

NORWAY'S ARMED FORCES

MFU



A SUMMARY OF CHOD NORWAY'S
DEFENCE STUDY 2003



CHOD NORWAY
GENERAL
SIGURD FRISVOLD

A MODERN DEFENCE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENT

The Defence Study (MFU) is CHOD Norway's recommendation for optimising our armed forces on the basis of an altered framework of conditions including new security challenges. Our country's political authorities requested the study, and directives given by the Minister of Defence define its scope. These directives state that we are to maintain ongoing efforts of restructuring towards modern, alliance adapted and task oriented armed forces.

When security threats and other fundamental conditions change, our Armed Forces need to adapt accordingly. Our resources will have to be directed towards creating genuine defence capabilities. Consequently, ambitions must be reduced in other areas. We have, however, already been going through considerable changes over a long period, and the recommendations in the MFU aim to continue the modernisation of our Armed Forces. Financial constraints foreseen for the coming years have, of course, influenced these recommendations. The proposals I put forward will give us a modern defence, first and foremost by making it more relevant, ready, available and deployable. Thus we will achieve Armed Forces, which are better prepared and available for solving the tasks given by our political authorities – both at home and abroad.

I appreciate the challenges and strains some of the recommendations of MFU will imply. In the Defence Staff we will prepare for solutions that can facilitate the transition for units, local communities, and each individual affected. At the same time it is important for me to underline that the solutions which are relevant and robust considering our tasks, will also be those that offer the best stability and security for Norway in the long run. I am confident that the recommendations in the MFU will bring us a considerable step closer to the vision: A Modern Defence for National Security and International Commitment.



A NEW DEFENCE FOR A NEW TIME

THE RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE MFU IMPLY NUMERICALLY SMALLER DEFENCE FORCES LOCATED IN FEWER BASES THAN BEFORE, BUT WITH AN IMPROVED ABILITY TO BE IN THE RIGHT PLACE AT THE RIGHT TIME WITH THE RIGHT MILITARY CAPABILITIES.

The current threat assessments imply that our Armed Forces must be able to deploy rapidly when challenges occur, whether this is in Norway or abroad. We have to be ready for action and have the ability to get into place with well-trained and well-equipped forces. New tasks require an adjustment of capacities, and better availability than the existing mobilisation system can offer. This also requires that our personnel conduct their service over a prolonged period of time, and that the levels of skills and experience are strengthened at all levels.

PERSPECTIVE

During the study process, the MFU has had both a short- and a long-term perspective. The longer perspective is necessary in order to observe trends, and to direct the Armed Forces towards long-term goals. The short-term perspective is necessary in order to include the continuation of the ongoing change. The MFU recommends an Armed Forces structure for 2008.



Security Challenges Imply a Shift from Focusing on Countering an Invasion to Focusing on a Wide Spectre of Operations.

FROM MOBILISATION TO HIGH READINESS

Future Armed Forces will be considerably different from the mobilisation defence. Today the differences between national and international security interests are to a large extent gone and crises may occur in a seamless transition between peace and war. From mainly being oriented towards the defence of Norwegian territory, we now have to direct our Armed Forces towards protecting Norwegian interests. This implies that we move from focusing on an anti-invasion defence to a wider spectre of possible operations also in peacetime. In the future our Armed Forces cannot be expected to produce traditional mobilisation forces. Instead flexible, ready and employable capacities have to be available when a situation arises. This implies that our personnel will have to be committed to deployment at short notice. Specially, this means fewer commissioned officers and more contract officers and enlisted personnel.

FOCUS ON THE SHARP END

Our Armed Forces will have to concentrate their activities and resources to a larger degree towards producing more operational military power – the sharp end. This means that resources will have to be released from the rest of the structure. The non-operational part of the Armed Forces only have a purpose as long as it contributes to giving the sharp end the best possible capacities available. None the less, substantial parts of the logistics and support structure must contain the same qualities and ability to react, move, and operate as the operational structure.

CONCENTRATION AND COMPETENCE

Armed Forces that are reduced in volume will have to concentrate their efforts on building and maintaining necessary quality, competence and creating operational capabilities. This applies to both the operational structure and the support structure. Limited financial resources also necessitate such a concentration of activities. Over time bases, garrisons and other installations have

been established throughout our country. Parts of these structures are not in accordance with the size and requirements of the new defence.

TOTALITY AND SYNERGY

Previously, the three services and the Home Guard to a large degree evolved within their own sectors. Today we have to emphasise jointness and totality, and make the different parts of the overall structure work together in order to exploit synergies. Collectively they will achieve better results than each service can manage by itself. We must also improve our abilities to collect intelligence and information, to process it and make sure it is made available for the right users. Pivotal in this are efforts to orient our forces in line with the concept called network centric warfare. The foundation for this concept is the possibilities inherent in new information technology. The central idea is to use modern technology to quickly establish a common situational awareness on which further activity is based.



