On the Publication of Defense of Japan 2012

Minister of Defense

Satoshi Morimoto

While economic and cultural ties between Japan and its neighbors are deepening, the security environment surrounding our country is becoming increasingly harsh.

In North Korea, a new regime centered on Kim Jong-un was put in place in a short period of time, and the country pressed ahead with the launch of a missile, which it calls “Satellite”, in April this year. As well as continuing to boost its defense expenditure and broadly and rapidly modernizing its military forces, China is expanding and intensifying its activities in waters near Japan. Russia is stepping up the activities of its naval vessels and aircraft in its Far Eastern region.

Taking a broad overview of the international community as a whole, frequent regional conflicts and terrorism, as well as other asymmetric threats, inspire a great deal of fear among the public. Furthermore, the transfer and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and the ballistic missiles that are their means of delivery, is becoming a major problem.

Under such security environment, we will attach particular importance to the following in implementing national defense and security policies.

Firstly, as well as making steady progress in developing the country's defense capability based on the National Defense Program Guidelines and the Mid-Term Defense Program, despite the harsh fiscal situation, and moving forward with the development of the Dynamic Defense Force, we will strive to ensure that the defense of Japan is rock solid in all aspects, including the security of the seas that are essential to our country's prosperity.

Next, the Japan-U.S. Alliance is a key pillar of our nation's security policy. With the security environment around Japan changing, the U.S. is also altering its defense strategy, developing a policy of placing greater emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region. Amid such major developments, by undertaking close cooperation with the U.S., as well as deepening and widening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, Japan will play a part in ensuring the peace and stability not only of Japan and the U.S., but also of the region as a whole.

Moreover, with regard to the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan including the issue of the relocation of MCAS Futenma, it is vital to swiftly alleviate the burden on local people, including those in Okinawa, while maintaining the deterrence and capabilities of the U.S. Forces. The adjustment of the plan for the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan was decided upon in the "2+2" Joint Statement issued in April this year; in addition, initiatives are underway aimed at responding to the new strategic environment in the region, including the establishment of dynamic defense cooperation that will revitalize joint endeavors by Japan and the U.S., such as joint training, joint surveillance activities, and the joint use of facilities. While striving to ensure that the outcomes of endeavors undertaken to date bear further fruit, we will seek to identify and translate into reality the ideal shape of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation from a strategic perspective.

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF also play a significant role in cooperation aimed at the peace and stability of the international community. As well as encouraging bilateral defense cooperation and exchange, starting with Australia and South Korea, which are our key partners in the Asia-Pacific region, we will strive to promote relationships of mutual understanding and trust with China and Russia, which are our neighbors, and strengthen collaboration with various other relevant countries. Moreover, as well as holding multinational conferences, such as the Tokyo Defense Forum, we will build cooperative multilateral relationships through our participation in overseas security conferences.

At present, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have personnel deployed on peacekeeping operations in the Golan Heights, Haiti, Timor-Leste and South Sudan, as well as undertaking anti-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. We will continue to undertake these overseas activities by the SDF, taking appropriate measures, while seeking to ensure the safety of our units.

Furthermore, with regard to our crisis management arrangements, we will strive to develop a system that facilitates a swift, accurate response, as well as strengthening intelligence functions, in order to ensure the safety of the country and the reassurance of the nation in regard to various internal and external risks, such as major earthquakes and missile launches by North Korea.

In recent years, expectations of and support for the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have been increasing. In an opinion poll conducted by the Cabinet Office in FY2011, a record rate of respondents (91.7%) stated that they had a positive impression of the SDF.

The trust and support of each and every member of the populace is essential to the defense of the nation. I sincerely hope that this white paper, "Defense of Japan 2012," will be read by as many people as possible, and that it will be of some assistance in providing the reader with a more profound understanding of the defense of our country.

Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan

The United States

- ✓ Announcement of the defense strategic guidance
- ✓ Rebalancing toward Asia-Pacific region
- ✓ Reduction of defense spending

[The U.S. Department of Defense]



(Reference) Number of Marine Corps Troops in the Asia-Pacific Region

Total :	approximately 24,000	Australia :	30
Hawaii :	6,147	South Korea :	133
Guam :	196	Philippines :	146
Japan :	14,951	Thailand :	50
Afloat :	2,123	Singapore :	16

Source:Materials published by the Department of Defense (as of December 31, 2011), The Military Balance 2012

North Korea

- ✓ The issue of nuclear development
- ✓ Launch of a missile which North Korea calls "satellite"
- ✓ Transition to a new regime

China

✓ **Maritime activities in waters near Japan**



(The United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Geophysical Data Center: ETOP01

Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Complex and Diverse Regional Conflicts and Approaches of the International Community

Part II The Basics of Japan's Defense Policy and Dynamic Defense Force

The National Defense Program Guidelines (Contents of the 2010 NDPG)

- **Basic Concept**
  - ✓ Developing Dynamic Defense Force

Building Up the Defense Force in FY2012

- **Major Matters Related to Building Up the Defense Force in FY2012**
  - ✓ Steadily working to develop effective and efficient defense force to realize the Dynamic Defense Force

✓ Deployment of a coastal monitoring unit & mobile warning squadron on Yonaguni Island

Coastal monitoring unit facility

Mobile warning radar equipment



Digital map 25000 (map image) "Okinawa" produced by The Geographical Survey Institute

Deployment of Next-generation Fighter Aircraft

✓ Selected F-35A as the new fighter aircraft

New Efforts Based on Recent Trends

- **Efforts for Development and Use of Space**

- **Efforts for Ocean Policy**

- **Guidelines for Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment, etc.**

✓ **With regard to overseas transfer of defense equipment, etc., the following are comprehensive exemptions:**

◆Cases related to peace contribution and international cooperation

◆Cases regarding international joint development and production of defense equipment, etc. contributing to Japan's security

Part III Measures for Defense of Japan

Effective Deterrence and Response

Ensuring Security of Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan

✓ **Number of scrambles and its % breakdown by target country and region**

◆Russia: approx. 58% China: approx. 37%



✓ **Example of Flight Patterns of Russian and Chinese Aircraft Against Which Scrambles Were Directed**



: Flight path of Chinese aircraft

: Flight path of Russian aircraft

Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

✓ **The launch of a missile purported to be a "satellite" by North Korea in April 2012**

◆Dispatch of Aegis destroyers, Patriot PAC-3 and the requisite units to the southwestern islands

Response to Large-Scale and Unconventional Disasters

◆Formulating disaster relief plans in order to respond to various disasters, including large-scale disasters

Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake



Overview of the Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake

◆Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake
◆Response to the nuclear disaster
◆Japan-U.S. cooperation

Lessons Learned from the Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake

Evaluation of the Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake

97.7%

of respondents answered they "appreciate" the SDF's activities

(FY2011 Cabinet Office Public Opinion Survey)

Part III Measures for Defense of Japan

The Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements

- **The Significance of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements**
- **Basic Framework Supporting the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements**
  - ◆Japan–U.S. defense ministerial meeting
- **Stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan**

Deepening and Widening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

Discussions Concerning the Coordination of USFJ Realignment

✓ **the "2+2" joint statement**

- ◆Maintenance of deterrence and capabilities under the Japan-U.S. Alliance
- ◆Reduction of the burden on Okinawa

Dynamic Defense Cooperation

- ◆Increase in the number of bilateral joint training exercises
- ◆Expansion of cooperative surveillance activities
- ◆Expansion of joint and shared use

Measures Relating to the Stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan

Stationing of U.S. Forces in Okinawa

- ◆Relocation of Futenma Air Station

Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Regions Other than Okinawa

- ◆Relocation of Air Defense Command Headquarters to Yokota Air Base

Part III Measures for Defense of Japan

Promoting Multilateral Security Cooperation and Dialogues in the Asia-Pacific Region

◆Tokyo Defense Forum（March 2012）

◆ Shangri-La Dialogue（June 2012）

Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

◆Japan-Italy defense cooperation

◆Japan-Vietnam defense cooperation

◆Japan–Russia defense cooperation

Anti-piracy Initiatives

◆Convoy led by a destroyer (from the air in front of the convoy)

Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities

◆PKO in South Sudan

◆PKO in Haiti

Looking Back Over 20 Years of International Cooperation by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF

The Path of International Cooperation by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF

Overview on Reaching 20 Years Since the Commencement of International Cooperation

◆the dispatch of minesweepers to the Persian Gulf

◆Humanitarian operations in Timor-Leste

◆International disaster relief activities in New Zealand

Part III Measures for Defense of Japan

The Organization and Human Foundation that Support Defense Capability

The Organizational Structure Supporting Defense Capability

Measures Aimed at Enhancing the Human Foundation

◆Child Raising Support

◆Re-employment Support

Defense Production, Technological Bases, and Acquisition of Equipment

Defense Production and Technological Bases

◆Fighter aircraft production and technological bases

◆The introduction of PBL

◆Adapting aircraft for civilian use

✓ Initiatives to Maintain, Foster and Upgrade Defense Production and Technological Bases

Interaction between the Ministry of Defense and the SDF, and the Local Community and Japanese Citizens

Activities in Civic Life and Contributions to Society

✓ Welfare support activities

✓ Activities relating to the Great East Japan Earthquake

Column ▶▶▶ ◆Introducing Voice of SDF Personnel and Other Articles through 36 Columns

A Message from Mr. Tsuyoshi Nagabuchi

An Array of Messages Sent to MOD

Smart Defense

In the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), significant reduction in defense expenditure in member countries and disparities in terms of military capabilities among member countries, particularly between the U.S. and European countries, are escalating. At present, the U.S. accounts for more than 70% of total defense expenditure in all NATO member countries; the European-led military operation in Libya in 2011 exposed the European countries' lack of capabilities in such areas as intelligence gathering, warning and surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR*), which they depended on the U.S.

In response to this situation, under the leadership of Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO has been promoting the concept of "Smart Defense", with the objective of "building greater security with fewer resources through multinational cooperation". NATO approved a package of more than 20 multinational projects at its summit in May 2012. In an age of austerity, it is necessary to continue to focus attention on such initiatives by NATO in order to maintain more effective and efficient security capabilities.

* Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance

Column

VOICE | Commentary | Q&A

7th Division Joint Long-distance Mobilization Exercise & Logistical Support Arrangements

7th Division Joint Long-distance Mobilization Exercise

From October 29 to December 2, 2011, the 7th Division (Higashi-Chitose) conducted a long-distance mobilization exercise involving their transfer to the Western Army's territory, with the objective of improving the control and coordination abilities required for long-distance mobilization and increasing unit readiness through exercises in partnership with the Western Army.

This was the first time that the 7th Division had conducted a joint long-distance mobilization exercise; during the mobilization stage, 410 troops and approximately 120 heavy vehicles, including Type 90 tanks and armored cars, were moved swiftly from Hokkaido all the way to Kyushu using various means of transport, including a civilian vessel (high-speed transport ship) and by rail.

This kind of long-distance mobilization exercise is one of the important initiatives aimed at building a dynamic defense force set forth in the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and beyond, and we will continue to prioritize such exercises in our future endeavors.

Armored cars being transported by rail in the course of their duties

Type 90 tank transported using a high-speed transport ship

Logistical Support Arrangements for Island Defense (Including Long-distance Mobilization)

In mobilization for defense purposes or disaster relief operations, when the Self-Defense Forces carry out their duties, movement over long distances is required, along with large quantities of supplies, including fuel, ammunition and provisions. Securing the transport capacity required for units to operate, preparing and distributing supplies, and putting in place the requisite vehicles is called logistical support.

In particular, in island defense involving long-distance mobilization, logistical support plays an extremely important role in securing transport capacity using both the Self-Defense Forces and the civilian sector, as well as in refueling and supplying various equipment; accordingly, it is necessary to strive to enhance logistical support arrangements for active units, while reflecting the lessons learned from large-scale disasters and international peace cooperation activities.

Column VOICE Commentary Q&A

Deployment of a Coastal Monitoring Unit & Mobile Warning Squadron on Yonaguni Island

The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and beyond stipulated that there will be an intensive focus on warning and surveillance functions and that efforts will be made to enhance defense readiness, including in southwestern Japan; moreover, the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2011-FY2015) stated that as well as forming and deploying a new Ground Self-Defense Force coastal monitoring unit in island areas of southwestern Japan, Air Self-Defense Force mobile warning radar equipment would also be deployed there. In light of this, having given comprehensive consideration to the fact that the region is close to the boundaries of Japan's territorial waters and airspace, and that vital land and social infrastructure is located there, the Ministry of Defense decided at the end of September 2011 to deploy these on Yonaguni Island, which is Japan's westernmost point.

Yonaguni Island, Japan's westernmost point

Coastal monitoring unit facility

Mobile warning radar equipmentfacility

Deploying the coastal monitoring unit on this island will make it possible to detect at an early stage any signs of ships or aircraft approaching the vicinity, while the deployment of the mobile warning radar equipment will facilitate more effective warning and surveillance of regard to aircraft passing through surrounding areas.

In the FY2012 budget, approximately ¥1 billion was allocated for the expenditure required to deploy the coastal monitoring unit and mobile warning squadron.

The Ministry of Defense intends to deploy the coastal monitoring unit until the end of FY2015, with the understanding and cooperation of local citizens.



C-130R Acquisition

During the Great East Japan Earthquake, the YS-11 transport aircraft of the Maritime Self-Defense Force carried relief supplies with all effort from across Japan to those afflicted by the disaster, and their flying hours increased sharply. As a result, the schedule for the decommissioning of these aircraft has been brought forward and is imminent, so in FY2011, the Ministry of Defense decided to acquire six KC-130R aircraft maintained in storage by the US Navy, and restore them to operational status as C-130R (refurbished aircraft), in order to avoid deficiencies in the transportation capability.

As well as having the flight performance required for operations under normal circumstances, the C-130R (refurbished aircraft) also have a high transport capacity for large-scale disasters. Possessing six such aircraft makes it possible to land at disaster-stricken airports, carrying the Maritime Self-Defense Force Mobile Construction Group troops required for the restoration of the airport, and to build a base for the storage of supplies as soon as possible. Moreover, it will be possible for the refurbished aircraft to operate for at least another 20 years, so the cost of acquiring them is cheaper than buying new aircraft.

Thus, not only is this the first instance in which refurbished aircraft have been acquired, but it can also be said to be a groundbreaking example of equipment acquisition, in which a high level of transport capacity was put in place in a very cost-effective manner.

KC-130R

Comparison of Transport Capacity

	YS-11	C-130R (refurbished aircraft)
Weight on board	Approximately 5 tons	Approximately 20 tons
Range	Approx. 2,200km (with a load of 1.5 tons)	Approx. 4,000km (with a load of 5 tons)
Rough terrain takeoff & landing ability	×	○

Questions Concerning the F-35A

Question 1 What are the features of the F-35A fighter ?

The F-35A fighter has the following characteristics:

F-35A fighter

(1) Its advanced stealth performance makes it difficult for enemy sensors to detect it, giving it an advantage in combat.

(2) Its diverse range of sensors give it the ability to gather the intelligence required for combat.

(3) It has superb networking capacity, so it is able to share the intelligence required for combat with other friendly fighter aircraft and ground troops.

(4) Data from a diverse range of sensors (including those other than the sensors mounted on the aircraft itself) are analyzed and merged for projection onto a single display, enabling the pilot to gain a comprehensive understanding of the combat situation.

Question 2 Which countries other than Japan use the F-35 fighter ?

The F-35 fighter is used by nine countries - the U.S., the UK, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, Canada, Australia, Denmark, and Norway; full-scale joint development of it began in the autumn of 2001. In addition to these nine countries, Israel has also decided to introduce it.

Moreover, the USA intends to use the following:

(1) CTOL*1 (type A) for the US Air Force

(2) STOVL*2 (type B) for the US Marine Corps

(3) CV*3 (type C) for the US Navy

*1: Conventional Take-Off and Landing
*2: Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing
*3: Carrier Variant

F-35B fighter

F-35C fighter

Activities Related to Maritime Security

The Maritime SDF participated in the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) for the first time as an observer in April 2012. At the symposium chiefs of naval staff from countries surrounding the Indian Ocean, including African nations, discussed issues relating to maritime security.

In response to the recent changes in the security environment, the 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines call for the development of Dynamic Defense Force focusing on operation. The MSDF has thus far been actively engaging not only in activities to deal with emergencies in areas surrounding Japan, such as warning and surveillance, but also in activities to create a more stable security environment at the regional and global levels, particularly those relating to maritime security, in order to maintain the free and open maritime order. As a maritime country, Japan depends on imports from abroad for the supply of most natural resources, so it is important to maintain the maritime order including ensuring the freedom of navigation at the global level, not to mention the security of maritime traffic leading to Japan.

The MSDF will share the results achieved through past various activities not only with the Asia-Pacific region but with countries around the world, including those surrounding the Indian Ocean, through which the sea lanes of communication leading to Japan go, by making use of this symposium and other multilateral frameworks, and it will thereby make efforts to improve the global security environment.

The IONS members comprise 32coastal countries of the Indian Ocean region

Indian Ocean Naval Symposium

Column VOICE Commentary Q&A

Voice of a Pilot Engaging in Air Scrambles

Yuta Yamazaki, First Lieutenant, 204th Air Squadron, 83rd Air Wing

As a pilot of fighter aircraft (F-15) based at the Air SDF Naha Airbase, I am engaging in the alert mission in order to scramble against intruding aircraft in the Southwestern region. A scramble is an important mission concerning national authority. Once a scramble order has been issued, we must scramble against aircraft of unidentified nationality approaching Japanese airspace as soon as possible. Although this is a very difficult mission with an incessant feeling of strain, I feel strong satisfaction and pride in performing it.

The writer sitting in the cockpit of F-15 fighter aircraft

A formation of F-15s

I remember an occasion in which I felt my legs shaking with nervousness at my first sight of an aircraft of unidentified nationality during a scramble soon after I was assigned to the alert mission. Any action taken by us could trigger an international dispute. We cannot afford to make a mistake. I always do my job while telling myself to act calmly and carefully.

In the Southwest region in recent years, activities by neighboring countries have become brisk, leading to an increase in the number of scrambles. The Southwest region is certain to become an increasingly critical area from the perspective of national defense. I will continue self-improvement efforts with a view to becoming a tough fighter pilot.

Column

VOICE | Commentary | Q&A

Voice of SDF Personnel Stationed on Remote Island Bases -Tsushima, Miyakojima and Minamitorishima Islands-

Japan is comprised of more than 6,000 islands and is surrounded by the vast seas. The total area size of Japan's territorial waters and exclusive economic zones is as large as approximately 4.47 million square kilometers, the sixth largest in the world. On remote numerous islands which constitute the Japanese territories, a large number of SDF personnel are performing their duties every day.

GSDF serviceman stationed on Tsushima Island

Yutaka Niibo, Sergeant Major, Tsushima Guard Unit

I am serving as the head of a medical corps of the Tsushima guard unit, which is deployed in a site close to the border with the Korean Peninsula. Tsushima has historically been at the forefront of national border defense, and each member of the unit has strong awareness of their position as a national border guard and is routinely conducting practical exercises. As a member of the "Yamaneko (wildcat) Unit" that guards a national border, I will devote myself to my mission in order to become a tougher SDF man and make our unit stronger.

ASDF serviceman stationed on Miyakojima Island

Kentaro Imazeki, Staff Sergeant, 53rd warning group, Southwest air warning unit

The Miyakojima Sub Base where I serve is a sub base located in the southernmost and westernmost region among the ASDF sub bases. The main mission of the radar site is warning and surveillance around this region, and I am responsible for the maintenance of radar equipment as a maintenance crew member.

The number of scrambles has increased in the Southwest region in recent years, and in order to provide support in this respect, I am performing my mission with a feeling of strain.



MSDF serviceman stationed on Minamitorishima Island

Hiroshi Osawa, Petty Officer 2nd Class, Minamitorishima air dispatch unit

I am serving as a member of the Minamitorishima air unit. Although this island is very inconvenient due to the absence of shops, I am working with my colleagues to contribute to the protection of Japanese territories and exclusive economic zones. On this island, which is located in Japan's easternmost region, the temperature often rises above 25 degrees Celsius even during the winter, and doing jobs in a strong sunlight and heat is laborious. However, I will continue working hard.

Threats in cyberspace

Question 1: What are the characteristics of cyber attacks and what is the trend of cyber attacks?

In cyberspace, a variety of entities are conducting various malicious activities, such as theft or falsification of information, and shutdown and malfunction of systems. Such cyber attacks are launched across national borders and it is difficult to identify the source of the attacks. There has been controversy over how to treat such attacks under international laws. Therefore, ensuring cyber security has emerged as a security issue for Japan and other countries in recent years (Part 1, Chapter 2, Section 2).



Question 2: How do the Ministry of Defense and SDF deal with cyber attacks?

Today, cyberspace constitutes essential infrastructure that supports the activities of the Ministry of Defense and SDF.

Therefore, the Ministry of Defense and SDF are implementing various measures to protect their own systems and networks on the assumption that they are routinely exposed to various risks (Part III-Chapter 1 Section 2).

Moreover, they will contribute to the improvement of Japan's overall security level in cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies, the private sector and allied countries (Part II, Chapter 3, Section 6).



Column

VOICE | Commentary | Q&A

Importance of Initial Response (within 72 hours) in Saving Human Lives

Number of human lives saved by the SDFs after the Great East Japan Earthquake and the number of personnel dispatched.



The 72-hour period from the occurrence of disaster is critically important for saving human lives.

The graph indicates changes in the number of human lives saved after the Great East Japan Earthquake. It shows that the number of lives saved declined with the passage of time and that after the passage of roughly 72 hours, the number dropped steeply. In other words, success of rescue activity depends on how quickly after the occurrence of disaster a large number of personnel can be deployed for rescue activity.

In light of that, it is necessary to routinely maintain a system that enables the SDFs to develop close relationship with local communities and make an initial response quickly.

For example, in order to enable initial response to be made quickly anytime and anywhere in response to any emergency, the Ground SDF keeps personnel stationed in 158 garrisons and sub bases (131 garrisons and 27 sub bases) across Japan. With those garrisons and sub bases as its footholds, the Ground SDF keeps operating units standby in each army group for quick dispatch to deal with various emergencies, including disasters.

Because of this standby system, the Ground SDF quickly made an initial response on a large scale after the Great East Japan Earthquake; for example, around 8,400 personnel were deployed to engage in rescue activity on the day that the earthquake occurred.



SDF engaging in rescue activity

Routinely maintaining a system that enables units stationed in local communities to make an initial response quickly.

Column

VOICE Commentary Q&A

Digitization of the Ground SDF

Since fiscal 2007, the Ground SDF has been conducting the C4ISR*1 unit experiments with a view to establishing the method of future warfare adapted to innovations in the field of information and communication technology. As a result of the experiments conducted so far, it became known that the use of state-of-the art C4ISR equipment enables the collection of more accurate information than before and quickly incapacitates the enemy through flexile means. In particular, it was confirmed that the use of UAV*2, UGV*3 and the firing command and control system ensures information superiority in various emergencies that may occur across wide areas and involve multiple incidents and always enables proactive operation of units. In addition, through those experiments, a new method of warfare was developed which impedes the enemy's exercise of military power by paralyzing its line of command and disrupting organized fighting capability in terms of functions.

An SDF service man using the firing command and control system

Moreover, those experiments are also intended to enable quick and flexible response to all foreseeable emergencies, including full-scale aggression, attacks on remote islands and major disasters and create a more effective Ground SDF under joint operation by developing the 2nd Division (Asahikawa) as a pioneer digitized unit.

*1 C4ISR: Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

*2 UAV: Unmanned Air Vehicle

*3 UGV: Unmanned Ground Vehicle

Column

VOICE | Commentary | Q&A

A Message from Mr. Tsuyoshi Nagabuchi

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF received a powerful message from Mr. Tsuyoshi Nagabuchi, a popular singer who provided strong support for disaster relief activities in areas hit by the Great East Japan Earthquake as well as other activities by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF.

Mr. Nagabuchi receiving a special letter of appreciation from the Minister of Defense (December 2011)

Cheering SDF personnel in Ishinomaki City, Miyagi Prefecture (April 2011)

Giving a live performance at the ASDF Matsushima Base to cheer SDF personnel (April 2011)

Giving a live performance at the Ministry of Defense facility (Ichigaya) to cheer SDF personnel (November 2011)

Column

VOICE | Commentary | Q&A

Reflecting on the Lessons of the Response to the Earthquake (Field Communication System)



Access node equipment

Broad-band multi-purpose wireless communication equipment
For use on a vehicle (above) and for mobile use

The field communication system has been developed as a replacement of communication equipment currently used by the Ground SDF, in order to ensure continuous field communication necessary for the command, control of and communication of information to army groups and divisions.

The new system enables the provision of a broad-area, high-speed network environment from the central command to individual personnel through the use of communication networks linking Ground SDF garrisons, field communication networks and private networks.

Moreover, the new system enables direct communication between each force of the SDFs as well as between the SDF and relevant external organizations through the use of software wireless technology. That is expected to facilitate information sharing with relevant organizations, the importance of which was learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake.

An Array of Messages Sent to MOD/SDF

Messages sent from all over the country including the disaster-affected areas were a strong source of support for MOD/SDF to carry out support activities.

We really appreciate these messages.

"I learned activities of SDF personnel on the internet. Thank you. I can do nothing but express my gratitude to young SDF personnel. They were working for the people even though their own family members also suffered from the disaster. Each of your activities touched our heart. Your activities will continue in difficult situations but each member of the nation that you protected will think of this. I truly hope that you will return to your family safely and with smiles."

Many letters sent to MOD/SDF

"I appreciate very much for your diligent daily activities and am profoundly grateful for your families who support you. Please take good care of yourselves as I expect difficult days are yet to continue. All Japanese people are cheering for you and are proud of you! I, too, will look for what I can do and take action.

Hold out Tohoku, Hold out Japan!

Let us all Japanese help to each other toward reconstruction and bring smiles to the disaster areas.

"At the Great East Japan Earthquake… I am deeply grateful for you all who went into actions at the risk of your own lives as well as for your families. Thank you so much. We will also do our best whatever we can. I wish you well. Thank you."

"It has been nearly three months since the Great East Japan Earthquake occurred on March 11. The degree of damage in the afflicted areas is becoming visible almost every day and a large number of people are cooperating toward reconstruction. The other day I saw SDF personnel working in protective clothing on television. Looking at the personnel trying hard to find missing persons and family mementos out of piles of things that had been swept from inside of houses by tsunami, I grieved at the scene. However, SDF personnel who are actually working for reconstruction there must be feeling far greater sadness than mine. Living together in Japan, I will do my best in what I can do now, even if small things, together with SDF personnel."

MV-22 Osprey

MV-22 Osprey

The MV-22 is an aircraft possessing the combined technologies of a rotorcraft, which enables vertical take-off and landing and hovering functions, and a fixed wing aircraft, which enables high velocity and a long flight range. Compared with the CH-46, the MV-22 boasts about twice the maximum velocity, three times the carrying capacity, and four times the cruising radius. Fulfilling all of the reliability and safety requirements, the U.S. Government decided to mass-produce the MV-22 in 2005 as a medium-sized air transport aircraft, and the Marine Corps is planning to procure 360 MV-22s. As of July 1, 2012, the Marine Corps possesses about 150 MV-22s and these aircrafts have been deployed globally and operated in various missions such as Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, and disaster relief activities in Haiti.

The Marine Corps is advancing its plan to replace its outdated rotorcraft, the CH-46, with the MV-22 that has superior basic capabilities, and the U.S. Department of Defense made an announcement in June 2011 concerning updating the CH-46 currently deployed at Futenma Air Base with the MV-22. Then, the U.S. Government gave the Japanese Government a Host Nation Notification on June 29, 2012, that one CH-46 squadron at Futenma Air Base would be replaced with one MV-22 squadron in October 2012.

Column VOICE Commentary Q&A

Japan-US Joint Exercise – the First Participation in KOA KAI

Captain **Shinji Marusawa**, commander, Escort Division 2 (commander of contingent to the U.S. exercise KOA KAI)

From October to December of 2011, I as the commander of an escort division participated in 2011 U.S. KOA KAI exercise conducted in Hawaii and its surrounding ocean area. This was the first participation for the MSDF. I boarded the escort vessel Kurama and took its command.

KOA KAI means "marine warrior" in Polynesian. The exercise is aimed at checking and evaluating whether the Hawaiian surface vessels under the Commander of Destroyer Squadron 31 are prepared for real missions.

Because this was our first participation, we conducted the exercise on the common platform with the U.S. Navy focusing on acquisition of tactics of the U.S. Navy to carry out real missions. I believe that we could achieve the original purpose by improving tactical skills through the exercise. At the same time, the fact that MSDF vessels joined the exercise for the U.S. Navy that has a great deal of experience in real missions and could carry out the exercise toe-to-toe with them proves a high interoperability and close coordination between the MSDF and U.S. Navy. I believe that MSDF's participation in KOA KAI will be beneficial for MSDF also in the future.

The author (left) and the Commander of the Destroyer Squadron 31 (right)

Column VOICE Commentary Q&A

Tomodachi Operation – a bond that tied Japan and the U.S.

Stephen (Steve) A. Town (now ex-service) Former Director, Army Air & Missile Defense Division (AAMDD) Liaison Officer in Japan

For about four and a half months from just after the Great East Japan Earthquake to the end of July 2011, I as a liaison officer at the Joint Staff Office at Ichigaya was engaged in liaison and coordination between the JSDF that was responding to the disaster and the U.S. forces that were supporting them.

Supporting Japanese people in cooperation with the JSDF that was responding to the unprecedented disaster required wide ranging coordination. Through the coordination efforts, we recognized anew that there are differences in culture and those in operation procedure based on the former between Japan and the United States. However, we could overcome these differences by mutual understanding developed through exchanges and joint exercises during peace time and the efforts on the both side to bring Japan-U.S. cooperation to a success for reconstruction of the disaster areas as early as possible.

Thanks to proactive Japan-U.S. coordination and the efforts of the people involved such as personnel in the field, Operation Tomodachi produced results including expeditious recovery of the Sendai Airport that was heavily damaged by the earthquake, showing a strong "bond" between the two countries.

Relocation of the Air Defense Command to Yokota

ASDF Air Defense Operations Group's operation commencement ceremony (March 2012)

In the Security Consultative Committee (2+2) Document "U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future" in October 2005, it was clearly stated that Japan's Air Defense Command would be collocated with the headquarters of the U.S. 5th Air Force at Yokota Air Base. Through subsequent consultations the governments of Japan and the United States agreed on "United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation" in May 2006.

Based on the Roadmap, the ASDF developed facilities necessary for the operation of the Air Defense Command at Yokota Air Base while moving command and control systems including command system and Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE) as well as associated equipments. The ASDF completed the relocation of the Air Defense Command and associated troops on March 26, 2012 and started operation of the Air Defense Command at Yokota Air Base.

With the Air Defense Command, the Air Intelligence Wing and the Air Defense Operations Group relocating from Fuchu Base to Yokota Air Base, the number of personnel at the Base is now about 800.

The collocation of the Air Defense Command with the headquarters of the U.S. 5th Air Force enables more rapid Japan-US information sharing necessary for air defense and ballistic missile defense that need only a short period of time for response. This will also strengthen cooperation between the headquarters organizations of the two countries to improve interoperability, is of essential importance for the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and contributes to the expansion of the effective deterrent and response forces.

Column VOICE Commentary Q&A

Exchange between Local Residents and US Forces

Understanding and cooperation of residents living in the vicinity of U.S. bases are essential for the presence of US forces in Japan. Since 2008 MOD has been holding Japan-US exchange events in areas surrounding U.S. base for interaction of U.S. military officials, their families and residents living in the vicinity of U.S. base through sports and culture.

Music exchange (Iwakuni City)

In FY2011, MOD held a Japan-US exchange joint concert near Iwakuni Base (Iwakuni City). In this concert Japanese and American elementary and junior high school students played koto (Japanese harp), consort and chorus incorporating marching and danced to a version of soranbushi (folk song of Hokkaido.) After the last consort and chorus by all players, about 1,000 thousand audience generously applauded the students.

Other exchange events include a food culture exchange near Misawa Base (Misawa City,) a music exchange by elementary and junior high school students near Yokota Base (Hamura City) and a tea ceremony exchange by high school students near Yokosuka Base (Yokosuka City), which were all received well by the participants and residents.

MOD intends to actively promote such Japan-US exchange events to deepen exchange between residents living in the vicinity of U.S. and U.S. officials and their families.

Food culture exchange (Misawa City)

Music exchange (Hamura City)

Tea ceremony exchange (Yokosuka City)

Column VOICE Commentary Q&A

Military Medical Cooperation in the ADMM-Plus

COL(DR) **KANG WEE LEE** Chief of Medical Corps, Singapore Armed Forces
Co-Chair, ADMM-Plus Experts' Working Group on Military Medicine

The inauguration of the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) in October 2010 represents an important response to the evolving strategic developments in the wider region. The ADMM-Plus which brings together the ten ASEAN Member States and eight "Plus" countries, including Japan, is a key component of the regional security architecture that allows key stakeholders to work together to enhance the peace and stability of the region.

Apart from facilitating strategic discussions at the Ministerial level, the ADMM-Plus plays a crucial role in strengthening regional cooperation amongst the armed forces of the ADMM-Plus countries. In this regard, the Experts' Working Groups (EWGs) – launched six months after the inaugural ADMM-Plus meeting – is a valuable platform for the militaries to forge practical cooperation in five key areas, namely humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), maritime security, peacekeeping operations, counter-terrorism and military medicine. The EWG on Military Medicine (EWG-MM) is co-chaired by Japan and Singapore. Our partnership underscores the strong bilateral defense relations between the two countries.

The EWG-MM is a distinctive platform to enhance practical military medical cooperation because this is the first time military medicine is on the agenda of an ASEAN security-related forum. In our EWG-MM co-chairmanship, Japan and Singapore will lead the ADMM-Plus' military medical services in enhancing the regional HADR medical response framework by driving the development of useful initiatives in the areas of inter-operability and coordination, information sharing and medical training.

To this end, the inaugural EWG-MM meeting in Singapore in July 2011 garnered strong support for a set of recommendations to strengthen the operational interface and facilitate the inter-operability of ADMM-Plus' military medical services. Significant achievements include the establishment of a register of points-of-contact, an inventory of medical support capabilities and a set of Standard Operating Procedures for disaster medical assistance.

With a strong foundation laid by the first EWG-MM meeting, Japan and Singapore co-hosted a EWG-MM Tabletop Exercise, focusing on the medical support for HADR operations, in Japan in July 2012. This is aligned to the EWG-MM's strategic direction to progress towards more operationally challenging activities and to enhance inter-operability, which is an important test of regional capability given that the military is often one of the first responders to a disaster scene. In this regard, a collective approach in building the regional capacity and capability for HADR medical response is an important and necessary step to meet the challenges in the scale and complexity of modern day disasters.

*Standard Operating Procedure

Column VOICE Commentary Q&A

Japan-US-Austria Joint Exercise –Cope North Guam –

Major **Hirofumi Murai** Western Air Defense Force Headquarters

As a F-2 pilot I participated in a joint exercise with the US Air Force and Australia Air Force (Cope North Guam) conducted in Guam in February 2012.

The exercise has been conducted every year since FY1999 with the aim of enhancing Japan-US joint coping capacity and tactical skills, but the Australian Air Force participated for the first time.

Just like ASDF the Australian Air Force is in a close relationship with the US Air Force and operates fighters in a similar way. This was the first Japan-US-Austria joint exercise but we could carry out the exercise without any anxiety.

Through the exercise I am deeply impressed by their gentlemanly behavior and enthusiastic attitude to actively try to deepen mutual understanding of tactics between Japan and Australia. In this sense, I felt that an exercise with Australian Air Force can be very productive.

The author coordinating the exercise with pilots of Australian Air Force in a briefing room (left)

At the time of the Great East Japan Earthquake in March 2011, C-17 transport aircraft of Australian Air Force provided transport support in close coordination with JSDF and the US force in Japan. Australian force is an important partner of JSDF. I hope that we can further deepen mutual collaboration and cooperation not only in security areas but also in disaster relief and humanitarian support activities.

Group photo of the participants of 2011 Japan-US-Austria joint exercise

Column VOICE Commentary Q&A

Voice of a Defense Attaché (ASDF)

Colonel **Shinju Terauchi** Defense Attaché at Japanese Embassy in Russian Federation

Russia, "our neighboring country," has a huge impact on the security of the Asia-Pacific region including Europe and Central Asia. Consequently, it is essential for Japan's security to promote trust and a cooperative relationship through defense exchange between Japan and Russia.

At Japanese Embassy in Moscow I am currently working on a variety of plans concerning defense exchange between the two countries. For example, I am looking for defense exchange in a new form such as exchange between ASDF transport aircrafts and Russian transport air force as inter-force exchange. For the success of such a defense exchange, I am making efforts to realize exchanges in cooperation with the Defense Ministry of Russia and the Russian Eastern District Army Headquarters as well as people on the Japanese side.

I am flying around from east to west of the vast Eurasia continent over nine time zones to a planning meeting with the Defense Ministry of Russia in Moscow and then to the Eastern District Army Headquarters at Khabarovsk that is a planned venue of exchange, for example.

My task is to prepare "stage" for players of the defense exchange and support realization of productive "exchange." I will be very happy as a Defense Attaché if the defense exchange builds bridge of security cooperation in Far East and with "our neighboring country."

The author in Russia (third from the left)

The Progress of Japan-UK Defense Relations



Prime Ministers Noda and Cameron (Tokyo, April 2012)
[Cabinet Public Relations Office]

Our military relationship with Japan goes back a long way. In the late 19th Century it was the United Kingdom's maritime operational and shipbuilding experience that the Imperial Japanese Navy chose to draw on. Admiral Togo studied in the UK and sailed with the Royal Navy as he established himself as a brilliant tactician and naval forces commander.

