaincy**[4] due to its deeply rooted tradition in the military and popular realms. It will only carry connotations of representation and will be used in this sense for the **Head Offices of the Higher Commands with Institutional Representation**.

For this purpose a Royal Decree for Institutional Representation has been approved following these **criteria**:

1. As Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, **His Majesty the King** is the highest institutional representative of them.

2. As the maximum authority for the Defence Policy, the **President of the Government** carries out institutional representation of the Armed Forces.

[4] Translator's note: Capitanía General.

3. As the maximum authority for developing, determining and executing the Military Policy, the **Minister of Defence** carries out institutional representation of the Armed Forces.

4. In a general sense, institutional representation will be unified under the **military authority or command** of the Service with the highest post rank in the territorial area where representation is to take place. This does not limit future decisions.

5. As the most visible member of the Armed Forces, the **Chief of the Defence Staff** will carry out institutional representation throughout the entire national territory and may delegate this to other military commands.

6. The **Service Chiefs of Staff** will carry out representation of their respective Services, and may delegate this to other commands from their Service.

7. The **Commands of the Services Principal Forces** will carry out representation in the territories where they are located.

8. Institutional representation at the Lieutenant General or Admiral level will be located preferentially in the current locations and will be exercised over several surrounding provinces. The current criterion will continue to be valid in the **Canary Islands**.

9. Institutional representation in a **province** will be carried out by the General or Officer of the Armed Forces with most seniority in that province.

10. In order to facilitate **transition** to the new institutional representation model, changes in Head Offices will be avoided as much as possible.

11. Efforts will be made to **balance out** representation throughout the national territory.

## IV. THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE'S PERIPHERAL STRUCTURE

The **principle of "integrated territorial management"** as one of the basic organisational criteria of the General State Administration seems to favour its rationalisation and simplification. The implementation of this principle requires some reforms to overcome the proliferation of the Department's peripheral organs and Autonomous Organisms within one same province, in order to achieve the **maximum physical and organic concentration possible**.

The **current spread** of Head Offices[5] involves an excessive personnel, material and infrastructure outlay that should be adjusted and resized according to workloads, diminishing the number of Head Offices.

As a result, a **Royal Decree** has been approved which provides a new peripheral organisation of the Ministry based on the **following criteria**:

1. The largest possible number of peripheral organs should be physically and organically **concentrated** in each provincial centre.

2. The **organisation** of each centre may cover all or some of these functional areas: recruiting, personnel, assets, raising horses, technical inspections, housing, infrastructure and Defence equipment, military construction and occupational safety.

[5] Translator's note: Delegaciones.

3. In order to facilitate the effective functioning of the centre, it will have a **Secretariat General** responsible for: personnel management, economic and financial administration, internal regime matters, coordination of common services and administrative information.

4. The internal **resizing** of the centres will be directly related to the number of its functional areas and its workload.

5. These centres will also have **legal counsel** and be under the **fiscal authority** of Defence's General Auditing Office. Their numbers will be adjusted in each territory to the needs and workload of each centre.

6. Yet to be specified are the provincial capitals that will have Head Offices since one **Head Office** may cover several provinces, so that in some of them it may only be necessary to have a **Branch Office**[6], dependent on the former, while other cities or geographical areas may only require a **Delegated Office**, which in turn will depend on the corresponding Branch Office.

7. The **Branch and Delegated Offices** will exercise in their territorial area the same functions as Head Offices in the functional areas covered.

8. The post of **Chief of the Head Offices** will be occupied by an officer in active service or in the reserve, with a post rank adjusted to the size and responsibilities required by these organisms. He will have the title of **Defence Delegate** and will basically coordinate, empower and supervise the internal services.

[6] Translator's note: Subdelegaciones.

9. The Head Offices of Defence will organically **be dependent** on the Department's Sub-secretariat, and the General Technical Secretariat will be responsible for coordinating, managing and inspecting them. The organ directly responsible for these functions will be the General Technical Vice-secretariat.