AN ANSWER TO ALTERED SECURITY CHALLENGES

THE AIM OF THE BUILD-UP OF THE NORWEGIAN ARMED FORCES AFTER WW II WAS TO PROTECT OUR OWN PEOPLE AND THE INTERESTS OF OUR ALLIES AGAINST THE THREAT FROM THE EAST. SINCE THIS THREAT NO LONGER EXISTS, WE HAVE TO RETHINK WHAT KIND OF DEFENCE STRUCTURES NORWAY NEEDS.

The ongoing and accelerating technological development fundamentally affects the functions of a military organisation. Furthermore, the Armed Forces will have to operate cost-efficiently within the given economic constraints. These are conditions the Armed Forces cannot ignore and which require change.

SECURITY POLICY

During the cold war the threat was clearly defined. The threat was principally linked to another state's possible will and ability to attack. Today the threat is much more complex and unpredictable. The distinction between national and international security is about to be wiped out, and crises may occur in gliding transitions between peace and war. Threats can just as well come from a single terrorist or a special interest group as from a nation state. We are facing so-called asymmetric threats. Long before 11 September 2001 this picture was becoming clear. The terror attacks on this day confirmed the new reality with extreme clarity.

Terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, new forms of organised crime and attacks on information systems which support vital functions in society, pose security challenges also for Norway. Protecting Norway and Norwegian interests goes beyond a unilateral protection of our territory. Other strategic conditions put Norway in a special position when considering a possible threat. Being a nation with vast natural resources, we supply oil and gas in quantities that influence the markets and the energy supplies to several major European nations. Such a strategic position can make us vulnerable in certain situations. In case of a sudden scarcity of resources in our part of the world our fisheries may also become a strategic commodity in strong demand. We still remain a small nation on the European flank and we still have a great power as our neighbour to the east.

NEW TECHNOLOGY PROMOTES CHANGE

New technology and thus new doctrines are about to change our Armed Forces in fundamental ways. The military tech-



Protecting Norway and Norwegian Interests Today goes Far Beyond Unilateral Protection of our Territory.

nological development makes it possible for military organisations to be more efficient in the future than today. Numerically large units with a former generation's equipment do not meet the requirements for Norwegian security if facing an opponent with high-technology weapons. A mobilisation defence is less relevant when ability to react on short notice is required. That is why modernisation implies a reduced number of soldiers and less equipment in mobilisation storage. A smaller and more capital-intensive defence with rapid reaction capability and of high quality is more effective than a large and personnel intensive defence with slow reaction capability. The rapid development in military technology obviously also has financial consequences. With scarce resources our Armed Forces will have to employ new technology actively to create solutions offering more defence for money.

REQUIRED TO OPERATE WITH ECONOMIC BALANCE

Even if the appropriations in NOK increase a little every year, our Armed Forces constantly get a smaller share of the national budget. We cannot expect this situation to change to any considerable degree. Our challenge is therefore to adapt to the economic situation and to achieve more defence for the available money, and to adjust our activity accordingly. Today's approved Armed Forces structure is not in economical balance in the long-term. Facing this challenge, our resources will have to be used to increase our operational capability and our ambitions in other areas have to be lowered. This means that we have to focus on a comprehensive and realistic defence planning to meet the overall goals set for our Armed Forces.

NATO'S NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT

NATO's strategic concept underlines that the alliance's armed forces must be readjusted to meet a wide spectre of tasks and challenges. NATO is in the process of implementing a modern force structure. It will have the necessary capabilities and be flexible enough to meet a variety of tasks that the forces may be required to solve. NATO's member countries are therefore undertaking extensive restructuring of their military forces with emphasis on the ability to rapidly deploy and operate – both within and out of NATO's area. The alliance's member countries see a decreasing need to maintain large forces, which cannot easily be deployed, and which are primarily meant for national defence. Instead, deployable forces available for the whole scale of NATO's tasks are prioritised. This is expressed by the force goals produced within the alliance.

MODERN, ALLIANCE ADAPTED AND TASK BASED

MFU IS BASED ON THE DIRECTIVES OF OUR MINISTER OF DEFENCE ON HOW NORWAY'S NEW DEFENCE IS TO BE SHAPED. IT IS STATED THAT OUR DEFENCE WILL BE MODERN, ALLIANCE ADAPTED AND TASK BASED.