Japan is the UK's most import ally in the region and an ally with a very similar outlook on international affairs. We want peace, global stability and prosperity for all. We are committed to the principles of international law, and are actively engaged across the world in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. And we both have immensely close relationships with the United States.

In April 2012, Prime Ministers Cameron and Noda met in Tokyo and endorsed a new Defense Cooperation Memorandum that defines this new relationship, which was signed by our Defense Ministers in June 2012. The memorandum also sets out new areas for cooperation such as cyber security and counter-piracy. We also want to reduce the burden of acquiring increasingly expensive defense equipment by increasing cooperation between our two defense industries.

We therefore intend to take every opportunity to share our experiences, advice and information for our mutual benefit – not only in Japan and the UK but around the world.

Column VOICE Commentary Q&A

Voice of Personnel in Duty at Djibouti SDF Facility

Lieutenant **Masanori Aoki** Leader of Public Relations Unit, the 9th Deployment Air force for counter Piracy Enforcement(DAPE)

Sent to the Republic of Djibouti in December 2011 as the leader of public relations unit of the 9th DAPE, I have been pushing forward with public relation duties. In this column I will describe the local exchange activities on which I have been working to contribute to creating a facility-surrounding environment suitable for carrying out our duties in Djibouti.

DAPE has been engaged in local exchange in various forms. During the time of my duty here, I built a relationship with schools near the facility with which we have had no exchange in the past and expanded the relationship through donation of goods and cultural exchange. In the environment where even one pencil is treasured unlike in Japan, I saw students who listen to their teacher with shining eyes. I'll never forget their pure eyes.

The principal of an elementary school said to me "Japan was hit by a great earthquake last year and lost so many things due to tsunami. I wonder how Japan, in such a difficult situation, can help people of other countries. Thank you very much." This was a moment when I realized that the "cordiality" of Japanese people can contribute to establishing friendly relations with other countries.

The author making arrangements with people of an elementary school

Commemorative photo at the school where an exchange took place (the author is second from the left in the back row)

Column VOICE Commentary Q&A

Voice of Personnel Dispatched to South Sudan PKO and the Family

Warrant Officer **Yoshihiro Isono**
Dispatched Personnel, Command Sergeant Major of the Central Readiness Regiment

When I was studying abroad about 15 years ago, I visited the boundary line with a neighboring country. I still remember the landscape there. Seeing the gap between the rich and the poor across the border fence with my own eyes, I was choked with sorrow and couldn't help thinking "what if I were born on the opposite side of the fence?"

13 years later, I was sent to Haiti as a member of the 1st International Relief Unit for Haiti. Now I am in South Sudan as a member of the 1st contingent of engineer unit and assisting local people toward realization of their dreams and hopes. I was born in Japan but no one can choose to be born in a country like Japan that provides help, or in a country that needs help.

Furthermore, even if you are lucky enough to be born in a country that provides help, you may suddenly find yourself on the side that needs help. I felt this strongly during the disaster dispatch in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake last year. It is truly an honor for me as a person born on the side that provides help to be given an opportunity to assist others as my task. Appreciating the opportunity, I will sweat a lot at work today as usual to show my gratitude.

The author with children of South Sudan

Mayumi (second from the right) and the family

Mayumi Isono, his wife

South Sudan…When I first heard the name of the country, I had no idea even about its location. This is the third dispatch for him in the last three years following Haiti two years ago and the Great East Japan Earthquake last year.

Every time I worry about his physical and mental health: hygiene, temperature, food, and the shock he might have by seeing the local conditions with his own eyes. He is so far away that we could not see him easily if something happens. This increases my anxiety.

However, he always sets out saying "Everything's going to be all right" with a smile and sends caring words to us from the location he was dispatched to.

"I will go to help people in need." Seeing his attitude, our children feel encouraged rather than lonely.

These missions are hard for both dispatched personnel and their family, but make us think about the meaning of "doing something for somebody. "Take good care of yourself and keep up good job!" These plain words I always say are all I wish for.

Column VOICE Commentary Q&A

Looking Back the First Dispatch Based on the PKO Law - Cambodia PKO –

Tetsuya Nishimoto, former Chairman of the Joint Staff Council (Chief of Staff, GSDF at the time of Cambodia PKO)

20 years have passed since June 1992 when the PKO Law was enacted and Japan participated in PKO in Cambodia for the first time.

At that time, having only a little more than three months after the enactment of the PKO Law, we experienced significant difficulties in preparation. First, we struggled in selection of personnel, formation of unit and training. Second, preparation and packing of enormous amount of equipment and arrangement of transportation means to send them to the site required huge amount of work. Third, we needed to make sure for removing anxiety of the personnel's families about the overseas dispatch as the first PKO by the SDF and to establish a support system for them.

In the field, they completed construction/repair of roads and bridges and improvement of ports to facilitate withdrawal of other troops, which was highly appreciated.

Meanwhile, the first general election for Cambodia was held under the tense situation in which U.N. volunteer Atsuhito Nakata and Civilian Police Superintendent Haruyuki Takada were killed in April and May 1993, respectively. At that time the biggest challenge was to ensure safety of 41 election observers sent from Japan. I believe that, because guarding them was not allowed by the law, the SDF personnel investigating roads/bridges near polling stations and sending food and water were conductive to ensuring their safety.

Visiting a field of Cambodia PKO as GSDF Chief of Staff (then) (second from the left)

The accomplishments are the result of humble and dedicated activities of the dispatched personnel and the organizing power nurtured by our predecessors. Supports by our brothers in the MSDF and ASDF are also unforgettable. I truly cannot thank them enough.

Since then Japan's international peace keeping activities have made major advances. I think this development is only natural for Japan, which has only limited natural resources and therefore is dependent on trade. It is strongly desirable to develop a legal system necessary to make the activities more effective and ensure safety of personnel.

Marking the 60th Anniversary – Efforts by the National Institute for Defense Studies

The National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), a think tank of the Ministry of Defense, conducts policy-oriented research and studies mainly on security and history of warfare, while fulfilling the function of a defense college to train high-ranking cadre of the SDF. Research results are provided to the decision makers of the Ministry as needed. Major results are made available to the public on the website of the institute (http://www.nids.go.jp/; e.g., East Asian Strategic Review, NIDS China Security Report, NIDS Journal of Defense and Security, NIDS Military History Studies Annual, and Briefing Memo). The NIDS also manages and publishes warfare history materials serving as the country's largest warfare history research center.

The NIDS also functions as a pioneering international exchange organization of the MOD. With the aim of contributing to the improvement of security environment through enhancement of trusting relationship with countries in the world and enhancing the quality of research studies and education, the NIDS conducts academic exchanges and joint researches with overseas defense universities and security research institutes.

The NIDS marks the 60th anniversary on August 1, 2012. During these 60 years, the NIDS has played a central role in Japan's security study. The NIDS is expected from various quarters to continue activities as a center of security study in the world responding to the demands of the times.

National Institute for Defense Studies

Column VOICE Commentary Q&A

Voice of SDF Reserve Personnel – To be a SDF Reserve Personnel and Member of Society

Reserve Leading Private **Yoko Kawano** (former Reserve Candidate of open recruitment)

When I tell people around me that I am a SDF reserve personnel, they ask me endless questions with astonishment that they found "SDF personnel" among them and that I am a woman, as well as from curiosity about the unknown world of the SDF.

It seems that few people know about SDF reserve personnel, but I feel that my friends and acquaintances accept the fact with interest as activities of a person who work and live a civilian life together with them.

Spending a lot of time contacting with general public, I am often asked questions and considered to be just "SDF personnel" by lay public without distinction from regular SDF personnel.

Therefore, I try to behave honorably and learn minimum knowledge about the SDF and defense on the daily basis so that I can facilitate public understanding and interest as a person standing between SDF and the general public.

I maintain physical fitness and keep myself in good shape as my obligation so that I can respond to a sudden calling.

I will continue to conduct myself always with awareness and responsibility as SDF reserve personnel.

The author working in her workplace that deals with interior goods

Column VOICE Commentary Q&A

Voice of Female SDF Personnel - First Female Graduates from National Defense Academy who are active in various places –

20 years after entering the National Defense Academy as first female students in 1992, they are now active in various places of the country.

GSDF

Lieutenant Colonel **Yoko Yato**

Personnel Planning Division, Personnel Department, GSDF Staff Office

After graduating from the National Defense Academy, I served as a company commander of the 10th Signal Battalion and engaged in international activities as a member of the 5th Iraq reconstruction assistance while being supported by many people. Now I am doing a job concerning personnel affairs in GSDF Staff Office. I wish to contribute to people and society and try new duties taking advantage of my past precious experiences.

The author working at GSDF Staff Office (Ichigaya)

MSDF

Vice Commander of the training ship "Kashima"

Commander **Ryoko Azuma**

As Vice Commander of the training ship "Kashima" whose duty is long training cruise I am teaching interns who have just graduated from an officer candidate school. Guidance by many superiors and predecessors and support of subordinates made me who I am today. Partly to repay their favor, I continue to work for development of younger people and pave the way for female juniors.

The author working as Vice Commander of training ship

ASDF

Lieutenant Colonel **Yukari Yoshida**

Commanding Officer, Matsushima Air Traffic Control Unit, Air Traffic Control Service Group

After graduating the academy, I first worked in Hamamatsu Air Traffic Control Unit, then in the academy (instructor) and ASDF Staff Office. Now I am working in Matsushima Base as the Commanding Officer of the Matsushima Air Traffic Control Unit. With support of so many people I could live a fulfilling life as a SDF personnel and mother of a child. For the future, I will continue my duty never forgetting my feeling of gratitude and treasuring bonds with people so that they are filled with "love and smiles."

The author working in Matsushima Base Traffic Control Tower as commander

Column

VOICE | Commentary | Q&A

Excellent Human Asset – Abilities of Retired SDF Personnel

Heiwa Sangyo Co., Ltd.

Business activities: Sales and manufacturing of components for precision machinery (important components that support high performance and safety of aircrafts, space crafts and railway vehicles)

[Retired SDF personnel]
Mr. Kenji Kobayashi,
Quality Assurance Director (former ASDF Colonel)

I am extremely busy everyday, working as both Quality Assurance Director and QMS* General Manager among other duties. Due to IT I am continuing to work and study day and night but I hope to contribute to the company and society taking advantage of my experience, knowledge, qualifications and network of contacts I have gained in the SDF.

*QMS: Quality Management System

[Employer side]
Mr. Yasuhiro Yao,
President

We are a machine manufacturer serving aerospace companies and plant manufacturing company. Mr. Kobayashi has demonstrated outstanding insights and performance in big-picture judgment and problem solving, which I cannot find in other employees. I have a high expectation in his activities as a director.

Ebara Environmental Plant Co., Ltd.

Business activities: design and construction, maintenance and repair work of environment/energy-related facilities

[Retired SDF personnel]
Mr. Kazuya Abematsu, Chief of Gonoike Power Plant Management Office* (former MSDF Commander)



While working in the SDF, I tried to deal with many people and fit together feeling of various people and relationships in workplace to accomplish a single task. This experience greatly helps me in my current job.

* Gonoike Power Plant Management Office Conducts operation and management of biomass fuel power plant

[Employer side]
Mr. Motoyuki Ito, O&M Business Division, Maintenance and Management Department

When we launched a new business, I received reports of trouble every day. In this situation, Mr. Abematsu organized employees and made arrangement for operation in the field. I think this proves that the knack for dealing with people acquired in SDF service is useful also in the general public.

Shikoku Godo Tsuun Co., Ltd.

Business activities: transportation and general waste collection

[Retired SDF personnel]
Mr. Masashi Kasai, Driver of the Heavy Vehicle Team 1 (Former GSDF Leading Private)

Good manners I have learned in the SDF are helpful here, which I owe to the people of the 6th Engineer Group (Toyokawa). Now, under the kind guidance of the people of the company I am working with "ensure safe delivery of important packages of customers" as my first principle and "drive carefully" as my motto.

[Employer side]
Mr. Takashi Miki
Team Leader of the Heavy Vehicle Team 1

Mr. Kasai is working on everything straightforwardly. Overseeing disaster dispatch of the SDF just after the occurrence of the Great East Japan Earthquake, he carried out transportation tasks with strong will that "as a former SDF member I will also complete my task overcoming the difficult situation," which greatly influenced our employees.

Column

VOICE | Commentary | Q&A

Voice from the Defense Industry

The Shipbuilders' Association of Japan, Naval Ships & Patrol Ships Sub-Committee

Shipbuilders with cooperation of government-furnished equipment makers and subcontractors support operations of Maritime Self-Defense Force vessels through construction of vessels, checking-out, maintenance and repair of vessels in commission.

They operate MSDF vessel business leveraging technologies unique to navy vessels and knowhow accumulated over the years based on their equipment, technology and human resources for construction/repair of merchant vessels.

Most of the newly constructed merchant vessels are for overseas client, and our business environment is extremely severe. In addition to the strong yen, serious oversupply is going on due to the global decline in construction demand combined with the expanded construction capacity of Korea and China.

Keihin Shipyard of Universal Shipbuilding Corporation, a member of the Shipbuilders' Association of Japan

If merchant vessel business that accounts for over 70% of all vessel business sales does not turn up, it will have a serious impact on the navy vessel business that is built on the foundation of the former. Even repair of navy vessels would become difficult in the worst case.

While ensuring continual work load is essential to maintain the base for navy vessel construction and repair, recently the need to strengthen design/development capability and optimize production systems is also strongly recognized as means to reinforce international competitiveness of the entire vessel business, which prompts shipbuilders' move toward enterprise partnership and integration of business.

Column

VOICE | Commentary | Q&A

Voice from the Defense Industry

The research on the CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear) Threat Assessment System Technology deals with systems capable of not only prediction and assessment of atmospheric diffusion of CBRN threat but also estimation of the location of pollution source based on the data from various CBRN detection sensors.

Because CBRN diffusion is influenced by various factors such as geographical features, urban constructions, and the direction/velocity of wind, visualization of invisible CBRN threat by precisely predicting atmospheric diffusion in view of those factors is important to ensuring the safety of soldiers.

The goal of the research is to establish methods for estimation of the location of pollution source and dynamic correction that incorporate actually measured data from the MOD/SDF's mobile/fixed CBRN detection sensors and weather sensors, assuming the situation where the source of pollution would be unclear. Although the private sector offers a large number of diffusion forecast systems to assess environmental impact and disaster prevention, they are not equipped with the function of estimating the location of pollution source. Therefore, the Technical Research and Development Institute (TRDI) plans to conduct research in this area from JFY2012 to 2019.



Operational Concept of CBRN Threat Assessment System Technology

Column

VOICE | Commentary | Q&A

Continuing Exchange between Afflicted Areas and Troops

Let us introduce an exchange between Kesennuma City (Miyagi Prefecture) and the troops of the Camp Omura (Nagasaki Prefecture).



(From the left) Ms. Takahashi, Ms. Sasaki and Ms. Miura, invited from Kesennuma City to a Fureai Concert held in Omura City

On March 18, 2012, about one year after the Great East Japan Earthquake, five guests including Ms. Kaai Takahashi, Ms. Masaka Sasaki and Ms. Toshie Miura were invited from Kesennuma City (Miyagi Prefecture) to "Fureai Concert" held by the Camp Omura (Nagasaki Prefecture).

At the time of the disaster, the 16th Infantry Regiment of the Camp Omura was working on disaster relief operation. Then, Ms. Takahashi and Ms. Sasaki who were members of a high-school brass band participated in a musical performance played by the regiment to entertain local people, where Ms. Miura, an employee of Kesennuma City, acted as MC, which triggered the exchange.

At the concert Ms. Miura looked back the circumstances at that time:

"I lost everything in the tsunami. Chased by the tsunami, I had a close escape from death, and I was spent mentally as well as physically. Then I had a chance to listen to the musical performance. Songs sung by personnel were a ray of light in utter darkness. It gave courage to me. I felt great comfort. Citizens of Omura and members of the regiment, I thank you very much!"

Even now over one year after the Great East Japan Earthquake, exchange continues between the people of the disaster-affected areas and the troops that conducted disaster relief operation there.

Column VOICE Commentary Q&A

Message from the Mayor of Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture

Yuto Yoshida, Mayor of Yokosuka City

Yokosuka is the center of Japan's sea defense where not only the Self Defense Fleet Headquarters and Yokosuka District Headquarters of JMSDF headquarters are located, but also the U.S. Seventh Fleet Headquarters and the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Japan are situated. We also have JGSDF and JASDF troops here as well as the National Defense Academy educating future JSDF officials. Yokosuka is truly essential to Japan's security.

Today, as the security environment of the region surrounding Japan is unclear and uncertain, it is important that JSDF and the U.S. Navy base in the city are securely operated while gaining local understanding. As the Mayor, I believe it is one of my major jobs to create such environment.

At the time of the Great East Japan Earthquake last year, the Commander of the Self Defense Fleet Headquarters issued sailing order to all available vessels 6 minutes after the earthquake, and a large number of U.S. vessels turned out from the Yokosuka Base in "Operation Tomodachi." Seeing these activities with their own eyes, the residents of Yokosuka City felt that JSDF and the U.S. forces are reliable in case of an emergency.

Approximately 10,000 JSDF personnel and 13,000 U.S. force personnel are living in the City. In order to provide a comfortable environment for the troops and their families, we will continue to work our best in improving the municipal administration.

At the send-off party for JMSDF Training Squadron 2012

Column VOICE Commentary Q&A

Cooperation with the Filming of "Yamamoto Isoroku"

In summer of 2010, we were asked by a studio to cooperate with a film production. The producer said: "I wish to depict the fact that an Imperial Navy officer, who was against war to the end, was to open the war, but actually aimed to conclude a peace at an early date." The movie was "Yamamoto Isoroku."

Let me introduce some of its impressive scenes. First, the scene of a heated debate between the Tripartite Pact proponents and opponents in the 1st Technical School's Auditorium (Etajima City) that was used to resemble the National Diet Building. The Auditorium, a historic building built in 1917 made of granite that was also used for the National Diet Building, added profound feeling to the picture. Next, the scene on the flagship "Nagato" was shot on our transport ship "Kunisaki." Pure white uniforms make navy more attractive, and some may feel them dazzling. Transport ship "Kunisaki" had just returned to Kure after three months of disaster relief dispatch in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake. In this movie, about 110 MSDF personnel cooperated as extras. After the completion of shooting on "Kunisaki" all crew members sent off the leading actor Mr.Koji Yakusho. The shooting lasted only for one day, but Mr.Yakusho was moved to tears by the traditional "Swing Cap" of MSDF.

The 1st Technical School's Auditorium
(Etajima City) where the heated debate scene was shot

Transport "Kunisaki" where the scene
on the flagship "Nagato" was shot

Column VOICE Commentary Q&A

SDF Personnel Who Are Active on the World Stage -Olympic and SDF Personnel-

Question 1 Let us know about SDF personnel who will participate in London Olympic Games.

A total of 13 personnel will participate including: Captain Hitomi Obara, who won a gold medal in women's 48-kg class of the World Wrestling Championships twice in 2010 and 2011; First Lieutenant Shinichi Yumoto, who competes in 55-kg class freestyle wrestling; Second Lieutenant Tatsuhiro Yonemitsu, who won a silver medal in 66-kg class freestyle of the 2011 World Wrestling Championships; Sergeant First Class Tsutomu Fujimura, who competes in 66-kg class Greco-Roman; Second Lieutenant Katsuaki Susa, who competes in flyweight class in boxing; Second Lieutenant Satoshi Shimizu, who competes in bantamweight class in boxing; Second Lieutenant Yasuhiro Suzuki, who competes in welterweight class in boxing; Sergeant First Class Midori Yajima, who is the winner of the 2012 Asian Championships in rifle; Sergeant First Class Yuki Yamazaki, who competes in a 50-km walk; Ensign Ken Takakuwa, who competes in 200-meter individual medley swimming; Sergeant Shinichi Tomii, who competes in the modern pentathlon; Leading Private Shino Yamanaka, who is the first Japanese woman to participate in the modern pentathlon; and Reserve Sergeant First Class Yukari Konishi (Aska Kotsu Co.), who competes in pistol shooting.

Question 2: Let us know about past Olympic athletes who were SDF personnel.

Many SDF personnel flourished in the past Olympic games. For example, at the Tokyo Olympics, then Second Lieutenant and weightlifter Yoshinobu Miyake won the first gold medal for Japan and then Sergeant Koukichi Tsuburaya, who made the entire country glued to the game, won a bronze in marathon. At the Mexico Olympics, in addition to Miyake, then Second Lieutenant Masaaki Kaneko and Sergeant First Class Shigeo Nakata each won a gold medal in wrestling. At the Los Angeles Olympics, then Second Lieutenant Takeo Kamachi, who was 49 years old when participated the game, and then Sergeant Atsuji Miyahara both won gold medals in pistol and wrestling, respectively.

Captain, Hitomi Obara

First Lieutenant, Shinichi Yumoto

Second Lieutenant, Tatsuhiro Yonemitsu

Sergeant First Class, Tsutomu Fujimura

Second Lieutenant, Katsuaki Susa

Second Lieutenant, Satoshi Shimizu

Second Lieutenant, Yasuhiro Suzuki

Ensign, Ken Takakuwa

Sergeant First Class, Yuki Yamazaki

Sergeant 1st Class, Midori Yajima

Reserve Sergeant First Class, Yukari Konishi

Sergeant, Shinichi Tomii

Leading Private, Shino Yamanaka

Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Overview

1. Trends in the International Community

With regard to Japan's security environment over the past year, various movements have been observed including the transition of power to Kim Jong-un as the new leader of North Korea, and act of provocation such as launching a missile, which North Korea calls "Satellite", various notable military movements by China and continued growing military activities by Russia. In the meantime, against the background of progress in the U.S. force's drawing down from Afghanistan and Iraq and the serious fiscal circumstances of the U.S. Government, the U.S. released a new defense strategic guidance, showing policies to rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region in its security strategy, and to emphasize its existing alliances in the region and to expand its networks of cooperation with emerging partners.

In the international community, notable phenomena have also continuously been observed with regard to global security issues including cyber attacks, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, as well as international terrorism and the weakening of governing systems. Furthermore, as a result of the mutual interdependence among countries that has contributed to the stability and prosperity of each country, it is also possible for security issues and instability arising in one country to transcend national borders and affect other countries. As such, the international security environment remains complex and uncertain.

Under such a security environment, it is also increasingly important for countries with common interests in the resolution of issues to work together, as it has become extremely difficult for one country to deal with issues confronting the international community and countries gain shared benefits by ensuring regional and global peace, stability and prosperity through the establishment of a more stable international security environment.

It is thought that even as the comparative influence of the U.S. has been changing, it will stay as the most influential nation in the international community in the future. On the other hand, as a result of their significant economic growth in recent years, national power of countries such as China, India, and Russia are growing, and it is believed that their relative international influence, which is oriented toward multi-polarity, will also grow. The increase in national power for these countries should be captured as a good opportunity for international coordination and cooperation. At the same time, however, there is a possibility that they will exert a significant influence on the security environment, and are thus being watched closely by the international community.

2. Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific Region

In the Asia-Pacific region, alongside the various changes that have taken place in tandem with the growing power of China, India, and Russia, efforts are being made to enhance and strengthen coordination and collaboration among countries in the region with a particular focus on non-traditional security sectors such as humanitarian aid and disaster relief and counter-piracy measures. On the other hand, this region is considerably rich in political, economic, ethnic, and religious diversity, and conflicts between countries/regions remain. Because of these reasons, major changes in the security environment have yet to emerge even after the end of the Cold War, unlike Europe and long-standing issues of territorial rights and reunification continue to plague the region.

On the Korean Peninsula, the Korean people have been divided for more than half a century, and the faceoff continues between the military forces of the Republic of Korea and North Korea. There are issues concerning Taiwan and the South China Sea. Japan also confronts unresolved territorial disputes over the Northern Territories and Takeshima, both of which are integral parts of Japanese territory.

In North Korea in December 2011, Kim Jong-il, its leader and Chairman of the National Defence Commission, died, and a new framework was established with Kim Jong-un as the new leader, who is believed to be his third son. Concerns over North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles have grown more serious, as was seen in North Korea's provocation such as the missile launch, which it calls "Satellite" in April 2012. The Six-Party Talks aimed at the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner has been suspended since December 2008, but in light of the series of North Korean announcements and actions including two previous announcements (in October 2006 and May 2009) of nuclear tests, the possibility that North Korea has already made considerable progress in its nuclear weapons program cannot be dismissed. Furthermore, there is a possibility that the country is developing nuclear weapons using Highly-Enriched Uranium. In addition to conducting nuclear tests, steps taken by North Korea to enhance its ballistic missile capability pose a significant threat to Japan's security, and are absolutely unacceptable as they are significantly detrimental to peace and stability in Northeast Asia and the international community. There is great concern toward such movements by North Korea, and developments in North Korea continue to be unpredictable and need to be closely monitored. North Korea's abduction of Japanese nationals is also yet to be resolved. It is a major threat to the lives and security of the Japanese public and its solution will require concrete actions by North Korea.

Many countries in this region have taken advantage of economic growth to modernize their military forces by increasing their defense budgets and introducing new weapons systems.

In particular, as China became an influential country both politically and economically, its military trends draw attention from other countries. On the one hand, the international community welcomes the fact that China has started playing a major role in the region and the world as illustrated by its active participation in international activities in non-traditional security areas. On the other hand, China has been broadly and rapidly modernizing its military forces, backed by the high and constant increase in its defense budget. China has not clarified the current status and future vision of its military modernization, and the

transparency of its decision-making process in military and security affairs is not enough. These are why it has been pointed out that there is a possibility that this could lead to a sense of distrust and misunderstandings by other countries. Furthermore, China has been expanding and intensifying its activities in waters close to Japan. These moves, together with the lack of transparency in its military and security affairs, are a matter of concern for the region and the international community, including Japan, which should require prudent analysis. These are why China is asked to further improve transparency regarding its military, and further strengthening mutual understanding and trust by promoting dialogues and exchanges with China is an important issue. While a substantial reshuffle in the Chinese Communist Party leadership is expected after the autumn of 2012, the environment surrounding the next administration would not be rosy due to its various domestic problems. How the next administration would deal with various challenges attracts attention.

Russia is pursuing its national interests as a country with global influence, and it is seeking to develop its military posture in line with its resources against the backdrop of its economic development to date. Currently, it is moving forward with downsizing its troops, reforming its organizational aspects, improving the effectiveness of its readiness postures, modernizing its military, including the development and introduction of new equipment, and so forth. Recently, there has been global deployment of its military, naval and air forces in particular, including joint training on voyages at long duration, anti-piracy activities, and patrol activities by strategic bombers. In the Far East, too, Russia continues with active operations of its vessels and aircraft, and large-scale exercises, and moves toward modernization of its equipment have been observed.

As seen above, in the Asia-Pacific region, where a lack of transparency and elements of uncertainty still exist, the presence of the U.S. forces remains extremely important in order to achieve regional stability. Japan and other countries have established bilateral alliances and friendly relations with the U.S. and they allow the stationing and deployment of U.S. forces in their territories. In addition, measures have recently been taken to further strengthen the presence of the U.S. forces.

Moreover recent years have also seen an increase in opportunities for bilateral defense exchanges between countries in the region. Efforts are being made to engage in multilateral security dialogues, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defence Minister's Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), and conferences hosted by non-governmental institutions with the participation of relevant defense ministers, as well as bilateral and multilateral joint exercises. Japan has been hosting the Meeting for Defense Authority Senior Officials at the vice-ministerial level with Southeast Asian countries. Promoting and developing such multi-layered approaches among countries is also important to ensure security in the region.

3. Major Security Issues in the International Community

In recent years, risks relating to the stable access of Global Commons[1], such as sea, space and cyberspace, have become a new security challenge.

These issues have been focused on from the security perspective activities in such domains as space and cyberspace, which cannot be fully grasped from a conventional geographical viewpoints, form a crucial platform for national security and people's daily lives, reflecting further progress in the field of information and communications technology (ICT) in recent years, as well as further advances in military science and technology. Moreover, ensuring the safety of maritime traffic, which has come to be emphasized as the cornerstone supporting global logistics, has attracted more attention, as the possibility that stable access to the seas may get inhibited, with regard to the large number of piracy acts occurring in recent years and discussions about the freedom of navigation, has been indicated. From this perspective, in recent years, various countries have been implementing concrete initiatives, including the reorganization of governments and related institutions, in order to deal with cyber attacks on a range of information and communications networks, which could have a serious impact on the function of a state and people's daily lives. Moreover, with regard to the seas, the international community has also been dispatching naval vessels, etc. to conduct anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia/Gulf of Aden, as well as implementing initiatives such as taking the opportunity presented by international conferences to affirm the importance of the freedom of navigation.

The problem of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons, and the ballistic missiles that serve as their delivery means remains a significant threat to the international community. In particular, there are continuing concerns about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles by North Korea and the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction by non-state actors such as international terrorist organizations. Moreover, in November 2011, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) expressed its concerns about nuclear development by Iran, giving details of the possibility that its activities may have military dimensions, but although the U.S. and the European Union (EU) has strengthened their sanctions against the country, Iran has moved forward with and expanded its uranium enrichment. On the other hand, initiatives are progressing focused on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, with the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) entering into force between the U.S. and Russia in February 2011.

There is an ongoing tendency for the offshoots of international terrorist organizations dispersed across the globe, as well as regional terrorist organizations and individuals sympathetic to their ideologies, to carry out their activities, and there is no change in the fact that they remain a security threat, even after the death of Osama bin Laden. There are also indications that such international terrorist organizations, etc. are using countries that are vulnerable in terms of their governance capacity, such as Afghanistan and Yemen, as a base for their activities and training.

There is still a diverse range of regional conflicts across the globe, with complex backgrounds and taking complicated forms, so the international community is undertaking intensive efforts aimed at dealing with

these conflicts and resolving them with its focus especially on the Middle East and the African region. Moreover, there is a growing tendency towards so-called "gray-zone" conflicts, which relate to territory, sovereignty or economic interests but do not reach the stage of armed conflict. At the same time, the problems of climate change and competition between sovereign states to secure resources and energy are becoming increasingly apparent, and the possibility has been indicated that they could become a cause of regional disputes, thereby becoming a new factor with an impact on the global security environment. Furthermore, military forces have also been tasked to take on various functions, such as for prompt response in disaster relief in the event of large-scale disasters and epidemics.

As seen above, the international community today faces diverse, complex and multilayered security issues and unstable factors. Such challenges could even occur simultaneously or compound each other. In addition to deterrence and handling of armed conflicts, the roles of military forces in responding to these are becoming more diverse to include a broad spectrum of activities from the conflict prevention to reconstruction assistance. Moreover, as the opportunities for military forces to play such an important role are increasing, comprehensive responses are required that seek to combine military capacity with methods focused on diplomacy, law enforcement and justice, intelligence and the economy.

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[1] The global commons, in this context, refers to territories and other entities not bound to exclusive jurisdiction that are connected and shared globally, on which security and prosperity of all nations are depended. The U.S. “National Security Strategy” (released in May 2010), etc.

Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Chapter 1 Defense Policies of Countries

Section 1 The United States

1. Security and Defense Policies

Even as the comparative influence of the United States changes, the country continues to play the greatest role in the peace and stability of the world and the trends of its security and defense policy have a great impact on many states including Japan. The Obama administration that was formed in 2009 has announced its national security policy and defense policy by releasing documents such as the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)[1]

In January 2012, the Obama administration released a new defense strategic guidance[2]. Based on the understanding that the U.S. is at an inflection point due to factors both outside and inside the country, that is, the U.S. forces' drawing down from Iraq and Afghanistan[3] after a decade of war, and the demand for deep cuts in the government spending including defense spending under the serious fiscal circumstances of the government, the guidance was released to review the defense priorities and show a blueprint for the Joint Force in 2020.

The defense strategic guidance indicates that the U.S. seeks the security of the Nation, allies and partners; the prosperity that flows from an open and free international economic system; and a just and sustainable international order where the rights and responsibilities of nations and peoples are upheld. It also states that future U.S. forces will be smaller and leaner, but will be agile, flexible, ready, and technologically advanced, and that it will have global presence emphasizing the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East, while still ensuring the ability to maintain its commitment to Europe, and strengthening alliances and partnerships across all regions.

1. Assessment of the Security Environment

The defense strategic guidance indicates that the global security environment presents an increasingly complex set of challenges (e.g. the rise of emerging countries like China, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), infringement on the global commons—sea, air, space, and cyberspace) and opportunities (e.g. development of the Asia-Pacific region, the Arab Awakening in the Middle East) to which all elements of U.S. national power must be applied.

2. Direction of Response

In light of this security environment, the defense strategic guidance shows the direction of the response by

the U.S.

As for the Asia-Pacific region, in particular, the guidance indicates that because U.S. economic and security interests are inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia, the U.S. will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region, and emphasize its existing alliances in the region and expand its networks of cooperation with emerging partners.

In addition, the U.S. will continue to take an active approach to countering the threats of al-Qaeda and violent extremists, encourage the peaceful rise of new powers, economic dynamism, and constructive defense cooperation, seek to assure access to and use of the global commons, and enhance its capabilities to conduct effective operations to counter the proliferation of WMD.

As specific efforts in each region, the guidance lists investing in a long-term strategic partnership with India, maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula by deterring and defending against provocation from North Korea, which is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons program, continuing engagement with Europe and Russia, and developing innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve its security objectives elsewhere in the world.

3. Priorities for Capability Development

The defense strategic guidance states that, to protect U.S. national interests and achieve the security objectives of the 2010 NSS in the current security environment, the U.S. forces will need to maintain and enhance its capabilities to succeed in the following primary missions:

(1) Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare: U.S. military forces must continue the efforts to defeat Al-Qaeda and preventing Afghanistan from ever being a safe haven again, and will also remain vigilant to threats posed by other designated terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah.

(2) Deter and Defeat Aggression: The United States' military planning envisages forces that are able to fully deny a capable state's aggressive objectives in one region by conducting a combined arms campaign across all domains --land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace. Even when U.S. forces are committed to a large-scale operation in one region, they will be capable of denying the objectives of, or imposing unacceptable costs on, an opportunistic aggressor in a second region.

(3) Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD)[4] Challenges: States such as China and Iran will continue to pursue asymmetric means to counter the United States' power projection capabilities, while the proliferation of sophisticated weapons and technology will extend to non-state actors as well. Accordingly, the U.S. military will invest as required to ensure its ability to operate effectively in A2/AD environments[5].

(4) Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction: U.S. forces conduct a range of activities aimed at preventing the proliferation and use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. In partnership with other elements

of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense (DoD) will continue to invest in capabilities to detect, protect against, and respond to WMD use, should preventive measures fail.

(5) Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space: The DoD will continue to work with domestic and international allies and partners and invest in advanced capabilities to defend its networks, operational capability, and resiliency in cyberspace and space.

(6) Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent: As long as nuclear weapons remain in existence, the U.S. will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal. It is possible that our deterrence goals can be achieved with a smaller nuclear force, which would reduce the number of nuclear weapons in its inventory as well as their role in U.S. national security strategy.

(7) Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities: U.S. forces will continue to defend U.S. territory from direct attack. They will also come to the assistance of domestic civil authorities in the event such defense fails or in case of natural disasters.

(8) Provide a Stabilizing Presence: A reduction in resources such as defense expenditure will require innovative and creative solutions to maintain U.S. support for allied and partner interoperability and building partner capacity. However, with reduced resources, thoughtful choices will need to be made regarding the location of deployment and the frequency of multilateral training exercises.

(9) Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations: In the aftermath of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. will emphasize non-military means and military-to-military cooperation to address instability and reduce the demand for significant U.S. force commitments to stability operations. U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.

(10) Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations: The DoD will continue to develop joint doctrine and military response options to prevent and, if necessary, respond to mass atrocities. U.S. forces will also remain capable of conducting non-combatant evacuation operations for American citizens overseas on an emergency basis.

The guidance states that these missions will largely determine the shape of the future U.S. forces, but their overall capacity will be based on requirements demanded by the missions (1), (2), (6), and (7).

4. Force Planning

Following the end of the Cold War, U.S. military forces have been composed based on the idea of “fighting and winning two major regional conflicts.” However, the QDR released in 2010 indicates that the current security environment is more complex than when these ideas were adopted, and that it is no longer appropriate for the U.S. to determine its military’s force structure based on these ideas as the U.S. must address diverse contingencies. The QDR points out that, while the U.S. must possess the capacity to address two capable nation-state aggressors, it must also have the ability to conduct a wide range of operations[6].

The defense strategic guidance indicates that even when U.S. forces are committed to a large-scale operation in one region, they will be capable of denying the objectives of, or imposing unacceptable costs on, an opportunistic aggressor in a second region. Secretary of Defense Panetta and other senior officials of the DoD said that U.S. forces continue to have capabilities to confront and defeat more than one adversary at a time[7].

5. Defense Posture Review of U.S. Forces

The QDR requires a cooperative and tailored approach to determine the U.S. global defense posture, reflecting regional political and security dynamics. Moreover, the QDR states the need to consider the five following principles when making decisions about the future U.S. defense posture: (1) forward-stationed and rotationally deployed U.S. forces continue to be relevant and required; (2) the U.S. defense posture will balance the need for a permanent overseas presence with the need for a flexible ability to respond to contingencies, etc.; (3) the U.S. will balance the need for assured access to support ongoing operations with the risks of introducing fragility into its lines of communication; (4) the U.S. defense posture should provide a stabilizing influence abroad and be welcomed by the host nation; and (5) the defense posture will continuously adapt to changes in the strategic environment.

In addition, The defense strategic guidance indicates that U.S. forces' presence abroad reinforces deterrence, helps to build the capacity and competence of U.S., allied, and partner forces, strengthens alliance cohesion, and increases U.S. influence.