10. The **functional areas** established in each Head Office will depend organically on the Chief and functionally on the Department's Higher and Directing Organs, and on the public organisms linked to them and competent in these matters.

## V. FOREIGN REPRESENTATION OF THE MINISTRY

In the last few years, **significant changes have taken place in Spanish Defence Policy**, such as Spain's active participation in international missions, full integration in collective defence organisations at the supranational level, in multiple meetings, and in the national commitment by the political parties and society to have Spain contribute continuously to maintain and preserve peace through its Armed Forces, wherever they are required.

The creation of a **Secretariat General for Defence Policy** with the role of "directing the international aspects of defence Policy in coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, without threatening the principle of unity of the State's foreign action", meets the need for a directing organ specifically equipped to meet the challenges faced by Spain in the future evolution of European defence within the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

It was necessary to adjust the existing regulations on Defence Attachés to the **Defence Policy needs** by approving a Royal Decree with a new Defence Attaché profile, according to the following criteria:

1. In Diplomatic Missions and in Spain's Permanent Representations before International Organisations, when the objectives or areas of action are directly related to the Ministry of Defence's responsibilities, there may be any number of **Defence Counsellors** answering directly to the Ambassador or permanent representative of the Ambassador.

2. The Counsellors, as **members of the Diplomatic Missions and Permanent Representation,** will have the same status and responsibilities as the other members, according to their level.

3. The Counsellors will **organically and functionally** answer to the Minister of Defence through the Secretariat General for Defence Policy, while also maintaining the necessary **coordination and information links** with the Chief of the Defence Staff, the Secretary of State for Defence and the Service Chiefs of Staff, with each being responsible for their own corresponding area.

4. In the Counsellors Offices that need it, an **Assistant Counsellor** will work directly with the Counsellor and **Adjunct Counsellors** will principally attend to the areas that the Ministry of Defence finds necessary. They will be labelled correspondingly: **Military, Naval or Air Adjunct Counsellor**, as well as **Armament and Materiel Counsellor**.

5. The **intelligence activities** to be carried out by the Defence Counsellors will follow periodical plans that meet the needs of the Department and will be coordinated by the Secretariat General for Defence Policy.

# ANNEX

# H

# THE PROCESS BEHIND THE STRATEGIC DEFENCE REVIEW

# INDEX

## THE PROCESS BEHIND THE STRATEGIC DEFENCE REVIEW


I. INTRODUCTION ..... 325

II. CONCEPTUAL ANTECEDENTS ..... 325

III MINISTERIAL STRUCTURE AND SUPPORT ORGANS ..... 334

IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE REVISION PROCESS .. 337

1.- First Phase: "The Spanish Strategic Conception" 338

2.- Second Phase: "Determination of Capabilities" .... 339

V. EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE PARLIAMENTARY, INSTITUTIONAL AND SOCIAL CONSENSUS ..... 340

# ANNEX H

# THE PROCESS BEHIND THE STRATEGIC DEFENCE REVIEW

## I. INTRODUCTION

The **term "review"** suggests that **the Strategic Defence Review** is a revision of a previously existing position, when in fact it is the first overall analysis of everything relating to the national and international aspects of our country's defensive strategy.

In a broad sense, the **Strategic Review** examines the **basic issues in the field of Defence**, such as risks and threats, and traditional and new missions for the three Services, and culminates in a determination of the **capabilities** necessary to carry out the tasks already described.

These comments must be seen in the light of their **historical timing** and context, which influence the broad definition of the **Strategic Review concept**. The conclusions reached in prior moments of national or international evolution are clearly quite different from the conclusions of this study, which will have an extended but not unlimited validity. The implications of the fall of the Berlin Wall for the defensive strategy of all the European nations, or of the more recent tragic terrorist actions of September 11, 2001 are sufficient examples of this.

## II. CONCEPTUAL ANTECEDENTS

Spain's **National Defence Directive 1/2000** (published on December 1) was the result of a positive change in the field of Defence that began at the time of the **transition to democracy**.