Our Armed Forces will have a structure and a competence that must be possible to maintain over time. The tasks of our Armed Forces are divided into national tasks and tasks to be solved in cooperation with our allies. These directives have obvious consequences for the changes facing our Armed Forces.

MODERN

A modern defence implies that our Armed Forces must have high availability. Important components are competence, equipment and ability to operate in an extensive network with each other and with allied forces. The personnel must be well trained and equipped, so that the forces are able to operate in a modern combat environment together with the Alliance.

Our Armed Forces must be restructured to be able to respond to a broad spectre of threats. To achieve this, quality will have to be prioritised before quantity. Joint thinking and further elimination of duplication of work will be increasingly important. What is best for land, sea and air forces in isolation will not be decisive, but what is best for the total defence ability will have overall priority.

ALLIANCE ADAPTED

An alliance adapted defence implies that our Armed Forces will be able to

operate effectively with allied forces at home and abroad, and be able to contribute actively to solve NATO's tasks. This requires more multinational cooperation, burden sharing and role specialisation. For this reason a heavier emphasis will be put on mustering the military capacities and skills the Alliance asks for. Norway's defence ability is optimised when our military is flexible and can be used both nationally and abroad. Participation in multinational operations also gives increased competence and experience, valuable in solving similar tasks in the defence of Norway.

TASK-BASED

A task-based defence implies that our defence structure and its forces at different levels must have the flexibility and ability to solve different types of tasks. It also implies that the tasks will be put first when determining structures, capabilities and competence that our Armed Forces should form. Thus we have to prioritise our resources even more in the direction of what actually strengthens our operational capacity.

IN ECONOMIC BALANCE

Our Armed Forces will have to be operated and renewed in order to maintain their competence and capabilities within the given economic constraints.

Therefore it is decisive that we can operate effectively at all levels. The goal is a modern defence with a lasting balance between structure and funds available. This requires continued emphasis on the ongoing restructuring. Our Armed Forces must complete the transition from a storage-oriented defence to a delivery-oriented defence, from large mobilisation forces to specialised high readiness forces, and from a focus on quantity to a focus on quality. Increased quality of operational capabilities through modernisation and new acquisitions, increased training and exercise and greater operational availability require more resources. Therefore it is first and foremost in the support structure and in the production capacity that the savings will have to be achieved.

NATIONAL TASKS

An important national task is to ensure and maintain a good and timely situational picture as a basis for strategic and political decisions. This means that surveillance, intelligence, and command and control will remain highly prioritised activities for our Armed Forces. Another national task is to prevent and manage episodes and security crises in Norway and in Norwegian jurisdiction areas. The purpose is to manage and bring to conclusion episodes, crises and terrorist attacks in accordance with Norwegian



MFU Answers to the Authorities' Expectations of a Modern Defence in Economic Balance.

terms, with as few negative consequences as possible. Another important task is to maintain and enforce Norwegian sovereignty. Our Armed Forces must therefore have sufficient ability to deter and manage limited episodes in which Norwegian sovereignty is threatened. This also means an ability to prevent intruders from entering Norwegian territory and prevent damage to vital interests in our society.

All these operations are led by Norwegian political authorities, and are of an extent that can be managed by our Armed Forces and Norwegian authorities alone.

TASKS TO BE SOLVED IN COOPERATION WITH OUR ALLIES

Together with our allies our Armed Forces must have the ability to meet threats and assaults against Norway and other parts of NATO. These may be threats of conventional attacks against our territory, attacks by weapons of mass destruction or other types of hostilities creating damage to the extent that NATO may implement collective defence measures. A very important part of this task is to contribute so that NATO as a whole retains its credibility and flexible military ability to solve its tasks. There is a need to strengthen our Armed Forces and

NATO's ability to manage non-conventional threats and assaults. With our allies we must be able to manage multinational crises, i.e. rapid military deployment to gain control of situations threatening common security or vital interests. At the same time we must contribute to multinational peace support operations where the purpose may be to prevent an acute crisis from occurring, support humanitarian operations or prevent an armed conflict from breaking out. Our closest allies are also developing modern reaction forces with a high level of readiness, trained to be present where needed – when needed – possibly also in Norway. The ability to receive them, and to support such reinforcements, is still an important task.

Allied forces must be able to operate effectively in our areas, and attractive training conditions still have to be maintained in Norway. The fact that allied forces already have experience with Norwegian conditions may in a given situation be of vital importance for our defence. To meet the demand for rapid and effective reaction, NATO is building up a comprehensive reaction force of about 20.000 personnel. This force will be able to deploy at short notice to solve tasks. The force is expected to be fully established by

2006, and the first units will be operational already from 2004.