In November 2011, President Obama delivered a speech at the Australian Parliament, clearly stated that he will give top priority to the U.S. presence and mission in the Asia-Pacific region and indicated that the U.S. will enhance its presence in Southeast Asia while maintaining the presence in Japan and the Republic of Korea[8]. This policy of the U.S. is reaffirmed in the defense strategic guidance.

Concrete examples of the enhancement of U.S. forces' presence in the Asia-Pacific region include enhanced presence of U.S. forces in Australia. In November 2011, President Obama and Australian Prime Minister Gillard jointly announced U.S.-Australia force posture initiatives, which include: (1) the rotational deployment of U.S. marines to Darwin and Northern Australia for around six months at a time where they will conduct exercises and training with Australian Defence Force[9]; and (2) increased rotations of aircraft of the U.S. Air Force through northern Australia, which will offer greater opportunities for combined training and exercises with the Royal Australian Air Force. The joint initiatives are described as part of the efforts to embody the basic concept of the U.S. forces presence in the Asia-Pacific region, which intends to pursue "a more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable military presence."[10]

Concerning the Middle East, after expressing particular concern about the proliferation of ballistic missiles and WMD, the defense strategic guidance indicates that U.S. policy will emphasize Gulf security,

in collaboration with Gulf Cooperation Council[11] countries when appropriate, to prevent Iran's development of a nuclear weapon capability. The guidance also states that the U.S. will continue to place a premium on U.S. and allied military presence in, and support of, partner nations in and around this region.

Regarding Europe, the guidance states that the drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan has created a strategic opportunity to rebalance the U.S. military investment in Europe, moving from a focus on current conflicts toward a focus on future capabilities, and that in keeping with this evolving strategic landscape, U.S. forces' posture in Europe must also evolve. Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 budget request of the DoD, which was formulated in light of the strategic guidance and submitted to Congress in February 2012, indicates that while reducing the U.S. Army's four brigade combat teams in Europe by two[12], the DoD will rotate U.S.-based units to Europe for training and exercises, and maintain the investment in missile defense systems in Europe.

For other regions, the guidance indicates that building partnerships remain important and that the U.S. will pursue new partnerships with a growing number of nations–including those in Africa and Latin America—who share common interests and viewpoints with the U.S. It also states that, whenever possible, it will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve its security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.

It is necessary to continue to pay attention to how the concepts of global posture review, as outlined in the QDR and the defense strategic guidance, are implemented in the future[13].

6. Nuclear Strategy

While President Obama aims to realize a world without nuclear weapons, he admits that it is impossible to abolish nuclear weapons soon, and indicates the need to maintain a nuclear deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist.

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which was released in April 2010, indicates that the nuclear security environment is changing and nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation are an imminent threat of today. Furthermore, it points to the necessity of working on the issue of ensuring strategic stability with existing nuclear powers, in particular Russia and China.

The NPR presents five key objectives based on awareness of this security environment: (1) preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; (2) reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons[14]; (3) maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels; (4) strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners; and (5) sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.

7. Space Policy

The U.S. relies on space-based systems for a great deal of its intelligence gathering and communications. The National Security Space Strategy (NSSS) issued in February 2011 indicates recognition of three trends in both the current and future space environment, namely that: 1) space is increasingly congested with man-made objects such as satellites; 2) space is increasingly contested by potential adversaries; and 3) space is increasingly competitive. Based on this understanding, the national security space objectives of the U.S. are: 1) to strengthen safety, stability, and security in space; 2) to maintain and enhance the strategic national security advantages afforded to the U.S. by space; and 3) to energize the space industrial base that supports the national security of the U.S. In order to attain these goals, a number of strategic approaches have been pursued, namely: 1) to promote responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space; 2) to provide partners with improved U.S. space capabilities; 3) to partner with responsible nations, international organizations, and commercial firms; 4) to prevent and deter aggression against space infrastructure that supports the national security of the U.S.; and 5) to prepare to defeat attacks and to operate in a degraded environment.

8. FY2013 Budget

As the budget deficit of the U.S. Government is deepening in recent years, the Budget Control Act enacted in August 2011 established the increase in the government's debt limit in return for the deep cut of the government spending by FY2021. In January 2012 the DoD announced that the reduction in defense spending in light of the act will amount to approximately 487 billion dollars in 10 years from FY2012 to FY2021 (approximately 259 billion dollars in five years from FY2013 to FY2017)[15].

The future defense spending cut mentioned above is one of the factors of the development of the defense strategic guidance, which presents the following principles: to differentiate between those investments that should be made today and those that can be deferred while retaining the ability to make a course change that could be driven by many factors, including evolutions in the strategic and technological spheres; to maintain a ready and capable force, even with reduced overall capacity; and to continue to reduce the "cost of doing business" of the DoD.

The principal objectives of the DoD's FY2013 budget request, announced in the meantime, are as follows: 1) making more disciplined use of defense dollars; 2) applying strategic guidance to force structure and investment; 3) ensuring the quality of the all-volunteer force; and 4) fully supporting deployed warfighters. The budget decreased by 5.2 billion dollars from the level of FY2011 budget to 525.4 billion dollars, and based on factors such as the withdrawal of forces from Iraq, the budget for overseas contingency operations[16] decreased by 26.6 billion dollars from the level of FY2011 budget to 88.5 billion dollars. The total therefore fell by 31.8 billion dollars from the level of the FY2011 budget to 613.9 billion dollars. Concrete content of the budget includes a reduction of defense spending by 259.4

billion dollars in five years from FY2013 to FY2017, postponement of a part of the procurement of F-35 fighters, and reduction in active end strength of U.S. forces by 102,400[17] in five years[18].

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[1] Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare: U.S. military forces must continue the efforts to defeat Al-Qaeda and preventing Afghanistan from ever being a safe haven again, and will also remain vigilant to threats posed by other designated terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah.

[2] The formal title of the document is "*Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense"*.

[3] U.S. forces in Iraq completed withdrawal from Iraq on December 18, 2011.

[4] Anti-Access (A2) refers to capabilities, usually long-range, designed to prevent an opposing force from entering an operational area. Area-Denial (AD) refers to capabilities, usually of shorter range, designed to limit an opposing force's freedom of action within the operational area.

[5] QDR indicates that in order to defeat adversaries possessing sophisticated anti-access and area-denial capabilities, the U.S. is developing a new joint air-sea battle concept. According to the QDR, this concept will address how air and naval forces will integrate capabilities across all operational domains. It will help guide the development of future capabilities needed for effective power projection operations. In November 2011, the Department of Defense announced that it had set up the Air-Sea Battle Office to work toward implementation of the concept. Then in January 2012, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dempsey released "Joint Operational Access Concept", a document that outlines how U.S. forces counter anti-access/area-denial capabilities. The concept is indicated to be an overarching concept, under which can nest other concepts dealing with more specific aspects of anti-access/area-denial challenges, such as the joint air-sea battle concept focused on the integration of air and sea capabilities. Further in March of the same year, the Director of the Army Capability Integration Center and the Commanding General of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command signed "Gaining and Maintaining Access: An Army-Marine Corps Concept" that falls under the Joint Operational Access Concept and explains the contribution of Army and Marine Corps toward defeating area-denial capabilities.

[6] At a press conference on February 1, 2010, then Secretary of Defense Gates made the following statement, voicing that the current way of thinking for handling two major regional conflicts was insufficient, "one of the steers that I gave to the folks working on the QDR was that I felt that, for some time, the two-major theater-of-operations construct was out of date, that we are already in two major operations. What if we should have a homeland disaster? What if we have another encounter? What if we have a Haiti? The world is very much more complex that when the two-MCO concept came together in the early 1990s."

[7] At a press briefing on January 5, 2012, Secretary of Defense Panetta said "we will have the capability to confront and defeat more than one adversary at a time."

8 Since fall of 2011, Obama administration has shown its intention to place a premium on the Asia-Pacific region in various occasions. Secretary of State Clinton, for example, stated in her contribution to Foreign Policy (2011 November issue) titled "America's Pacific Century" that one of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade would be to lock in a substantially increased investment—diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise—in the Asia-Pacific region. Also, at a joint press conference after the Japan-U.S. defense ministers meeting on October 25, 2011, Secretary of Defense Panetta said that the Pacific would remain a key priority for the U.S. and that he would strengthen its forces in the region.

9 The initial deployment would consist of a company of 250 U.S. marines and aims to eventually establish a rotational presence of up to a 2,500 person Marine Air-Ground Task Force including aircraft, ground vehicles, and artilleries over a few years. On April 3, 2012, about 200 U.S. Marine Corps personnel arrived in Darwin as the first rotation.

10 This basic concept was presented by then Secretary of Defense Gates in his speech on June 5, 2010 and also by Secretary of State Clinton in her paper mentioned above. Other concrete examples of the efforts to strengthen U.S. force posture in the Asia Pacific region include the announcement to deploy Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) to Singapore (announced in a speech given by then Secretary of Defense Gates on June 3, 2011) and the provision of 24 F-16 fighters to Indonesia (announced on November 18, 2011).

11 Regional organization established in 1981 for the purpose of coordination, integration, etc. among member states. Its six members are the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait.

12 As for the reduction of brigade combat teams (BCTs) in Europe, 2010 QDR stated to maintain four BCTs in Europe, but the DoD reviewed its plan in April 2011 and announced that it would retain three BCTs.

13 The DoD is, at present, conducting its Global Posture Review (GPR).

14 In order to reduce the role of nuclear weapons to deter non-nuclear attacks, the U.S. says that it will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations (negative security assurance.) The U.S. also says that it will only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interest of itself, allies and partners.

15 According to the document published by the DoD concerning the FY2013 budget request that was submitted to Congress in February 2012, “the amount of reduction” here means the difference between the total DoD base budget for 10 (5) years estimated at the time of FY2012 budget request (submitted to Congress in February 2011) and the total DoD base budget for 10 (5) years estimated at the time of FY2013 budget request.

The Budget Control Act provides that, if the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction of Congress cannot develop an additional deficit reduction proposal by November 23, 2011, the government spending will be mandatorily reduced (“sequestered”) by 1.2 trillion dollars for the period from January 2013 to 2021. The Committee announced on November 21, 2011 that it would not be possible to make any bipartisan agreement of a deficit reduction proposal before the deadline. As a result, defense spending may be further reduced mandatorily after 2013, and the size of the reduction is pointed out to be about 500 billion dollars.

16 This corresponds to expenses associated with the War on Terror during the Bush administration and includes the cost of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

17 Breakdown of the personnel reduction is; 72,000 in Army, 6,200 in Navy, 4,200 in Air Force, and 20,000 in Marine Corps.

18 The U.S. will sustain the force structure of its Army and Marine Corps in the Asia-Pacific region. A part of the content of the FY2013 budget request had been released in advance as a major budget decision on future DoD budget on January 26, 2012.

2. Military Posture

In regards to strategic offensive weapons including nuclear weapons, the U.S. is moving ahead with its reduction based on a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that came into force in February 2011. In April 2012, it announced that its current deployed strategic warheads[1] stood at 1,737, while its deployed delivery platforms[2] stood at 812.

The U.S. is studying the concept of a Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS), as an effort contributing to the nation's ability to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons. The concept consists of utilizing highly precise non-nuclear weapons to penetrate the anti-access (A2) capabilities of adversaries and promptly strike, no matter what and where in the world the target may be[3].

In regards to missile defense (MD), the Obama administration is advancing a plan to improve MD capabilities in Europe in a step-wise fashion from 2011 to 2020, and ultimately construct a comprehensive MD structure that responds to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as well[4], under the recognition that while the threat from Iran's short- (SRBMs) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) is developing more rapidly than previously projected, the development of ICBMs has been slower than estimated and the capabilities and technologies for missile defense, such as interceptor missiles and sensors, have markedly improved.

In February 2010 the U.S. announced the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR). On homeland defense, the review noted that the U.S. would use ground-based interceptors to respond to ICBMs from North Korea and Iran. In regards to regional defense, the U.S. would expand investments into MD systems while taking a phased adaptive approach (PAA) that is tailored to each region and improve the MD capabilities step by step, working with partner countries and properly sharing the burden. In January 2012, the U.S. announced that it will continue investments into MD programs in its homeland and Europe while reducing the spending for deployable regional MD systems with a view to increasing reliance on its allies and partners in the future.

The U.S. ground forces consist of approximately 560,000 soldiers, and approximately 200,000 marines, which are forward-deployed in Germany, the ROK, and Japan, among other countries. As described in the defense strategy guidance, the Army continues its transition to a smaller yet capable force fully prepared to conduct the full range of operations worldwide. The Marine Corps aims to acquire forces capable to respond to any threat as a "middleweight force" bridging a seam between smaller special operations forces and larger heavy conventional forces. In January 2012, the DoD announced that it will reduce the active Army end strength to 490,000 and the active Marine Corps end strength to 182,000 in the future.

U.S. maritime forces consist of approximately 1,080 vessels (including approximately 70 submarines) totaling about 6.40 million tons. The 6th Fleet is deployed to the East Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea and Africa; the 5th Fleet to the Persian Gulf, Red Sea and northwest Indian Ocean; the 3rd Fleet to the eastern Pacific; the 4th Fleet to South America and the Caribbean Sea; and the 7th Fleet to the western

Pacific and Indian Ocean. The QDR indicates that U.S. maritime forces will continue to retain a robust forward presence and power projection capabilities.

The U.S. air forces consist of roughly 3,500 combat aircraft across the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. In addition to carrier-based aircraft deployed at sea, part of the tactical air force is forward-deployed in Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan and the ROK. The QDR indicates that the increase of fifth-generation fighters will further improve the survivability of the U.S. air forces and strengthen support operations for the security forces of partner countries.

Moreover, the U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) was founded in order to address the increasing threats in cyberspace, by overseeing operations in cyberspace. The U.S. Cyber Command attained Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in May 2010 and commended full capability in November of the same year[5].

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[1] Warheads that have been equipped in deployed ICBMs and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) and nuclear warheads equipped in heavy bombers.

[2] The figure as of March 1, 2012.

[3] Conventional Strike Missiles (CSMs) are the leading part of the developmental plan guiding this initiative. While retired ballistic missile rockets and others will be diverted for use, confusion with nuclear weapons will be avoided as CSMs move along a depressed trajectory that is clearly different from ballistic missiles.

[4] While there is the possibility for changes in specifics and timing, this is a plan to improve MD capabilities over four phases by deploying SM-3 Block IA by 2011, SM-3 Block IB by 2015, SM-3 Block IIA by 2018, and SM-3 Block IIB by 2020. Based on this plan, the U.S. will deploy a ground-based missile defense system in Romania by 2015 and in Poland by 2018. In September 2011, the U.S. and Romania signed an agreement to deploy U.S. land-based SM-3 ballistic missile defense system in Romania. In the same month, the U.S. and Poland jointly announced official entering into force of the agreement to deploy U.S. land-based SM-3 system in Poland. In the same month, Turkey decided to host a U.S. missile defense radar in the country, and the radar has been already deployed. In October of the same year, the U.S. and Spain announced that four U.S. Aegis ships will be based at Naval Station Rota in southwestern Spain (first two ships are scheduled to arrive in 2014 and the remaining two ships in 2015).

[5] As cyber-related units, Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER), Fleet Cyber Command (FLTCYBERCOM), 24th Air Force/Air Force Cyber Command (AFCYBER), and Marine Corps Forces Cyber Command (MARFORCYBER) have been newly formed.

3. Current Military Posture in the Asia-Pacific Region

The United States, which is a Pacific nation, continues to play an important role in ensuring the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region by deploying the Pacific Command, a joint command consisting of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

The Army is composed of two divisions and deploys such forces as the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii and the 2nd Infantry Division and 19th Sustainment Command in the ROK, in addition to approximately 2,500 personnel in Japan, including the I Corps (Forward) and the headquarters, U.S. Army Japan[1].

The Navy consists of the 7th Fleet, which is in charge of the area including the western Pacific and Indian Ocean, and the 3rd Fleet, which is in charge of the area including the eastern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea, under the Pacific Fleet, the headquarters of which is located in Hawaii, totaling approximately 180 vessels. The 7th Fleet is comprised mainly of one carrier strike group, with main bases in Japan and Guam. Its major mission is to defend and protect the territory, citizens, sea lanes, allies, and other vital interests of the United States, and ships assigned to the Pacific Fleet including carriers, amphibious ships, and Aegis cruisers.

The Marine Corps deploys one Marine Expeditionary Force in each of the U.S. mainland and Japan under the Pacific Marine Corps, which has its headquarters in Hawaii. Of this force approximately 15,000 personnel are in the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, which is equipped with F/A-18 fighters and other aircraft and are both deployed in Japan. In addition, maritime pre-positioning ships loaded with heavy equipment and others are deployed in the western Pacific.

The Air Force deploys four air forces under the Pacific Air Force, the headquarters of which is in Hawaii. It deploys three air wings equipped with F-16 fighters, C-130 transport aircraft in the 5th Air Force stationed in Japan, and two air wings equipped with F-16 fighters in the 7th Air Force stationed in the ROK.

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[1] The figures of U.S. military mentioned in this paragraph are the numbers of active personnel recorded on the publication source of the U.S. Department of Defense (as of December 31, 2011), and it could change according to unit deployment.

Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Chapter 1 Defense Policies of Countries

Section 2 Korean Peninsula

On the Korean Peninsula, people of the same ethnicity have been divided into two—north and south—for more than half a century. Even today, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea pit their ground forces of about 1.6 million against each other across the demilitarized zone (DMZ).

Maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is vital for the peace and stability of the entire East Asian region, to say nothing of Japan.

(See Fig. I-1-2-1)

1. North Korea

1. General Situation

North Korea has been advocating the construction of a strong socialist state in all areas—ideology, politics, military affairs, and economy[1]—and it adopts "military-first politics" to realize this goal. The "military-first politics" has been defined as a form of leadership that advances the great undertaking of socialism by resolving all problems that arise in the revolution and national construction on the principle of military first and stressing the importance of the armed forces as the pillar of the revolution[2]. After the Chairman of the National Defense Commission Kim Jong-il who was in a position to fully control North Korea's military forces died in December 2011, the First Chairman of the National Defense Commission Kim Jong-un who is believed to be his third son regularly visits military organizations and mentions the importance of military forces, which indicates that he intends to continue attaching importance to, and relying on, the military forces[3].

Although North Korea has been facing serious economic difficulties and has depended on the international community for food and other resources, the country seems to be maintaining and enhancing its military capabilities and combat readiness by preferentially allocating resources to its military forces.

North Korea deploys most of its armed forces along the DMZ. According to the official announcement at the Supreme People's Assembly in April 2012, the proportion of the defense budget in FY2011's national budget was 15.8%, but it is believed that this represents only a portion of real defense expenditures.

Furthermore, North Korea seems to maintain and reinforce its so-called asymmetric military capabilities by developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles and by maintaining large-scale special operation forces. In addition, North Korea has repeatedly made military provocations on the Korean Peninsula[4].

North Korea's military behavior has increased tension over the Korean Peninsula, and constitutes a

serious destabilizing factor for the entire East Asian region, including Japan.

Needless to say, North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons is not accepted, and it is also necessary to pay enough attention to the development and deployment of ballistic missiles, the military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles by North Korea.

Partly because North Korea maintains its extremely closed regime, it is difficult to accurately capture the details and intentions of the country's behavior. However, it is necessary to continue to pay utmost attention to them.

2. WMD and Ballistic Missiles

Concerning WMD, issues of North Korea's nuclear weapons program have been emphasized, as well as its chemical and biological weapons capabilities. In particular, North Korea's nuclear issue has serious influence on Japan's national security and it is also a critical problem for the entire international community in terms of non-proliferation of WMD. In particular, nuclear tests by North Korea, when considered in conjunction with North Korea's reinforcement of its ballistic missile capability that could serve as the means of delivery of WMD, simply cannot be tolerated as they constitute a serious threat to the security of Japan and do considerable harm to the peace and stability of Northeast Asia and the international community.

As for ballistic missiles, North Korea seems to be conducting R&D for deploying existing ballistic missiles, extending the range and converting into solid fuel propulsion[5]. Also, it is pointed out that North Korea's proliferation of ballistic missiles continues[6]. Both North Korea's missile issue as well as its nuclear issue are destabilizing factors for the entire international community and the Asia-Pacific region, and such developments are of great concern.

(1) Nuclear Weapons

a. Major developments regarding the Six-Party Talks

With regards to the issue of North Korea's development of nuclear weapons, six rounds of the Six-Party Talks have been held since August 2003 aimed to take peaceful measures to achieve the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. At the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks in 2005, a joint statement was adopted, which focused on the abandonment of "all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs" by North Korea. In 2006, however, North Korea delayed its participation in the Six-Party Talks, launched seven ballistic missiles and announced that it had conducted a nuclear test. In response, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolutions 1695 and 1718 imposing sanctions on North Korea. Later North Korea returned to the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks and, in February 2007, the "Initial Actions

for the Implementation of the Joint Statement" to implement the joint statement made at the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks was announced followed by the announcement of the "Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement" as the outcome of the sixth round of the Talks. The agreement includes completion of the disablement of nuclear facilities in Yongbyon and "a complete and correct declaration of all its (North Korea's) nuclear programs" by the end of 2007. However, the implementation of the agreement has not been completed[7] and the Six-Party Talks has been suspended since December 2008.

In 2009, North Korea again announced that it had conducted a missile launch and a nuclear test. In response, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1874 in June 2009, imposing additional measures against North Korea. In 2011, North Korea announced its intention to return to the Six-Party Talks without any preconditions, and later, meetings of head negotiators of the Six-Party Talks from North and South and U.S.-North Korea high-level talks have been held, but the Six-Party Talks has not yet resumed.

While some argue that North Korea's response to its nuclear development problem is a so-called brinkmanship policy by intentionally heightening tension in order to receive some sort of reward, others point out that North Korea's ultimate objective is to secure deterrence capability by possessing nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal of North Korea is pointed out to be the maintenance of its existing regime. Considering this, these two views are not incompatible.

While it is important for Japan, the United States, and the ROK to maintain close cooperation to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem, roles played by other countries like China and Russia (the other participants in the Six-Party Talks), as well as such international institutions as the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are also important.

b. The Current Status of the Nuclear Weapons Program

Details of North Korea's nuclear weapons program are largely unclear, partly because North Korea remains an extremely closed regime. In light of unclear status of past nuclear developments and various North Korean announcements and actions including two previous announcements (in October 2006 and May 2009) of nuclear tests, the possibility that North Korea has already made considerable progress in its nuclear weapons program cannot be dismissed[8].

With regards to plutonium, a fissile material that can be used for nuclear weapons[9], North Korea has suggested its production and extraction several times[10]. Moreover, in June 2009 North Korea announced that the whole amount of the newly extracted plutonium would be weaponized. In November 2009, North Korea made an additional announcement that it achieved notable results in weaponizing the extracted plutonium[11].

As for highly enriched uranium that can be also material for a nuclear weapon, in 2002 the United States announced that North Korea acknowledged the existence of uranium enrichment program for nuclear weapons. Later in June 2009, North Korea declared the commencement of uranium enrichment and in

September in the same year announced that the uranium enrichment experiment had been successfully carried out. Furthermore, in November 2010 North Korea disclosed its uranium enrichment facilities to American nuclear specialists and later announced that it was operating a uranium enrichment plant equipped with thousands of centrifuges. North Korea insists that the enriched uranium is used as fuel of light water reactors, that therefore the uranium concentration program is a peaceful use of nuclear energy. However, a series of North Korean behavior concerning uranium enrichment indicates that there is the possibility that the country is developing nuclear weapons using highly enriched uranium in addition to plutonium[12]. In February 2012 North Korea announced suspension of the uranium enrichment program at Yongbyon and a moratorium on nuclear tests and long-range missile launches based on the agreement with the United States. However, in response that North Korea launched a missile, which it calls "Satellite" in April of the same year, the United States announced the suspension of nutritional support that had been stated to be carried out, and the U.N. Security Council issued a presidential statement strongly condemning the launch; then North Korea declared that they were no longer bound to the agreement.

In general, miniaturizing a nuclear weapon enough to be loaded on a ballistic missile requires a considerably high degree of technological capacity. However, considering the fact that the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China succeeded in acquiring such technology by as early as the 1960s, it is difficult to eliminate the possibility that North Korea, in a relatively short time, will achieve miniaturization of nuclear weapons and acquire nuclear warheads[13]. It is necessary to remain watchful of all related developments.

(2) Biological and Chemical Weapons

Because North Korea is an extremely closed regime and most materials, equipment, and technology used for manufacturing biological and chemical weapons are for both military and civilian use, facilitating camouflage, details of North Korea's biological and chemical weapons development and arsenals are not clear. However, it is believed that North Korea has a certain level of production base for biological weapons although it ratified the Biological Weapons Convention in 1987. As for chemical weapons, North Korea has not acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and it is estimated that North Korea has several facilities capable of producing chemical agents and has a substantial amount of stock of such agents[14].

(3) Ballistic Missiles

North Korea is an extremely closed regime, and details of its ballistic missiles are unknown as is the case of weapons of mass destruction. It appears, however, that North Korea gives high priority to the development of ballistic missiles out of political and diplomatic considerations and from the viewpoint of

earning foreign currency[15], in addition to enhancing its military capabilities.

a. Scud

It is believed that, since the middle of the 1980s, North Korea has manufactured and deployed Scud B and Scud C[16], a variant of Scud B with extended range, and has exported these ballistic missiles to the Middle East and other countries.

b. Nodong

North Korea is also thought to have started its development of longer-range ballistic missiles by the 1990s, including Nodong. It appears that Nodong, which is believed to be already deployed, is a liquid fuel propellant single-stage ballistic missile. It is assessed to have a range of about 1,300 km, and may reach almost throughout Japan.

It is highly probable that Nodong was used in the launch into the Sea of Japan in 1993. A total of six ballistic missiles fired from the Kittaeryong district in the southeastern part of North Korea in July 2006 are believed to be Scud and Nodong[17]. In July 2009, North Korea is believed to have launched a total of seven ballistic missiles from the same district, and it is possible that they were either Scud or Nodong[18].

Though details about Nodong's capability have not been confirmed, as the ballistic missile is believed to be based on the Scud technology, it seems that it does not have the accuracy to carry out strikes on specific target installations.

c. Taepodong-1

North Korea has also been developing Taepodong-1 which has an estimated range of at least approximately 1,500 km. Taepodong-1 is assumed to be a two-stage, liquid fuel propellant ballistic missile with a Nodong used as its first stage and a Scud as its second stage. The ballistic missile launched in 1998 is assessed to be based on Taepodong-1. North Korea is believed to have shifted its focus to the development of a longer range missile, and Taepodong-1 may have been a transitory product for the development of Taepodong-2.

d. Musudan

It is believed that North Korea is currently developing a new type of intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM)"Musudan". It has been pointed out that Musudan is a revamped version of the Russian Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) SS-N-6 that it acquired in early 1990s. It will likely be loaded onto a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL), just like its Nodong and Scud counterparts, and then transported. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that the new missile boasts a range of between 2,500 and 4,000 km, meaning that Guam in addition to all parts of Japan could fall within its firing range[19].

It is very difficult to verify the intention of North Korea's military activities because of its closed regime.

In addition, it is believed that North Korea has constructed underground military facilities across the country, and the ballistic missiles would be loaded onto the TELs. These make it difficult to detect individual and specific signs of launch of missiles with the TELs including Musudan, such as its detailed launch sites and timings in advance.

e. Taepodong-2

Taepodong-2 is believed to be a two-stage missile with a new booster as its first stage and a Nodong as its second stage, with a range of approximately 6,000km. A Taepodong-2 is believed to have been launched from the Taepodong district located in the northeastern coastal area in July 2006, and was damaged during the flight at an altitude of several kilometers, several tens of seconds after the launch without separating the first stage, and have fallen near the launch site. In the launch of April 2009, it is thought that North Korea used a Taepodong-2 or a variant of it[20] from the same district again. Since it is estimated that the missile crossed over Japan, and flew more than 3,000 km before falling in the Pacific Ocean, it is believed that North Korea had been able to extend the range of its ballistic missiles since its failed launch of Taepodong-2 in 2006. In addition, it is believed that North Korea may have tested the required technologies, such as increasing the size of propulsion, separation of the multi-staged propulsion devices, and attitude control.

In April 2012 North Korea conducted a launch apparently of a Taepodong-2 or its variant from Tongch'ang-ri district on northwestern coast of North Korea, which was called a “Satellite”. Although North Korea set falling areas off the western coast of ROK (in the Yellow Sea) and off the eastern coast of Luzon Island, the Philippines (in the Pacific Ocean), the missile flied over a minute and then fell to the Yellow Sea broken to several pieces. The launch is considered to be a failure[21]. Because the launch failed and North Korea repeatedly mentioned future launches of “Satellite”, North Korea is likely to attempt similar launches on the pretext of “Satellite” launch.

At present, North Korea appears to be developing not only ballistic missiles mentioned above but also a solid fuel propellant short-range ballistic missile[22]. In addition, the new missile appeared in the military parade in April 2012 could possibly be a long-range ballistic missile. Close attention is required in regard with North Korea’s potential efforts to improve existing ballistic missiles, including extending their ranges.

As the background of North Korea’s rapid strides in the development of its ballistic missiles with only a few test launches, it is assumed that the country imported various materials and technologies from outside. It is also pointed out that North Korea transfers and proliferates ballistic missile airframes or related technologies, and that North Korea promotes the further development of missiles using funds procured by such transfer and proliferation. For example, because Nodong has a similarity in shape to Shahab-3 of Iran, it is pointed out that Nodong airframes or related technologies may be transferred to Iran. It is also pointed out that North Korea is conducting tests at transfer destinations and using the results. Moreover,

because a test launch of a long-range ballistic missile would contribute to extending the range of other shorter-range missiles, increasing the warhead weight and improving the circular error probability (CEP), the launch of long-range ballistic missiles such as Taepodong-2 may lead to the improvement of the performance of Nodong and other ballistic missiles possessed by North Korea.

In light of this, it is necessary to remain alert to North Korea's ballistic missiles, particularly in terms of transfer and proliferation, in addition to their development and deployment.

(See Fig. I-1-2-2)

3. Military Posture

(1) General Situation

North Korea has been building up its military capabilities in accordance with the Four Military Guidelines (extensive training for all the soldiers, modernizing all the armed forces, arming the entire population, and fortifying the entire country)[23].

North Korea's armed forces are comprised mainly of ground forces, with total troop strength of roughly 1.2 million. North Korea's military forces are believed to have been maintaining and enhancing their capabilities and operational readiness, but most of its equipment is outdated.

Meanwhile, North Korea has large-scale special operations forces that can conduct various operations ranging from intelligence gathering and sabotage to guerrilla warfare. These forces are believed to reach approximately 100,000 personnel[24]. Moreover, North Korea seems to have many underground military-related installations across its territory.

(2) Military Capabilities

The North Korean Army comprises about one million personnel, and roughly two-thirds of them are believed to be deployed along the DMZ. The main body of the army is infantry, but the army also maintains armored and artillery forces including at least 3,500 tanks. North Korea is believed to regularly deploy long-range artillery along the DMZ, such as 240 mm multiple launch rockets and 170 mm self-propelled guns, which can reach cities and bases in the northern part of the ROK including the capital city of Seoul.

The Navy has about 650 ships with total displacement of approximately 103,000 tons and is chiefly constituted with small naval vessels such as high-speed missile crafts. Also, it has about 20 Romeo class submarines, about 60 midget submarines, and about 130 air cushioned landing crafts, the latter two of which are believed to be used for infiltration and transportation of the special operation forces.

The Air Force has approximately 600 combat aircraft, most of which are out-of-date models made in China or the former Soviet Union, but some fourth-generation aircraft such as MiG-29 fighters and Su-25 attack aircraft are also included. North Korea has a large number of outdated An-2 transport aircraft as

well, which are believed to be used for transportation of special operation forces.
North Korea's military forces are vigorously conducting various types of training to maintain and enhance their operational readiness. Meanwhile, given the serious food situation, the military forces seem to be engaged in agricultural assistance as well.

4. Domestic Affairs

(1) Death of Kim Jong-il, Chairman of the National Defense Commission, and transition to a new regime

On December 19, 2011, North Korea revealed that Kim Jong-il, Chairman of the National Defense Commission, died due to sudden illness on 17 of the same month. After the death of the chairman, North Korean media and others started to refer to Kim Jong-un as supreme leader, which revealed that he is the new leader of North Korea[25].
After assuming the position of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army on December 30 in the same year, Kim Jong-un has become the de-facto head of military, party and the "nation" by assuming the First Secretary of the Korean Workers' Party and the First Chairman of the National Defense Commission. It laid out a new framework in a short period of time after the death of Kim Jong-il, Chairman of the National Defense Commission. His accession to military posts including the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and frequent visits to military organizations suggest that his power base is built mainly on the control of the military. Because various "national" events[26] and Field Guidance by Kim Jong-un are carried out in an orderly manner, it is believed that the new regime is on a track to certain degree. However, some point to the looseness in social control due to the increasing gap between rich and poor, and the inflow of information from abroad and other factors, which attracts attention in terms of stability of the new regime.

(2) Economic Conditions

In terms of their economy, North Korea has been facing chronic stagnation and energy and food shortages in recent years due to the vulnerability of its socialist planned economy and decreased economic cooperation with the former Soviet Union and East European countries following the end of the Cold War. In particular, it seems that North Korea still has to rely on food assistance from foreign countries[27].
In response to a host of economic difficulties, North Korea has tried some limited reform measures and changes in its economic management systems. It is believed that North Korea conducted so-called redenomination (decreasing the denomination of its currency) at the end of 2009[28]. Moreover, in January 2011 the country newly adopted a "State Strategy Plan for Economic Development"[29] and seems to be implementing economic cooperation projects with other countries[30]. Meanwhile, there is believed to be

little possibility for the country to undergo any structural reforms that would impact its current leadership system, and thus the country faces various challenges before it can fundamentally improve its current economic situation.

5. External Relations

(1) Relations with the United States

The United States made it clear that it would make efforts to convince North Korea to abandon its nuclear program in close cooperation with other countries, aiming to resolve the issue through the Six-Party Talks. The United States have consistently clarified its position that it is necessary for North Korea to comply with the joint statement of the Six-Party Talks in 2005 and take specific measures to improve North-South relations before resuming the Six-Party Talks.
North Korea has showed willingness to denuclearize Korean Peninsula and an attitude to emphasize relations with the United States. On the other hand, North Korea criticizes the United States claiming that its "hostile policy" toward North Korea and lack of trust between the two countries get in the way of the peace and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and that the conclusion of a U.S.-NK peace agreement is necessary to build relationships of trust. Therefore, there exists a significant gap between the two parties' stances[31].

(2) Relations with the Republic of Korea

Regarding relations between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea, after the inauguration of President Lee Myung-bak in the ROK, incidents that heightened North-South military tensions occurred, including the exchange of fire between North Korean and ROK naval vessels near the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the Yellow Sea in November 2009, the sinking of the South Korean patrol vessel[32] in March 2010, and the shelling incident of Yeonpyeong Island[33] in November of the same year. Later North Korea changed its attitude to call for dialogue with ROK by calling for the abolishment of conflict between the North and South and the promotion of dialogue and cooperation in a New Year's joint editorial in 2011, which led to a North-South talk. After that, however, North Korea again intensified its confrontational stance with South Korea, criticized the ROK government's stance, etc. after the death of Kim Jong-il, Chairman of the National Defense Commission, and declared that it would have no dealings with the Lee Myung-bak administration forever in December of the same year[34].

(3) Relations with China

With regard to the relationship between North Korea and China, the China-North Korea Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance concluded in 1961 is still in force. Currently China is the country's biggest trade partner. In addition, National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong-il made multiple visits to China both in 2010 and 2011. Furthermore, Chinese naval ships visited North Korea in August of the same year. These events among others indicate close relations between China and North Korea in various areas, especially in politics and economy[35]. Concerning North Korea's nuclear problem, China has repeatedly expressed its support for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and early resumption of the Six-Party Talks.

(4) Relations with Russia

While relations between North Korea and Russia have become less close since the end of the Cold War, the two countries signed the Russia-North Korea Treaty on Neighborly Friendship and Cooperation in 2000[36]. In August 2011, Kim Jong-il, Chairman of the National Defense Commission, visited Russia and Russia-North Korea summit was held for the first time in nine years. After this, there are moves toward strengthening of the relationship between Russia and North Korea. For example, they are advancing cooperation in gas-pipeline project and it has been reported that they agreed to implement joint exercise for search and rescue. Concerning North Korea's nuclear problem, Russia along with China has expressed its support for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and early resumption of the Six-Party Talks. Furthermore, recognizing that North Korea's uranium enrichment program causes a serious concern, Russia calls on North Korea to take action toward rejoining to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and IAEA security arrangement.

(5) Relations with Other Countries

Since 1999, North Korea has made an effort to establish relations with West European countries and others, including the establishment of diplomatic relations with them[37] and participation in the ARF ministerial meetings. Meanwhile, it has been reported that North Korea has cooperative relationships with countries such as Iran and Syria in military affairs including arms export and military technology transfer.

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1 North Korea says it will open the door to the "powerful and prosperous nation (Kangseong Daeguk)" in 2012, which is the 100th anniversary of the birth of the late President Kim Il-sung, but recently they also use the expression "powerful and prosperous nation(Kangseong Kukka)."

2 Joint editorial of the Korean Workers' Party's newspaper Rodong Shinmun and its journal Workers (June 16, 1999).

3 As of the end of June 2012, approximately 50% of the official activity made by the First Chairman of the National Defense Commission Kim Jong-un after the death of late Chairman Kim Jong-il are visits on military organizations. Furthermore, the First Chairman stated in his speech at the military parade

to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the birth of Kim Il-sung in April of the same year, "In order to brighten the dignity of the military-first Korea for countless generations and accomplish the great achievement to build a strong and prosperous socialist nation, we have to strengthen our people's army in every aspects as the first, second and third priority."