This does not mean that the successive National Defence Directives have followed one set course, from Directive 1/1996 (6th Legislature) or from prior Directives such as 1/1986 and 1/1992, until Directive 1/2000. Rather, they have gradually evolved to reflect the strategic and defensive **changes in the international panorama**, which has undergone a complete transformation in the last few years.

The first of several key elements of the Strategic Review process appear in **Directive 1/1996**; with references to an **era of greater security** in European politics and strategy after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the approval of the Treaty on Conventional Forces, and the adoption of various **confidence and security-building measures** in a climate marked by **decreasing tension**. Directive 1/1996 also acknowledged the rise of conflicts with limited size but significant international impact, along with the threat of proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons and their means of delivery.

Around this time, the **Atlantic Alliance** developed a **new conception of its own security and defence**, and Spain became an active participant in a profound process of transforming allied structures, within the framework of international security and defence organisms. **Directive 1/1996 set the basic objectives for our Defence Policy**, with diverse references to the need for modernisation and improved effectiveness in the Spanish Armed Forces along with greater societal understanding of its tasks and commitments.

The above illustrates how Directive 1/1996 already included elements that would subsequently appear in the 2000 Directive, such as linkage of our security to that of surrounding countries and the increasing internationalisation of our Defence Policy. However, the aim of Directive 1/1996 was to balance the new

international reality with the traditional missions of the Armed Forces, in spite of the fact that they were clearly insufficient.

Before considering National Defence Directive 1/2000, a key document must be highlighted due to its clarity in explaining the Spanish Defence Policy: **The Report of the Joint Non-Permanent Congress/Senate Commission (May 1998)**, regarding the full professionalisation of the Armed Forces.

The content of this document went far beyond its title, **"The Professionalisation of the Armed Forces"** to introduce numerous broad considerations that can be placed within the overall context of the **Strategic Defence Review**.

Before a decision was made regarding the professionalisation of our Armed Forces, Representatives and Senators addressed the current global defence and security situation with an in-depth examination of the **changes in the international strategic scenario, the European and transatlantic security and defence framework, and the impact of new technologies on defence organisations and national armies**. Only after this phase did they proceed to analyse the transition from a **mixed model** of the Armed Forces to a fully professionalised model. The Members of Parliament also recognised that the disappearance of bi-polarity had not ended international conflicts. Rather, they were now appearing in a more complex, **"multi-directional and multi-faceted manner"**.

Given this scenario, Spain's defence should no longer be considered in an autarchic manner; instead it should be inspired by a new concept of **"shared security"** with our allies. At the same time, it would be necessary to advance in our own capability for self-defence while assuming responsibility for new international missions. The members of Parliament suggested that in Spain, as

in other countries, these issues could be compatible with the so-called **"peace dividend"**; that is, the tendency for European countries to reduce the size of their defence effort by increasingly committing themselves to **action within multinational organisms**.

It is important to mention the clear revolution in the **allied strategic concept** that took place during those years and was reflected in the April, 1999, NATO document, signed in Washington, D.C. by member Heads of State or Government. This extensive document used all the terms of classic political and strategic analysis to explain the evolution of the international arena and its expression in the tasks and objectives of the Atlantic Alliance.

In contrast with traditional goals of the Alliance such as **security, consultative mechanisms, and deterrence**, the Washington document defined two new and important missions for NATO: **crisis management**, such as in the particularly violent experience of the Balkan crisis; and the initiation of a **new association policy**, capable of including all the countries of our continent, old and new.

The document also included new analyses of the threats to our security, recognising that the threat of a large-scale aggression with conventional arms has been replaced by "**new multi-directional risks of both military and non-military nature that are difficult to foresee**".

The various paragraphs of the Washington document correspond to what might be called **an international culture of defence**, making it easy to find similarities with the other documents that have already been mentioned. For example, it recognised the need to function at all times within a **broad**

**concept of security**, that includes indispensable defensive actions while taking into account the political, economic, social, and environmental factors also mentioned in the Report of the Spanish Parliament. The similarities also refer to the need to defend the full usefulness of the transatlantic link, even though the original threat, of Eastern European regimes lacking freedom and full of expansive ambitions, has disappeared.