SECURITY AT HOME REQUIRES INVOLVEMENT ABROAD

To meet the stated requirements and respond to new security threats, our Armed Forces will have to change in fundamental ways. The forces have to be available, mobile and relevant for the task, and they must be able to cooperate with other allies. These are, however, also qualities we need in order to react if situations should arise in Norway. Should a situation develop and become more serious, Norway will have to rely on international assistance. Norwegian participation in international operations is a prerequisite for this. Forces that are not adapted to the alliance, cannot be integrated in national defensive fighting in an effective way, and will therefore constitute a less suitable contribution to our national security. Our Armed Forces must therefore have a balance of experience between peace support operations and military presence at home, and participation in international operations with our allies. This duality implies no weakening of our capability to solve national defence tasks, but is, on the contrary, a condition for our Armed Forces' ability to uphold national security.



OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE

WHAT WILL OUR NEW ARMED FORCES LOOK LIKE? WHICH CAPABILITIES WILL BE PRIORITISED, AND HOW WILL THEY BE ORGANISED TO ACHIEVE THE BEST POSSIBLE COLLECTIVE EFFECT?

Below is a short description of the recommendations for elements in the operational structure – first joint capabilities and then within each service.

JOINT CAPABILITIES

NATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE

In accordance with our Parliament's decision an extensive reorganisation of the operational command structure of our Defence took place in 2002–2003. The command structure now consists of the Armed Forces Operational Headquarters (FOHK) in Stavanger with two subordinate commands, Regional Command North (LDKN) in Bodø and Regional Command South (LDKS) in Trondheim. It is deemed necessary that our Defence is given time to implement and gain experience with the present command structure, and it is therefore recommended that it remains unchanged for a period of two years. A thorough evaluation will take place during 2004 with the aim to improve efficiency and consider further rationalization of our national strategic leadership, command

structure as well as our posts in allied command structures abroad.

SPECIAL FORCES

Our special forces (SOF) offer a flexible capacity to meet different and changing challenges: maintaining sovereignty on the continental shelf, preventing and fighting terrorism, and participation in allied and international peace building operations. A reorganisation of our special forces into one unit, called Joint Special Operations Command (FJK) will include elements from existing SOF in our three services.

INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE

The move towards a network centric ability requires an advanced information infrastructure with integrated services. The mainly static structure of today is to a large degree built to counter an invasion. The new deployable and moveable force structure, which will operate in a network centric environment, requires a more advanced and mobile infrastructure.

JOINT CIS TASK GROUP

Today the operational CIS resources are distributed between the services and the Defence Logistic Organisation (FLO). This complicates overall control and coordination, and makes our CIS resources less available. Therefore it is recommended that a deployable joint CIS Task Group be established. This unit will be central in the further development of our information structure.

JOINT ISTAR-BATTALION

ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance) represents decisive capabilities in planning and execution of military operations. This is a target area for NATO. Today's capacities in this field are divided on a number of different units and services and there are strong needs to pool these resources in order to achieve better coordination. It is therefore recommended that a joint, tactical ISTAR unit be established in order to support national and allied forces.



UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

A UAV unit is proposed to be in place from 2007 as a new capacity in the recommended structure. It is recommended to acquire a UAV system providing surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities primarily for the ISTAR battalion.

SATELLITE SURVEILLANCE

It is recommended to continue the international cooperation giving access to important imagery of maritime areas, and to prioritise further international cooperation within this field in NATO.

ALLIANCE GROUND SURVEILLANCE (AGS)

Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) is a NATO project for acquisition of a strategic capability for ground surveillance to be owned and operated by NATO. The AGS will be able to give continuous radar based surveillance of moving and static objects within a very large ground area, independent of weather and visibility. It is recommended that Norwegian support of the AGS be carried on.

MILITARY INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Military information operations are not directed against our own or allied population, but against a possible opponent in a military conflict. This includes mainly the ability to influence an opponent's military communication and information systems, and to protect our own. In the recommended force structure this covers the capabilities of electronic warfare, psychological operations, and computer

network operations. Within this field, single capabilities primarily meant to contribute within defensive, but also offensive military information operations in support of our own information security, are proposed.

The command structure at both strategic and operational levels must have the ability to direct and coordinate information operations.

NORWEGIAN ARMED FORCES JOINT MEDICAL SERVICES – RAPID REACTION FORCE

It is recommended that a deployable field hospital capacity is established and dimensioned to be able to support national and allied forces.