4 In addition, at the House Armed Services Committee in March 2012, James Thurman, the commander of U.S. Forces Korea, gave testimony that "North Korea employs sophisticated computer hackers trained to launch cyber infiltration and cyber attacks against Korea and the United States" showing his understanding that North Korea is stepping up its efforts to enhance cyber attack capabilities in recent years. Furthermore, in May 2011, the Seoul Central District Public Prosecutors' Office announced its investigation result that a network failure of the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation in March of the same year was caused by a cyberattack with the involvement of North Korea.

5 Generally, liquid propellant missiles need to be fueled immediately before launch taking an extended period of time. On the other hand, solid propellant missiles are considered to be militarily superior to liquid fuel propellant missiles because they are capable of immediate launches with their propellant stored in airframes, making signs of their launches unlikely to be detected in advance, and they are easy to store and handle.

6 Concerning the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles by North Korea, the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence pointed out that "its export of ballistic missiles and associated materials to several countries, including Iran and Syria, and its assistance to Syria—now ended—in the construction of a nuclear reactor (destroyed in 2007), illustrate the reach of the North's proliferation activities."

7 In June 2008, North Korea submitted a declaration of its nuclear program. However, as of June 2012 no agreement has been made concerning a specific framework for verification.

8 The Worldwide Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence pointed out that "these tests (in 2006 and 2009) strengthen our assessment that North Korea has produced nuclear weapons".

9 Plutonium is synthetically produced in a nuclear reactor by bombarding uranium with neutrons. The used fuel is then chemically processed at a reprocessing facility, allowing for the extraction of the plutonium. The plutonium is then used as a basic material for the production of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, in order to use uranium for nuclear weapons, it is necessary to extract uranium 235 (U235), a highly fissile material, from natural uranium. This process is called enrichment. Generally, a large-scale enrichment facility that combines thousands of centrifuges is used to boost the U235 concentration to nuclear weapon levels (over 90%).

10 In October 2003 North Korea announced that it had completed the reprocessing of 8,000 used fuel rods that contains plutonium and then in May 2005 that it had completed extraction of additional 8,000 used fuel rods.

11 Then U.S. Forces Korea commander Walter Sharp testified before the House Armed Services Committee in April 2011 that "we assess North Korea currently holds enough plutonium to make several nuclear weapons."

12 The Worldwide Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence in January 2012 pointed out that "the North's disclosure (of uranium enrichment facility) supports the United States longstanding assessment that North Korea has pursued a uranium-enrichment capability." Also, the ROK Defense White Paper 2010 notes that, "in an announcement by a foreign affairs department spokesperson in April 2009, North Korea suggested that it had completed the 'enrichment of uranium,' followed by its claim in November 2010 that it was running around 2,000 centrifuges. Considering the above mentioned, it is suspected that the North has pursued a highly enriched uranium (HEU) program."

13 The Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) Report released by the U.S. Department of Defense in February 2010 pointed out that "we must assume if there are no major changes in its (North Korea's) national security strategy in the next decade, it will be able to mate a nuclear warhead to a proven delivery system."

14 In his statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2009, Lieutenant General Maples, then Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), stated that "North Korea has had a long-standing chemical warfare program," and "we believe that Pyongyang possesses a sizeable stockpile of agents." He also stated that "North Korea is believed to have a long-standing biological warfare program that could support the production of biological warfare agents." The ROK Defense

White Paper 2010 pointed out that, “it is believed that approximately 2,500 to 5,000 tons of chemical weapons remain stored in the facilities scattered across the country. The North is also suspected of being able to independently cultivate and produce such biological weapons as anthrax, smallpox, and cholera.”

15 North Korea admitted that it is exporting ballistic missiles to earn foreign currency. (Comment by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on June 16, 1998, and statement made by a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman on December 13, 2002).

16 The ranges of Scud B and Scud C missiles are estimated to be about 300 km and 500 km, respectively.

17 Taepodong district in the northeastern coastal area. Other launches of Scud and Nodong missiles had more practical characteristics, based on the indication that the missiles were launched before dawn, a number of different types of ballistic missiles were launched in succession over a short period of time, launches were carried out using TELs, and ballistic missiles with different ranges were landed within a certain area. This leads to the assumption that North Korea has improved the operational capability of ballistic missiles.

18 All seven ballistic missiles launched were assumed to have fallen landed in the military target practice area (the area surrounded by the points at 1) 39 degrees 9 minutes north latitude and 127 degrees 37 minutes east longitude; 2) 41 degrees 12 minutes north latitude and 129 degrees 50 minutes east longitude; 3) 41 degrees 30 minutes north latitude and 131 degrees 59 minutes east longitude; 4) 41 degrees 15 minutes north latitude and 132 degrees 6 minutes east longitude; and 5) 38 degrees 55 minutes north latitude and 128 degrees 2 minutes east longitude), for which the navigation warning was issued by the Japan Coast Guard upon notification by North Korea on June 22, 2009.

19 In the statement for the House Armed Services Committee in March 2009, General Sharp, then Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, stated that preparations are currently under way in North Korea to field a new intermediate range ballistic missile capable of striking Okinawa, Guam, and Alaska. Furthermore, the ROK’s Defense White Paper 2010 notes that, "in 2007, it began to develop new intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) called the Musudan with a range that extended beyond 3,000 km and which were capable of direct strikes on neighboring countries, including South Korea, Japan and Guam.”

20 For instance, making a three-stage missile by installing a booster on the top of a two-stage missile.

21 After the launch, North Korea announced that “the earth observation satellite failed to enter its preset orbit. Scientists, technicians and experts are now looking into the cause of the failure,” admitting the failure of the launch.

22 In March 2007, then U.S. Forces Korea Commander Burwell B. Bell testified before the House Armed Services Committee that, “North Korea is developing a new solid-propellant short-range ballistic missile. Recently, in March 2006, North Korea successfully test-fired the missile. Once operational, the missile can be deployed more flexibly and rapidly than the existing system and North Korea will be able to launch the missile in a much shorter preparation period.”

23 Four Military Guidelines were adopted at the fifth Plenum of the fourth Korean Workers’ Party’s Central Committee in 1962.

24 It had been said that North Korea possessed two types of special operations forces: one under the military forces and the other under the Korean Workers’ Party. However, it has been reported that these organizations merged in 2009 and the Reconnaissance General Bureau was established under the auspices of the armed forces. Moreover, James Thurman, the commander of U.S. Forces Korea, stated at the House Armed Services Committee in March 2012 that “North Korea continues to improve the capabilities of the world’s largest special operations force with more than 60,000 soldiers trained in a variety of infiltration methods such as overland, undersea and airborne entry in to the ROK.” Also, the ROK Defense White Paper 2010 points out “the North has been strengthening its special warfare capabilities by deploying light infantry divisions to the frontline corps and adding an infantry regiment to the frontline. The number of special force troops is estimated to reach approximately 200,000.”

25 Korean Central News Agency called Kim Jong-un “discerning leader of our party, nation and army” on December 23, 2011, and “the supreme leader of our revolutionary armed forces and unparalleled leader of our military-first policy” on 24th of the same month. Later at the National Memorial Service on 29, Kim Yong-nam, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, called Kim Jong-un “the supreme leader of our party and army and people.”

[26] The Korean Workers' Party conference was held on April 11, 2012, followed by the Supreme People's Assembly on 13 and a military parade commemorating 100th birth anniversary of the birth of Kim Il-sung on 15.

[27] In November 2011, the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) forecasted the country's production of principal foods to be 4.657 million tons between November 2011 and October 2012, and estimated that the necessary imported amount of grains to be approximately 0.739 million tons.

[28] New currency was issued for the first time in 17 years, since 1992, and currency exchange was conducted at the rate of 100 former notes to 1 new note. However, it is pointed out that prices skyrocketed due to supply shortages and other reasons, pushing the economy into turmoil and causing an accompanying increase in social restlessness.

[29] North Korea says the plan set a state strategic goal for economic development, which puts main emphasis on building infrastructure and developing agriculture and basic industries including electric power, coal, oil and metal, and regional development.

[30] In June 2011, ground-breaking ceremonies were held of China-North Korea joint development projects at the Rason Economic and Trade Zone in the northeastern part of North Korea and the Hwanggumpyong/ Wihwa-do Economic Zone in the western part of North Korea. In Addition, at the Russia-North Korea summit in August of the same year, the two countries agreed to consider a gas-pipeline construction project from Russia to ROK via North Korea. If the project is materialized, North Korea is believed to receive approximately 100 million dollars annually for junction transportation of Russian gas.

[31] According to Rodong Sinmun on January 12, 2012, for example, North Korea argued that "in order to prevent a war on the Korean Peninsula and ensure peace and safety, it is imperative to terminate the unsteady peace between Korea and the United States without further delay and establish a permanent peace security system."

[32] On 26 March 2010, the ROK's naval patrol ship "Cheonan" sank near the Northern Limit Line in the Yellow Sea. In May 2010, a joint military-civilian survey group comprising experts from the United States, Australia, United Kingdom, and Sweden released survey results indicating that the ROK naval ship had split and sank as a result of a shock wave and bubble effect created by the underwater blast of a torpedo fired by a small North Korean submarine.

[33] On November 23, 2010, North Korea bombarded Yeonpyeong Island as the South Korean military engaged in firing exercises off the coast of the island facing the Yellow Sea, causing deaths and injuries on the South Korean side including some civilians. According to South Korea's Ministry of National Defense, North Korea fired a total of approximately 170 shells at Yeonpyeong Island on two occasions, of which approximately 80 shells landed. Furthermore, the South Korean Armed Forces fired shots in response to the two North Korean shellings using its K-9 self-propelled howitzers.

[34] North Korea issued a statement that it would have no dealing with the Lee Myung-bak administration also in May 2011.

[35] With regard to economy, it has been pointed out that China accounted for about 70% of the total North Korean trade in 2011, and according to trade statistics released by the Chinese Government, total trade between China and North Korea in 2011 was the highest ever at approximately 5.63 billion dollars. Some have voiced their opinion that North Korea's dependency on China has been further increasing.

[36] The previous treaty (Soviet-North Korea Friendship and Mutual Assistance Treaty) contained the provision that if either of the signatories (Russia and North Korea) is attacked, the other would immediately provide military and other assistance by any means available. This provision, however, was dropped from the new treaty.

[37] For example, the United Kingdom and Germany established diplomatic relations with North Korea in 2000 and 2001, respectively.

2. The Republic of Korea and the U.S. Forces in the ROK

1. General Situation

In the ROK, the administration of Lee Myung-bak, inaugurated in February 2008, has shown its intention to promote its policy based on "co-existence and co-prosperity" with regard to North Korea, and firmly maintains the principle of giving top priority to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, repeatedly showing its emphasis on the abandonment of the nuclear program by North Korea[1]. On the other hand, the ROK stated that it would make a decisive response to military provocations by North Korea and indicated a policy to maintain and ensure deterrence capability against provocations.

U.S. forces, mainly the Army, have been stationed in the ROK since the ceasefire of the Korean War. The ROK has established very close security arrangements with the United States primarily based on the U.S.–ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, and the U.S. forces stationed in the ROK have been playing a vital role in deterring the outbreak of large-scale armed conflicts on the Korean Peninsula. The two countries confirmed that the U.S.-ROK alliance is "the primary axis of security" for the ROK and "the cornerstone" for the United States in maintaining stability in the Asia Pacific area. In view of the progress in the North-South relations, improved national strength of the ROK, and changes in the U.S. strategy, the two countries are advancing a shift to a new joint defense system of "the ROK forces leading and the U.S. forces supporting" through transition of the wartime operational control to the ROK[2]. It is necessary to monitor their development.

2. Defense Policies and Defense Reform of the ROK

The ROK has a defensive weakness in that its capital Seoul, where a quarter of the country's population is concentrated, is situated close to the DMZ.

The ROK has set the defense objectives as follows: "defending the nation from external military threats and invasion, upholding the peaceful unification, and contributing to regional stability and world peace." As one of the "external military threats," the ROK had once designated North Korea as its "main enemy" in the ROK Defense White Paper, but now the white paper indicates that the ROK's enemy is the North Korean regime and its military[3].

In 2005 the ROK announced "National Defense Reform 2020" centering on expansion of a civilian base for national defense, and buildup of military structure and system of the forces in conformity with characteristics of modern wars among other pillars. As an amendment reflecting the results of an analysis and assessment of the security situation and defense reform records after the formulation of the National Defense Reform 2020, the Defense Reform Basic Plan (2009–2020) was announced in June 2009, defining such matters as a narrowing of the initially planned reduction in the force strength and the

possibility of preemptive strikes against North Korean nuclear and missile facilities[4]. Meanwhile, in response to the sinking of ROK patrol ship and the artillery shelling on Yeonpyeong Island, in March 2011 the ROK Ministry of National Defense released the Defense Reform Basic Plan (2011–2030), a new revised national defense reform plan, to accompany reinforcement of its troop and chain-of-command reforms that would protect against provocations by North Korea. Now efforts toward embodiment of the plan are underway[5].

3. Trends in Defense Buildup in the ROK

As for the ROK's military capacity, the ground forces consist of 22 army divisions and two marine divisions, totaling 550,000 personnel; the naval forces consist of about 190 vessels with a total displacement of approximately 192,000 tons; and the air forces (Air Force and Navy combined) of approximately 610 combat aircraft.

In recent years, the ROK has been focused on modernizing its Navy and Air Force in particular in order to establish a system of omnidirectional military posture to deal with all types of threats, not least threats from North Korea. The Navy has been introducing submarines, large transport ships and domestically-built destroyers. In February 2010, the first mobile force in the ROK was created[6]. The Air Force is proceeding with the introduction of F-15K fighters and plans to promote a next-generation fighter program that includes stealth capabilities. In addition, the ROK is believed to be promoting domestic production of missiles[7].

In recent years ROK is actively promoting equipment export, which reached 2.4 billion dollars in 2011. It is reported that export items have become diverse to include communication electronics and ships. ROK intends to promote export with a goal of reaching the world's top 10 in export amount by 2012 and the top 8 by 2015[8].

The FY2012 defense budget amounts to approximately 32.9576 trillion won, an increase of approximately 5.0% over the previous fiscal year, marking the 13th consecutive rise since FY2000.

(See Fig. I-1-2-3)

4. U.S.-ROK alliance/ U.S. Forces in the ROK

Since its inauguration, the administration of Lee Myung-bak has implemented various efforts to deepen the U.S.-ROK alliance. At a U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting in June 2010, an agreement on the "Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and Republic of Korea" that includes an evolution into "a comprehensive strategic alliance" to expand the scope of the alliance globally beyond the Korean Peninsula and widen the partnership of the two countries to non-military areas. Furthermore, the 42nd Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in October 2010 announced a joint statement incorporating the

Guidelines for U.S.-ROK Defense Cooperation to embody the future vision of the U.S.-ROK Alliance, which shows a further strengthening of the bilateral relationship[9].

In addition, the two countries have been committed to solving issues such as realignment of the U.S. forces stationed in the ROK and transition of the operational control authority in wartime over U.S.-ROK combined forces to the ROK. As for the realignment of the U.S. forces in the ROK, the relocation of U.S. forces Camp Yongsan located in the center of Seoul to the Pyongtek area, south of Seoul, and the relocation of U.S. forces stationed in the northern side of Han Gang to the southern side of the river were agreed upon in 2003. However, it seems that the relocation to the Pyongtek area is delayed[10]. As for the transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) to the ROK, the two countries agreed to dismantle the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command and complete the transition in April 2012. Later in June 2010, however, agreement was made to postpone the transition to December 1, 2015[11]. the U.S.-ROK Strategic Alliance 2015, which provides the framework for the transition of OPCON, was signed in October 2010. After the completion of the realignment of the U.S. forces in the ROK and the transition of OPCON, defense of the ROK will change from "the U.S.-ROK joint defense system" to the new joint defense system of "the ROK forces leading and the U.S. forces supporting," which could have a significant impact on the nature of U.S. forces in the ROK.

5. External Relations

(1) Relations with China and Russia

The ROK has been promoting military exchanges with China, including mutual visits of vessels and aircraft. At the May 2008 summit meeting of the top leaders of the ROK and China, they agreed to upgrade the ROK-China relationship from a "full-scale cooperative partnership" to a "strategic cooperative partnership" and the hotlines were established between the two countries' Navies and Air Forces in November. Further at the ROK-China defense chief meeting in July 2011, the two countries agreed to enhance their military exchanges. Later, the first ROK-China defense strategy dialogue was initiated.

Military exchanges have been under way between the ROK and Russia in recent years, including exchanges among high military officials and mutual visits of naval vessels. The two countries have also agreed on cooperation in the areas of military technology, defense industry and military supplies. At the ROK-Russia Summit in September 2008, they agreed to upgrade the bilateral relations to the "strategic cooperative partnership."

(2) Activities Overseas

Since its dispatch of an engineering unit to Somalia in 1993, the ROK has participated in a number of U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO). In December 2009, the ROK unveiled plans to substantially expand the number of personnel sent overseas on PKO missions from the current level[12]. In July 2010, the ROK created the "International Peace Support Force", a special unit for overseas dispatch.

The ROK had withdrawn from Afghanistan but resumed activities there in July 2010 by sending troops to the country again for the purpose of protecting Korean members of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) stationed in Parvan province. Further, the ROK has dispatched naval vessels to off the coast of Somalia/Gulf of Aden where they have been engaged in the protection of ROK-registered ships and maritime security operations (MSO) of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) since April 2009. In January 2011, the ROK dispatched a ROK special forces unit for the purpose of supporting the training of United Arab Emirates (UAE) special forces units, joint exercises, and protecting ROK citizens in emergency situations[13].

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1 President Lee Myung-bak mentioned the "grand bargain" in September 2009, a package deal to settle the nuclear issue with North Korea. According to a remark by the spokesman of the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the "grand bargain" seeks a comprehensive agreement on the nuclear issue by putting a complete set of denuclearization steps by North Korea and the corresponding measures that North Korea wants from the five countries of Japan, the United States, the ROK, China, and Russia.

2 The United States and the ROK have been operating the U.S.–ROK Combined Forces Command since 1978 in order to run the U.S.–ROK joint defense system to deter wars on the Korean Peninsula and to perform effective joint operations in case of emergency. Under the U.S.–ROK joint defense system, the operational control authority over ROK forces is to be exercised by the Chairman of the Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff in peacetime and by the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, who also serves as Commander of the Combined Forces Command, in wartime.

3 The ROK Defense White Paper 2010 described North Korea as following: "The North has posed serious threats to the South's security with its large-scale conventional military forces, development and enhancement of WMDs, including nuclear weapons and missiles, and constant armed provocations as shown by the attack on the ROK Ship *Cheonan* and the artillery firing at Yeonpyeong Island. As long as such threats continue, the main agents of the provocative acts, which are the North Korean regime and its military, will remain enemies of the South."

4 In addition to revising the force strength from 500,000 to 517,000, The Defense Reform Basic Plan (2009–2020) prioritizes the following measures in order to prepare for North Korean threats: 1) organize frontline troops in a manner that allows them to exercise their combat strength immediately after the outbreak of war to secure the security of the metropolitan region; 2) boost surveillance/reconnaissance, precision strike, and interception capabilities in order to block and eliminate North Korea's asymmetric threats in enemy areas to the utmost extent; 3) secure strong reserve mobile power for each unit in order to counter enemies with a numerical advantage; and 4) secure combat sustainability by stabilizing noncombat zones and nurturing elite reserve forces.

5 The ROK Ministry of National Defense positions the following three areas as priority areas: 1) strengthening the integrity of the ROK armed forces, 2) securing active deterrence capabilities, and 3) maximizing efficiency of national defense administration. Based on these priority areas, the ROK states that it is to promote reform with the following eight issues as its priority issues: 1) reorganization of the armed forces' chain-of-command, 2) establishment of an island defense command for the northwest (Yellow Sea), 3) improvement of the national defense training structure, 4) organization of a priority order for strengthening military power, 5) response to North Korea's special forces and cyber threats, 6) enhancement of mental strength and assistance for educating national citizens about security, 7) improvement of the national defense personnel management

system, and 8) bettering the efficiency of the national defense budget.

[6] The primary missions of the Seventh Mobile Corps, which is the first mobile corps established in the ROK, are described as the protection of sea lanes, deterrence against North Korea and support for the government's external policies. The Seventh Mobile Corps has one Aegis-equipped vessel and six destroyers under its command, and more Aegis vessels and destroyers to be put in service in the future are expected to be deployed to the corps.

[7] In April 2012, the ROK Ministry of National Defense announced that the country has developed and already fielded missiles that include cruise missiles able to strike throughout North Korea.

[8] For example, the ROK exported KT-1 training aircrafts and K-9 self-propelled artillery to Turkey and signed export agreement of T-50 training aircrafts with Indonesia. Further in December 2011, Indonesian Ministry of defense and Korean Daewoo Shipbuilding signed a procurement agreement of three 209-level submarines.

[9] In addition to these, the U.S.-ROK Foreign and Defense Minister's Meetings were held in July, 2010 and June 2012, respectively.

[10] The United States is advancing the realignment of its forces stationed in the ROK in line with the June 2003 agreement to relocate its forces to the southern side of Han Gang in two stages and the October 2004 agreement to cut the number of its forces stationed in the ROK by 12,500 from approximately 37,500. However, the two countries agreed at the summit meeting in April 2008 to maintain the current strength of 28,500 as the appropriate level.

[11] As reasons of the postponement of the transfer, the Republic of Korea's Ministry of National Defense mentioned several factors, such as: 1) the change of the security environment on the Korean Peninsula, including an increase in military threats from North Korea; 2) a time of leadership change in and around the Korean Peninsula, including the presidential election of the Republic of Korea; and 3) public demand, noting the necessity to adjust the period of the transfer, and the reflection of financial conditions necessary to fulfill future military capabilities.

[12] The ROK intends to further improve the legal and institutional foundations for the ROK armed forces to expand their participation in PKO activities. In December 2009, an act concerning the participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations was enacted.

[13] The ROK obtained a contract for construction of nuclear power plant from UAE in December 2009 and a groundbreaking ceremony of the nuclear plant was held in UAE in the presence of President Lee Myung-bak in March 2011.

Part 1 Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Chapter 1 National Defense Policies of Countries

Section 3 China

1. General Situation

China has the world‘s largest population with its vast landmass surrounded by 14 countries. It has long borderlines and a long coastline. China is also a nation with various races, religions, and languages. Most of its ethnic minorities[1] populate the borderlands often with the same ethnic groups living across the borders. China, with a long history, has been shaping and maintaining a distinct culture and civilization. China’s pride in its unique history and semi-colonial experience in and after the 19th century are driving its desire for a strong nation and fueling its nationalism. Furthermore, China, a state with a socialist regime, aims at building a modern socialist state under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)[2].

In recent years, China has significantly increased its international trade and attracted considerable foreign investment. The economy has dramatically grown, especially in the coastal and urban areas. It has still maintained its high economic growth[3] despite the impact from the worldwide financial crisis and the government debt crisis in Europe. A great deal of attention has been paid to its movements at various international conferences, which shows China’s increased international presence in the international community[4]. Moreover, China has been playing a certain role in non-traditional security areas. It actively sends personnel to the U.N. Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) and has been sending its ships to the anti-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia/Gulf of Aden, which have been highly appreciated by the international community.

The international community, including Japan, welcomes the fact that China, which is growing into a big power, has started playing a major role in the world and the region in both name and reality. On the other hand, there have been disputes with other countries on issues relating to trade imbalance, currency rate, and human rights. In addition, China’s response has been criticized as assertive in regards to the issues on conflicting interests with its surrounding countries, including Japan. Thus, there is a concern over its future direction. China is expected to recognize its responsibility as a big power, accept the international norms, and play a more active and cooperative role in regional and global issues.

China has various domestic problems. Corruption within central and local communist party leaderships is becoming a great political problem. As a result of its rapid economic growth, there are emerging problems such as regional disparities between urban-rural and coastal-inland regions, wealth gaps among urban residents, inflation, environmental pollution, and lack of agricultural/industrial water. Moreover, issues associated with the rapid aging of the population are forecasted to arise in the future. Because these factors, that could destabilize the government administration, are getting larger and diversifying, it is

expected that China will continue to tighten its control on the society. However, it has been pointed out that there are unstable aspects in controlling public activities, partly due to the spread of the internet. Moreover, China also has domestic ethnic minority issues, such as protest activities by ethnic minorities in areas such as the Tibet Autonomous Region and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. It has been reported that some ethnic minorities are undertaking campaigns seeking separation and independence. Under the guiding principle of the "Scientific Outlook on Development," the Hu Jintao administration aims to build a "Harmonious Society" as its fundamental policy and is committed to giving priority to solution of the aforementioned domestic problems[5]. While a substantial reshuffle in the CCP leadership is expected after the autumn of 2012, environment surrounding the next government would not be rosy. How the next administration will handle various challenges attracts attention.

On the diplomatic field, it is believed that, in order to maintain national stability, China is aiming to maintain stability in the strategic international environment by sustaining good relations with major powers such as the United States and Russia, to maintain good relations with neighboring countries and stable situations in those countries, to promote multipolarization of the world, and to secure interests necessary for economic development such as natural resources and energy supply.

On the military front, China has been modernizing its military forces, backed by the high and constant increase in its defense budget. China appears to give particular priority to the Taiwan issue as a core issue of national sovereignty. For the time being, it will probably aim to improve its military capabilities to prevent Taiwan's independence in its military modernization. In recent years, China has also been trying to acquire capabilities for missions other than the Taiwan issue. Because China has been steadily growing as a major political and economic power, its military trends draw attention from other countries.

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[1] It is reported that there are 55 ethnic minorities living in China, besides the Han Chinese ethnic group.

[2] In July 2011, the CCP stressed its role in building "socialism with Chinese characteristics" in this occasion again at a meeting commemorating the 90th anniversary of the founding of the CCP. The Sixth Plenary Session of the 17th Central Committee of the CCP in October of the same year stressed the value of socialism and approved a decision to enhance China's international influence through deepening its cultural system reform.

[3] China exceeded Japan in nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in US dollars in 2010 and established itself as the second largest economy in the world next to the United States. On the other hand, some point out that it is not easy for China to sustain its high economic growth rate given such indices as its falling real estate price and lower export growth rate in 2011.

[4] In recent years, a great deal of attention has been paid to China's movements at international conferences, such as the Group of Twenty (G20) Summit on the Financial Market and the World Economy and the Conference of the Parties under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP) as well as in the establishment of new multilateral frameworks such as the BRICS summit.

[5] "Scientific Development Concept" chiefly consists of "adhering to standardized plans and consideration for all perspectives, maintaining a people-oriented position of establishing comprehensive, balanced and sustainable development concept and the need to promote complete economic, social, and human development." (As commented by President Hu Jintao at the Third Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the CCP in October 2003).
The construction of a "Harmonious Society" is defined as a process to continue dissolving social inconsistencies. The "Resolution on Major Issues Regarding the Building of a Harmonious Socialist Society" (adopted at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the CCP in October 2006).

2. Military Affairs

1. National Defense Policy

China positions the buildup of strong defense capabilities and powerful military forces that match national security and interests of development as the strategic mission to modernize the state, while it considers the main goal and mission of national defense policies to be to defend sovereignty, security, and interests of development of the state, to protect the harmony and stability of the society, to promote modernization of national defense and military forces, and to protect the stability and peace of the world[1].
China has a policy of active promotion of the "Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics," which mainly consists of the mechanization and informatization of its military power, based on its military strategy[2] to win a local war under informationized conditions, in response to global trends in military developments observed in the Gulf War, the Kosovo War, the Iraq War and others. China appears to emphasize not only physical means but also non-physical means with respect to military affairs and warfare, incorporated the concept of "Three Warfares"—"Psychological Warfare," "Media Warfare," and "Legal Warfare"—into the tasks of the political work by military[3], and declared a policy of "close coordination between military struggle and political, diplomatic, economic, cultural, and legal endeavors[4]."
In China's military modernization, backed by its stable relations with Russia and other neighboring states that share land borders with China, it is believed that China is giving the top priority to handling of the Taiwan issue, more specifically, to improvement of its capabilities to hinder the independence of Taiwan and foreign military support for Taiwan. Furthermore, in recent years, China is trying to acquire capabilities for missions other than the Taiwan issue. Especially, it stresses the use of military in non-traditional security areas[5]. As regards a long-term plan for China's military modernization, China proclaims that it will "realize the basic mechanization and achieve a major progress in construction of informatization by 2020" and "by focusing on the capability to win a local war under informationized conditions, it will improve the abilities to accomplish diversified military missions and thoroughly

complete the historical military missions in a new phase of the new century[6].” China appears to be aiming to develop its military forces according to the development of its national strength.

China has been increasing its defense spending, broadly and rapidly modernizing its military forces, mainly its nuclear and missile force as well as its Navy and Air Force, and strengthening its capability for extended-range power projection. In addition, China is working to improve joint operational capabilities among services and branches, to conduct practical exercises, to cultivate and acquire highly-capable human resources for administering operations of informationized forces, and to improve the foundation of its domestic defense industry[7].

Furthermore, China has been expanding and intensifying its activities in its surrounding waters. These moves, together with the lack of transparency in its military affairs and security issues, are a matter of concern[8] for the region and the international community, including Japan, which should require prudent analysis.

2. Military Transparency

China has not disclosed specific information on possession of weapons, procurement goals and past procurements, organization and locations of major units, records of main military operations and exercises, and a detailed breakdown of national defense budget. Moreover, China does not clearify specific future vision of its military modernization and the transparency of its decision making process in military and security affairs is not enough either.

China has released defense white papers titled China’s National Defense every two years since 1998, and it also conducts a lot of dialogue with national defense authorities of other countries[9]. Furthermore, in August 2007, China expressed its will to return to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and to participate in the United Nations Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures, and has submitted annual reports based on each framework. The Chinese Ministry of National Defense has been giving monthly press conference by a spokesperson since April 2011.

In this manner, China has regularly published compiled documents on its national security while reintegrating itself into and commencing participation in U.N. frameworks regarding armaments and military expenditures[10]. These efforts can be appreciated, because they are contributing to improvement of the transparency of its military capabilities.

However, China has not yet achieved the levels of transparency expected of a responsible major power in the international society. For example, as for a detailed breakdown of national defense spending, China basically announced only the total amount and general purposes for the following three categories: personnel, training and maintenance, and equipment. Slight progress was seen in China’s National Defense in 2008 in terms of information disclosure[11] but it does not provide a basic breakdown such as procurement costs for major weapons. Moreover, the report for the United Nations Instrument for

Reporting Military Expenditures submitted by China in 2009 was not filled out in accordance with the standard format used by many other nations, including Japan, which requires a detailed breakdown of military expenditure. The information disclosed in the report submitted by China was almost as simple as that provided in China's defense white papers.

There are incidents that incite concerns over China's military decision-making and actions. For example, details have yet to be disclosed regarding causes of the Chinese nuclear-powered submarine's submerged navigation in Japanese territorial waters in November 2004, although it constitutes the breach of international law. Concerning the details and its intention of the anti-satellite weapons test in January 2007, the Chinese government did not give an explanation which is sufficient to allay Japan's concerns even though the test caused new concerns about the future of space development[12]. In recent years, when environment surrounding military has greatly been changing including advancement in military specialization and diversification of missions according to the modernization of military, some see that relations between the CCP leadership and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been getting complex and others see that the degree of military influence on foreign policy decisions has been changing[13]. The situation attracts attention as a risk management issue too.

China is steadily growing as a major political and economic power, and its military power also attracts attention from other countries. In order to allay other countries' concerns over China, it is becoming more and more important for China itself to improve transparency of its national defense policy and military capabilities. It is hoped that China will increase transparency concerning its military affairs by such efforts as disclosing specific information pertaining to its defense policies and military capabilities.

3. National Defense Budget

China announced[14] a national defense budget for FY2012 of approximately 650.3 billion yuan[15]. The initial budget amount announced represented a growth of approximately 11.4% (approximately 66.7 billion Yuan)[16] compared to the initial budget amount for the previous fiscal year. This shows that Chinese national defense budget continues to increase at a rapid pace[17]. The nominal size of China's announced national defense budget has more than doubled in size over the past five years, and has grown approximately 30-fold over the past 24 years. As regards the relationship between defense and economy, China positions the buildup of defense capabilities as important a task as economic development, explaining that it "adheres to the principle of coordinated development of national defense and economy" in China's National Defense in 2010. Accordingly, it is believed that China will continue to invest resources in improvement of its defense capabilities to the degree that does not hamper its economic development.

In addition, it must be noted that the amount of the defense budget announced by China is considered to be only a part of its actual military expenditures[18]. For example, it is believed that the announced defense

budget does not include all the equipment procurement costs and research and development expenses.
(See Fig. I-1-3-1)

4. Military Posture

China's military forces are composed of the PLA, the People's Armed Police Force (PAP)[19], and the militia[20]. It is provided that these bodies be instructed and commanded by the Central Military Commission[21]. The PLA is defined as a people's army created and led by the CCP, comprising the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Second Artillery Corps (strategic missile force).
(See Fig. I-1-3-2)

(1) Nuclear and Missile Forces

China has made independent efforts to develop nuclear capabilities and ballistic missile forces since the middle of the 1950s, seemingly with a view to ensuring deterrence, supplementing its conventional forces, and maintaining its voice in the international community. With regard to the nuclear strategy, it is recognized that China employs a strategy where it can deter a nuclear attack on its land by maintaining nuclear force structure able to conduct retaliatory nuclear attacks to a small number of targets such as cities in the enemy country[22].
China possesses various types and ranges of ballistic missiles: intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), intermediate-range ballistic missiles/medium-range ballistic missiles (IRBM/MRBM), and short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM). Update of China's ballistic missile forces from a liquid propellant system to a solid propellant one is improving their survivability and readiness. Moreover, it is also believed that China is working to increase performance by extending ranges, improving accuracy, introducing MIRV, and other means[23].
China has developed the DF-31, which is a new mobile-type ICBM with a solid propellant system mounted onto a Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL), and the DF-31A, a model of the DF-31 with extended range. China appears to have already begun their deployment[24]. Regarding SLBMs, China currently appears to be developing the JL-2, a new SLBM whose range is believed to be approximately 8,000 km and constructing Jin-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) to carry the missiles. Given that the DF-31 and the DF-31A have been deployed, once the JL-2 reaches a level of practical use, it is believed that China's strategic nuclear capabilities will improve by a great margin.
As for the IRBM/MRBM covering the Asia-Pacific region including Japan, China has deployed the solid-propellant DF-21, which can be transported and operated on a TEL, in addition to the liquid-propellant DF-3 and DF-4 missiles. These missiles are capable of carrying nuclear warheads. It is believed that China possesses conventional ballistic missiles with high targeting accuracy based on the

DF-21, and is developing conventional anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM), which could be used to attack ships at sea including aircraft carriers[25]. In addition to IRBM/MRBM, China also possesses the DH-10, a cruise missile with a range of 1,500 km or longer, as well as the H-6 (Tu-16), medium-range bombers that are capable of carrying nuclear warheads and cruise missiles. These missiles might complement ballistic missile forces, covering the Asia-Pacific region including Japan[26]. Concerning SRBM, China possesses a large number of solid-propellant DF-15 and DF-11, and they are believed to be deployed against Taiwan[27].

China announced that it had conducted tests on midcourse missile interception technology in January 2010. Attention will be paid to China's future trends in ballistic missile defense[28].

(See Fig. I-1-3-3)

(2) Ground Forces

The size of the Chinese ground forces is the largest in the world with approximately 1.6 million personnel. Since 1985, China has continuously sought to modernize its armed forces by curtailing the number of personnel and streamlining organizations and systems in order to improve efficiency. China aims to develop highly capable military forces, while reducing units inferior in equipment and technologies. Specifically, it is improving mobility by such measures as switching from the past regional-defense model to a nationwide-mobile model, working to motorize and mechanize its infantry. In addition, China is believed to be strengthening its airborne troops (belonging to the Air Force) and special operations forces. It is continuing its efforts to make its military units multi-functional, to build a command system for improvement of its integrated strategic abilities and efficient operations, and also to work on reforms to improve its logistical support capabilities[29]. In 2009, China carried out "Stride 2009" exercises which traversed across military regions and were deemed its largest ever exercises of this type, and it also carried out similar "Mission Action 2010" exercises in 2010. These exercises are believed to have been designed to verify and improve capabilities necessary for deployment of army units to distant areas, such as army's long-range maneuvering capabilities and logistical support capabilities, including mobilization of militia and public transportation[30].

(3) Naval Forces

The naval forces consist of three fleets—the North Sea, East Sea, and South Sea Fleets. The Chinese Navy has approximately 1,090 ships (including approximately 60 submarines), with a total displacement of approximately 1.35 million tons. The Navy is in charge of maritime national defense and protection of the sovereignty of territorial waters and maritime rights and interests. The Chinese Navy introduced modern Kilo-class submarines from Russia and is actively constructing new types of domestic submarines

in order to enhance[31] its submarine force. Additionally, the Navy is increasing surface combatant ships with improved air defense and anti-ship attack capabilities, landing ships[32], and supply ships. Also, it commissioned a large hospital ships in October 2008[33].

With regard to possession of aircraft carriers, a number of senior military officials have made positive remarks[34]. China has renovated the Varyag, an incomplete Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier purchased from Ukraine, and carried out the first trial navigation[35] in August 2011. China seems to be advancing training of carrier-based aircraft pilots and development of the J-15, a carrier-based fighter. In addition, it has constructed a structure on land which replicates an aircraft carrier and is developing an airfield for take-off and landing training. Based on these facts, it is believed that China is now earnestly advancing research and development on technologies necessary for possession of aircraft carriers.[36].

In view of these developments in the modernization of the Chinese Navy, it is believed that China is trying to build capabilities to conduct operations in more distant areas.