The Alliance also pointed out the need to modernise the Armed Forces of its member countries. This led to the launching of the **Defence Capabilities Initiative,** which has become a reference point in the programming of the various Ministries of Defence and a true challenge for all European countries; as this initiative may lead to **increasing the current budgets** in an era when Europe, since the introduction of the Euro, is characterised by **financial austerity, deficit reduction, and dedication to social and cultural projects**.

Nonetheless, the need for modernisation of Defence resources and the call to remedy the shortfalls as soon as possible gain a sense of urgency in the document when it describes **the missions of the Alliance's member Armed Forces**. It is evident that once these missions have been accepted, they cannot be delegated to the countries that have customarily led in this field, nor can all the weight of them fall on the United States. The Washington Document indirectly calls the allied countries to carry out an in-depth study of their own **Defence possibilities** and to take responsibility for developing their **respective strategic commitments**.

The **Spanish Defence White Paper 2000**, the fruit of an extensive effort to better define our defence's conditioning factors, occupies a prominent position among the successive studies on defence policy in Spain. Presented by the Ministry of Defence at

the end of the 6th Legislature, the Preface touches on issues similar to those already mentioned: "*In less than fifty years, we have witnessed a shift from a traditional concept of Defence as defending a territory to a concept of collective deterrence*", and have finally reached the dawn of a new phase of "*conceiving defence also as the projection of stability*".

The Defence White Paper has had an undeniable and far-reaching impact. It refers to the effort that will be needed –now that the soviet threat has disappeared– in order to prepare for a **more secure** but **less stable horizon spanning the next 15 years**. This document's definition of the **national security interests**, and its analysis of the **risks**, **threats and missions of the Armed Forces** were significant contributions to Defence thinking.

This document was broadly distributed and was the subject of numerous book reviews and commentaries in the national press and specialised media. This marked a large step forward in **involving society in defence issues**, something that is still deficient in our country. While it is true that the White Paper may have lacked both sufficient public debate and sufficient consensus for improving the implementation of our National Defence principles, it was a quality study that has occupied a key place in the thinking of many Spanish citizens and has undoubtedly **enhanced our Defence culture**.

Today, the Defence White Paper is still a valid reference point, containing rigorous analyses of each of the topics involved in both Western strategy and Spain's Defence Policy. However, the White Paper lacked **a strong operational nature**, so it did not serve to determine the various essential reforms needed, nor did it clearly establish the new **profile of our Armed Forces** for carrying out the various missions assigned to them **in the 21st century**.

It was evident at the time that the White Paper did not answer all the questions that arose and lacked a binding nature capable of actually producing a reform. For this reason, the **President of the Government** stated at the end of the Foreword: *"The conclusions inferred from this collective thinking will provide the basis for proceeding, when the time comes, to a Strategic Review of Defence in order to equip the Armed Forces with the essential military capabilities they need to act in the strategic landscape of the century that is dawning."*

Thus the **7th Legislature** began on a solid base and with undeniable progress in the area of Defence. After the General Elections of 2000, the Government and the Ministry of Defence made it a priority to replace the 1996 Directive with a **new Directive on National Defence**. The resulting National Defence Directive 1/2000 was signed by the President of the Government on December 1 of that year, undoubtedly the culmination of a series of new and hopeful criteria expressed in Directive 1/1996, which can clearly be considered a **Transition Directive.**

**Directive 1/2000** puts our Defence in a new dimension. Spain is now in the 21st century, participates fully in International Security and Defence Organisations, and its Strategic Concept is in large part linked to that of its Allies. This is expressly stated in Directive 1/2000, which declares that the objectives in the prior Directive 1/1996 have been to a large extent achieved. Looking towards the future, it seeks to continue the modernisation and professionalisation of our Armed Forces so that they can contribute to the **new role that Spain seeks to play in the world**. This expresses the logical ambition of the Spanish society for international projection.