ARMY

Army units will be relevant and available, and will concentrate on the ability to operate effectively with other services and our allies. The brigade will be the Army's main contribution. Brigade capacity is relevant in all operations as an independent unit nationally, or together with the alliance, conducting missions in Norway or abroad. A modern army, limited in volume, must be flexible and possess high strategic and tactical mobility to be able to rapidly deploy to critical areas. The ability to understand a situation or development correctly and rapidly is decisive for all operations. The Army will provide vital contributions to a joint ISTAR battalion. Armies are by their nature in need of a

relatively large number of personnel. In most conflicts no technology can replace the personnel's direct relations with the opponent, the parties or the civilian population.

Below is a brief discussion of the most important elements of the proposed Army structure in 2008.

- **A Mechanised Brigade (Bde North)** which is mobile, flexible and deployable after a relatively short reaction time. The brigade will be dimensioned for high intensity combat with our allies. Personnel with stand-by contracts will constitute the greater part of the force. In addition, to keep Bde North operational, an extra set of materiel is needed. Together with trained personnel this will constitute a mobilisation brigade (Bde 6).
- **A Mechanised Infantry Battalion** with a short reaction time. The battalion is one of the battalions in the mechanised brigade, but is organised to operate independently or as part of an allied brigade/division. In addition to commissioned and non-commissioned officers the unit will mainly consist of enlisted personnel.
- **Core of a Joint ISTAR Battalion** The Army's contribution forms the core of a Joint ISTAR Battalion (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance).



- **A Tactical Land Headquarters (Headquarters 6. Division).** Norway intends to establish a division HQ/framework available to NATO. However, the issue is still under consideration.
- **Guarding the Royal Family.** His Majesty the King's Guard will still carry out guard duties and escort the Royal Family during peace, crisis and war.
- **Military Border Guard.** The military border guard along the Russian border will continue as today.
- **Transport helicopters.** Until new helicopters are acquired, the current Bell 412 capacity will be continued.
- **Support elements.** A number of CS- and CSS-units as possible single contributions to allied units or to support Norwegian units will be established. The capacities will have a relatively short reaction time and will normally be attached to the units mentioned above.

NAVY

The Navy will continue prioritising its contribution to joint operations. The naval forces will have an ability to operate in coastal waters as well as blue waters and within a NATO context. Below are briefly described the most important elements in the proposal of our naval structure in 2008:

- **Five New Frigates** with NH-90 heli-

The Operational Structure will be Characterised by Rapid Reaction and High Mobility – in Norway and Abroad

copter. The frigates are optimised for anti-submarine warfare, but will be able to contribute in all types of maritime operations and certain joint operations.

- **Six Skjold-class Fast Patrol Boats – FPBs.** The most important operational tasks for these vessels will be presence along our coast, surveillance, maintaining sovereignty and crisis management. The first vessels will be delivered in 2008.
- **Hauk-class FPBs.** The operation of these FPBs will contribute to the production of competent personnel for the new frigates and the Skjold-class. The Hauk-class is proposed to be phased out not later than 2010.
- **Six Mine Warfare Vessels.** The Navy's mine warfare vessels will continue at a number of four mine hunting vessels and two minesweepers. Acquiring remotely controlled sensors and weapons for under-water operations will further enhance the vessels' capacity.
- **Six Ula-class Submarines.** The submarines will continue to be operated and all vessels will undergo a limited update, in order to secure a technical life span to beyond 2020.

- **Coast Guard.** The Coast Guard's operational structure will remain as of today.
- **Coastal Rangers.** A reduced coastal rangers force will be included as the maritime element of the Joint ISTAR Battalion.
- **Logistic and support vessels.** Logistic vessels are necessary to achieve adequate endurance and flexibility in all operations. It is recommended that the planning of logistic vessel/tanker to support frigate operations continue.
- **Maritime tactical command element (NOTG).** The NOTG is vital for Norway to fulfil the ambition of commanding multinational maritime forces.

AIR FORCE

The Air Force can quickly react and deploy combat capable units, both nationally and abroad. Air Force units are generally closely coordinated nationally and within the alliance – both during operations and through mutual acquisitions. While fighter aircraft capabilities remain the paramount Air Force contribution to joint operations, other air assets also play important roles. Major assets are briefly described below.