(4) Air Forces

The Chinese Air Force and Navy have approximately 2,070 combat aircraft in total. The number of fourth generation modern fighters is rising steadily. China is domestically mass-producing the J-10 fighters, imported from Russia and produced under license the Su-27 fighters, and imported from Russia the Su-30 fighters equipped with anti-surface and anti-ship attack capabilities. Moreover, it is believed that China has been developing a next generation fighter domestically[37]. China is importing highly sophisticated long-range surface-to-air missiles in order to improve air defense capabilities. It is making continuous efforts to improve in-flight refueling capabilities and early warning and control system, which are essential for operations of modern air forces. Furthermore, it is reported that China has a plan to import large cargo aircraft from Russia and is developing new cargo aircraft in order to improve its transportation capability.

China has begun to enhance electronic warfare and intelligence gathering capabilities of aircraft and has also increased efforts in actual reconnaissance flights against its surrounding countries. In recent years, in particular, Chinese air activities that appear to be some form of information gathering against Japan have been observed frequently[38]. Also, in September 2007, multiple H-6 medium-range bombers flew into the Japanese air defense identification zone over the East China Sea and advanced near to the Japan–China median line. Similarly, in March 2010 a Y-8 early warning aircraft advanced near to the Japan–China median line. In March 2011, a Y-8 patrol aircraft and Y-8 intelligence gathering aircraft crossed the Japan-China median line and approached within approximately 50 km of Japan’s airspace near the Senkaku Island. These incidents indicate that Chinese aircraft are diversifying their flight patterns.

Judging from the modernization of air forces and the activities by aircraft, it is believed that China is not only improving its air defense capabilities for its national territory, but also aiming to build up capabilities

for air superiority and anti-surface and anti-ship attacks in areas which are as distant from China as possible, and improving long-range transportation capabilities[39]. Further attention needs to be paid to these activities conducted by Chinese air forces.

(5) Military Use of Space and Cyber Warfare Capabilities

China continues to put forth efforts for space developments. It has launched various satellites into space by its indigenously produced rockets, conducted manned space flights, and launched a lunar orbiter[40]. While there is one view that China's space development programs have been aiming at boosting national prestige and developing space resources. Given that military and non-military sectors in China's space development sectors seem related[41], there is the possibility that China utilizes space for such military purposes as information gathering, communications, and navigation. Recently, several high ranking officials in China's Air Force expressed its policy to actively work on utilization of space[42].

China is also developing anti-satellite weapons, and it conducted a test in which China destructed its own satellite by applying ballistic missile technology in January 2007. It is also pointed out that China is developing a system that uses laser beams to hamper satellite functions.

China is thought to have a strong interest in cyber space. They are believed to have organized and be currently training a cyber warfare-specialized unit[43]. In recent years, a series of cyber attacks to governments of many countries have been identified and some point out that the PLA is relevant to these attacks[44].

China's interest in anti-satellite weapons and cyber space can be attributed to the fact that information gathering and command and communication in the military sector, which are vital for swift and efficient exercise of military strength, increase its reliance on satellites and computer networks[45].

5. Activities in the Ocean

(1) Situation of Activities in Waters Near Japan

China has been expanding and intensifying its maritime activities in recent years. With regard to its activity in waters near Japan, Chinese naval vessels have been observed conducting what appeared to be training exercises or information gathering activities. Chinese government ships have also been observed, which were engaged in monitoring activities for protection of its maritime rights and interests[46]. Moreover, advancements to the Pacific Ocean by Chinese naval surface vessels are being routinely conducted. For example, a fleet of the record number of 11 Chinese naval vessels passed between the main island of Okinawa and the Miyako Island, headed to the Pacific Ocean in June 2011, and conducted what appeared to be training exercises including an unmanned aerial vehicle's flight. It seems that they are trying to

improve their deployment capabilities in the open ocean[47].

In addition to these military activities[48], it has been confirmed that China's law enforcement agencies have intensified their monitoring activities in waters near Japan in recent years.

In December 2008, the "Haijian 46" and the "Haijian 51", which belong to the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) of China, conducted navigation operations which foreign ships are not permitted under international laws such as hovering and cruising within Japan's territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands. In March and April 2011 and in April 2012, there have been instances of Chinese helicopters, that appeared to belong to the SOA, flying close to Japanese destroyers which were being engaged in vigilance monitoring in the East China Sea[49]. After the incidence in which a Chinese fishing trawler collided with patrol vessels of the Japan Coast Guard off the coast of the Senkaku Islands in September 2010, the "Yuzheng 201", a fisheries surveillance ship belonging to the Bureau of Fisheries at the Ministry of Agriculture of China, entered the waters near the Senkaku Islands on several occasions. Furthermore, in August 2011, the "Yuzheng 201" and the "Yuzheng 31001" temporarily intruded into Japan's territorial water near the Senkaku Islands[50]. In February 2012, a survey vessel of Japan Coast Guard conducting a marine survey in Japan's exclusive economic zone was demanded to stop the activity by the "Haijian 46" and the "Haijian 66" that belong to the SOA. In addition, in March 2012, the "Haijian 50" and the "Haijian 66" navigated Japan's contiguous water area near the Senkaku Islands and the "Haijian 50" temporarily intruded into Japan's territorial water[51]. Later, Yuzheng ships navigated Japan's contiguous water area near the Senkaku Islands on multiple times.

In other areas than waters near Japan as well, China is intensifying its activities in the South China Sea, including the Spratly Islands and Parcel Islands, over which it is engaged in territorial disputes with neighbors, including some ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries. In March 2009, Chinese ships, including a naval vessel, a maritime research ship of the SOA, a Bureau of Maritime Fisheries patrol ship, and trawlers, approached a U.S. Navy acoustic research ship operating in the South China Sea to obstruct its operations[52]. From March to April 2010, it is believed that China conducted exercises for three weeks in which six vessels were deployed to the South China Sea, and, in July the same year, it was reported that surface vessels and naval air forces conducted a large-scale, multi-branch joint live-ammunition exercise. In July 2011, it is reported that Chinese Navy conducted a joint exercise with Haijian ships, which belong to the SOA, and other ships in the ocean area surrounding the Hainan Island in the South China Sea. Furthermore, in recent years, there has been growing friction between China and its neighboring countries over the South China Sea, as illustrated by protests by Vietnam and the Philippines against China's activities in these waters.

See Section 5

(2) Objectives of Activities in Waters Near Japan

Taking into general consideration such factors as China's geographical location and economic globalization as well as the fact that China explicitly states in its laws and other documents that its Navy assumes the role of safeguarding maritime rights and interests and protecting maritime safety[53], the Chinese Navy and other organizations are considered to have the following objectives in their maritime activities.

The first one is to intercept naval operations by enemies in waters as far as possible from China in order to defend its territory and territorial waters. Behind this objective is an increase in effectiveness of long-range attacks due to recent progress in science and technology.

The second one is to develop military capabilities to deter and prevent Taiwan's independence. For example, China maintains that it will not allow any foreign intervention in solving the Taiwan issue and realizing the unification of China. In order for China to try to prevent by force foreign intervention into Taiwan, which is surrounded by the sea, it needs to enhance its military operational capabilities at sea.

The third one is to acquire, maintain, and protect its maritime rights and interests. China is engaged in oil and gas drilling as well as building facilities and surveying for the drilling in the East China Sea and South China Sea[54]. It is believed that its naval vessels operated near the drilling facilities of the Kashi oil and gas fields in September 2005, partly because China tried to demonstrate their naval capabilities of acquiring, maintaining, and protecting its maritime rights and interests.

The fourth one is to defend its sea lanes of communications. In this background is the fact that its sea lanes of communications, including its crude oil transportation routes from the Middle East, are extremely important for the globalizing Chinese economy. What part of its sea lanes of communication the Chinese Navy thinks it should defend depends on such factors as international situations, but given the recent modernization of the Chinese Navy and Air Force, the areas which they can defend is believed to get larger beyond waters near China.

Given these objectives and recent trends in China's maritime activities, it is believed that China plans to expand sphere of its maritime activities, and carry out its operations as an ordinary routine practice in waters surrounding Japan, including the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean as well as the South China Sea. Therefore, attention needs to be paid to such activities as operations of naval vessels and various surveillance operations near Japan, developments of facilities that serve as bases for these activities[55], and developments of its own interpretations regarding the legal status of coastal areas in China's exclusive economic zones[56].

6. International Military Activities

In recent years, the PLA has begun emphasizing nontraditional security missions such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and anti-piracy. In order to carry out these missions, it is becoming active in dispatching its units overseas as well[57]. It is believed that in the background of the

PLA's stance on international military activities is the fact that China's national interests have expanded beyond its national borders, thereby increasing its need to protect and promote its national interests overseas, and its intent to strengthen its stature by demonstrating its will as a great power to fulfill its responsibilities to the international community.

China states that it consistently supports and actively participates in the U.N. PKO. According to China's National Defense in 2010, it has sent a total of 17,390 military personnel to the U.N. PKO. According to the United Nations, as of the end of May 2012, China had deployed a total of 1,930 personnel, police officers, and military observers to 12 U.N. PKO, including the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). Thus China shows a certain presence in the U.N. PKO. In the background of China's aim in its proactive attitude to the U.N. PKO is its intent to strengthen its relations with the regions where the peacekeeping operations are conducted, particularly with African nations.

Furthermore, China has also been taking part in international initiatives to deal with piracy off the coast of Somalia/Gulf of Aden. As its first mission in distant waters, the Chinese Navy has dispatched vessels to these waters since December 2008 in order to make them escort Chinese and other ships. This demonstrates that the Chinese Navy is improving its capacity to execute naval operations in more distant waters. This is also thought to be a proof that China is placing a greater emphasis on protecting its sea lanes of communication[58].

In view of the deteriorating situation in Libya, China has carried out an evacuation operation of Chinese nationals from the country from February through March 2011. In this operation, China dispatched a naval frigate and transportation aircraft of the Air Force to Libya in addition to private chartered aircraft. This is the first participation of the military in an evacuation operation of Chinese nationals living abroad, and it has been pointed out that through such activities China is trying to build a pacifist and humanitarian image of its military forces and to demonstrate, both domestically and internationally, its intent to place priority on military operations other than war, as well as its desire to prove the ability to project its military power to distant locations.

7. Education and Training

In recent years, the PLA has been conducting practical exercises including such large-scale exercises as cooperative exercises of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and landing exercises in order to modernize its operational capabilities. The whole PLA military training conference in 2006 emphasized promotion of a shift from military training under the conditions of mechanization to military training under the conditions of informatization. The new Outline of Military Training and Evaluation, in effect since 2009, highlights training for military operations other than war (MOOTW), education in knowledge and expertise required for informatization, simulated training of high-tech weapons and equipment, network training, and training in complex electromagnetic environments where electronic interference occurs, in

addition to joint exercises by different services.

In the education spectrum, the PLA aims to develop military personnel versed in science and technology. In 2003, it lauched a human resource strategy project to develop human resources capable of directing joint operations/informatized operations and of building informatized armed forces. The project has a goal of achieving a big leap in the development of military personnel to 2020. In recent years, the PLA appears to be increasing its wage standards. It is believed that the objective of this is to secure highly capable human resources. Moreover, in 2000, in order to recruit highly capable and highly educated people, the military started a system where it provides scholarships for civilian college students and then allows them to enter the military as commissioned officers after graduation. On the other hand, in recent years, it is pointed out that there is an issue concerning treatment of veterans.

China has been developing a mobilization system with a view to effective use of civilian resources in the case of war and other emergencies. In February 2010, China enacted the National Defense Mobilization Law, which is the basic law for wartime mobilization, and in July the same year, put the law into effect[59].

8. National Defense Industry Sector

While China imports highly sophisticated military equipment and parts that it cannot produce domestically from other countries such as Russia, China is believed to place emphasis on indigenous production of them. The country manufactures much of its military equipment domestically and is now actively making research and development efforts on new ones. China's national defense industry sector appears to be developing due to improvement of private industry infrastructures accompanying economic growth, use of dual technologies, and the absorption of foreign technologies, as well as its own efforts. The sector is working as a basis of the modernization of its military[60].

Growth in the Chinese defense industry was once hindered by inefficiency caused by excessive secrecy and other factors. However, in recent years, reform of the defense industry has progressed. In particular, emphasis has been placed on two-way technological exchanges where military technologies are utilized for building national economy, and, in turn, civilian technologies are absorbed for a buildup of national defense. Specifically, the technologies of the defense industry have contributed to development of civilian space exploration, aviation industry, and shipbuilding industry.

Furthermore, China encourages and supports international cooperation and competition in dual-use industries, thus appearing to have an interest in absorbing foreign technologies through dual-use industries.

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1 China's National Defense in 2010. In a white paper on China's peaceful development published in September 2011, while China made clear that it pursues "peaceful development" but "never seeks

hegemony", it also stated that it is firm in upholding its "core interests" which include the followings: "state sovereignty," "national security," "territorial integrity," "national reunification," "China's political system established by the Constitution and overall social stability," and "the basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social development."

2 China traditionally adopted the strategy of a "People's War" based on the recognition that a world-scale war was possible. Under that strategy, the country attributed importance to guerrilla warfare using its vast territory and enormous population. This posture, however, led to harmful effects such as excessively enlarged and inefficient military forces. Under these circumstances, China has come to place importance on local wars such as conflicts that occur over its territorial land and waters since the first half of the 1980s based on a new recognition that a world-scale war will not take place on a long-term basis. After the end of the Gulf War in 1991, the country started implementing measures to improve its military operation abilities in order to win a local war under highly technological conditions. Recently, it has been stated that the core of military modernization is to strengthen capabilities to win a local war under informationized conditions.

3 China amended Regulations on the Political Work of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in 2003 to add the practices of Media, Psychological, and Legal Warfare to its political work. The Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China (August 2011) of the U.S. Department of Defense explains Media, Psychological, and Legal Warfare as follows:

・Media Warfare is aimed at influencing domestic and international public opinion to build public and international support for China's military actions and to dissuade an adversary from pursuing policies perceived to be adverse to China's interests.

・Psychological Warfare seeks to undermine an enemy's ability to conduct combat operations through psychological operations aimed at deterring, shocking, and demoralizing enemy military personnel and supporting civilian populations.

・Legal Warfare uses international and domestic laws to gain international support and manage possible political repercussions of China's military actions.

In October 2011, *China National Defense*, a Chinese military official publication, pointed out that "with media antagonism, psychological competition and legal contest gradually becoming normal operational means and styles in recent years, operational domain is also expanding and developing beyond physical and informational ones in a traditional sense into cognitive one." In February 2012, *Jiefangjun Bao (PLA Daily)*, another official publication by the PLA, pointed out that "military operational domain has expanded from three dimensions of land, sea and air into multi-dimensions of land, sea, air, space and electromagnetic domain" and that "building and development of operational capabilities reach air, sea, and informational and psychological domains in addition to accuracy, sophistication and strength."

4 China's National Defense in 2008.

5 China's National Defense in 2008 explains that "With the focus of attention on performing the historical missions of the armed forces for the new stage in the new century and with raising the capability to win local wars in conditions of informationization at the core, it works to increase the country's capabilities to maintain maritime, space and electromagnetic space security and to carry out the tasks of counter-terrorism, stability maintenance, emergency rescue and international peacekeeping." In addition, China's National Defense in 2010 describes the diversified military missions by the following seven topics: "Safeguarding Border, Coastal and Territorial Air Security," "Maintaining Social Stability," "Participating in National Construction, Emergency Rescue and Disaster Relief," "Participating in UN Peacekeeping Operations," "Conducting Escort Operations off the coast of Somalia/Gulf of Aden," "Holding Joint Military Exercises and Training with Other Countries," and "Participating in International Disaster Relief Operations."

6 China's National Defense in 2010. China's National Defense in 2008 also mentions a target to "by and large reach the goal of modernization of national defense and armed forces by the mid-21st century."

7 It is pointed out that the PLA is advancing reorganization, including establishment of Strategy Planning Division in the General Staff Department, which are aimed at study and further integration of military strategy.

8 The U.S. National Military Strategy (NMS) (February 2011), after pointing out that the United States "remain concerned about the extent and strategic intent of China's military modernization, and its

assertiveness in space, cyberspace, in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea and South China Sea," states that the United States will be prepared to oppose any nations that jeopardize access to and use of the global commons and cyberspace, or that threaten the security of its allies. The Defense Strategic Guidance released by the United States in January 2012, after pointing out that "States such as China and Iran will continue to pursue asymmetric means to counter our power projection capabilities," identified power projection capabilities in anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) environments as one of the primary missions for the U.S. Armed Forces. Furthermore, Annual Report to Congress of the U.S. -China Economic and Security Review Commission, bipartisan consultative body of the U.S. Congress, describes the PLA's military strategy as "Area Control Military Strategy."

9 China's National Defense in 2010 states that "in the last two years, senior PLA delegations have visited more than 40 countries, and defense ministers and chiefs of general staff from more than 60 countries have visited China."

10 China disclosed some fighter aircraft and submarines which had previously been generally undisclosed to foreign delegates, including delegates from Japan, at the 60th anniversary of the foundation of the Navy (in April 2009) and of its Air Force (in November 2009). This is thought to be a sign of its posture of working to improve transparency with regard to the military.

11 China's National Defense in 2008 provides details of personnel expenses, operation maintenance costs, and equipment costs only for the defense budget for FY2007 each by active force, reserve force, and militia.

12 Other examples are: China sent notification indicating a refusal for U.S. naval vessels including U.S. aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk to pull into Hong Kong on the expected day of arrival and the U.S. naval vessels abandoned their port (November 2007) and; since China sent notification to the Maritime SDF training squadron of its request to postpone their port call to Qingdao just before the expected day of arrival, the squadron had to cancel their visit (October 2010).

13 For example, some point out that there are increasing number of cases in which the PLA expresses its position on security issues concerning national sovereignty or maritime interests. On the other hand, others point out that the extent of military's involvement in the party's decision-making process is limited because the number of PLA representatives to key decision-making bodies of the CCP is fewer than the past. Meanwhile, the PLA has repeatedly stressed "absolute instruction of the forces by the party."

14 National defense budget within central fiscal expenditures. The national defense budget amount for FY2012 within nationwide fiscal expenditures is said to be approximately 670.3 billion yuan. This budget amount represents growth of approximately 11.5% (approximately 69.1 billion yuan) compared to the national defense budget (initial budget) within the nationwide fiscal expenditures for the previous fiscal year.

15 Converting national defense budgets of foreign countries into another currency simply by applying currency exchange rates cannot necessarily reflect the accurate value due to difference in price level. But hypothetically speaking, if China's national defense budget for FY2012 were converted at a rate of 12 yen per yuan (FY2012 disbursing official rate), this would result in approximately 7,803.7 billion yen. The 2011 Yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that China's military expenditures for 2010 were approximately $119.0 billion, ranking it second place in the world behind the United States.

16 China announced that the rate of growth for its FY2012 national defense budget is "an increase of approximately 11.2% (approximately 67.6 billion yuan) compared to the previous year," but this is the growth rate calculated by comparing the spending of FY2011 with the initial budget of FY2012.

17 China's announced national defense budget within central fiscal expenditures achieved double-digit-percent growth on the initial-budget basis for 21 successive years up through FY2009, and the growth in FY2010 was approximately 9.8%.

18 U.S. Defense Department's Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China (May 2012) estimates China's defense spending on military-related expenditures as from $120 billion to 180 billion dollars in FY2011. The same report indicates that China's official defense budget does not include major categories of expenditure such as foreign procurement.

19 Missions of the PAP include security of party and government, border security, social projects, and firefighting activities. According to China's National Defense in 2002, it is to maintain state security

and social stability, and assist the PLA in wartime in defense operations.

[20] The militia engages in economic development in peacetime and other activities and has a duty to provide logistical support for combat operations in wartime. China's National Defense in 2002 explains, "Under the command of military organs, the militia in wartime helps the standing army in its military operations, conducts independent operations and provides combat support and manpower replenishment for the standing army. In peacetime, it undertakes the tasks of performing combat readiness support, taking part in disaster relief efforts, and maintaining social order." According to China's National Defense in 2010, "China now has 8 million primary militia members."

[21] Formally, there are two Central Military Commissions—one for the CCP and another for the state. However, both commissions basically consist of the same membership, and both are essentially regarded as institutions for the CCP to command the military forces.

[22] China's National Defense in 2010 states that "China consistently upholds the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, adheres to a self-defensive nuclear strategy, and will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country." On the other hand, the "Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China" (May 2012) of the U.S. Department of Defense points out that there is some ambiguity over the conditions under which China's "no first use" policy would or would not apply.

[23] For difference between liquid-propellant system and solid-propellant system, see footnotes 1-5 of Section 2.

[24] The Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China (August 2011) of the U.S. Department of Defense indicates that China may also be developing a new road mobile ICBM, possibly capable of carrying a multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV).

[25] The Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community of the United States published in February 2009 states that China is developing conventionally armed short- and medium-range ballistic missiles with maneuverable re-entry vehicles (MaRV) that could be used to attack U.S. naval forces and airbases. Moreover, in January 2011, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates expressed concerns about the development of the anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles ever since he took his job, and stated that the development has proceeded fairly. In addition, in June 2011, it was reported that Chen Bingde, the PLA's Chief of the General Staff, announced that China was currently conducting research and development of the DF-21D that was believed to be an anti-ship ballistic missile.

[26] In its Annual Report of November 2010, the U.S.-China Economic Security Review Committee pointed out that China could attack five out of the six main U.S. Air Force bases in East Asia with its normal missiles (ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles), and also have the ability to target air bases in Guam by enhancing the capability of its bombers.

[27] U.S. Defense Department's Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China (May 2012) states that by October 2011 China had deployed 1,000 to 1,200 SRBM on the shore opposing Taiwan, and that it is engaged in the deployment of new missile brigades and efforts to increase offensive capabilities, including the introduction of variants with improved ranges, accuracies and payloads. Besides this, in March 2011, Taiwan's National Security Bureau Director Tsai Der-sheng said that China has developed and deployed new "DF-16" missiles and that these are highly destructive long-range missiles, which will mainly be used against Taiwan and in order to prevent U.S. intervention.

[28] At the press conference on the day after it was announced that the test had been carried out, a spokesperson from China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, "The test would neither produce space debris in orbit nor pose a threat to the safety of orbiting spacecraft. The test was defensive in nature and targeted at no country. It is consistent with the defensive national defense policies that China has consistently pursued." On the other hand, China's National Defense in 2010 explains that "China maintains that the global missile defense program will be detrimental to international strategic balance and stability, will undermine international and regional security, and will have a negative impact on the process of nuclear disarmament. China holds that no state should deploy overseas missile defense systems that have strategic missile defense capabilities or potential, or engage in any such international collaboration."

[29] China's National Defense in 2010, etc.

[30] In the "Stride 2009" exercises, it was reported that the four individual army divisions, belonging to

each of the military regions of Shenyang, Lanzhou, Jinan, and Guangzhou, traveled long distances from their own military region to a different one, after which they engaged in exercises with simulated enemy forces. In order to transport personnel and equipment, they are reported to have used civilian cargo aircraft, passenger airplanes, and the "Hexie" high-speed train, as well as Air Force cargo aircraft and freight trains. In the "Mission Action 2010" exercises, it was reported that a total of 30,000 forces from individual army divisions belonging to Beijing, Lanzhou, and Chengdu as well as from the Air Force and the Second Artillery Corps participated with the aim of improving the long-range maneuvering capabilities and integrated operation abilities.

[31] In recent years, in particular, China is believed to be substantially increasing the number of state-of-the-art Yuan class submarines, which are domestically produced. These submarines are believed to be superior in quietness and to be equipped with air independent propulsion (AIP) system.

[32] Recently, China appears to be increasing the number of Yuzhao-class large landing ships, the load displacement of which is said to exceed 20,000 tons.

[33] This hospital ship, "Daishandao" (commonly known as the "Peace Ark"), is reported to have toured around the coast of the Chinese continent and the islands and reefs of the Spratly and Parcel Islands for the span of roughly a month beginning in October 2009, delivering medical services to the stationed military personnel and inhabitants there. Moreover, this ship was also commissioned for medical services duty "Mission Harmony-2010" from August to November in 2010, followed by another medical services duty "Mission Harmony-2011" from September to December in 2011. In this mission, the ship was believed to visit four countries—Cuba, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Costa Rica—for providing medical services.

[34] Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie remarked during the Sino-Japanese Defense Dialogues held in March and November 2009 that China cannot remain "without an aircraft carrier indefinitely," and that "the possession of aircraft carriers should be determined in comprehensive consideration of various factors including economic development, the level of shipbuilding, and security factors." Furthermore, in June 2011, it was reported that Chief of the General Staff Chen Bingde announced that China was currently building aircraft carriers.

[35] It is believed that China is repeating trial navigation of Varyag. Concerning its current situation, a spokesperson of the Ministry of National Defense of China explained that "related works are progressing smoothly based on the plan." Meanwhile, the Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China (May 2012) of the U.S. Department of Defense shows its view that Varyag will likely commission in 2012, which will serve as a training platform for fixed-wing aircraft. It also points out that "it will still take several additional years for China to achieve a minimal level of combat capability for its aircraft carrier."

[36] Additionally, in 2006, it was reported that China was negotiating the purchase of Russian made the Su-33 carrier-based fighter aircraft, which can be operated with a Kuznetsov-class carrier. It was also reported in 2007 that China had plans to purchase arresting wires that are used on aircraft carriers from Russia. In September 2008, it was reported that China was planning cooperation with Ukraine, which has a simulation training facility for carrier-based aircraft, with respect to education and training of Navy pilots. The U.S. Defense Department's Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China (May 2012) points out that "Some components of China's first indigenously-produced carrier may already be under construction; that carrier could achieve operational capability after 2015. China likely will build multiple aircraft carriers and associated support ships over the next decade."

[37] In the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee in February 2011, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated his view that China had the potential to deploy 50 next generation fighters equipped with stealth capability by 2020 and 200 fighters by 2025. It was reported that China had succeeded in conducting the first flight test of its stealth fighters "J-20" in January 2011 and that the country is continuing the tests.

[38] The number of scrambles by the Japan Air Self Defense Force against Chinese aircraft is also on the increase. Sea Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-1.

[39] China's National Defense in 2008 explains that China's Air force is "working to accelerate its transition from territorial air defense to both offensive and defensive operations, and increase its capabilities for carrying out reconnaissance and early warning, air strikes, air and missile defense, and strategic projection, in an effort to build itself into a modernized strategic Air Force." The Annual

Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China (August 2010) of the U.S. Department of Defense explains that China's Air Force has continued its conversion from a force for limited territorial defense to a more flexible and agile force able to operate off-shore in both offensive and defensive roles, using the U.S. and Russian Air Forces as models. In the joint military exercise "Peace Mission 2010" (October 2010) that China and Russia participated in, among other countries, it is reported that China's battle group comprising two H-6 bombers and two J-10 fighters, supported by an early warning aircraft and air refueling tankers, made a round-trip flight of a route that spanned 1,000 km each way without landing, and conducted air-to-ground exercises.

40 "China's Space Activities in 2011" released by China in December 2011, after stating that "Since 2006, China has made rapid progress in its space industry," mentions its development of next-generation carrier rockets, its success in launches of satellites, including earth observation satellites and navigation satellites, and others as "innovative achievements." For example, in recent years, China launched the manned spacecraft "Shenzhou-7" and its astronauts succeeded in carrying out extra-vehicular activities for the first time in September 2008. China also launched the lunar orbiting satellite "Chang'e-2" in October 2010. In addition, China launched the space laboratory "Tiangong 1" in September 2011, and succeeded in its docking with the unmanned spacecraft "Shenzhou-8" in November 2010 and the manned spacecraft "Shenzhou-9" in June 2012. These show that China is promoting its plan with construction of space stations in mind.

41 "China's Space Activities in 2011" stresses that China has consistently adhered to the principle of peaceful utilization of outer space. On the other hand, for example, China's National Defense in 2006 notes that, regarding science, technology and industry for national defense, "Major scientific and technological projects such as manned space flights and the Lunar Probe Project, are being carried out to spur the leapfrogging development of high-tech enterprises" and "to bring about overall improvements in defense-related science and technology." Also, the entire manned space project is said to be commanded by the Director of the PLA's General Armament Department.

42 For example, Air Force Commander Xu Qiliang is reported to have said, "China's Air Force has established a strategy of having both offensive and defensive unified aerospace capabilities."

43 U.S. Department of Defense's Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China (August 2011) points out that, "The PLA has established information warfare units to develop viruses to attack enemy computer systems and networks, as well as tactics and measures to protect friendly computer systems and networks. These units include elements of the militia, creating a linkage between PLA network operators and China's civilian information technology professionals."

44 Annual Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (November 2011) points out that China's government or military appeared to sponsor numerous computer network intrusions and that the military is thought to engage in computer network attacks. The Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community (January 2012) points out that "China and Russia are of particular concern" concerning cyber threats to the United States. Moreover, the Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China (January 2012) of the U.S. Department of Defense points out that "In 2011, computer networks and systems around the world continued to be targets of intrusions and data theft, many of which originated within China."

45 China's National Defense in 2010 states "maintaining its security interests in space, electromagnetic space and cyberspace" as one of the main targets/tasks in its national defense policy for the new stage.

46 Concerning the PLA, there is a view that believes that by turning exception into normality through uniform peacetime and wartime force deployment and exceeding traditional activity spaces, they intend to desensitize the alertness of others and make the international society tolerate and accept changes in the situation. (Taiwan's 2009 National Defense Report).

47 China's National Defense in 2006 states "The Navy aims at gradual extension of the strategic depth for offshore defensive operations." Later, there was a report that Chinese Navy Commander Wu Shengli stated in April 2009 that Navy's "open sea training has been normalized." Furthermore, China's National Defense in 2010 states that, in line with the requirements of offshore defense strategy, the PLA Navy, "By organizing naval vessels for drills in distant waters, develops training models for MOOTW (military operations other than war) missions."

Moreover, recently, the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China,

after acknowledging implementation of exercises by Chinese naval vessels in the western Pacific, made statements to the effect that these are planned regular exercises, do not target any specific state, and are consistent with relevant international laws and practices. Thus, China is trying to wipe out concerns in the international community while stressing the legitimacy of its trainings.

48 Other examples of military activities are: a submerged Chinese nuclear-powered submarine navigated in Japanese territorial waters, breaching international law in November 2004; it was confirmed that a total of five Chinese naval vessels, including one Sovremenny-class destroyer, were sailing near the Kashi gas field (Tianwaitian in Chinese) in the East China Sea and some of them circled around the said gas field in September 2005; a Chinese Song-class submarine surfaced in the vicinity of the U.S. aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk in international waters reportedly near Okinawa in October 2006. The foreign submarine's approach to a U.S. aircraft carrier is a noteworthy military incident.

49 On March 7, 2011, a Chinese Z-9 helicopter believed to belong to the SOA flew as close as approximately 70 m and as low as approximately 40 m above the water around the Japanese destroyer Samidare, which was patrolling the waters in the central area of the East China Sea. On March 26, a Z-9 helicopter flew again as close as approximately 90 m and as low as approximately 60 m above the water around the destroyer Isoyuki. On April 1, a Y-12 aircraft which was believed to belong to the SOA flew as close as approximately 90 m and as low as approximately 60 m above the water around Isoyuki.

The official website of the SOA East Sea Branch published an article titled "Marine surveillance helicopter accomplish first successful refueling operation on offshore platform during mission." Judging from a photograph accompanying the article, it is clear that the marine surveillance helicopter belonging to the SOA is based at the Pinghu Gas Field located in the East China Sea. Furthermore, the article states that China will continue to track and monitor vessels that encroach on national interests in China's territorial waters in the East China Sea.

50 In addition, it was reported in October 2010 that China had formulated plans to build 30 law enforcement ships within the next five years in order to improve its law enforcement capacity to protect Chinese maritime interests, and that the SOA deployed the "Haijian75", which engages in marine monitoring activities, to water area near the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. It is also reported that the Maritime Safety Administration of the Ministry of Transport which operates "Haixun" ships is showing a stance to strengthen its patrolling activities with its aircraft in water area including "disputed areas" in the East China Sea. Concerning the act of giving names to remote islands by Japan, including the chain that makes up the Senkaku Islands, that did not have names despite the fact that they are base-points for Japan's exclusive economic zone, the People's Daily, an official newspaper of the CCP, reported that "this is an action that publicly harms China's core interests."

51 Similar incidences occurred in May and September 2010.

52 Then Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair testified before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee on March 10, 2009, that "in the past several years, they [Chinese] have become more aggressive in asserting claims for the EEZ."

53 For instance, China's National Defense in 2010 defines safeguarding of national maritime rights and interests as one of the major goals and tasks of China's national defense policy, and notes that China practices an administration system of sharing responsibilities between the military and the local authorities, including organs of maritime surveillance, fisheries administration, etc., in border and coastal defense.

54 In September 2010, China unilaterally announced postponement of the negotiation to conclude an international agreement with Japan on resource development in the East China Sea. While the negotiation has not been resumed yet, it is pointed out the possibility that China has started developing the Shirakaba oil-gas field (Chunxiao in Chinese), and that it also has started production in the Kashi gas field (Tianwaitian in Chinese). In addition, it is reported that China plans to operate the "Jiaolong" to search for seabed resources in deep waters and the "Haiyangshiyou 981", an oil-drilling rig, in the South China Sea.

55 It is reported that China is constructing a large-scale naval base that has underground tunnels for nuclear-powered submarines in the city of Sanya located in the southern tip of Hainan island. Experts point out that the base is in a strategically important location that secures access to the South China Sea, as well as the western Pacific, and that China is advancing construction work in order the base to play a role as a major hub of the South Sea Fleet, where aircraft carriers will be deployed.

[56] It is pointed out that, in recent years, China aims to limit military activities of other countries in coastal areas of China's exclusive economic zones by employing its own interpretations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). For instance, the Chinese Government announced in a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on November 26, 2010, that it is opposed to unsanctioned military activities by any country in coastal areas of China's exclusive economic zones. Also in November, *China National Defense*, a Chinese military official publication, after pointing out that coastal areas in the exclusive economic zones of the country were an essential part of the national sea territory under China's jurisdiction, stated that the air above such areas has a different status from the air above international waters, and, therefore, passage of aircraft of other countries over these areas should be restricted. The publication also criticized the activities of U.S. military vessels and aircraft in coastal areas of China's exclusive economic zones. It is pointed out that, behind these claims by China, there is an intention to expand "legal warfare" (see footnotes 2, 3).

[57] China actively participates in international disaster relief activities. China's National Defense in 2010 states that the PLA has carried out 28 international humanitarian aid missions, and provided 22 disaster-stricken countries with relief materials with a total value exceeding 950 million yuan. When Haiti was struck by a major earthquake in January 2010, the China International Search and Rescue Team (CISAR), which includes military personnel such as engineers, departed for the scene on the day the earthquake struck (Beijing time). When flooding occurred in Pakistan in August the same year, China dispatched military transportation helicopters for the first time in an overseas mission.

[58] China's National Defense in 2010 notes that the Chinese Navy has developed its capabilities of conducting operations in distant waters and in countering nontraditional security threats. Chinese Navy Admiral Wu Shengli stated the following with regard to "Mission Harmony-2010," a medical service operation by the "Daishandao" hospital ship (commonly known as the "Peace Ark") of the PLA Navy from August to November in 2010: "The mission embodies the Chinese Navy's capacity to accomplish diversified military missions, and thus improves our comprehensive support abilities. At the same time, it showcases our image as a responsible major power that proactively pursues its international obligations."

[59] China's National Defense in 2010 states the following: "China pursues the principles of combining peacetime needs with wartime needs, integrating military with civilian purposes and combining military efforts with civilian support. It strengthens national defense mobilization and reserve force building, enhances national defense mobilization capabilities, and reinforces its defense strength." For example, in recent years, it took measures to position a cargo-passenger ship as means to improving transportation capacity at the time of national defense mobilization because the ship "actively represents the idea of making and developing military-civilian integration."

[60] The U.S. Defense Department's Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China released in August 2011 notes about China's defense industry that the shipbuilding and defense electronics sectors have witnessed the greatest progress, coupled with technological development in the sectors of missile and space systems. In contrast, the sectors of guidance and control systems and engines and advanced applications and software have experienced slower progress, and China still heavily depends on foreign enterprises for technologies in these sectors.

3. External Relations

1. General Situation

In its relationships with other countries, China proactively develops military exchanges including reciprocal visits by senior military officials and joint military exercises. In recent years, China has been engaged in vigorous military exchanges not only with major powers such as the United States and Russia and with its neighboring countries including Southeast Asian countries, but also with countries in Africa

and Latin American. China is believed to regard military exchanges as a strategic means to safeguard its national interests, and as such to position military exchanges as an element in China's overall diplomatic strategy[1]. The objectives of China's promotion of military exchanges include alleviating concerns regarding China by strengthening its relations with other countries, creating a favorable security environment, enhancing China's influence in the international community, securing natural resources and energy, and building foreign bases.

2. Relations with Taiwan

China holds the principle that Taiwan is a part of China, and that the Taiwan issue is therefore a domestic issue. The country maintains that the "one-China" principle is the underlying premise and foundation for discussions between China and Taiwan. China also claims that it would never abandon its efforts for peaceful unification, and expresses that it will take policies and measures to solve issues of Taiwanese people's interest and to protect their due authority, while it has repeatedly stated that it has not renounced the use of force from the standpoint of strong opposition to any intervention in the unification of China by foreign powers as well as any move toward independence of Taiwan. The Anti-Secession Law, enacted in March 2005, stipulates that China will be able to protect its national sovereignty and territories through non-peaceful means and other necessary measures in the event that Taiwanese separatist forces bring about Taiwan's separation from China under any pretext or through any means, resulting in the serious situation which may lead to Taiwan's separation from China, or which may bring about a complete elimination of the possibility of peaceful reunification (Article 8), and clearly lays out the non-renunciation of the use of military force by China.