This new strategy goes beyond purely defensive matters and seeks to **enhance the Spanish responsibilities on the**

**international scene**. The Directive accurately describes the Armed Forces as an **"instrument of the State's external action"**, reaching beyond traditional deterrence missions and defence of the national territory when the need arises.

This forward-looking definition of National Strategy owes itself to Spain's membership in International Security and Defence Organisations, **a Strategic Concept** that is linked to the **Allied Strategic Concept**, and a current scenario characterised by the **absence of a clear and defined threat to our territory**.

These circumstances indicate that the Armed Forces will have to act beyond traditional missions, through involvement in the **management of crises** that could threaten our security in various regions of the world.

**Directive 1/2000** is not just one more Directive. Its **innovative character** expresses the design of a new strategy that requires the present and future adaptation of our Armed Forces, as reflected in the following three **priority objectives**:

First, the Directive places Spain's security and defence in the framework of **"shared security and collective defence"** with our allies.

Second, it is based on possible uses of our Armed Forces that are very different from past missions. New missions include humanitarian aid, peace and crisis management operations, and conflict prevention. The Armed Forces are considered an **instrument of the State's external action**, establishing our presence in the collective security and defence organisations by contributing towards peace, security and stability maintenance.

The process of integrating National Defence into the State's external action is even more prominent in the Directive's Preamble, which refers to the creation of the **Foreign Policy Council** in order to **conceive and execute a national strategy** that would necessarily include both Foreign Policy and Defence Policy.

Finally, the Directive establishes as its third objective to **foster a consciousness of national defence** in Spanish society by developing a **defence culture**.

The implementation of these **three objectives** follows **eight basic lines** of Defence Policy that should guide Ministry of Defence actions during the entire 7th Legislature. The first basic line consists of carrying out a **Strategic Review of Defence**, centred around integrating Defence into the broader framework of shared security with our partners and allies and determining the military capabilities necessary for responding to the demands derived from this. This implies that the Review should address in a joint and global manner all the organic, functional, and operational issues related to Defence in order to adapt them to the new strategy. The mandate for the Strategic Review came at an ideal time, as the process of professionalising our Armed Forces was virtually finalised and Spanish participation in shared security tasks was increasing in the context of a renewed effort at modernising our military resources.

In addition, as was expressly indicated in the Directive, the Strategic Review of Defence was to be elaborated with **the greatest possible consensus in the parliamentary, institutional and social contexts**.

Another basic line in National Defence Directive 1/2000 that should be highlighted involves "decisively strengthening the

Defence Culture so that Spanish society assumes ownership of any questions related to its security, its liberty and the defence of its interests."

It is evident that **Strategic Review and Defence Culture** are closely linked, in that the Strategic Review must have a direct projection in our own society and our **society** in turn must serve as the **source of inspiration and control for the Strategic Review**.

## III. MINISTERIAL STRUCTURE AND SUPPORT ORGANS

Conscious of the challenge involved, the Ministry of Defence began to reform its own organisational structure a few months after Directive 1/2000 was enacted, in order to equip itself with new instruments to facilitate success in this new task. **Royal Decree 64/2001 created a Secretariat General for Defence Policy (SEGENPOL),** describing it as a *"directing organ and principal aid to the Minister in directing the Department's Defence Policy"*. It described in great detail thirteen different functions for this organ, among which we may highlight Section G): *"to direct the elaboration of Directives in matters of Defence Policy and military policy"*.

Along these lines, the creation of the **Secretariat General for Defence Policy** has served to give the maximum possible impulse to the beginning of a **Strategic Review of Defence**, entrusted to this Secretariat General as its **priority activity and objective**.

With this express mandate, on February 12, 2001, the new Secretary General for Defence Policy stepped into his role and began to proceed with the Review. That very day, after comments by the Minister and other members of the **"Ministry's Board of**

**Directors"**, which includes the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Service Chiefs of Staff, a process began which has continued step by step until now.

This Council has heard from and debated with various groups that will be mentioned in the following paragraphs. When appropriate, the Minister has presented these findings to the **President of the Government**, due to his executive position, as well as to **His Majesty the King**, on account of **his direct participation in the life of the Spanish Armed Forces**.