- **F-16 Fighting Falcon.** Our fighter aircraft fleet continues the transition from a pure air-to-air capable force into a multi-role, all weather capable force available also to NATO. Although 57 aircraft will remain in the inventory only 48 will be kept Combat Ready.
- **2 ARS (Air Control Centre, Recognized Air Picture (RAP) Production Centre and Sensor Fusion Post).** Both are static installations but play a vital role nationally and for NATO.
- **1 Tanker Aircraft MRTT (Multi Role Transport/Tanker).** MRTT is a force multiplier for our Fighter aircraft fleet, extending their range and endurance considerably.
- **6 P-3 Orion Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft.** All P-3 Orion's will be upgraded with improved sensor capabilities – primarily for maritime surveillance but exploitable also as a minor national ground surveillance asset (AGS).
- **3 DA-20 Jet Falcon Electronic Warfare Aircraft.** Main role will be to exercise national and allied forces in resisting electronic warfare.
- **Transport Aircraft – C-130 Hercules or equivalent.** Our C-130E/H aircraft are aging and are considered for updating or replacement.
- **18 Bell 412 SP Tactical Transport Helicopters (TTH).** The helicopters contribute to the land forces' tactical

mobility. A small number of new helicopters will be acquired for SOF purposes.

- **14 NH-90 Maritime Helicopters** will be acquired. Six will operate out of our new Frigates, and eight will operate out of the Coast Guard vessels enhancing the Navy's operational capacity.
- **12 Sea King Search and Rescue helicopters (SAR)** will be replaced. To ensure synergy CHOD recommends that the replacement be based on the NH-90 platform.
- **Norwegian Adapted Surface to Air Missile System (NASAMS)-units.** NASAMS will be reduced in volume, enhanced to meet new threats (NASAMS II project) and available for operations at short notice.

HOME GUARD

It is proposed that the Home Guard carries out a quality reform focusing on preventing and fighting terrorism and other asymmetric threats, continuing their contribution to guard vital functions in society. Furthermore, home guard units will continue to fill an important role in supporting the territorial defence, as well as local and regional civil-military cooperation. The Home Guard must transform into a modern, flexible and task based organisation of high quality. This implies a greater specialisation in organisation, equip-

ment and training. Hence it is recommended that the Home Guard structure be divided into three categories: Rapid Reaction Forces, Reinforcement Forces, and Follow-on Forces. Up to 50,000 personnel is recommended as total strength:

- **Rapid Reaction Forces.** These units will carry through 6–20 days of training every year and will be trained and equipped to solve all types of Home Guard tasks. The units will stay at relatively high alert, and will be well equipped. Every Home Guard District will have a small number of personnel in these units, maximum 10% on a national basis.
- **Reinforcement Forces** are units carrying through up to 3+5 days of annual training with the purpose of reinforcing Rapid Reaction Forces. Units will have relatively short reaction time. Every Home Guard district will have a relatively large number of personnel being part of these units, totally about 50% on a national basis.
- **Follow-on Forces** are forces carrying out up to 3+5 days of annual training. All personnel have uniforms and equipment and will be partly equipped with unit materiel. These units will mainly conduct static missions.



PERSONNEL

NEW TASKS DEMAND A CHANGE IN OUR PERSONNEL STRUCTURE.

The restructured Armed Forces require more officers and enlisted personnel on time-limited contracts. At the same time there will be a shift in the personnel structure by increasing the number of personnel on the operational side at the expense of personnel connected to logistics and service-support activities. Below follows a brief description of consequences concerning compulsory military service (conscription), their basic training and the overall organisation of the officers' education, training and career system.

COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE AND BASIC TRAINING

In the new force structure the competence and quality of each individual soldier is more important than a large volume of personnel. Ready and employable units require motivated soldiers ready to make a contribution. The following elements are emphasised:

- The Armed Forces requirement should decide the number of conscripts enrolled.

- Compulsory military service must be motivating and meaningful for each individual soldier.
- Recruitment and conscription boards will play an important role in screening candidates. Introduction of mandatory conscription boards for females is recommended.
- Basic training within the Army, Navy and Air Force normally lasts 12 months, and in the Home Guard 4 to 6 months.
- As an integrated part of the compulsory service it is possible to sign up for an apprenticeship contract or to join a technical college. The duration of service will then be more than 12 months.
- Measures to improve conditions and benefits, and promote status related to compulsory service, will be important aspects of the recruitment effort. Economic compensation will be offered for service duration exceeding the norm. The level of compensation should increase significantly in proportion with time served.
- Candidates for extended service contracts and officer candidates will

be actively recruited during Basic training and other phases of compulsory service.

ENLISTED PERSONNEL

The need for enlisted personnel on contracts will increase significantly and their numbers might double. Current contract regime must be reviewed and updated.

OFFICERS

There will be an increased demand for younger, but at the same time more experienced officers at lower ranks to ensure high quality force production for the force structure.

The officer corps proposed will consist of three main categories: officers on time-limited contracts, regular career officers, and officers in the reserves. It is recommended to make acceptance of postings to international operations mandatory for all active duty officers.

Officers with time-limited contracts.