Ma Ying-jeou, who was re-elected in the presidential election in January 2012, continues to advocate a policy of pursuing Taiwanese economic development through expanding economic exchanges with China and the status quo rather than independence[2] in his second term. As exemplified by coming into force of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), relations between the two sides is moving forward mainly around the realm of economy[3]. On the security front, while President Hu Jintao made appeals for China and Taiwan to make contact and hold exchanges over military issues at an appropriate time in order to explore creation of mechanisms for building mutual trust over military security[4], President Ma Ying-jeou has demanded withdrawal of the PLA missiles which are pointed at Taiwan. Attention will be paid to trends in the future relations between China and Taiwan including trends of political dialogues including military affairs.

3. Relations with the United States

There are various outstanding issues between the United States and China, such as human rights in China, the Taiwan issue, and trade issues. However, since a stable U.S.–China relationship is essential for China in developing its economy, it is believed that China will continue to desire to maintain its stable relation with the United States.

The United States expresses that it welcomes a China that takes on a responsible leadership role with the international community in international such issues as recovery of the world economy, climate change, and proliferation of WMDs. The United States proclaims that it will monitor the Chinese military's modernization, recognizes that the two nations do not agree on every single issue, and makes it clear that the United States will be candid on human rights and other issues. It also states that disagreement between the two should not prevent cooperation on issues of mutual interest[5].

On the Chinese side, President Hu Jintao stated that China and the United States would work together to build a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship in the twenty-first century. Thus, China shows its stance of emphasizing stable development of U.S.–China relations through pragmatic cooperation over an extensive array of fields.

Military exchanges have also developed between China and the United States. They have been conducting various policy dialogues. China has dispatched observers to U.S. military exercises, and joint drills have been conducted between the Chinese and U.S. navies on mutual port visits. A military hotline between the defense departments of the two countries was set up in April 2008. But while China wants to develop relations between the Chinese and U.S. militaries, it asserts that there are a number of issues that must be resolved in order to realize sound development in the relations. The issues include U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, activities of U.S. military vessels and aircraft within China's exclusive economic zones, legal hurdles in mutual military exchanges, and a lack of strategic trust in China on the part of the United States[6]. Some unstable facets have been observed in military exchanges of the two countries. For example, China notified suspensions of the major military exchanges with the United States when the U.S. Department of Defense notified Congress of possible arms sales to Taiwan in October 2008 and January 2010[7]. On the other hand, the United States maintains that China's military development, lack of transparency, and other issues raise questions about its future conduct and intentions. It asserts that U.S.–China relations must be undergirded by a process of enhancing confidence and reducing mistrust[8]. For this reason, with regard to military exchanges, it is believed that the aim of the United States is to improve the current situation, wherein such exchanges are frequently suspended once problems arise, and to build relations that are capable of maintaining more stable channels for mutual understanding. In recent years, for instance, Strategic Security Dialogues have been established (May 2011) in U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogues.

4. Relations with Russia

Since the China–Soviet confrontation ended in 1989, both countries have placed importance on their bilateral relationship. The deepening of the "strategic partnership" between China and Russia, which was established in the mid-1990s, has been emphasized. In 2001, the China–Russia Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation [9] were concluded. Subsequently, in 2004, the long-standing issue of border demarcation between the two countries came to a settlement. The two countries share an idea that they will promote multipolarization of the world and establishment of a new international order. In addition, economic motives including natural resource/energy supply have been driving the good relationship between them in recent years.

On the military front, since the 1990s, China has purchased modern weapons from Russia, including the Su-27 and the Su-30 fighter aircraft, Sovremenny-class destroyers, and Kilo-class submarines. Russia is currently the largest supplier of weapons to China. However, some point out that their trade amounts have been on the decline in recent years due to the advancement of indigenous weapon production in China. It is also pointed out that Russia, which shares a land border with China, has a policy of not supplying sophisticated weapons to China that would cause a threat to Russia and that Russia has a concern about competition with China in arms exports.

China–Russia military exchanges include regular visits by high-ranking army officials and joint military exercises [10]. It is believed that through these exchanges the two countries can deepen mutual understanding and build confidence between their military forces and show their presence as a pole in the multipolarizing world, and China can learn operational methods of Russian weapons and military operational doctrines.

5. Relations with North Korea

North Korea and China have a "traditional friendship," and North Korea seems to rely heavily on China for a great portion of food assistance and energy supply. Accordingly, China is believed to have a stronger influence on North Korea than other countries[11] and the international community expects that China will play an active role in resolving the nuclear issue. On the other hand, China was cautious in adopting a tougher stance against North Korea regarding the sinking of the Cheonan in March 2010 and the artillery firing at Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010. In addition, when the Chairman of the National Defense Commission Kim Jong Il died in December 2011, China expressed its deepest sympathies to North Korea while promptly declaring its support for the new regime led by Kim Jong-un. It is pointed out that such an attitude stems from its increasing concerns for possible destabilization on the Korean Peninsula, but, at the same time, is intended to secure China's influence on the new regime.

6. Relations with Other Countries

(1) Relations with Southeast Asian Countries

As for its relations with countries in Southeast Asia, China has been continuously developing bilateral relations with all the countries in the region through active mutual top-level visits and other means. In particular, China has had good relations with Myanmar and has assisted in developing Myanmar's infrastructure such as pipelines for petroleum or natural gas, ports, and railroads. It also has supplied key military equipment. Some pundits point out that behind this close relationship is associated with Myanmar's location which provides China the shortest access to the Indian Ocean[12].

China is also actively involved in multilateral frameworks such as ASEAN Plus One (China), ASEAN Plus Three, and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)[13]. While China has been deepening its economic and cultural cooperation with ASEAN countries through diplomatic forums, more recently, it has been proactively advancing cooperation in the area of national security[14] by enhancing exchanges of military personnel such as mutual visits of their high-ranking military officers and exchanges and cooperation between military departments.

(2) Relations with Central Asian Countries

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, located in the western part of China, is situated next to Central Asia. It shares borders with the three countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and has ethnic minorities settled in the areas straddling borders. Naturally, the region hosts lively exchanges between the people of those countries. Therefore, China is greatly concerned about the political stability and security situations in Central Asian states such as terrorism by Islamic extremists. Chinese engagement in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which was established in June 2001, is viewed as an indication of China's concerns in such areas. Moreover, China is also strongly interested in the energy and natural resources of Central Asia with a view to diversification of its supply source and procurement methods of these resources and is promoting cooperation in the energy field with Central Asian countries, such as the construction of oil and natural gas pipelines between China and Central Asian nations.

(3) Relations with South Asian Countries

While China has been at odds with India due to such issues as border conflicts, it has traditionally maintained an extremely close relationship with Pakistan, which has been at odds with India as well. It is believed that, as illustrated by the joint development of the JF-17 fighter, their cooperation in the military sector including exporting weapons[15] and military technology transfer is also advancing. On the other hand, in recent years, China has been committed to improving its relationship with India while also

paying consideration to maintaining balance with Pakistan. Actively conducting mutual visits by top leaders with India, China states that its relations with India are strategic and that the issue of border demarcation between the two countries, which once culminated in military clashes, is progressing. It is believed that the development of relations with India can be attributed to their intent to place importance on economic growth as well as their responses to progressing U.S.–India relations.

Regarding military exchanges, China has conducted a variety of joint exercises with Pakistan and India since 2003 including joint naval search and rescue exercises[16].

(4) Relations with EU Countries

Trade between China and European Union (EU) countries has grown remarkably in recent years. For China, the EU is now as important a partner as Japan and the United States, especially in the economic field. China, at diplomatic opportunities, strongly requests EU countries to lift their arms embargoes against China which have been imposed since the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989[17].

Regarding information technology, avionics, and air-independent propulsion systems for submarines and other areas, EU member countries possess more advanced technologies than those of China or Russia, which exports weapons to China. Therefore, if the EU arms embargo on China were lifted, it is possible that the weapons and military technologies of EU countries would transfer to China, and that they would be utilized as a bargaining chip to gain the edge in weapons transactions with Russia. For this reason, Japan has expressed to the EU its objection to lift of the arms embargo on China. However, because the EU is asking China for financial support to handle government debt crisis in Europe, some see that China may accelerate its move to call for lift of the arms embargo on this occasion. It is necessary to pay continuous attention to future discussions within the EU.

(5) Relations with Middle Eastern Countries, African Countries, Pacific Islands, and Central and South American Countries

China has been enhancing its relations with Middle-Eastern and African nations with a focus on its economic relations by actively assisting in their infrastructure development and investing in their resource and energy development and has been further expanding its influence in the region. In recent years, not only interactions among top levels of states and high-ranking military officials but also arms exports and exchanges between military forces[18] are actively conducted. Behind these moves, some see China's intention to ensure stable supply of energy and natural resource and also to secure its overseas bases in the future.

China’s relations with the Pacific islands are also on the rise. It has been implementing the development of oil, natural gas, and cobalt mines in Papua New Guinea and has signed an agreement on military

cooperation with the country. Vigorous and continual economic assistance has also been implemented towards other islands. Furthermore, China tries to engage in military exchanges with Fiji and Tonga.

Chinese military officials visit countries including Argentina and Brazil on a regular basis to enhance its relations with Central and South American countries. China has reportedly been working on improvement of its relations with these countries through such events as the medical services missions[19] by a hospital ship of the Chinese Navy.

7. International Transfer of Weapons

China has provided developing countries in Asia, Africa, and other areas with weapons such as small arms, tanks, and aircraft. It is reported that the main recipients are Pakistan, Iran, and Bangladesh, while weapons are also being exported to African countries such as Namibia, Egypt, Algeria, and Sudan as well as Central and South American countries including Venezuela and Peru. Some experts claim that China transfers weapons in order to strengthen its strategic relationships with the allies, enhance its influence in the international community, and secure energy and natural resources. It is pointed out that China is supplying weapons to countries that have problems in terms of democracy and human rights, and attention is paid as to whether China will improve transparency of international weapons transfer in response to the concerns of the international community.

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1 China's National Defense in 2010 states that "China develops its military relations with foreign countries in a comprehensive manner, continues to strengthen its practical exchanges and cooperation with the armed forces of other countries, and strives to foster a military security environment featuring mutual trust and benefit." Major General Qian Lihua, director of the Defense Ministry's Foreign Affairs Office, stated that military diplomacy, including various forms of exchange with foreign countries, serves as a strategic means to safeguarding state sovereignty, security, and interests of development, and also performs a specific role in the fostering of a positive external environment for the development of China.

2 Taiwan's presidential election in January 2012 was virtually a two-man race between the incumbent President Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen, Chairwoman of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), and Ma Ying-jeou was re-elected as President with 51.6% of total votes. In the legislative election on the same day, the Chinese Nationalist Party (CNP) lost seats but secured majority. Some polls concerning the election results indicate that the major reason for the President Ma's victory was people's support for his policy toward China and people's hope that he would hold stable China-Taiwan relationship, especially on the economic front. Chinese side has shown a stance to appreciate the election result as it justifies the current peaceful development policy.

3 Recently, leaders of the organizations authorized to deal with cross-strait talks (the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) on the Chinese side and the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) on the Taiwanese side) met for the first time in 10 years in June 2008. Direct chartered passenger weekday flights, direct maritime links, and direct mail services between China and Taiwan began in December 2008. In June 2010, the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), which would be equivalent to the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the two

sides, was concluded. It is said that Taiwan's investment in and export to China are increasing.

4 Discourse at the discussion on December 31, 2008, commemorating the 30th anniversary of the announcement of Message to Compatriots in Taiwan. China's National Defense in 2010 stresses that the two sides "can hold contacts and exchanges on military issues at an appropriate time and talk about a military security mechanism of mutual trust."

5 The U.S. National Security Strategy (May 2010). In addition, the Defense Strategic Guidance of January 2012 states "China's emergence as a regional power will have the potential to affect the U.S. economy and our security in a variety of ways" and "two countries have a strong stake in peace and stability in East Asia and an interest in building a cooperative bilateral relationship."

6 Remarks by Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) Xu Caihou in a conference with then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (October 2009). Deputy Chief of the PLA General Staff Department Ma Xiaotian stated at the 11th round of the U.S.-China Defense Consultative Talks held in December 2010 that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, U.S. laws that impose restrictions on contacts between the military forces of the two countries, and the frequent military reconnaissance operations conducted by U.S. naval vessels and aircraft in coastal areas of China's exclusive economic zones constituted key obstacles to developing stable military-to-military ties.

7 In January 2011, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates paid his second visit to China since November 2007 and held a talk with Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie. They reached a consensus on full-fledged resumption of military exchanges between the United States and China, including reciprocal visits by high-level officials, which had been put on hold since January 2010. In May 2011, Chief of the General Staff Chen Bingde officially visited the United States. In July of the same year, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mullen visited China. He met with Chief of the General Staff Chen Bingde and they confirmed that they would promote pragmatic cooperation including a joint exercise off the coast of Somalia/Gulf of Aden. China accepted the visit by U.S. Vice President Biden and a U.S. aircraft carrier paid a port call to Hong Kong in August of the same year. When U.S. Department of Defense notified Congress of possible arms sales to Taiwan in September of the same year, China strongly criticized the stance of the United States and postponed the joint exercise off the coast of Somalia/Gulf of Aden and others. However, China has still made its efforts to stabilize the China-U.S. relationship. The Importance of the relationship between the two countries including their military exchanges has been confirmed on such occasions as Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping's visit to the U.S. and his meeting with President Obama in February 2012 and Chinese Defense Minster General Liang Guanglie's visit to the U.S and his meeting with Secretary of Defense Panetta in May of the same year.

8 The U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR; February 2010).
In addition, the Defense Strategic Guidance of January 2012 points out "the growth of China's military power must be accompanied by greater clarity of its strategic intentions in order to avoid causing friction in the region."

9 Regarding the military field, this treaty mentions military confidence building or strengthening of mutual troop reductions in border areas, military cooperation such as military technical cooperation, and holding discussions in the event that there is awareness of any threat to peace.

10 China and Russia conducted their first large-scale joint exercise in the Shandong Peninsula and other areas in China in August 2005. In August 2007, July 2009, September 2010, and June 2012, member states of the SCO conducted joint anti-terrorism exercises. In addition, Russia and China held "Naval Interaction 2012," a large-scale joint Navy exercise, in the Yellow Sea in April 2012. The SCO aims at cooperation in such areas where the member states share their interests as maintenance of peace and stability in the region, joint actions against terrorism, politics, trade, and economy. In addition to the anti-terrorism exercise "Peace Mission," the SCO is making efforts for stabilization of the Central Asia including Afghanistan through such decisions as approving Afghanistan to be a SCO observer country at the SCO summit meeting held in June 2012.

11 In addition to chairing the Six-Party Talks that have been held in Beijing since 2003, China agreed to U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718, which imposed sanctions on North Korea when North Korea announced the nuclear tests in 2006, UNSCR 1874, which settled additional measures against North Korea in response to the country's second nuclear test announcement in May 2009, and other resolutions. On the other hand, North Korea seems to emphasize negotiations with the United States over the nuclear issue, and it is believed that China, which is apprehensive that destabilization

of situations in its surrounding countries would lead to repercussions within China, hesitates to employ firm measures. Therefore, there is a view that China's influence on North Korea is limited.

[12] Some see that Myanmar is breaking dependence on China in its diplomacy.

[13] China held the ASEAN-China Summit for the first time in 1997.

[14] Recent military exchanges between China and Southeast Asian countries include the China-Singapore joint army counter-terrorism exercises in June 2009 and November 2010, the China–Thailand joint army counter-terrorism exercises in July 2007, September 2008, and October 2010, China–Vietnam naval joint patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin held every year since 2006, and "Blue Assault 2010", a joint exercise conducted by Chinese Marine Corps and Thai Navy's special forces from October to November of 2010. In 2007, China provided Cambodia with patrol ships and other equipment as an assistance package. It is also reported that China signed a purchase agreement with Timor-Leste in 2008 to sell two patrol ships. With regard to relations with Indonesia, Ma Xiaotian, Deputy Head of the PLA General Staff Department, visited the country in March 2011 in order to meet Defense Minister Purnomo and signed a memorandum of understanding on military technology cooperation including the joint production of Chinese anti-ship missiles. In June the same year, the two armies conducted their first joint counter-terrorism exercise "Sharp Knife 2011." In addition, Thai military delegation led by its Defense Minister visited China in April 2012 and agreed on joint development of a new multiple rocket system.

[15] "Yearbook 2011" of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) points out that Pakistan accounts for about 53% of the total Chinese export value of weapons from 2006 to 2010, becoming the largest importer of Chinese weapons.

[16] In December 2007, China and India conducted a joint anti-terrorism exercise "Hand-in-Hand 2007" for the first time since their border conflict in 1962. In September 2011, they held the first cabinet-level strategic dialogue. Meanwhile, in March 2011, the Air Forces of China and Pakistan conducted a joint exercise "Shaheen-1." In November of the same year, special operation forces of the two countries participated in "Friendship 2011," an anti-terrorism joint exercise. Furthermore, it was reported that Pakistan's Defense Minister Mukhtar asked China for construction of a naval base at the Gwardar port in Pakistan in May of the same year.

[17] For example, in November 2010 Chinese President Hu Jintao visited France, where China and France announced a joint statement including the support for lift of the arms embargoes against China. Several EU countries appear to be positive about it.

[18] For example, China conducted its first joint air drills with Turkey from September to October in 2010. As to its relationships with African countries, a hospital ship of Chinese Navy reportedly visited Djibouti, Seychelles and other places to provide medical services in 2010. Defense Minister Liang Guanglie visited Seychelles in 2011. It appears that they will cooperate in Seychelles' replenishment to Chinese naval vessels and its use of ports.

[19] For activities of the hospital ship of Chinese Navy, see footnotes 2-33 and 2-58. In addition, China conducted "Peace Angel 2010", the first joint medical rescue exercise with Peru in November 2010.

4. Military Capabilities of Taiwan

Taiwan, under the guidance of building the "hard rock" defense advocated by President Ma Jeou Ying, identifies prevention of war, homeland defense, response to contingencies, deterrence of conflict, and regional stability as the strategic objectives, and takes the military strategy of "resolute defense and credible deterrence."

Taiwan, for improved expertise of its military personnel and other purposes, aims to transform its armed forces currently consisting of drafted personnel and volunteers into all-volunteer forces, while reducing the total forces from 275,000 to 215,000 personnel by the end of 2014. At the same time, the Taiwanese armed forces attribute importance to introduction of advanced technologies and improvement of joint

operational capabilities. Additionally, in light of the serious damage that occurred from the typhoon in August 2009, the Taiwanese armed forces identified disaster prevention and relief as one of their major missions[1].

Taiwan sets out the policy that the defense budget will not go below 3% of its GDP in principle[2].

With regard to Taiwan's military power at present, ground forces include 41 Army brigades and three Navy Marine Corps brigades with a total of approximately 215,000 personnel. In addition, it is believed that the total of approximately 1.65 million reserve personnel of air, naval, and ground forces would be available in case of war. Regarding naval capabilities, in addition to Kidd-class destroyers which were imported from the United States, Taiwan possesses relatively modern frigates and other vessels. Regarding air capabilities, Taiwan possesses F-16 A/B fighters, Mirage 2000 fighters, Jing Guo fighters, etc.

In view of the fact that the PLA is enhancing its missile, naval, and air forces, the Taiwanese military believes it still needs to modernize its equipment. The U.S. Department of Defense has notified Congress of possible arms sales to Taiwan based on the Taiwan Relations Act[3], but Taiwan also wishes to purchase the F-16C/D fighter aircraft and other arms from the United States. The issue is to be observed.

Taiwan is also promoting the independent development of military equipment. The Tien Kung II surface-to-air missiles and Hsiung Feng II anti-ship missiles are deployed and it is believed that the Hsiung Feng IIE cruise missiles are being developed in order to acquire long-range attack capabilities, while the Tien Kung III surface-to-air missiles are being developed in order to ensure the capabilities to deal with ballistic missiles.

The military capabilities of China and Taiwan are generally characterized as follows:

1) Regarding ground forces, China possesses an overwhelming number of troops; however, their capability of landing on and invading the island of Taiwan is limited. Nevertheless, China is making efforts to improve its landing and invasion capabilities in recent years, such as building large landing ships.

2) Regarding naval and air forces, China, which overwhelms Taiwan in terms of quantity, has also been steadily modernizing its naval and air forces in recent years in terms of quality, where Taiwan had superiority over China.

3) Regarding missile attack capabilities, China possesses numerous short-range ballistic missiles with a range that covers Taiwan, and Taiwan seems to have few effective countermeasures.

In addition to sizes of forces and performance and quantity of military equipment, a comparison of military capabilities should take into account various factors such as objectives and characteristics of envisioned military operations, operational posture, proficiency in military personnel, and logistics. Nevertheless, as China is rapidly modernizing its military power, the overall military balance between China and Taiwan is shifting in favor of China[4]. Attention should be paid to the modernization of both the Chinese and Taiwanese military capabilities and U.S. weapon sales to Taiwan.

(See Figs. I-1-3-5, 6)

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1 Taiwanese National Defense Report 2011(July 2011).

2 According to Taiwanese National Defense Report 2008 (May 2008), the ratio of the defense budget to its GDP reached 3% in FY2008, but whether the ratio has remained since 2009 is not clear.

3 Recently, the Department of Defense notified Congress of the possible sales of Patriot PAC-3 surface-to-air missiles and AH-64D attack helicopters in October 2008, possible sales of PAC-3 missiles, UH-60 helicopters, Osprey-class mine hunters, and others in January 2010, and possible arms sales including equipment necessary to upgrade F-16A/B fighter aircraft in September 2011.

4 Taiwanese National Defense Report 2011, after recognizing that the possibility of military conflict between China and Taiwan has decreased after cross-strait relations relaxed, makes an assessment on cross-strait military situations in the following ways: "The PRC's objective to unify Taiwan has not changed. As the military strength of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait becomes even more imbalanced, we are bound face growingly severe military threats."

Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Chapter 1 National Defense Policies of Countries

Section 4 Russia

1. General Situation

Russia claims that it has restored the level of social and economic development that was lost in the 1990s, and asserts that it will continue to pursue its national interests as a state with global influence while aiming to further the multipolarization of the international community.

Recognizing that it must undertake a number of sweeping modernizations, including departing from its conventional resource-dependent economy, establishing a democratic political system and eradicating corruption[1], Russia has worked on these issues under then President Medvedev and then Prime Minister Putin.

In such situation, then Prime Minister Putin who had served as President for two terms—eight years from 2000 to 2008—again declared his candidacy for president in September 2011[2]. However, in the lower house election in December 2011 "United Russia" assembled the majority but lost many seats[3]. In addition, civil demonstrations were staged protesting against irregularities during the election and demanding the resignation of the prime minister. It is believed that the environment surrounding the new administration is not necessarily favorable[4].

Against this background, President Putin who won the presidential election in March 2012 and took office in May of the same year and former President Medvedev who was appointed as Prime Minister recognize the need of continued efforts to solve modernization issues[5]. How the new administration will solidify its support base in the country and what political methods they will use to handle these issues will be the focus of attention.

New President Putin delivering speech at his inauguration (Reuters)

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1 Annual State of the Nation Address by then President Medvedev (November 2009).

2 In the party convention of the ruling party "United Russia" in September 2011, then President Medvedev recommended then Prime Minister Putin for presidential candidate and Putin accepted the recommendation. In return, Putin declared that he would recommend Medvedev for Prime Minister after winning the presidential election, subject to the victory of "United Russia" in the lower house election. "United Russia" formally fielded then Prime Minister Putin as presidential candidate at its party convention in November of the same year.

3 "United Russia" won only 238 seats that is approximately 53% of the total seats of the Russian Lower House (450 seats), falling greatly from 315 seats won in the previous election (2007).

4 According to the Russia Public Opinion Research Center, the approval rating of presidential candidate Putin (then Prime Minister) was 52% as of February 3, 2012.

5 In his papers to serve as campaign platform published after January 2012, then Prime Minister Putin listed as his policy: expanding the participation in politics by the people; prevention of corruption; strengthening of domestic industries by departing from its resource-dependent economy to modernize its economy, and: that middle class should play a leading role in society. In the "United Russia" party

convention in November 2011, he said that he would pursue a foreign policy that claims national interests and raise the military strength to a new level. In his annual state-of-the-nation address, then President Medvedev listed as future tasks of his administration modernization of politics, prevention of corruption, drastic change in military forces and promotion of foreign policies based on the national security.

2. Security and Defense Policies

1. Basic Posture

Approved in May 2009, the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation through to 2020 sets out the objectives and strategic priorities, domestic and foreign, for national security and for solid national development.

The National Security Strategy views that Russia's influence has been strengthened by a policy of promoting the multipolarization of the world and using the potential of Russia. The unilateral approach to the use of force and confrontation of major countries in international relations are listed as having a negative impact on the interests of Russia, and Russia expresses vigilance over the United States' plan to deploy a missile defense system (MD) in Europe as well as the approach of NATO's military infrastructure to the Russian border. In order to ensure strategic stability, Russia claims it will, under the central role of the United Nations in the international security, enhance cooperation with members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and build an equal and full-fledged strategic partnership with the United States. Russia says it will use its political, legal, economic, military, and other instruments in order to uphold its national sovereignty and interests.

As for national defense, Russia views as a threat the series of policies of some developed nations that pursue superiority in the military field, particularly in the area of strategy by developing high-tech weapons, non-nuclear strategic weapons, and global missile defense systems. Russia exemplifies, as the challenges for strengthening its defense capabilities, a shift to a new military structure by increasing the number of permanent readiness units[1] and improving organizational and military alignment, while maintaining the capabilities of its strategic nuclear forces.

The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, formulated as a document substantiating the principles of the National Security Strategy in the military sphere, in February 2010, demonstrates the recognition that, while the probability of a large-scale war breaking out is on the decline, the military dangers facing Russia are increasing[2], which is demonstrated by the approach of NATO's military infrastructure to the Russian border, including the expansion of NATO, as well as the construction and deployment of the strategic MD system. Furthermore, it also states that Russia will maintain permanent combat-readiness to deter and prevent conflict.

The doctrine regards nuclear weapons as an essential component for preventing the outbreak of nuclear wars and wars that use conventional weapons and claims that Russia maintains a sufficient level of nuclear deterrent capacity and reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to an event where nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction are to be used against it or its allies or under circumstances wherein conventional weapons have been used against it and where the survival of the country itself is imperiled.

2. Military Reform

Having gone through the chaos after the collapse of the Soviet Union and faced with the difficulty in maintaining its military posture of the same level as during the Cold War era because of the severe economic situation and the decline in population in the 1990s, Russia began a full-scale process for military reform in 1997 by heeding the three pillars of reform: downsizing, modernization, and professionalization.

Moreover, against the backdrop of the changes to the army's operating environment and the decline in its combat capabilities due to a shortage of personnel[3], based on the policy statement "Future Outlook of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation" that was approved by President in September 2008, Russia is currently advancing measures to modernize its army, including troop reductions, structural reforms (from the command structure based on divisions to that based on brigades[4]), combat-readiness reviews (reform of all combat forces into permanent readiness units), and the development and introduction of new equipment.

The country's goal in troop reduction, set in order to maintain an adequate troop level of one million personnel, is scheduled to be achieved by 2016[5]. Since December 2010, Russia reorganized its six military districts into four military districts, established joint strategic commands (OSK) corresponding to each of these new military districts, and controls all of its services—Ground, Navy, and Air forces—in an integrated manner under the supervision of a Military District Commander[6].

Regarding the modernization of the military forces, based on the state policy on military equipment for the period of 2011 to 2020 that appeared to have been approved by President by the end of 2010, Russia intends by 2020 to further modernize its equipment and invest approximately 20 trillion rubles (about 55 trillion yen) to increase its percentage of new equipment up to 70%[7].

Furthermore, in order to make the combat readiness of permanent readiness units effective, Russia is promoting the introduction of a contract service system which secures personnel with high combat readiness capabilities by selecting them through contract from among the conscripted military personnel. However, further review has been under way to address difficulties in securing personnel due to such problems as high turnover rate and financial restraints[8].

It is thought that Russia will continue these measures to improve conventional armed forces along with its efforts to maintain its strategic nuclear deterrent capability against the backdrop of the national defense budget that has been increasing in recent years.

(See Fig. I-1-4-1)

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1 The permanent readiness units have been created by reorganizing troops in the midst of a military forces reduction after the launch of the Russian Federation's armed forces, to strengthen combat

readiness through concentrating personnel. The units are expected to promptly respond during the first phase of a large-scale war or in the event of a minor conflict. Russia also attaches importance to the deployment of troops across multiple theaters of operation in order to defend its vast land with compact military forces. During the Georgia conflict in August 2008, Russia deployed not only troops of North Caucasian region but also troops of other regions. This is believed to be a training of handling a conflict by mobilizing permanent readiness units across theaters of operation.

[2] In the Doctrine, the general notion pertaining to threats is split into two categories: military dangers (a state of interstate or intrastate relations that may, in certain conditions, cause the emergence of a military threat) and military threats (a state of interstate or intrastate relations where there is the real possibility of the outbreak of a military conflict). It lists for the former's example the approach of NATO's military infrastructure to the Russian border, including the expansion of NATO, the construction and deployment of a strategic missile defense system, as well as the territorial claims and the intervention against Russia and its allies. For the latter it lists the radicalization of military and political situations, and ostentatious displays of military strength designed to provoke through exercises in its adjacent territories.

[3] The changes to the army's operating environment indicates that large-scale military strength is no longer required; cooperative operation has become necessary between each service of the military under a unified command structure; the ability to carry out a wide range of tasks has also become necessary including non-combat duties; and threats Russia faces have changed.

[4] The command structure is reorganized from the four-tiered structure of military district–army–division–regiment, to a three-tiered structure of military district–operational command–brigade. It claimed to have been completed in December 2009, but there remains the challenge of setting in place a system to operate the structure hereafter.

[5] It was decided that the total military force would be limited to 1 million people as of 2016 by a presidential order in December 2008 (approximately 1.13 million people as of 2008).

[6] By the September 2010 presidential order, four military districts were newly established by December of the same year; the Western, the Southern, the Central and the Eastern military districts. Prior to this, in July 2010 the President signed another presidential order for the establishment of the four military districts and the four joint strategic commands (OSK) corresponding to these four districts. It is assumed that units that belong to other ministries and government bodies, such as the Border Troops of the Border Service of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) and the Interior Troops of the Ministry of the Interior of the Russian Federation come under the control of the Military District Commander. However, it is thought that the strategic rocket units are not under the direction of the Military District Commander. It also seems that the military districts are positioned as military districts from the perspective of administrative management, and as joint strategic commands (OSK) from the perspective of operation of units.

[7] Russia intends to increase the percentage of new equipment to 70% by 2020 by updating it by an average of 9 to 11% per year. About 19 trillion rubles (about 52 trillion yen) of the 20 trillion rubles (about 55 trillion yen) will be allocated to the Ministry of Defense. Furthermore, of the 19 trillion rubles, about 80% will be allocated to the procurement of new equipment, approximately 10% to R&D, while modernizing its nuclear triad would be made a priority. In his paper on national defense policy published in February 2012 to serve as campaign platform, then Prime Minister Putin indicated to strengthen military power including nuclear force, aerospace defense and naval power by spending approximately 23 trillion rubles (about 63 trillion yen) in 10 years. In addition, it has been pointed out from some part of Russian government that the defense industry needed to make efforts to improve the quality of equipment, set fair price and meet deadlines to ensure equipment procurement according to plan. In his paper on defense policy, then Prime Minister Putin also stated that the defense industry is slow in modernization and that it is necessary to regain leading position in technology through promotion of competition, public-private cooperation and other efforts.

[8] By the end of 2007, Russia had made steady progress toward establishing a completely professional army, such as allotting contract NCOs to permanent readiness units. But Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Makarov intended to reduce the number of contract NCOs for reasons such as unpopularity of military service and financial burden. In February 2012, however, then Prime Minister Putin announced the policy to increase contract NCOs to 700,000 by 2017; attention should be paid to future development. Behind the promotion of contract service system, there may be decrease of the

population suitable for military service and the shortening of the conscription period (From January 2008, the conscription period has been shortened to 12 months).

3. Military Posture

Russia's military strength is derived not only from the Russian Federation Armed Forces, but also from forces such as the Border Troops of the Border Service of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) and the Interior Troops of the Ministry of the Interior of the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation Armed Forces has three services (forces) and three independent corps (units): ground force, naval force, air force and strategic-rocket unit, aerospace defense unit[1], and airborne unit.
(See Fig. I-1-4-2)

1. Nuclear Forces

The Russian military emphasizes its nuclear forces to secure a global position in the trend toward forming a multipolar world, to strike a balance with the nuclear forces of the United States as well as to supplement its inferiority in conventional forces. It is thus believed that Russia is working to maintain a state of immediate readiness for its nuclear force unit.
Russia is gradually reducing the number of its strategic nuclear missiles due to issues such as aging. However, it still possesses intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and long range bombers (Tu-95MS Bears and Tu-160 Blackjacks) following the United States in scale.
Russia is obligated to reduce strategic nuclear arms pursuant to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty concluded with the United States[2]. However, Russia is working to accelerate the development and introduction of new weapons following the policy to prioritize the modernization of nuclear forces based on its state policy on military equipment.
Russia started the deployment of Topol-M ICBM (SS-27) units in 2005 and the deployment of the RS-24, which is considered as a multi-warhead version of the Topol-M, in March 2011[3].
In April 2007, Russia launched a Borey-class ballistic missile submarine nuclear- powered (SSBN). As Russia completed a flight test for the new-type SLBM Bulava in December 2011, it is believed that the deployment of the submarine that mounts SLBM Bulava on it will be decided within 2012[4].
As for non-strategic nuclear forces, Russia had scrapped ground-launched short- and intermediate-range missiles with a range of between 500 and 5,500 km by 1991 in accordance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with the United States, and had removed tactical nuclear weapons from naval vessels and stored them in onshore missile silos in the following year. Russia, however, still possesses a broad array of nuclear forces.

2. Conventional Forces and Other Issues

Russia recognizes the need to outfit its conventional forces with new equipment, and it is assumed that Russia is implementing the development and procurement of such equipment based on its state policy on military equipment[5]. There is a need to pay close attention to the direction Russia will take in its development, procurement, and deployment of new equipment, which includes the so-called fifth generation fighter[6] and the Mistral-class amphibious assault ship[7].

Furthermore, the Russian armed forces have been carrying out a range of exercises[8] using its conventional forces in Europe and Asia. In addition, Russia is intensifying its military activities, including joint naval exercises for its vessels on voyages of long duration and its continuous participation in the counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia/Gulf of Aden since 2008.

However, it faces issues such as difficulties in securing personnel and lax military discipline due to the decrease in the youth population as well as poor living conditions for military personnel. There is a need to keep a close watch on how these factors will affect Russia's ability to manage its military forces.

As for the future Russian armed forces, since there are opaque elements which may be influenced by Russia's future economic and social development, it is necessary to continue to observe their future trends.

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1 Aerospace defense unit was established in December 2011 based on the existing space unit and the units assigned under the air force as one corps with missions including outerspace surveillance, missile attack alarm, defense against ballistic missile and aerospace attacks and satellite launches.

2 In April 2010 Russia and the United States signed the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) and the treaty came into force in February 2011. Each side is obligated to reduce deployed strategic warheads to 1,550 and their deployed delivery platforms to 700 within seven years after the entry into force of the treaty.
In April 2012, the United States announced that as of March 1, 2012, the number of Russia's deployed strategic warheads was 1,492 and that of its deployed delivery platforms was 494.

3 In March 2011, the first regiment of RS-24 missiles was operationally deployed in the division in Teykovo, in the Ivanovo Oblast northeast of Moscow. In addition, it is believed that Russia is promoting the development of new heavy ICBM which enables highly flexible operations with its heavy launch weight which allows it to smash robust ICBM launch sites and mount a large number of warheads with less yield, as well as new warheads of enhanced capability to penetrate missile defense.

4 Russia plans to build eight Borey-class SSBNs by 2020. In February 2012, it was reported that Minister of Defense Serdyukov revealed a plan to field the first SSBN "Yuri Dolgoruky" in June 2012 and the second SSBM "Alexander Nevsky" in August 2012. There is another report that a prospect to deploy Bulava in October 2012 was presented at an extended meeting of Defense Ministry staff conference in March 2012. Out of the 18 flight tests of Bulava that had started in September 2005, 11 tests succeeded. In addition, Russia is developing improved version of SLBM to be mounted on Delta-IV class SSBNs (the first one was commissioned in 1984) that are believed to play a central role in marine nuclear force before the commission of Borey-class SSBNs.

5 The need for new equipment was touched on in the annual state of the nation address by President in November 2009, and in the military doctrine.

6 While there are no clear standards for demarcating fighter generations, it is pointed out that a fifth generation fighter has more advanced capabilities than those of previous generations by combining the latest technologies, such as various types of electronic equipment and stealth. According to various news reports, Russia aims to mass-produce and equip its fifth generation fighter PAK FA (Future Frontline Aircraft System) by 2015.
In July 2010, then Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Air force Zeline stated that the initial batch of

mass produced fifth generation fighters would be installed with the engines not for the fifth generation fighters, which indicates a possibility that the development of the engine has been delayed. Also, according to Sukhoi, 100 test flights have been completed as of November 2011.

[7] From the lessons learned during the conflict with Georgia in which Russia took a long time to transport military forces by naval vessels, it was pointed out that Russia needed to strengthen its amphibious capabilities. In December 2010 Russia decided to purchase two ships from a consortium with France and in January 2011 an agreement was reached that the two would be constructed in France and a further two would be constructed in Russia. Reports have suggested that the ships will be deployed to the Northern Fleet and the Pacific Fleet, but in June 2010 Chief of the General Staff Makarov stated that the ships were particularly needed in the Far East region and that for the defense of the Kuril Islands Russia needed a means of maneuver to deploy units swiftly when necessary. Russia calls the four islands of the Northern Territories and the Kuril Islands "Kuril" Islands.