The **principal executive organ** in this entire process has been the **"Strategic Review Coordination Group", presided by the Secretary General for Defence Policy**, and bringing together representatives of all the **Ministry's highest posts**. The objectives of this group have been: to establish the basic criteria for the Review process; to determine the members and approve the procedural norms of the work groups, seminars and forums involved in elaborating the corresponding studies; to coordinate the work of these groups to ensure that they are carried out according to the basic criteria, orienting them when necessary; to study and evaluate the conclusions of the work groups, and agree on the final document of the Strategic Review, based on these many written contributions.

A **"Support Team"** was created to assist the **"Coordination Group"** in the Strategic Review, drawn from the SEGENPOL's Studies Area and reinforced with other members of this Secretariat General. When necessary, the Secretary of Defence (SEDEF), the Under-Secretary of Defence (SUBDEF), the Defence Staff (EMAD), the Study and Monitoring Group (GES) and other Departmental organisms were asked to designate representatives for this team.

The **responsibilities** of this "Support Team" were to: support the Coordination Group in all its studies and work, gather information pertinent to the Review, make proposals as to the basic criteria needed to move the process forward, carry out the necessary comparative studies for the Review, facilitate information to all the participants in the Review's work groups, analyse the conclusions of the various work groups and present the corresponding reports to the Coordination Group.

Along with this, from the very beginning of this process there was a request to create **"Cooperative Cells"** in each of the Service Headquarters that might serve to maintain close contact with the SEGENPOL during the Review process, so as to ensure the involvement of the greatest possible number of specialists. This desire to involve the largest possible number of participants in constructive interaction concerning the Review led to a willingness on the part of the SEGENPOL for **other cooperative cells** to be formed in civil and military organisms, such as our Permanent Representatives at NATO and at the European Union's Political and Security Committee, and in educational centres such as the military academies and the Superior Academy of the Armed Forces.

Along another line, two **"Consultative Groups"**, personally presided by the SEGENPOL, were formed to act as a sounding board for the main concerns expressed by military personnel concerning the Review process. The numerous meetings of these groups have allowed various representatives of our Armed Forces and other specialists to freely, informally and sincerely express their own views. The work from these "Consultative Groups" has been enormously enlightening as extremely sincere opinions and proposals have been offered for each of the principal problems.

The **first** Consultative Group was composed of career diplomats and high-ranking active or reserve military personnel. The **second** Consultative Group was composed of military personnel from the Lieutenant Colonel rank or lower, including representatives of the Non-Commissioned Officer category. The second group of officers were drawn from the various Division Plans of the Headquarters, the Joint Defence Staff Strategic and Military Cooperation Division, and the Cabinets of the MINISDEF, SEDEF, SUBDEF, SEGENPOL and the Chief of the Defence Staff, with balanced representation from the three Services.

The work on the Strategic Defence Review began with two **"Debate Forums"** hosted by **the Spanish Strategic Studies Institute**, which reports to the **Directorate General for Institutional Relations**, and involving prestigious professors, doctors, journalists, diplomats, high civil servants and military personnel.

The various **"Work Groups"** had a very active part in the Strategic Review, with each group commencing its research at the appropriate time as the overall process developed. These groups were composed of officers from the Ministry and the various Headquarters.

## IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE REVIEW

The SEGENPOL directed the elaboration of an internal set of **Instructions** so as to establish the norms for the development of the Review.

This process has taken place in **two distinct phases**. The **first** was directed towards **defining and describing the framework and objectives of the Strategic Conception**. The **second** was

aimed at **determining the military capabilities** needed by the Armed Forces to guarantee the fulfilment of the missions assigned.

## 1.- First Phase: "The Spanish Strategic Conception"

The first part of this work consisted in **reformulating the Spanish Strategic Conception**. This involves our **security interests**, the **risks** that we must face and the possible **scenarios**, in a range of options spanning from peace to armed conflict, including greater or lesser crises outside our borders.