The current system must be improved



to ensure availability of technical and tactical level competence, through a higher degree of continuity and experience at junior ranks. Arrangements must be made to ensure a smooth transition back to a civilian career upon end of contract. Transition from time-limited contract to a regular officer's career will be possible based on the Armed Forces needs.

Regular career officers. The Armed Forces requirements for officers above junior ranks and specialists will decide the number of commissioned officers. Officer's education is followed by a subsequent compulsory service period. Compulsory service will start upon completion of either a military academy or a corresponding civilian bachelor degree. Commission may be offered on application after completion of compulsory service. Commission will be dependent on the availability of vacant posts, and

to a greater degree than today on the requirements of our Armed Forces.

Officers in the Reserves. Reserves still form an important resource and are based on voluntary commitments from retired officers who have completed either an officer candidate school or a military academy. The reserve officers are eligible for limited time contracts with standby units and may participate in operations abroad.

Mandatory assignment. Emphasis on high readiness and an increased ability to deploy units demands a high degree of flexibility with regard to the personnel structure.

To ensure availability of high quality combat ready units, personnel should have a common understanding of tactics and procedures. This takes time and must be achieved well in advance of

any deployment. A transformation from Armed Forces dependent on volunteers to a force where each serviceman and -woman is obliged to take part in all relevant types of assignments and missions should the need arise, is recommended.

EDUCATION

In line with the new manning requirements, a new education system is recommended:

- Today's Officer candidate schools will be replaced by a three-month Basic officer's course immediately followed by an apprenticeship for a total of two years.
- The current Officers school for joint technical education will continue.
- The military academies' current levels (KS I, KS II) will be replaced by a three-year education offering a Bachelor degree.
- The Staff College levels 1 and 2 will be replaced by a module-based one year Staff College. Students may apply for a second year Master-degree program.

Competence and Quality of Each Soldier is more Important than a Large Volume of Personnel

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT STRUCTURE

THE OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE MANDATES A CHANGED LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT STRUCTURE.

A new concept for base, logistics and support structure is proposed with the following highlights:

- Concentration of forces to fewer bases
- Formation of main bases, branches, deployable and mobile bases
- The Defence Logistic Organisation (FLO) will operate the bases and direct logistics and support functions in Norway as well as abroad
- Increased cooperation with allies and use of public-private partnership (PPP).
- Extensive integration across the services
- Increased availability

Recommended changes and adjustments to the base structure and force production and the proposed structure for the Norwegian Defence Logistic Organisation (NDLO) are summarised below. The adjustments result in a shift in personnel composition from the logistics and support structure to the operational structure.

JOINT BASE STRUCTURE

Two joint bases will be established at Romerike and Jørstadmoen. Base Romerike will accommodate the NDLO Centre of Competence, the NBC Training School, the Armed Forces Medical Services, the Administrative College Course Section and a transport company. Base Jørstadmoen will house the Command Control and Information Support Centre. In addition NDLO will operate a base located at Kjeller/Gardermoen/Trandum/Nordkisa serving all three services.

ARMY FORCE PRODUCTION AND CAMP STRUCTURE

The Army will be organised into two elements under the Chief of Staff/Army: The Army Forces (HSTY) and the Army Transformation and Doctrine Command (TRADOK). This will make control easier and enables a management better reflecting future requirements for the production of forces. Further development of the Army doctrine and increasing general competence has high priority. HSTY will consist of the following elements and location:

- The Army Staff
- Mechanised combat units based both in Troms and Østerdalen.
- Command elements for Support units based both in Troms and Østerdalen.
- Intelligence units (including the core of ISTAR battalion/corps). Based in Troms.
- Artillery elements. Units based both in Troms and Østerdalen. Command element based in Troms.
- Engineer elements based both in Troms and Østerdalen. Command element located in Troms.
- An Air Defence/NASAMS coordination element will be established as part of HQ 6. Div.
- Logistic and medical elements. Units will be based both in Troms and Østerdalen.
- 6. Division command will continue as the Tactical land command at division and brigade level.
- His Majesty the King's Guard. Main focus will be guard duties to the Royal Family.
- Camp Sør-Varanger. The border guard will be continued within HSTY

- Camp Porsanger with necessary base support and training activities.

Transformation and Doctrine

Command (TRADOK) will be established with the following elements:

- Management, staff and the doctrine element, distributed to Troms and Østerdalen. TRADOK Command co-located with the Army academy at Linderud, Oslo.
- The Army Academy will continue subordinate to TRADOK at Linderud.