[8] Advancing its military reform, Russia has been conducting large-scale exercises for its verification and other purposes. "Caucasus-2009", "Ladoga-2009" and "Zapad-2009" were carried out mainly in the western part of Russia from June to September 2009; "Vostok-2010" was conducted in the former Far Eastern Military District and the former Siberian Military District between June and July 2010, and; "Center 2011" in the Central Military District, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz and Tajikistan in September 2011.

4. Russian Forces in the Vicinity of Japan

1. General Situation

Russia newly established the Eastern Military District and the Eastern Joint Strategic Command in 2010[1]. In addition to ground forces, the Pacific Fleet, air force, and air defense units have also been placed under the control of the Military District Commander, who has unified control over each of these services.

The current presence of the Russian military forces in the Far East region is comparatively much smaller than it was at its peak. However, a considerable scale of military forces, including nuclear forces, still remains in the region. Russian military operations in the vicinity of Japan appear to be increasingly active.

Given that the overall Russian armed forces set their basis of operation on maintaining the combat readiness of their strategic nuclear unit as well as dealing with conflicts with the inter-theater mobility of its permanent readiness units, it is necessary to continue paying attention to the positioning and trends of the Russian armed forces in the Far East region with the movement of units in other regions also in mind. (See Fig. I-1-4-3)

(1) Nuclear Forces

As for strategic nuclear forces in the Far East region, ICBMs, such as SS-25s, and approximately 30 Tu-95MS Bear long-range bombers are mainly deployed along the Trans-Siberian Railway. In addition, SSBNs, such as the Delta III-class nuclear submarine carrying SLBMs, and others are deployed in and around the Sea of Okhotsk. The readiness of these strategic nuclear forces appears to have been generally maintained.

As for non-strategic nuclear capabilities, a variety of weapons are deployed in the Far East region, including Tu-22M Backfire medium-range bombers and (under)sea- and air-launched cruise missiles. A total of approximately 20 Tu-22Ms are deployed in the area across from Sakhalin in the Eastern Military District.

(2) Ground Forces

Ground forces in the Far East region have continued to shrink. As part of its military reforms, it is believed that Russia is promoting a reorganization from a division-based command structure to a brigade-based one, while also reorganizing all of its combat forces to permanent readiness units. The Eastern Military District now consists of twelve divisions and brigades with about 80,000 personnel in total and has a naval infantry brigade with an amphibious capability.

(3) Naval Forces

The Pacific Fleet is stationed and deployed from its main bases in Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk. The fleet comprises approximately 240 ships with a total displacement in the region of about 550,000 tons, including about 20 major surface ships and about 20 submarines (about 15 of which are nuclear powered submarines) with a total displacement of approximately 280,000 tons. The forces have been scaled down.

(4) Air Forces

In terms of air forces in the Far East region, in the Eastern Military District Russia deploys approximately 390 combat aircraft from its Air Force and Navy combined. This number continues to shrink, but existing models are being modified and new models are being introduced to improve their capabilities.

2. Russian Forces in Japan's Northern Territories

Since 1978 under the regime of the former Soviet Union, Russia has been redeploying ground troops on Kunashiri, Etorofu, and Shikotan Islands of Japan's Northern Territories, which are inherent territories of Japan. The numbers of military personnel are considered to be far less than at past peak times, however, one division with mainly defensive duties is stationed in this region and there are deployed tanks, armored vehicles, various types of artillery, and anti-air missiles[2].

After then President Medvedev visited Kunashiri Island[3] for the first time as head of the state in November 2010, Russia started modernization of equipments stating that this is necessary to ensure the security of the "Kuril" Islands. In February 2011, the Minister of Defense Serdyukov indicated his intention to keep the division stationed on Kunashiri Island and Etorofu Island and stated that Russia would strengthen the units there through supplying them with the latest communication systems, electronic warfare systems, and radar, while suggesting a possible reduction in the units[4].

The number of Russian military personnel stationed in this region in 1991 was approximately 9,500, and at the Japan-Russia Defense Ministerial Meeting held in 1997, then Russian Defense Minister Rodionov made it clear that the troops stationed in the Northern Territories had been reduced to 3,500 soldiers by 1995. In July 2005, however, when then Russian Defense Minister Ivanov visited the Northern Territories, he declared that Russia would neither increase nor decrease the troops stationed on the four islands, clearly showing the intention to maintain the status quo[5].

As mentioned above, Russian troops continue to be stationed in the Northern Territories, which are inherent territories of Japan, and it is hoped that the issue will be resolved at an early date.

3. Operations in the Vicinity of Japan

Intensified activities by Russian forces in the vicinity of Japan including exercises and drills are believed to have objectives such as verification of the results of military reform through exercise, etc. against the background of the economic recovery at home.

In the large-scale military exercise "Vostok-2010" that was conducted from June to July 2010, it is thought that Russia could verify its ability to respond to conflicts under its new command structure and also its ability to manage units from different services in an integrated manner. In addition, by deploying troops that are not stationed in this region to the Far East exercises, it is considered that it verified its ability to deploy forces in regions far from where they are stationed[6].

In September 2011, a large-scale military exercise was conducted in the eastern part of the Kamchatka Peninsula, including anti-aircraft and anti-ship firing drills and landing drills with participation of over 10,000 personnel, more than 50 naval vessels and 50 aircraft. It is believed that abilities to deal with various situations were trained through the exercise.

The number of exercises carried out by Russian ground forces in areas adjacent to Japan decreased sharply from the peak; however, some activities seem to be on the rise again[7].

With regard to naval vessels, their activities seem to be on the rise in recent years. For example, joint exercises and counter-piracy operations have been carried out, in extended voyages by vessels deployed in the Pacific Fleet, and nuclear submarines carry out patrols[8]. In September 2011, 24 naval vessels including Slava-class guided missile cruiser passed through the Soya Strait one after the other. This was the first time ever identified after the end of the cold war that Russian naval vessels on this scale passed through the strait[9].

Regarding aircraft, since the resumption of patrol activities by its strategic aviation units in 2007, Russia has been increasing flights by long-range bombers and carrying out flights of Tu-95MS long-range bombers and Tu-160 long-range bombers which are refueled in mid-flight. Moreover, due to an upturn in its fuel situation, etc., pilot training time is on an upward trend, and there also seems to be an increase in activities such as flights approaching Japan and exercises and training[10], as exemplified by the flight of Tu-95MS long-range bomber that took the route that circled the area encompassing Japan in September 2011.

(See Fig. I-1-4-4)

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1 Eastern Military District's headquarters are in Khabarovsk.

2 The 18th Machine Gun and Artillery Division which comprises two regiments is stationed on Etorofu Island and Kunashiri Island. It is a defensive division whose purpose is the defense of landing and Russia's only machine gun and artillery division, following the military's progress in reforming divisions into brigades.

3 After then President Medvedev became the first head of the state to visit Kunashiri Island in November 2010, Kunashiri Island and Etorofu Island were visited by First Deputy Prime Minister

Shuvalov in December 2010, by then Regional Development Minister Basargin in January to February 2011, and by then Deputy Prime Minister Ivanov in May 2011. Furthermore, Security Council Secretary Patrushev visited Kunashiri Island and Suisho Island of the Habomai Islands in September 2011. In addition, in January 2011 Deputy Defense Minister Bulgakov and in February 2011 Minister of Defense Serdyukov visited Kunashiri Island and Etorofu Island and inspected the units stationed there.

4 Then President Medvedev stated that "the additional equipment to be deployed there (on Kunashiri Island and Etorofu Island) must be necessary and sufficient and modern enough to ensure the safety of these islands ("Kuril Islands"), which are integral parts of Russia's federal territories." In addition, the maintenance of infrastructure, such as the airports and the ports, are being carried out in accordance with the "Kuril" Islands Social and Economic Development Plan. Moreover, there are reports on plans for updating equipment, including the deployment of the Bastion coast defense missile system and the Tor M2 ground-to-air missile system and updating to T-80 tanks. In addition, it was reported in February 2012 that the development of two garrisons in Kunashiri Island and Etorofu Island would be completed within 2013. Furthermore, there is another report that the Mistral-class amphibious assault ships will be deployed to the Pacific Fleet for the defense of "Kuril" Islands.

5 During the 1998 visit to Russia by our Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense, then Russian Minister of Defense Sergeev commented that the number of Russian troops stationed in the northern territories was steadily decreased. Also, a senior official of the General Staff stated that troops on the "Kuril" Islands would be maintained at around 3,500, within the process of reorganizing the division into a brigade.

6 "Vostok-2010" was carried out in June and July 2010 in the Far Eastern Military District and the Siberian Military District. In addition to the units from these military districts, permanent readiness units from the Volga-Urals Military District (at that time), Northern Fleet and Black Sea Fleet naval vessels and air force fighters stationed in Eurasia deployed within the (former) Far Eastern Military District. Also, units from the Ministry of the Interior, Federal Security Service, and Ministry of Emergency Situations also participated. Moreover, as part of "Vostok-2010", related exercises were conducted on Etorofu Island.

7 Ground force of the Eastern Military District conducted an anti-terrorism exercise "Selenga 2011" jointly with Mongol in September 2011. It is reported that the ground force also participated in a navy exercise enacted in the eastern part of the Kamchatka Peninsula in the same month. In addition, Russia is reported to have conducted a command and staff section exercise to verify its new organization.

8 The number of cases of the Russian fleet passing through the three international straits (Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima) of Japan that have been identified and disclosed in FY2011 is as follows: eleven cases in the Soya Strait (three in 2009, seven in 2010), one case in the Tsugaru Strait (none in 2009, two in 2010), and seven cases in the Tsushima Strait (ten in 2009, seven in 2010), showing an increase in the last few years.

9 A part of 24 naval vessels participated in the exercise conducted in the eastern part of the Kamchatka Peninsula and other places.

10 Long-range flights in the vicinity around Japan were carried out in areas surrounding Japan by Tu-95 long-range bombers in July, September and November 2011, and February and April 2012; and by Tu-22 middle-range bombers four times in August 2011. When Tu-95 long-range bombers took the route that circled the area encompassing Japan in September 2011, they are refueled in mid-flight by a IL-78 air tanker in the temporary danger zone set by Russia. In addition, when Tu-95 long-range bombers flew in the vicinity of Japan in February 2012, other aircraft such as A-50 early warning aircraft flew with them.

5. External Relations

(1) General Situation

Recognizing that, amid the trend toward multi-polarity, Russia's international position as one of the poles of influence is being strengthened, Russia sets out its basic foreign policy to achieve its national interest[1]. Moreover, stating that its diplomacy is to be conducted based on the national security that serves the interest of its people, Russia aims at a practical diplomacy conductive to solving issues toward modernizing the country's economy[2].

Toward this goal, while strengthening the economic cooperation with Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, Russia is tackling strengthening of its ties with the United States and European countries to achieve modernization, launching to build a partnership with the European Union (EU)[3]. Also from the perspective of its own modernization, Russia considers that it needs to strengthen its relationships with countries in the Asia-Pacific region[4]. Close attention should be paid to how Russia, with its diplomatic stance focused on the benefits of achieving its own modernization, will develop its relations with other countries in the future, including in the area of security.

2. Relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States

Russia has positioned the development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the CIS as the highest priority of its diplomatic policy. It maintains relationships with the CIS states including multinational frameworks such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)[5]. There is also a move to pursue strengthening of economic ties within the CIS region, as exemplified by the announcement of the "Eurasia Union" concept[6].

Russia has been making efforts to maintain its military influence[7] among the CIS member states, stating that its vital interests are concentrated in the territories of the CIS[8]; Russia has dispatched its troops to be stationed in Ukraine, Moldova (Transdniester), Armenia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyz and Georgia, which left the CIS in August 2009 (South Ossetia, Abkhazia)[9].

With increasing activities by Islamic armed insurgents in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Russia has been pursuing military cooperation centered on counterterrorism measures in the region, and organized a Collective Rapid Deployment Force in May 2001 within the framework of the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Furthermore, in June 2009, a permanent Joint Rapid Reaction Force was established to strengthen the functions of the CIS Collective Rapid Deployment Force[10].

In addition, out of concern that the worsening security in Afghanistan could lead to the destabilization of Central Asia, Russia and Central Asian countries are supporting Afghanistan while considering measures to strengthen the security of borders with Afghanistan[11].

3. Relations with the United States

The U.S.-Russia relationship, which had been stalled due to the Russo-Georgian War and the deployment plan by the United States of the MD system to the Eastern Europe, turned toward improvement under the Obama administration inaugurated in January 2009.

Russia strongly opposed to the deployment plan of the MD system in Europe by the United States, stating that it would have a negative impact on Russia's nuclear deterrent capabilities. But in September 2009, the United States announced that it was reviewing the proposed deployment of the MD system in Europe[12], which was cautiously welcomed by Russia.

Meanwhile, Russia's understanding is that the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) effective from February 2011 would be invalidated if the United States developed, both quantitatively and qualitatively, its MD capabilities and threatened Russia's potential strategic nuclear strength[13]. Russia also intimates that it would withdraw from the new START in response to the United States' recent advancement of its MD plan[14] in Europe[15].

4. Relations with Europe and NATO

While the relationship between Russia and NATO temporarily deteriorated due to factors such as the Russo-Georgia War, through the framework of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), Russia now participates to a certain extent in NATO decision making and acts as an equal partner in areas of mutual interest.

At the NRC summit held in Lisbon in November 2010, Russia and NATO stated that the both sides would work toward building a true and modernized strategic partnership. They are now searching for possibilities of dialogue and cooperation in the fields such as missile defense (MD), Afghanistan[16], cooperation to fight terrorism, and anti-piracy measures. With regards to MD cooperation, there has been no progress in the cooperation of NATO and Russia[17]. For example, the talks at the meeting of NRC defense ministers held in June 2011 highlighted the difference in position between NATO advocating MD cooperation in which only information and data would be exchanged under the two independent systems of NATO and Russia, and the position of Russia aiming at the "sector MD" in which both sides operate integrally by setting zones for each country's responsibility under a unified MD system of NATO and Russia.

Meanwhile, there remains the unsolved problem between Russia and NATO about the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement[18].

5. Relations with Asian Countries

Russia recognizes that the significance of the Asia-Pacific region is increasing within its multi-pronged foreign policy, and the region is also important from the viewpoint of economic development in Siberia and the Far East, anti-terrorist measures, and security[19]. It is currently implementing a pipeline project to transport Siberian oil to the Far East and developing resources in Sakhalin. In order to develop these underground resources and revitalize its regional economy and social infrastructure, which moreover will help to modernize its economy, Russia attaches great importance to enhancing its economic relations with Asia-Pacific countries, including Japan and China[20].

For this reason, Russia has been prioritizing relations with countries in the Asia-Pacific region in its foreign policy and has joined various regional frameworks[21].

In respect to the relationship with North Korea, there is a move toward strengthening the relationship. For example, in August 2011 then President Medvedev met then Chairman of the National Defense Commission Kim Jong Il who visited Russia for the first time in nine years, and it was reported that later they agreed in implementing a joint exercise for search and rescue[22]. On the other hand, Russia clarified its stance on North Korea's missile launch that was claimed to be a satellite by stating that it is regrettable and incompatible with the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874.

6. Exportation of Arms

Russia seems to actively promote the export of arms not only to maintain the infrastructure of its military industry and to make economic profit, but also to help promote better foreign policy. The country's export value has been increasing in recent years[23]. In January 2007, the Russian government granted the exclusive right to export arms to the Rosoboron Export State Corporation as part of its on-going efforts to improve its export system. In addition, Russia regards its military industry as an integral part of the nation's military organization and is committed to improving and further developing the military industry by such measures as promoting the integration of aircraft companies such as Sukhoi, MiG, and Tupolev.

Russia has exported its jet fighters and warships to countries including India, ASEAN member countries, China, Algeria, and Venezuela[24]. In addition, Russia signed agreements with North Korea and Iran on military technology cooperation in 2001.

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1 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (released in July 2008).

2 According to the speech by then President Medvedev at the Meeting with Russian Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives to International Organizations (July 2010) and the annual state of the nation address (November 2009, November 2010 and December 2011). In his paper on foreign policy published in February 2012 to serve as campaign platform, then Prime Minister Putin showed his stance to ensure Russia's security and interests while developing mutually-beneficial cooperative relationship with other countries.

3 Russia and European Union (EU) released a Joint Statement on the Partnership for Modernization, launching a partnership for modernization including increasing investment. Moreover, at the U.S.-Russia summit in June 2010, both countries determined to cooperate on innovations and other

fields.

[4] According to the speech by then President Medvedev at the Meeting with Russian Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives to International Organizations (July 2010) and the annual state of the nation address (November 2010).

[5] For SCO, see footnotes 3-10 of Section 3.

[6] In Izvestia on October 4, 2011, then Prime Minister Putin advocated the foundation of ”Eurasia Union” to strengthen economic partnership in the region built on the customs union and the unified economic block. In addition, eight CIS countries (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Moldova and Armenia) signed the CIS Free Trade Zone Agreement in the same month.

[7] After the conflict with Russia in August 2008, Georgia withdrew from the CIS in August 2009, but Russia unilaterally recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgian territory and continues to have troops stationed in the regions.

[8] While some CIS countries continue to prioritize their relations with Russia, such as Belarus and Kazakhstan, others are attempting to maintain a distance from Russia. Each member state of GUAM, a regional structure formed by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova (the acronym "GUAM" is composed of the initial letters of the member states) has been taking mostly pro-Western policies to reduce their security and economic dependence on Russia.

[9] After the conflict with Georgia in August 2008, then President Medvedev indicated that Russia recognized as one of its five principles of diplomacy the area of privileged interests for Russia.

[10] Learning from the fact that CSTO could not sufficiently respond to the request by Kyrgyz for peace keeping at the time of ethnic conflict in the southern part of Kyrgyz in June 2010, CSTO has been discussing improvement in efficiency of its crisis response system. The CSTO summit meeting in December 2011 warned against foreign forces’ stationing in a member state by requiring the consent of all member states when any of member state builds a base of a third country.

[11] Influx of narcotics and activities of Islamic extremists from Afghanistan are recognized to be threats for the Central Asia region. For this reason there are moves to strengthen the security of the border with Afghanistan; SCO is offering support to Afghanistan; CSTO discussed closer cooperation for Afghanistan border security, and; Russia and Tajikistan signed a border security cooperation agreement (September 2011). There is also a concern that the security situation in the Central Asia could be worsened by the withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from Afghanistan scheduled toward the end of 2014.

[12] See Section 1-2 for the U.S. MD deployment plan in Europe

[13] Statement by the Russian Federation concerning missile defense (April 8, 2010)

[14] See footnote 4 of Section 1-2

[15] Russia has demanded a legal guarantee that the MD plan of the United States is not targeted at Russia, and claimed that the United States does not consider Russia’s concern. Russia warns against the United States by issuing a Presidential statement in November 2011, mentioning countermeasures such as fielding of early-warning radars and the possibility of its withdrawal from the new START.

[16] NRC summit in 2010 decided to further facilitate railway transit of non-lethal items of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) through Russian territory in support of Afghanistan.

[17] In the field of Theater Missile Defense aimed at protection of deployed troops from the threat of short- and intermediate-range missiles with a range of up to 3,000 km (the object of protection has been extended to the people and entire territories of NATO members in Europe at the Lisbon conference in 2010) NATO and Russia launched joint researches on interoperability under the framework of NRC in 2003; four joint command post exercises were conducted from 2004 to 2008. The cooperative relationship was discontinued as a result of the Georgian Conflict in August 2008 but the parties agreed to resume the cooperation at the NRC summit in 2010. At the summit the parties also agreed to advance comprehensive joint analysis concerning the future framework of missile defense cooperation. Russia claims that its participation in cooperation with NATO on missile defense needs to be on a completely equal footing. Russia also claims that it will face the following alternatives in the next 10 years: either an agreement is reached on missile defense and a complete mechanism of cooperation is created, or failing to do so, a new stage of arms race will start.

[18] At the 1999 Istanbul summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), an agreement was reached; on changing the troop ceilings set formerly by blocks to those set by country

and territory and; on complying with the current CFE Treaty until the adapted CFE Treaty came into effect. Dissatisfied with NATO members having refused to ratify the adopted CFE Treaty due to Russian forces not withdrawing from Georgia and Moldova, although Russia rarified it, in December 2007, Russia suspended the implementation of the CFE Treaty and halted inspections based on this treaty. At the time of writing, only four countries ratified the adapted CFE Treaty—Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine—and it has yet to come into effect. Besides this, Russia has proposed dissolving the existing security framework that has NATO at its center and creating a new European security treaty that would provide new fundamental principles for security in Europe and the Atlantic region.

[19] The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (released in July 2008). In his paper on foreign policy to serve as campaign platform published in February 2012, then Prime Minister Putin expressed his recognition that the importance of the whole Asia-Pacific region was rising.

[20] To strengthen the Russian economy, Russia considers utilizing the potential of the Asia-Pacific region an important issue (according to the speech by then President Medvedev at the Meeting with Russian Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives to International Organizations (July 2010)). In the presidential order concerning foreign policy issued in May 2012, President Putin holds up his policy to participate in the integration process of the Asia-Pacific region in order to accelerate socioeconomic development in East Siberia and Far East regions, and stated that Russia will work to develop relationships with Japan, South Korea and other countries as well as China, India and Vietnam.

[21] Russia has participated in regional frameworks, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the East Asia Summit (EAS since 2011.) At Russia’s proposal, the 2012 APEC Summit is scheduled to be held in Vladivostok.

[22] In addition, the Eastern Military District Commander visited North Korea in August 2011 and had a talk with Chief of General Staff of the North's Korean People's Army.

[23] According to the website of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the value of Russia’s arms exports in 2011 was approximately 7.87 billion dollars, making it the world's second largest exporter after the United States (about 9.98 billion dollars).

[24] Russia concluded sales contract with Indonesia for the Su-27 and Su-30 fighters in 2003 and 2007, and with Malaysia and Vietnam for the Su-30 fighter in 2003, and has delivered the fighters to these countries. There are also reports of a sales contract with Vietnam in 2009 for the Su-30 fighter and a Kilo-class submarine. In March 2010, Russia agreed to deliver an aircraft carrier to India by the end of 2012, and concluded a sales contract for the MiG-29K fighter. In April 2012, an Akula-class nuclear submarine Nerpa was leased to India based on a lease contract that had been concluded with India. Moreover, in 2006 Russia concluded sales contracts with Algeria and Venezuela for arms, including the Su-30 fighter, and has delivered some of these arms. Russia’s exports to China have included the Su-27 and Su-30 fighters, Sovremenny-class destroyers, and Kilo-class submarines. However, against the backdrop of the advancement of indigenous weapon production in China, some point out that the value of its exports to China has been declining.

Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Chapter 1 National Defense Policies of Countries

Section 5 Southeast Asia

1. General Situation

Southeast Asia holds key positions for traffic linking the Pacific and Indian Oceans, such as the Straits of Malacca, the South China Sea, and is an important region for Japan. The countries in this region are making efforts to achieve political stability and steady economic growth, and lately have realized overall economic development to varying degrees. Such economic development has deepened the relationships of interdependence within and outside the region. However, this region still has destabilizing factors, including the territorial dispute over the Spratly Islands, ethnic minority issues, separatist and independence movements, and Islamic extremist groups. Moreover, there are incidents such as piracy by which the safe passage of ships is obstructed[1]. In order to cope with these problems, the countries in the region are working to build sufficient military forces not only for traditional national defense but also to address new security issues such as anti-terrorism and piracy. In recent years, against the backdrop of economic development, they have been modernizing their military forces, particularly their navy and air forces.

In this region, the United States is developing relationships of confidence with Southeast Asian countries and working to strengthen their readiness through numerous joint military exercises such as the multinational military exercise Cobra Gold and Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT)[2] and the provision of military technology and military assistance.

(See Fig. I-1-5-1)

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1 According to a report by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), although the number of incidents of piracy in Southeast Asia had been declining every year, from 70 cases in 2007, 54 cases in 2008, and 46 cases in 2009, it increased to 70 cases in 2010 and 80 cases in 2011.

2 CARAT is a general term for a series of bilateral exercises held by the United States with Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Timor-Leste (a new participant in 2012). A similar exercise, known as Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism (SEACAT), is also conducted between the United States and Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand).

2. Defense Policy of Each Country

1. Indonesia

While there is a perception that within the next several years there is yet to be any indication of a conventional military threat from outside, the intensity of trans-national security threats has actually significantly increased in the past few years. Indonesia states that it treats non-military security issues as a part of national defense issues[1].

To that end, Indonesia is promoting Total Defence through both military defense and non-military defense activities under the idea that all people utilizing all resources available, maintaining Indonesia's independence, national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unification. Furthermore, Indonesia is implementing military reform, which includes the prohibition of the involvement of military officers in politics and business activities, and the separation of military and police roles.

In its diplomatic policy, Indonesia emphasizes cooperation with other Southeast Asian countries, and lays out as its basic principle the development of an independent and active foreign policy. In its national defense policy, Indonesia makes it clear that it does not leave the safety of the nation to another nation. However, Indonesia regards defense and military cooperation with the United States as significant for the development of the country's defense force, not only for the interest of Indonesia but also for its regional security interest[2], and has strengthened cooperative relations with the United States in such fields as military education and training, and military equipment procurement in recent years.

Though the United States temporarily suspended military cooperation with Indonesia due to disputes over the activities of Indonesian forces in Timor-Leste, the United States resumed the cooperation in 2005[3]. The two countries concluded the Framework Arrangement on Cooperative Activities in the Field of Defense[4] in June 2010. In addition, President Obama visited Indonesia in November of the same year to conclude a comprehensive partnership of the two countries. Furthermore, President Obama had talks with President Yudhoyono in November 2011 and it was announced that the United States would provide 24 F-16 fighters to Indonesia[5].

Indonesia believes that participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations promotes Indonesia's presence in the realm of international relations and is actively dispatching personnel to such activities[6].

2. Malaysia

Malaysia, which is located at the center of Southeast Asia, considers itself to have strategic interests in common with its neighbors. Based on the premise of building close and friendly relationships with other countries, Malaysia has stipulated that the basic principles of its foreign policy are maintaining good bilateral and multilateral relations with other countries, cooperation with Muslim countries, South-South

cooperation, and upholding the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries.

At present, Malaysia does not acknowledge any imminent external threats, but believes that its forces should maintain a level of readiness that enables them to deal with all military threats, so it places importance on “Independence”, “Total Defense”, “Commitment to the Rule of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA)[7]”, “Cooperation to the U.N. for World Peace”, “Measures against Terrorism”, and “Defense Diplomacy” in its defense policy. "Independence" refers to maintaining the readiness of forces, including logistical support, human resources, and a defense industry. "Total Defense" refers to comprehensive, integrated defense by various government agencies, private sectors, non-governmental organizations, and the public.

Based on its defense policy, Malaysia actively participates in U.N. peacekeeping operations and has dispatched its troops to Afghanistan, and anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia/Gulf of Aden[8]. Moreover, as part of “Defense Diplomacy”, it undertakes bilateral exercises and promotes military cooperation with a range of countries other than those involved in the FPDA, including the U.S. and India.

3. Myanmar

Following the collapse of its socialist regime in 1988, the armed forces seized power in Myanmar. The military junta suppressed pro-democracy movements by such means as keeping its leader Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest. In response, the United States and European countries imposed economic sanctions.

Against the backdrop of a slumping economy as a result of economic sanctions and isolation in the international community, in 2003, Myanmar issued a seven-step road map[9] to democracy. A general election was held in November 2010 and then Prime Minister Thein Sein was elected as the new President by the parliament the following February. In March 2011, the road map to democracy was completed with the launch of the new administration.

Since the launch of the new administration, the Government of Myanmar has been actively making efforts toward democratization including dialogue between Aung San Suu Kyi and members of the Cabinet, release of political prisoners, and cease-fire agreements with ethnic minorities[10]. The international community cautiously welcomed these efforts. For example, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) accepted Myanmar as 2004 chair of ASEAN at the 19th ASEAN summit held in November 2011. In the same month, U.S. Secretary of State Clinton visited Myanmar as the first U.S. Secretary of State to do so after 57 years, and had talks with President Thein Sein and Aung San Suu Kyi. Furthermore, the United States and other countries successively announced an easing of the sanctions on Myanmar[11]. Thus, Myanmar’s progress toward democratization is welcomed but concerns such as nuclear issues and its military ties with North Korea are also being pointed out[12].

In foreign policy, Myanmar upholds up the principle of independence and non-alignment. However, it is believed that China is an especially important partner for Myanmar and provides key military equipments[13] in addition to economic supports. Myanmar is also strengthening its cooperative relationship with India both in economic and military areas.

4. The Philippines

The Philippines perceives terrorism by domestic anti-government armed groups as the most serious threat to national security. Since 2004, the country has been implementing reform programs in the areas of defense planning, improvement of operational and training capabilities, reform of military structures, and modernization of forces in accordance with a defense reform program called the Philippine Defense Reform (PDR).

The Philippines and the United States have a history of a close relationship and maintain a long-standing and tight military cooperation relationship. The two countries maintain the cooperative relationship, with the continuation of the mutual defense treaty and military assistance agreement, even after the withdrawal of the U.S. forces in 1992[14]. The two countries have been conducting the large-scale annual joint military exercise Balikatan since 2000 with the aim of improving combat readiness and interoperability. In addition, the United States designated the Philippines as a Major Non-NATO Ally[15]. In November 2011, U.S. Secretary of State Clinton and Secretary of Foreign Affairs Albert del Rosario signed the Manila Declaration commemorating the 60th anniversary of the U.S.-Philippines mutual defense treaty. In April 2012, the first United States-Philippines Ministerial Dialogue (2+2) was held. In June 2012, President Aquino visited the United States to hold talks with President Obama. Both leaders discussed various issues including security affairs and reaffirmed importance of the bilateral relationship.

5. Singapore

Given the concentration of people and their property in limited national land space and deepening economic interdependence with other countries, Singapore identifies diplomacy and deterrence as the twin pillars of national defense for maintaining peace and stability, and gives high priority to national defense, with defense spending accounting for about one-quarter of its national budget[16]. For national defense policy, Singapore declares that it will strengthen dialogue, confidence-building and cooperation with armed forces of countries within and outside Southeast Asia and promote Total Defense[17]. Faced with the need to appropriately and flexibly respond to war, terrorism, peacekeeping activities, and humanitarian crises, Singapore is working on the transformation of the Third Generation Singapore Forces[18] to implement effective responses with limited resources, and is striving to modernize equipment

and enhance operational capabilities.

Singapore makes efforts for regional cooperation based on friendly cooperative relations with other Southeast Asian countries, including the conclusion of defense cooperation agreements with countries within and outside the region[19]. Also, aiming to contribute to the stability and development in the region, Singapore supports the United States' presence in the Asia-Pacific. The two countries signed a memorandum of understanding in 1990 permitting the United States to use military facilities in Singapore. The United States ranks Singapore as a Major Security Cooperation Partner. In July 2005, the two countries signed the Strategic Framework Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Singapore for a Closer Cooperation Partnership in Defense and Security. In addition, in June 2011, at the 10th IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue), then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced a policy to deploy U.S. littoral combat ships (LCS) to Singapore[20].

Singapore has dispatched its troops to Afghanistan, and anti-piracy operations off the Coast of Somalia/Gulf of Aden[21].

6. Thailand

Under its flexible omnidirectional diplomatic policy, Thailand pursues cooperation with other Southeast Asian countries and coordination with major countries, including Japan, the United States and China. Thailand's national defense policy consists of the two elements of 1) enhancement of the defense capabilities of the armed forces, and coordination and integration with other government institutions; and 2) strengthening of security cooperation relationships with neighboring countries, the regional community, and the international community. On this basis, it has adopted the national defense strategy that revolves around the three pillars of Security Cooperation, United Defence, and Active Defence[22]. Thailand is promoting close security cooperation with neighboring countries, the buildup of defense capabilities, and reform of the armed forces and the Ministry of Defense.

Thailand believes that while risks of traditional threats such as a large-scale invasion have decreased, risks of non-traditional threats such as international terrorism are on the rise, and in particular the insurgency in southern Thailand by separatists poses a national challenge going forward. Thailand also has border disputes with neighboring Myanmar and Cambodia. Though the insurgency in the south is raising realistic concerns for Thailand, in the area of build-up of defense capabilities, the country is modernizing the armed forces centering on the naval and air forces and is the sole owner of an aircraft carrier in Southeast Asia[23].

Thailand has established a good relationship with the United States. Since the conclusion of the Military Assistance Agreement in 1950, Thailand and the United States maintained the cooperative relationship, and they have been conducting the joint military exercise Cobra Gold since 1982. Cobra Gold became a multinational exercise in 2000 and includes noncombat missions such as humanitarian assistance and

disaster relief[24]. In 2003, the United States designated Thailand as a Major Non-NATO Ally[25] in appreciation of its proactive participation in the U.S.-led War on Terror.

In addition to U.N. peacekeeping operations, Thailand has dispatched its troops to Afghanistan, and anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia/Gulf of Aden[26].

7. Vietnam

During the Cold War era, the Soviet Union was the largest donor of assistance for Vietnam, and Russia owned a naval base in Cam Ranh Bay. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Vietnam rapidly expanded its diplomatic relations, and established diplomatic ties with the United States. At present, Vietnam pursues an omnidirectional diplomatic policy and states that it will actively participate in international and regional cooperation in order to build friendly relations with all countries under its foreign policy principles of multilateral participation and respect for diversity. As its defense policy, Vietnam advocates a posture of "all-people national defence"[27], and states that maintaining a peaceful and stable environment for socioeconomic development, achieving industrialization and modernization, and building a socialism-based market economy are its vital national interests and the objectives of its national defense policy.

Regarding relations with the United States, the two countries concluded an agreement on International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program in June 2005. In recent years, it appears that Vietnam is strengthening the relationship in the military area through joint exercise with the U.S. Navy and U.S. Navy ships' calling at Vietnam, for example[28].

In September 2011, the second Vietnam-U.S. defense policy dialogue was held and the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding on promoting cooperation between the two defense ministries. Furthermore, in June 2012, U.S. Secretary of Defence Panetta visited Cam Ranh Bay which was one of the U.S. forces' key strongpoints during the Vietnam War, as the first U.S. Secretary of Defence to do so after the War. He held talks with Prime Minister Dung and Defense Minister Thanh and they agreed to expand security cooperation.

Vietnam has maintained close ties with Russia, particularly in the area of national defense since the Cold War era, and depends almost totally on Russia for its military equipment. In 2001, Vietnam and Russia signed the Joint Statement for a Strategic Partnership, and agreed to strengthen cooperation in the area of national defense.

Vietnam and China have contentions issues such as territorial disputes in the South China Sea, but are actively conducting exchanges of high government officials under their comprehensive strategic partnership, as illustrated by the visit of the Vietnamese Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong to China in October 2011 and the visit by Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping to Vietnam in December of the same year.

Vietnam and India upgraded their relationship to strategic partnership in 2007 and has been deepening their cooperative relationship in a broad range of areas including economy and security. In October 2011, President Truong Tan Sang made an official visit to India and had a talk with Prime Minister Singh.

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1 Based on Indonesia's Defence White Paper 2008.

2 Based on Indonesia's Defence White Paper 2008.

3 In action against Indonesia's suppression of independence movements in Timor-Leste, the United States suspended International Military Education and Training (IMET) for Indonesian military personnel in 1992. IMET provides the military personnel of the U.S. allies and friendly nations with opportunities for studying and training at the U.S. military educational institutions. Though the restriction was partially lifted in 1995, the United States suspended IMET again in 1999. In 2005, the United States lifted the restriction and decided to resume arms export to Indonesia.

4 Specifically, this agreement integrates existing cooperative activities in such areas as security dialogues, education and training, defense industries, procurement of military equipment, maritime security, and other mutually agreed areas of cooperation.

5 According to the announcement by the Office of the Press Secretary, the White House on November 18, 2011, the government of Indonesia requested a total of 30 aircrafts, with 24 F-16 aircraft and six F-16 aircraft for use as spare parts and requested delivery of aircraft to begin by July 2014.

6 As of the end of May 2012, Indonesia has dispatched a total of 1,902 personnel on U.N. peacekeeping operations, including 1,354 to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and 192 to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).

7 Entered into force in 1971. This agreement states that Australia, New Zealand and the U.K. will discuss what response should be adopted in the event of aggression towards or the threat of an attack on Malaysia or Singapore. The five countries carry out various exercises based on these arrangements. In recent years, cooperation has expanded to encompass initiatives which focus on non-traditional threats, such as terrorism and maritime security, as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

8 As of the end of May 2012, Malaysia has dispatched a total of 1,199 personnel on U.N. peacekeeping operations, including 879 to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and 251 to the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT). Concerning Afghanistan, the country has dispatched 46 personnel to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) led by NATO as of May 2012.

9 Consists of seven steps of: reconvening of the National Assembly, stepwise implementation of processes necessary for democratization, drafting a new constitution, national referendum, convening of Pyithu Hluttaws, holding of election and the establishment of a new government.

10 Approximately 30% of Myanmar's population is ethnic minorities, some of which demand secession or greater autonomy for their regions. In 1960s, the government of Myanmar implemented oppressive policies including human rights violations such as forced labor and forced migration, which led to armed conflicts with armed groups of ethnic minorities. Now the government of Myanmar is advancing peace negotiations with armed groups of ethnic minorities and has reached agreement on ceasefire with groups, such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the Karen National Union (KNU).

11 By April 2012, the United States, Australia, Canada and EU announced their policy to ease or partially suspend the economic sanctions.