**Debate Forum A** analysed **"the international context of Spanish security"** with the purpose of **establishing the characteristics of the international environment** that Spain currently experiences, in regards to both the security of its interests and the defence of the national objectives in cases of tension or crisis. Its method for carrying out this task consisted of a rigorous analysis of two fundamental documents that have already been mentioned, the Defence White Paper 2000 and the Defence Directive 1/2000, in order to draw from them a current strategy. Then, the problems that affect or may affect us in the coming decade were placed in the strategic scenario of our interests and the projection of objectives. The **final report** from this group presented an **analysis of the influence of political, social and economic factors on Spanish interests in the various scenarios analysed**.

The second of these groups, **Debate Forum B**, studied the **"risks and threats to Spanish society in the coming decade"**, in an attempt to identify, discover and evaluate the possible evolution of present **risk factors** as well as others that might appear in this decade, without distinguishing a priori whether they come from inside or outside Spanish society.

In this conceptual phase, **Work Group 1**, composed entirely of officers, had the job of **studying and defining the National interests, the risks or threats** that might affect them and the possible **scenarios** where the Armed Forces might carry out their responsibilities in order to meet their commitments.

After this first examination of interests, risks and scenarios, the objective of **Work Group 2** was to define the **general missions of the Armed Forces**. They began with the missions in Article 8 of the Constitution concerning providing the security that ensures the achievement and preservation of our national interests, and proceeded in full awareness of the evolution of the international panorama and the number of situations in which Allied Armed Forces have been obliged to intervene through peace maintenance missions or humanitarian aid. This group's task was to convert these general missions into specific derived missions and subsequently into concrete **military tasks**, in order to **estimate the forces** necessary to execute them.

## 2.- Second Phase: "Determination of Capabilities"

Once the Conceptual Phase was completed and the new Spanish Strategic Concept had been delineated, the **second phase** of the Strategic Review began. Through a series of successive work groups, the necessary military capabilities were determined that would ensure the fulfilment of the missions assigned to the Armed Forces.

At the beginning of this second phase, **Work Group 3** was created, led by a General. It made an important contribution in the area under its responsibility: **"Level and Size of Forces"**. Using as a basis the studies carried out in the Conceptual Phase (concerning strategic objectives, interests, risks and scenarios, and definitions of the missions and military commitments of the

Armed Forces), this group studied the **volume and quality of the necessary forces**, considering the length of military operations and the possibility of simultaneous operations.

Within the general framework established for the work carried out in these groups, the studies were approached from **two different perspectives**: one of **shared security and collective defence**, and one of **solitary national defence considerations**.

At the same time, **Work Group 4**, also headed by a General, was created with the objective of studying **"Joint Action and Reaction Forces"**, in compliance with what was expressed in National Defence Directive 1/2000; essentially that organic, functional and operational questions in the area of Defence should be approached jointly. This work group was composed of **two subgroups**: the **first** addressed strategic management, operational management and Reaction Forces, while the **second** focussed on studying Joint Logistics.

**Other groups** were established to study both Human and Material Resources under the supervision of the **SUBDEF** and the **SEDEF** respectively. The Study and Monitoring Group **(GES)** was responsible for analysing the normative consequences.

## V. EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE PARLIAMENTARY, INSTITUTIONAL AND SOCIAL CONSENSUS

National Defence Directive 1/2000 stipulated that the Strategic Review should be elaborated with the **broadest possible consensus** in the parliamentary, institutional and social arenas.

The process chosen to best achieve this involved principally the creation of several groups of experts, thus ensuring **participation by representatives of the various segments of our**

**society**. Our actions needed to be compatible with the two traditional paths. On the one hand, **a top-down definition process** would ensure that the instructions needed for the development of the Review were never lacking, in regard to the needs and, especially, the specific possibilities of our country. On the other hand, a **bottom-up work method** would take into consideration the diversity of opinions and knowledge of the social agents that are most relevant to this important process.

In order to achieve this triple consensus, three important **seminars** were organised by the Secretariat General for Defence Policy.