Several units will be discontinued in their current form but their activities will be integral to the new structure:

- Staff Brigade North
- The Rapid Reaction Force – Army
- The Army's Combat Training Centre
- The Army Logistic Centre
- The Army's Signals Centre

NAVY FORCE PRODUCTION AND BASE STRUCTURE

- Camp Åsegarden (and AB Evenes) will be decommissioned. It is recommended that Allied Training Centre North (ATC/N) relocates to existing bases in Troms and Finnmark
- The Officer Candidate School at Horten will be decommissioned. Basic officer training will take place at naval base Haakonsværn.

AIR FORCE PRODUCTION AND BASE STRUCTURE

- The Armed Forces' Ammunition school at the Air Force Training Centre (AFTC) Kjevik relocates to Camp Sessvollmoen.
- The Air Force Officer Candidate School



decommissioned. Basic officer training will take place at AFTC Kjevik and with operational units in the Air Force.

- Air Force Station Mågerø along with its associated Programming Centre and Control & Reporting School will be moved to AB Rygge. AFS Mågerø will be decommissioned.
- AB Gardermoen will be decommissioned and 335 squadron moved to AB Rygge.
- Air bases Evenes, Torp, Langnes, Flesland and Værnes will be decommissioned.

HOME GUARD FORCE PRODUCTION AND CAMP STRUCTURE

White Paper no. 45 (St. prp. Nr. 45) decided a Home Guard structure at an estimated cost of about 2.2 billion NOK a year (average 2005 – 2014). The quality reform proposed for will establish a new structure costing about 1,3 billion NOK per year. The proposal not only lowers the cost considerably, but will also yield a Home Guard with better quality and an improved ability to solve a broader set of tasks. The Home Guard will retain a high quality operational structure able to undertake operational and territorial tasks. To enable this, it will be necessary to reduce force production expenses, as well as associated support and camp structure. Reducing the operational structure down to 50.000 personnel is a step towards achieving the goals. The reduction results in an adjusted requirement for Home Guard camps. The following camps will be established or continued: Camp Ravneberget (kept until further notice), Lutvann, Kongsvinger (kept

until further notice), Grønvad-Kongsberg, Terningmoen, Kjevik, Vatneleiren, Bergen, Haakonsvern (Sea Home Guard), Setnesmoen, Dombås, Værnes, Drevjamoen, Setermoen, Trondenes (Sea Home Guard), and Høybuktmoen.

The following camps will be discontinued:

Eggemoen, Heistadmoen, Skei i Jølster, Persaunet, Steinkjersannan, Mosjøen, Narvik and Altagård.

NDLO

NDLO (Norwegian Defence Logistics Organisation) will be subject to considerable restructuring to ensure necessary funds needed by the operational structure. Elements of NDLO will be made more available in order to support and participate along with deploying forces.

Maintenance Division (FLO/D). The Maintenance Division will manage and maintain the information systems FISBasis and Golf in addition to strategic communication networks. FLO/D will be restructured to ensure effective support operations and to establish deployable logistic bases. Services delivered locally at bases in Norway will be considered for competitive outsourcing. This includes the provision of the information systems.

Information Systems Division (FLO/IKT). The CIS division (FLO/IKT) will manage systems and supply technical engineering. It is recommended that the tasks be considered transferred to the Materiel Division.

Materiel Division (FLO/M). FLO/M (including FLO/IKT) will be retained within NDLO, directly subordinate to CHOD Norway. The division will focus on procurement strategies. Engineering will be considered for outsourcing.

Heavy Works Division (FLO/TV).

In accordance with White Paper no. 12 (St. prp. Nr. 12 (2003–2004)), CHOD Norway proposes to detach the division from the Defence Organisation to increase cost awareness within the Armed Forces. It is recommended that FLO/TV be changed into a public enterprise with special powers from 1 January 2006. Furthermore, plans exist to further change FLO/TV into a governmentally owned limited company.

Regional Support Functions (RSF). The RSF will be restructured. The four units will be located in North Norway (Indre Troms), Central Norway (Bodø), West Norway (Bergen), and East Norway (Romerike). RSF will later be integrated into the Maintenance Division of FLO.



MFU – WHAT HAPPENS NEXT?

CHOD Norway's Defence Study forms the basis for the debate on our future defence.

After CHOD Norway has delivered his recommendations to the Minister of Defence it is expected that the Government will put forward a White Paper for a new long-term document to the Norwegian Parliament in February 2004. Parliament is expected to debate this White Paper in June 2004.

CHOD NORWAY'S
DEFENCE STUDY/
MFU 03

OSLO MIL/HUSEBY
NO-0016 OSLO
NORWAY

This document constitutes a summary of CHOD Norway's final report MFU – 03. In case of possible errors, shortcomings or inconsistencies in this summary the official final report applies. Abbreviations, names of units, departments etc. used in this document are meant for descriptive purposes, and do not necessarily correspond to official translations.