**The first** had an **international character** and involved broad participation of civilian and military authorities in a debate on **what should be the missions and commitments of our Armed Forces over the next 15 years**, based on the experience of other countries that have recently undergone processes similar to the Review. Throughout the three days of the seminar, the contributions of representatives from **the United Kingdom, Belgium the United States, Norway and the European Union** served to complement the studies already carried out by the Ministry of Defence. During this seminar a Round Table was organised that included specialised journalists, in an attempt to get in touch with the public opinion through them. Another Round Table involved the spokespersons of the various parliamentary political groups that were present in the Defence Commission of the House of Representatives, so as to fulfil the mandate of achieving the maximum **political consensus**.

**The second seminar** was **national in character** and sought to debate the **modernisation of the Services**, considering conceptual and organisational issues as well as aspects of

equipment and weapons systems. Along this line, it became evident that the idea of the Armed Forces constituting **one single entity** is an indispensable condition. In addition to this, the participation of significant personalities from various social segments in the seminar facilitated progress towards **institutional and social consensus**.

The topics debated in the **third seminar on the Strategic Defence Review** were the **human resources** of the Armed Forces, as well as the **military capabilities and weapons systems** of the Services. The proceedings of the two prior seminars were also presented.

In order to keep the various **Parliamentary Political Groups** adequately informed as to the progress of the various tasks involved in the Strategic Review, **the Secretary General for Defence Policy** appeared before the **Defence Commission of the Congress of Deputies (House of Representatives)** in June, 2001 and before the **Senate Defence Commission** in February, 2002. In addition to this, the **Minister of Defence** has maintained regular bilateral contacts with the representatives of the main parties in order to achieve the necessary political consensus.

The SEGENPOL has also sought to involve **public opinion** in the key ideas of the Strategic Review. To this end, it has carried out three different types of **surveys** to **identify the opinions and concerns** of the citizens on these matters. **One of them** was included in the regular surveys carried out by **the Institute for Sociological, Economic and Political Analysis (ASEP)**. The **second** survey was administered by the **"Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies" (IEEE)** and contained thirty questions posed to representatives in the areas of education, science, culture, the media, the trade unions, diplomacy and banking. The **third** survey was developed by the SEGENPOL's **Studies Area** and consisted

of open questions directed to specialists, in order to gather deeper insights regarding the Review.

The results of the surveys have led to some important conclusions. A majority of the respondents manifested their desire for the National Defence Policy to be **the result of consensus** between Government and opposition, in contrast with other national policies, such as fiscal or economic ones, that are more closely linked to specific political parties and their various electoral programmes.

The respondents consider that **there is no imminent military threat to Spain**, although they felt that some risks have increased and also diversified, so that they might possibly affect national security. The **geographical areas** of greatest concern are North Africa, the Eastern Mediterranean and Latin America.

A majority of the respondents considered that **Spain's activity outside the national territory** is feasible, within the limits of our country's financial constraints and international commitments, if it contributes to peace among peoples and international stability.

In the minds of the respondents, the fact that the Armed Forces serve to maintain peace is a particularly **new meaning for Defence**. In general there is unanimity about **improving military capabilities** in order to carry out these new missions. In some cases the respondents mentioned the need to make these improvements within the context of **coordinating and improving European Union-NATO links**.

A majority of respondents also demonstrated explicit support for **strengthening the defence industry**, due to the immediate repercussion of this in the area of research and scientific progress

as a nation. The respondents recognised that this would require a significant financial effort but that the investment would be justified if carried out with peaceful objectives.

Finally, a significant majority of the respondents emphasised the importance of politically fostering actions directed at creating a **national defence consciousness** by providing information on Defence and the Armed Forces.

In conclusion, the Strategic Defence Review has had extensive **repercussions** throughout the entire process of its development. The **media** have included **opinion editorials and interviews** with Ministry of Defence representatives and other military strata in national press and in specialised journals. The Ministry itself has made use of **its website** to inform public opinion of the periodical activities organised around the Strategic Review.