12 In the meeting with President Thein Sein in November 2011, U.S. Secretary of State Clinton, after mentioning the concern about political reform, reconciliation with ethnic minorities, release of all the political prisoners, and enhancement of the rule of law in addition to the nuclear issue and military ties with North Korea, expressed that the U.S. will match steps with steps, action with action.
It is reported that at talks with ROK President Lee Myung-Bak, President Thein Sein admitted that some weapons trading took place with North Korea in the past 20 years and indicated that the country would not engage in such trade in the future. He denied cooperation with North Korea in nuclear development. Moreover, it has been reported that, at the 11th IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La

Dialogue) held in June the same year, Defense Minister Hla Min disclosed that academic studies on nuclear technology had begun under the previous government, but that this research had been abandoned when the new government was inaugurated and that Myanmar had also suspended its political and military ties with North Korea.

[13] Summit-level exchange with China has been actively conducted. Recently, President Thein Sein visited China in May 2011, followed by Vice-President Tin Aung Myint Oo's visit in October 2011, and Commander- In-Chief General Min Aung Hlaing's visit in November 2011. As Myanmar announced the suspension of construction of Myitsone Dam being built with Chinese involvement, some see that Myanmar is trying to break from the traditional dependence on China.

[14] When the 1947 Philippine–U.S. agreement on military bases was revised in 1966, the time limit for the presence of U.S. military bases in the Philippines was set for 1991. Clark Air Base was returned in November 1991, followed by the return of the Subic Bay Naval Complex in November 1992. U.S. forces stationed at the two bases were moved to Guam, Okinawa, and other locations. Subsequently, the two countries signed the Visiting Forces Agreement in 1998, providing for the legal status of U.S. military personnel visiting for joint military exercises in the Philippines.

[15] This is a status established by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Nunn Amendment of 1987. Designated countries are allowed to receive benefits in military areas such as eligibility to have military equipment. As of the end of April 2012, the following 14 countries are designated as MNNAs: Australia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, the ROK, Jordan, the Philippines, New Zealand, Argentina, Bahrain, Thailand, Kuwait, Morocco, and Pakistan.

[16] The ratio of defense budget to the national budget has stood at 24–32% from 2000 to 2012. Singapore has the policy of keeping its defense budget under 6% of its GDP, and this ratio was about 3-5% from 2000 to 2012.

[17] Based on the perception that national defense cannot be achieved by conventional military force alone, being faced with limited human resources and changes in the nature of modern warfare, Total Defense is promoted whereby people are organized in five components: Psychological, Social, Economic, Civil, and Military Defense.

[18] The Third Generation Singapore Forces place emphasis on three aspects: integration/networking, holistic advancements, and technological advancement.

[19] Singapore concluded a Defense Cooperation Agreement with India in 2003; as well as other similar agreements with Germany in 2005; with China and Australia in 2008; and with New Zealand, Vietnam and South Korea in 2009. In December 2009, Japan and Singapore signed a Memorandum on Defense Exchanges.

[20] Four LCSs will be deployed on a rotational basis, the first of which will be deployed in the second quarter of 2013.

[21] Singapore dispatched landing ships, transport planes and air tankers to Iraq for a total of 11 times between November 2003 and December 2008, while it has sent medical officers and others to Afghanistan since May 2007. As of May 2012, Singapore has sent 39 personnel to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) led by NATO. Furthermore, after April 2009, it dispatched landing craft task forces for anti-piracy operations off the Coast of Somalia/Gulf of Aden and the forces are working under the Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151); in addition, it dispatched one Air Force F-50 maritime patrol aircraft from April to July 2011.

[22] According to Defence of Thailand 2008, United Defence means the consolidation of national power by the armed forces in every dimension including military, political, economic, socio-psychological, and scientific and technological aspects, for national defense. Active Defence means that the armed forces prepare, reinforce, develop, and administer all the military resources so that they are self-sufficient and ready to be used as a deterrent to solve problems and to settle disputes.

[23] The aircraft carrier *Chakri Naruebet* was built in Spain and commissioned in 1997. The flattop has a full displacement of some 11,500 tons, and is some 180 m long and some 30 m wide. Its main tasks are search and rescue operations and EEZ surveillance; however, some point out that the aircraft carrier rarely goes to sea due to funding shortages.

[24] Thailand, the United States, Japan, Singapore, Indonesia, the ROK, and Malaysia participated in the Cobra Gold exercise in February 2012, with some 70 personnel participation from Japan's Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces.

[25] See footnote 15

[26] As of the end of May 2012, Thailand has dispatched a total of 865 personnel for U.N. peacekeeping operations, including 824 for the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and 23 for the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT).

Thailand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained that, in light of the fact that the number of Thai commercial and fishing vessels that were attacked by pirates off the Coast of Somalia in 2009 totaled six, Thailand has dispatched navy vessels two times since September 2010 to protect Thai ships and crew using sea routes in that area, and to share responsibility as a member of the international community and contribute toward resolving these international security problems.

[27] The all-people national defense is described as efforts to build up defense capabilities by combining the unity of people and the political system under the guidance of the Communist Party of Vietnam.

[28] For example, in July 2011, the U.S. Navy and the Vietnam Navy carried out joint exercise including search and rescue off the coast of Da Nang. In August 2011, U.S. Navy dry cargo/ammunition ship Richard E. Byrd visited Cam Ranh Bay, for the first time in about 40 years as a U.S. Navy ship, for maintenance and supply.

3. Military Modernization in the Region

In recent years, Southeast Asian countries have been modernizing their militaries against a backdrop of economic development and other factors.

Indonesia introduced five Russian-made Su-27 fighters and five Su-30 fighters by 2000. In 2011, it agreed to receive F-16 fighters from the United States and started a joint development of the next-generation fighter KF-X with the ROK. Regarding naval strength, in 2009, Indonesia completed the commissioning of four Dutch-made Sigma-class corvettes. In December 2011, the country concluded a contract to purchase three 209-class submarines from the ROK. In addition, in September 2007, Indonesia signed an agreement with Russia to purchase $1 billion worth of Russian-made weapons with government loans.

Malaysia started introducing 18 Russian-made Su-30 fighters from 2007, and the delivery was completed in 2009. As for naval strength, Malaysia's first submarine (the Scorpene-class submarine jointly developed by France and Spain) was commissioned in January 2009, and a second one in November 2009. The six German-made Kedah-class corvettes ordered in 2000 were all commissioned in 2010.

The Philippines introduced one Hamilton-class frigate in 2011 and the second one in May 2012. In addition, it has been reported that the Philippines is considering procurement of military equipment such as combat aircraft, patrol aircraft and trainer aircraft from Italy, Brazil and the ROK.

Singapore is actively striving to modernize its forces by introducing early-warning aircraft, air tankers and submarine rescue ships, making it the first country in Southeast Asia to do so[1]. Regarding air strength, in May 2009, Singapore took the first delivery of four U.S.-made F-15 fighters for the detachments in Idaho, the United States. Singapore plans to have a total of 24 F-15 fighters, all of which are scheduled to be delivered by 2012. Singapore has also become the first Asian member of the Security Cooperation Participants (SCP) in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. As for its naval strength, all six French-made Formidable-class frigates with stealth capability were commissioned in 2009. Singapore also purchased two secondhand Swedish-made submarines in 2005; the first submarine was launched in 2009, while the second submarine was launched in 2010.

In 2007, Thailand decided to introduce twelve Swedish-made JAS-39 fighters and two Saab 340 early-warning aircrafts, of which initial six JAS-39 fighters and one Saab 340 early-warning aircraft have been delivered. As for naval strength, Thailand does not own any submarines at present, but it is reported to have started considering the introduction of a submarine[2]. Currently Thailand owns seven Black Hawk helicopters and it is reported that a budget to purchase two more Black Hawks was approved.

Vietnam introduced four Su-30 fighters from Russia in 2004, and there are reports that the country signed a contract to purchase additional twenty Su-30s from 2009 to 2010. Regarding naval strength, Vietnam was reported to have concluded a contract to purchase six Kilo-class submarines from Russia[3] in December 2009 and is negotiating with Holland on a contract to build four Sigma-class corvettes. In

addition, Vietnam purchased two Russian-made Gepard-class frigates in 2006, which were both delivered in 2011[4].

Many Southeast Asian countries have expanded the growth of their defense spending in recent years, and this is considered one of factors that make the modernization of military equipment possible. Aside from this factor, there are views that sensitive relations among Southeast Asian countries to the military buildup, the growing influence of China, and the limited effectiveness of the regional security institutions as a confidence-building measure, are behind the ongoing military modernization in Southeast Asia.[5]

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[1] Singapore introduced early-warning aircraft E-2C in 1987, air tanker KC-135R in 1997, and a submarine rescue mother ship in 2008.

[2] Defense of Thailand 2008 states that "Major equipment of the Navy must be modernized to meet these needs and must also be balanced with our neighboring states so that the Royal Thailand Navy can jointly engage in regional security cooperation" and "submarines will be efficient deterrent weapons and offensive defense to enhance capability of underwater operation for naval force in the Gulf of Thailand and the Coast of Andaman Sea."

[3] It was reported in December 2009 that Vietnam has agreed to purchase six Kilo-class submarines for a total of some $2 billion, and Russia will build them at the pace of one submarine a year.

[4] It is reported that these ships will be deployed in Cam Ranh Bay.

[5] Based on the Military Balance (2011), published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), etc.

4. Trends concerning the South China Sea

In the South China Sea, there are territorial disputes between Southeast Asian countries and China[1] over the Spratly Islands[2] and Paracel Islands. In addition, there has been growing concern among the international community in recent years over issues such as the freedom of navigation in the Sea.

Although China had initially pressed for bilateral negotiations on the abovementioned issues, signs emerged to suggest that the related countries were taking steps toward the peaceful resolution of these issues. At the ASEAN-China Summit held in November 2002, the leaders signed the "Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea[3]" which aims for a peaceful resolution of the territorial issues. At the ASEAN-China Summit held in October 2010, the leaders reaffirmed their commitment to fully and effectively implement the Declaration and work towards the eventual adoption, on the basis of consensus, of the "Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea[4]."

On the other hand, with regard to the Spratly Islands, there is an increase in activities by the related countries aimed at territorial claims, as well as movements in protest of these territorial issues[5]. It was also pointed out that conflicts with related countries were arising from tightened monitoring activities by China's law enforcement agencies[6].

The United States and other countries have also stated at international conferences and other forums their views on the South China Sea issue including the freedom of navigation. Against this background, there is a move to discuss the South China Sea issue at ASEAN-related conferences to solve them. In the joint declaration of the 5th ASEAN Defence Ministerial Meeting (ADMM) held in May 2011, the South China Sea issue was brought up for the first time, and the full execution of the Declaration on the Conduct and the promotion of formulation processes for the Code of Conduct as well as the importance of the freedom of navigation, were incorporated. Furthermore, the ASEAN-China Foreign Ministerial Meeting held in July 2011 adopted the guidelines for implementing the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea; in addition, the joint declaration of the Sixth East Asia Summit (EAS) held in November 2011 prescribed the settlement of differences and disputes by peaceful means, as well as the awareness that international law of the sea contains crucial norms that contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in the region.

The South China Sea issue is considered to have a potential impact on the peace and stability of the regional and international community, and attention will continue to be paid to trends in the countries concerned as well as the direction of dialogues aimed at resolution of the issue.

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1 Currently, China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei are claiming territorial rights over the Spratly Islands. With regard to the Paracel Islands, China, Taiwan, and Vietnam are claiming territorial rights.

2 The areas surrounding the Spratly Islands are promising treasure troves of offshore resources such as oil and natural gas. In addition, the area is a maritime transport hub and is blessed with rich fishing

resources.

[3] A political declaration that clarifies general principles for resolving issues related to the South China Sea

[4] Proposed by the Philippines at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in 1999. The Code of Conduct would provide more concrete behavior than those stipulated in the "Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea," and possess legally binding force.

[5] In 1988, an armed conflict occurred between the Chinese and Vietnamese naval forces over the Spratly Islands. Although the situation remained tense for some time, no major military conflicts arose after that. However, frictions sometimes have come to surface; for example, many countries went up against China in opposition to its construction of a building and military exercises in the sea area surrounding the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands.

[6] In the waters surrounding the Paracel Islands, the Chinese authorities captured Vietnamese fishing boats many times. In May 2011, it was reported that a surveillance vessel of China's State Oceanic Administration cut an investigation cable towed by a Vietnamese resource exploration vessel. Vietnam also claimed that it faced similar obstructive activities from China in June 2011, and civilian anti-Chinese demonstrations occurred in Vietnam as a consequence of these incidents. Moreover, it has been reported that an incident occurred in February 2012, in which a Chinese naval vessel fired on a Vietnamese fishing boat.

In the waters around the Spratly Islands, for instance, in March 2011 a research vessel of the Philippines was ordered to withdraw from an area near the Reed Bank by a Chinese vessel. In May of the same year, it was reported that Vietnamese fishing vessels operating in the same waters had received warning shots from vessels of the Chinese authorities.

In the sea area surrounding the Scarborough Shoal in April 2012, in response to the Philippine's dispatch of a Navy vessel there for the purpose of inspection of Chinese fishing vessels, China dispatched fisheries surveillance ships and others, which faced off against the navy and coast-guard vessels of the Philippines for a prolonged period.

On the other hand, there were also cases in which Chinese fishing vessels were captured. In April 2010, it was reported that Malaysian naval vessels and aircraft had been tracking a Chinese fishery surveillance ship.

China has, for instance, deployed its government vessels to the respective departments in charge of these waters, including the "Yuzheng 310" responsible for fisheries Surveillance, "the Haijian 75" and "the Haijian 84" responsible for maritime surveillance, showing its efforts to strengthen law enforcement activities in the South China Sea.

5. Regional Cooperation

Southeast Asian nations utilize ASEAN as a multilateral security framework for the region. In addition to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a dialogue forum on the political and security sectors in the Asia-Pacific region, the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) has been held annually since 2006. Furthermore, at the 13th ASEAN Summit in 2007, the ASEAN Charter[1] was adopted, containing the basic principles for establishment of the ASEAN Community by 2015, and entered into force in December 2008 after the completion of the ratification procedures of all member states.

ASEAN places importance on developing relations with non-ASEAN member states. It held the First ADMM Plus, an expanded version of the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting, comprising ADMM members and eight new non-ASEAN countries including Japan. In addition, the United States and Russia officially participated in the Sixth East Asia Summit (EAS) held in November 2011. This way, ASEAN is keeping up its efforts to strengthen relation with countries outside the region.

In the Southeast Asian region, multilateral cooperation is being promoted in frameworks other than ASEAN as well, in order to deal with a wide variety of security issues such as transnational problems including terrorism and piracy. The main counter-piracy measures taken in this region includes the "Malacca Straits Patrols" carried out by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. In addition, the "Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia" (ReCAAP) proposed and led by Japan took effect in 2006, and advancements are being made toward the sharing of information related to piracy and the establishment of cooperative systems[2].

Since 2004, Malaysia, Singapore, the U.K., Australia, and New Zealand have conducted joint exercises including maritime interdiction training within the framework of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA).

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1 Based on the principles of the consensus system and of non-interference in internal affairs, ASEAN failed to take effective measures against Myanmar, etc., and thus the direction of organizational reform attracted much attention. The ASEAN Charter has adopted the principle of unanimity as before; thus, when a consensus cannot be reached, the ASEAN Summit may decide how a specific decision is to be made. Furthermore, the Charter prescribed that in the case of a serious breach of the Charter or non-compliance, the matter shall be referred to the ASEAN Summit for decision and that ASEAN shall establish an ASEAN human rights body. The ASEAN Charter strives for the enhancement of its organization and institutions as mentioned above.

2 Aimed at strengthening cooperation among the maritime security agencies through the establishment of systems for information sharing relating to piracy and cooperative networks among the respective countries. As of the end of May 2012, 18 countries are party to the agreement: Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Denmark, India, Japan, the ROK, Laos, Myanmar, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, the U.K. and Vietnam.

6. Regional issues

While the cooperative relations have been developing among Southeast Asian countries, there are still unstable factors in the region.

The situation sometimes became tense in the area near the Temple of Preah Vihear[1] located between Cambodia and Thailand, where national boundaries are undefined. In response to an armed conflict that occurred in the area in February 2011, the two countries agreed to the deployment of observers led by Indonesia, the chair of ASEAN of the year, but large-scale clashes broke out again in April. In July 2011, the International Court of Justice made the temple and its surrounding area a provisional demilitarized zone and handed down a provisional measure to order immediate withdrawal of all military personnel of the two countries. In August the same year, after the inauguration of the Yingluck administration, top-level meetings and border committees have been held, showing some improvements in the relationship between the two countries[2].

In the Philippines, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), an anti-government Islamic group that has been fighting over a span of 40 years, agreed to a ceasefire in 2003. In 2004, through the efforts of the International Monitoring Team (IMT), a peace process was set in motion. However, after August 2008, military clashes once again became intensified over the resolution of territorial issues, and IMT's activities were suspended in November the same year. Thereafter, peace negotiations began afresh in December 2009, and at the end of February 2010, IMT[3] activities resumed in Mindanao. Nevertheless, a peace agreement was never realized under the previous Arroyo administration. Under the Aquino administration as well, after March 2011, peace negotiations have been under way, and it is hoped that a final Mindanao peace agreement will be achieved at an early date[4].

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1 A Hindu temple situated at the border between Cambodia and Thailand. In 1962 the International Court of Justice ruled that the temple belongs to Cambodia but national boundaries remain undefined in the area surrounding the temple. In 2008, the relationship between the two countries became tense triggered by the registration of the temple as World Heritage upon application made by Cambodia. Since then the bilateral relationship concerning the temple has repeatedly improved and worsened.

2 Since then, the two countries have been engaging in debate by the border committee but neither the deployment of Indonesian observers nor the withdrawal of the troops has been realized.

3 As of the end of May 2012, IMT member countries comprise Malaysia, Japan, Brunei, Libya, Norway and the EU; NGOs are also members.

4 Japan decided to join the International Contact Group (ICG) in December 2009. The group comprises Japan, the U.K., Turkey, and four NGOs, and provides advice to Mindanao peace authorities as well as participates as an observer in peace negotiations. In August 2011, President Aquino and MILF Chairman Al Haj Murad had an informal talk in Japan.

Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Chapter 1 National Defense Policies of Countries

Section 6 South Asia

1. India

1. General Situation

India is surrounded by many countries and has long coastlines totaling 7,600km. The country has the world's second largest population of more than 1.2 billion following China and has significant influence in the South Asian region. Also, it has a geographic position that is significant in maritime traffic, connecting the Asia-Pacific region with the Middle East and Europe. India is expected to play an important role in maritime security.

India has multiple ethnic groups, religions, languages and cultures in the country, but it has an administration elected through free and fair elections under the multi-party system and is the world's largest democratic country[1]. Also, India shares a lot with major developed countries including Japan in terms of fundamental values and systems, such as liberalism, democracy and a market economy.

2. National Defense Policy and Security Situation

In an environment of evolving security challenges, which include non-traditional and asymmetric threats, India pursues a robust and autonomous security strategy which involves strengthening of her own defense capabilities. India also shows its interests in involving in cooperating with regional and international efforts towards promotion of peace and stability[2].

In fact, India participates in 10 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), with approximately 8,100 personnel as of May 2012[3]. India has been sending naval vessels off the coast of Somalia/Gulf of Aden to conduct coast guard surveillance operations against piracy since October 2008[4].

India intends to maintain minimum credible nuclear deterrence while committing to no first use on nuclear weapons and maintaining the unilateral moratorium (temporary suspension) on nuclear tests that it announced immediately after the nuclear test in 1998[5].

The Indian Armed Forces include ground forces of 13 corps with approximately 1.13 million personnel; naval forces of two fleets of about 160 warships, totaling approximately 420,000 tons, and air forces of 19 combat air wings and others with roughly 860 combat aircraft. India is expanding procurement of equipment from foreign countries as well as joint development with them to modernize its weaponry, and has emerged as the world's largest arms importer[6]. India currently possesses one aircraft carrier and plans to introduce one aircraft carrier from Russia at the end of 2012, which is currently being repaired, while it

also plans to deploy one domestic aircraft carrier in 2014, currently under construction.

In July 2009, India's first domestic nuclear submarine was launched. India also acquired one Russian Akula-class nuclear submarine in April 2012[7]. India is currently promoting preliminary design for joint development and production of fifth-generation fighter jets with Russia[8], and in January 2012 selected the French Rafale for the 126 Medium Multirole Combat Aircraft deal; the selection process started in June 2007[9].

India is also developing various types of ballistic missiles. India succeeded in the first test launch of the ballistic missile "Prahaar" in July 2011. In addition, India succeeded in the first test launch of the ballistic missile "Agni 4" capable of carrying a nuclear warhead in November of the same year, and the first test launch of the ballistic missile "Agni 5" in April 2012[10].

India is developing the ballistic missile defense system and succeeded in a ballistic missile interception test in February 2012[11].

(See Fig. I-1-6-1)

3. Foreign Policies

(1) Basic Posture

India has been promoting economic liberalization and reform since the 1990s, and is actively engaging in multilateral diplomacy, thereby steadily increasing its presence in the international community. India's rapid expansion of military cooperation with friendly nations not only strengthens the security environment of the South Asia region, but also is expected to enhance security worldwide. In recent years, India has been making efforts to expand military exchanges, such as by conducting joint exercises with various other countries. The country has also been importing multiple weapons and acquiring related technologies through the military cooperation with various countries supported by its recent economic growth.

(2) Relations with the United States

India is actively striving to strengthen bilateral relations with the United States. The United States is also promoting involvement in India in line with expansion of the relationship derived from the economic growth of India. These lead to deeper relationships in various fields[12].

In November 2009, Prime Minister Singh made an official visit to the United States, announcing a joint statement with President Obama reconfirming the global strategic partnership between the two countries and promoting security and anti-terrorism measures on a global scale. President Obama also made an official visit to India in November 2010 to meet with Prime Minister Singh[13].

Regarding security affairs, U.S. Secretary of Defense Panetta visited India in June 2012 and had talks with Prime Minister Singh and Defense Minister Antony. They discussed the security situation in the Asia-Pacific region and cyber security. Also in the same month, Minister of External Affairs Krishna visited the U.S. and held the third U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue with U.S. Secretary of State Clinton. They discussed security affairs, such as terrorism and cyber security, and the expansion of trading cooperation. India and the United States have carried out military exchanges actively, and army, navy and air forces have been conducting joint exercises on a periodical basis[14]. India has expressed an interest in U.S. weapons, and signed an agreement to purchase P-8 patrol aircraft[15] and C-17 transport aircraft[16] in 2009 and in November 2010, respectively.

(3) Relations with China

India has been trying to improve relations with China under a framework of "Strategic and Cooperative Partnership" through mutual visits by leaders despite the Tibet issue and unresolved national border issues between the two countries, as well as concerns over Chinese nuclear weapons and missiles and the modernization of its military force, including naval forces.

In April 2010, Prime Minister Singh and Chinese President Hu Jintao met through the BRICs Summit Meeting and confirmed their efforts to resolve unsettled issues related to their borders. In December 2010, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited India to meet Prime Minister Singh, and reached an agreement to establish a mechanism for regular exchange of visits between heads of state/government to embody a strategic and cooperative partnership[17]. In December 2011, the fourth China-India Defense and Security Consultation, a vice ministerial meeting, was held in New Delhi, which led to an agreement to further promote mutual trust and strengthen exchange and cooperation in various fields.

(4) Relations with Russia

India has maintained a close relationship with Russia through mutual visits made annually by both leaders and the signing of the Declaration of Strategic Partnership. In December 2011, Prime Minister Singh visited Russia for talks with then Russian President Medvedev and then Prime Minister Putin, and affirmed further enhancement of the Strategic Partnership, in addition to signing agreements on military-technical cooperation[18].

India has been promoting the deal for aircraft carrier[19] and joint development of supersonic cruise missiles with Russia, the main supplier of weapons to India[20]. In March 2010, then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin visited India. During the visit, he concluded a purchase contract for 29 MiG-29K carrier-based fighter aircraft, and held talks on the joint development of multi-role transport aircraft[21].

In December 2010, then President Medvedev visited India and signed a preliminary design contract for

fifth-generation fighter aircraft[22]. At the India-Russia annual Defense Ministers meeting in October 2011, both countries announced that they would finalize the second stage of the preliminary design contract before September 2012.The two countries have also conducted joint military exercises since 2003[23].

(5) Relations with Other Countries

With regard to relations with Bangladesh, Prime Minister Singh visited Bangladesh in September 2011 for the first time in 12 years as the prime minister of India and met with Prime Minister Hashina and signed a Protocol to Land Boundary Agreement, which had been agreed upon in 1974[24].

Furthermore, India has been emphasizing relations with East Asian countries[25], including the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

India also aims to enhance relations with African states[26]. In May 2011, the Second Africa-India Forum Summit was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and both sides agreed to develop their partnership.

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1 The country has a Muslim population exceeding 100 million.

2 The Annual Report of the Ministry of Defense of India published in May 2011 pointed out that the global security continued to be adversely affected by continuing conflict and violence in the world. Even though the possibility of conventional full-scale inter-state war is reckoned to have reduced, the security environment has become complex, with incidence of low intensity conflicts and asymmetric threats taking various forms, including domestic and trans-national terrorism, narco-terrorism, cyber warfare and piracy. Furthermore, a secure, stable peaceful and prosperous neighborhood is central to India's security construct. India continues to pursue active and collaborative engagements with her neighbors with a view to promoting mutual understanding and regional peace and stability.

3 The number of personnel from the Indian forces engaged in U.N. peacekeeping operations has been ranked either third or fourth in the world since 2001.

4 In October 2008, the Indian government approved the dispatch of Navy vessels on a patrol mission to the Gulf of Aden, and in November 2008, a frigate of the Indian Navy sank a fishing vessel which had been hijacked by pirates.

5 The nuclear strategy disclosed in January 2003 mentioned continuing export controls of nuclear weapons, missile-related parts and technologies, participation in the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty negotiations and commitment towards the world free of nuclear weapons, but at the same time, provides that the country reserves the option to retaliate with nuclear weapons against biological/chemical attack.

6 Source: Statistics from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), June 2012

7 The submarine is named Chakra. It is reported that the submarine is on a 10-year lease to India at around $1 billion contract. India is also reported to have become the world's sixth country after the U.S., Russia, France, the U.K. and China to operate nuclear submarines.

8 India and Russia signed an agreement to jointly develop and produce fifth-generation fighter jets in October 2007. They also signed another agreement in December 2010 to develop and produce 200 to 250 fighter jets, specifying two-seat models and enhanced thrust engines for the aircraft to be developed and produced. It is the largest military procurement in India's history.

9 Candidates for 126 MMRCA included U.S. F/A-18 and F-16, Russian MiG-35, GRIPEN of Sweden, Typhoon jointly developed by a group of European corporations and Rafale of France. It is reported that in April 2011, all the candidates were eliminated except Typhoon and Rafale, and Rafale was selected as the final candidate in January 2012. The deal for the 126 fighter aircrafts is estimated to touch US$10 billion but using option for 63 more will cost around US$15 billion in total.

10 According to the Ministry of Defense of India "Prahaar" is an approximately 150km-range and

ground-to-ground strategic missile. It is pointed out that “Agni 4” is a ballistic missile with an approximately 3,500km-range, mobile, and two-stage solid propellant; and “Agni 5” is a ballistic missile with an approximately 5,000-8,000km-range, mobile, and three-stage solid propellant.

[11] In March 2011, in Wheeler Island in eastern Orissa Province, India conducted tests of intercepting ballistic missiles, and it reportedly succeeded in shooting them down six times in a row. Then U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told reporters at the press conference during his visit to India in February 2008, “Missile defense talks with India are in the very initial stages. We have just started to talk about conducting a joint analysis about what India’s needs would be in the realm of missile defense and where cooperation between us might help advance that.”

[12] “Report to Congress on U.S.-India Security Cooperation” of the U.S. Department of Defense issued in November 2011 states that the United States and India are natural partners, destined to be closer because of shared interest and values and our mutual desire for a stable and secure world.

[13] The both countries agreed to enhance and strengthen the “global strategic partnership”. In addition, the United States endorsed India to join the U.N. Security Council for the first time, and they agreed to lift export restrictions against India of high technology related to some fields including national defense.

[14] The army has conducted annual field exercise known as “Yudh Abhyas” since 2004. Joint annual naval exercises known as “Malabar” and “Habunag” have also been conducted. Air force has conducted biennial joint exercise called “Cope India.” The “Malabar” was a bilateral exercise between the United States and India, but five countries including Japan, Australia, and Singapore participated in “Malabar 07-2”, and three countries including Japan participated in “Malabar 09”. “Malabar 10,” “Malabar 11” and “Malabar 12” were conducted as a bilateral exercise.

[15] P-8 is a new type of U.S. Navy patrol aircraft. The United States had not exported the aircraft overseas before it did to India. A total of eight aircraft are scheduled to be delivered to India.

[16] India requested the United States to sell 10 C-17 transport aircraft to India in January 2010. The purchase agreement was announced when U.S. President Obama visited India in November 2010.

[17] In the talks, both countries agreed to continue talks in order to reach an equitable accord acceptable to both countries. They also announced that efforts would be made to protect the peace and security of border regions.

[18] The joint statement included deepening of the strategic partnership.

[19] In January 2004, then Russian Defense Minister Ivanov visited India and concluded a contract to sell a retired aircraft carrier, the Admiral Gorshkov, to India.

[20] In March and December 2010, India announced the successful test launch of the same missile “Brahmos.”

[21] The two countries signed an agreement on the joint development of multi-role transport aircraft in September 2010.

[22] In addition to the joint design of fifth-generation fighter aircraft, the two countries also concluded an agreement for the supply of the cruise missile “Brahmos,” that was being jointly developed, to the Indian Army, and issued a joint statement on contents including the expansion of trade, strengthening cooperation in the nuclear energy sector, and Russia’s support for India as a strong candidate for a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council.

[23] The joint exercise “Indra” has been conducted since 2003, and has been held a total of five times up until “Indra 2010.” It has been announced in 2012 that “Indra 2012” will take place in Russia.

[24] It has been reported that the exchange of 111 Indian enclaves in Bangladesh and 51 Bangladeshi enclaves in the Indian territory has taken place. The Annual Report of the Ministry of Defense published in May 2011 describes the India-Bangladesh relations have improved significantly.

[25] The Annual Report of the Ministry of Defense published in May 2011 indicates that the security situation in East Asia underlines the need for initiatives for building trust and confidence in the region and that the establishment of ADMM (ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting) Plus forum of ten ASEAN and eight non-ASEAN countries, including India, is seen as an effort to establish an open and inclusive security architecture for the region. Furthermore, India’s policy is to encourage and participate in cooperative approaches to ensure that the critical sea lanes in the region are kept open, secure and free for navigation and defense aircraft.

[26] The Annual Report of the Ministry of Defense published in May 2011 points out that the salience of

Africa in international security is increasing and an added strategic dimension is required in view of the emerging security challenges.

2. Pakistan

1. General Situation

Pakistan, with approximately 180 million people, borders India, Iran, Afghanistan, and China, and is one of the most geopolitically important countries in Southwestern Asia. Since Pakistan borders Afghanistan and in the past the so-called Khan network was involved in the proliferation of nuclear-related materials and technologies, Pakistan's attitude towards the international fight against terrorism and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is attracting increasing international attention.

In February 2008, Pakistan People's Party became the leading party in the general election, and Yousaf Raza Gilani became Prime Minister in March 2008 and Asif Ali Zardari became President in September 2008. Since the inauguration of the regime, the administration has been struggling as the domestic security situation has worsened with issues such as growing anti-U.S. sentiment[1] while supporting the U.S.-led war against terrorism, and retaliatory terrorism by armed groups. Regarding the issue associated with the prosecution of President Zardari, the Supreme Court found then Prime Minister Gilani guilty in April 2012, and declared his retroactive disqualification from membership of parliament in June of the same year. As a result, in the same month, the National Assembly held an election and appointed former Minister of Information and Technology Raja Pervez Ashraf as new prime minister. The turmoil is sometimes caused in the internal affairs as seen in the intense conflicts between the administration and the Supreme Court like this case.

2. National Defense Policy

Pakistan claims that maintaining nuclear deterrence against the nuclear threat posed by India is essential to ensure national security and self-defense.

The Pakistan Armed Forces include ground forces of nine corps with approximately 550,000 personnel; one naval fleet of about 40 warships, totaling approximately 94, 000 tons; and air forces including 12 air combat wings with a total of roughly 480 combat aircraft.

In recent years, Pakistan has been actively proceeding with development of ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead and cruise missiles. The recent successive test launches of the cruise missile "Barbur" (Hatf 7) (October 2011 and June 2012), the ballistic missiles "Shaheen 1A" (Hatf 4) (April 2012), "Ghaznavi" (Hatf 3) (May 2012), and "NASR" (Hatf 9) (May 2012), and the cruise missile Raad (Hatf 8) (May 2012) indicate that Pakistan is steadily deploying ballistic and cruise missiles to its forces[2]. (See Fig. I-1-6-1)

3. Foreign Policies

(1) Relations with India

India and Pakistan, which became independent from the former British India after World War II, have had three large armed conflicts over the Kashmir territorial issue[3] and others.

The territorial dispute over Kashmir has long been the bone of contention between India and Pakistan, with dialogues repeatedly resumed and suspended.

The dialogue between the two countries had been suspended due to Mumbai terror attack in November 2008, but it resumed in February 2011 as a result of the talk by the vice-ministers of foreign affairs. Following this, Minister of Foreign Affairs Khar visited India to meet Minister of External Affairs Krishna in July 2011, and affirmed the importance of peaceful resolution to all outstanding issues lying between the two countries through dialogues[4]. In November 2011, Pakistan granted India most favored nation status, showing the move for improving relations. Furthermore, it is reported that then Prime Minister Gilani and Prime Minister Singh hold talks in Maldives and confirmed the continuation of dialogue. In April 2012, President Zardari visited India to have talks with Prime Minister Singh and both emphasized the progress in the negotiation process.

(2) Relations with the United States

After the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan declared that it would cooperate with the United States and other countries on counterterrorism efforts[5]. Its cooperative stance was accorded with international regard, and sanctions imposed by the United States as a result of the 1998 nuclear tests were lifted[6]. In light of counterterrorism efforts, military cooperation between the United States and Pakistan has continued to be strengthened even after the Obama administration inaugurated in January 2009.

In March 2010, then Minister of Foreign Affairs Qureshi held a first Strategic Dialogue with U.S. Secretary of State Clinton in Washington. The subsequent dialogues held in July and in October the same year. During these dialogues, the United States affirmed its continued support for Pakistan, while Pakistan affirmed its continued commitment toward counterterrorism efforts. However, after the U.S. forces conducted Osama Bin Laden mop-up operation in the territory of Pakistan in May 2011, the dialogue was suspended. Both countries later reached an agreement to continue strategic talks[7], but relations between the two countries intensified again when NATO forces conducted air attacks on border posts in Pakistan in November 2011, causing casualties of Pakistani soldiers. Pakistan strongly condemned the U.S. saying the attack was a violation of its sovereignty and Pakistan retaliated by closing the ground supply route for Internal Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and by removing U.S forces from the airbase in Pakistan, which had been used by the U.S. forces for the war on terror.

(3) Relations with China

Pakistan, while valuing the friendly/collaborative relations with Islamic countries, maintains close ties particularly with China to counter the influence of India. In May 2011, then Prime Minister Gilani visited China to meet with Chinese President Hu Jintao and agreed to strengthen the strategic partnership[8]. It is reported that at the Summit, then Prime Minister Gilani thanked China for supporting independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Pakistan after the killing of Osama Bin Laden and stated in August 2011 that the relations with China was an important pillar of Pakistan's foreign policy. Furthermore, both nations have enhanced military exchanges and the first joint exercise of air forces of both countries, "Shaheen -1"was conducted in March 2011 and a joint anti-terrorism exercise, "YOUYI 2011"[99] was conducted in Pakistan in November 2011.

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1 Anti-U.S. sentiment in Pakistan has been growing as a result of the Osama Bin Laden mop-up operation by the U.S. forces in the territory of Pakistan in May 2011 and the air attacks on border posts in Pakistan by NATO in November 2011.

2 Regarding ballistic and cruise missiles that Pakistani are test launching, the following are indicated:
"Babur" (Hatf 7): a cruise missile with the range of approximately 750km
"Shaheen 1A" (Hatf 4): an improved model of "Shaheen 1" with an approximately 750km-range, mobile, and single-stage solid propellant ballistic missile
"Ghaznavi" (Hatf 3): an approximately 290km-range, mobile, and single-stage solid propellant ballistic missile
"Nasr" (Hatf 9): an approximately 60km-range, mobile, and solid propellant ballistic missile
"Raad" (HATF 8): a cruise missile with the range of approximately 50km

3 The two countries have adopted greatly different positions in relation to solving the Kashmir territorial issue. India's territorial claim over Kashmir is based on a document from the Maharaja of Kashmir to India, while Pakistan claims that the territorial claim over Kashmir should be decided through referendum in accordance with the 1948 U.N. Resolution.

4 The Annual Report of the Ministry of Defense of India published in May 2011 states that India supports the dialogues with Pakistan, however, Pakistan needs to take effective steps to address India's concerns about terrorism originating from the territory under Pakistan's control.

5 Pakistan has supported the fight against terrorism led by the United States and other countries. For example, it provided logistical support for the U.S. operations against Afghanistan, and carried out operations to clean up terrorists in the border regions of Afghanistan. Also, Pakistan started dispatching warships to naval operations in the Indian Ocean in April 2004. In appreciation of this support from Pakistan, the United States designated the country as a Major Non-NATO Ally. Furthermore, in March 2011 the navies of Australia, China, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, the U.K., the U.S. and others participated in the third multinational naval exercise "Aman 2011" hosted by Pakistan.

6 At the same time, the sanctions that had been imposed also on India by the United States and other countries due to India's nuclear test were lifted.

7 In October 2011, Marc Grossman, the U.S. Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, visited Pakistan and met with President Zardari, then Prime Minister Gilani, Minister of Foreign Affairs Khar and the Chief of Army Staff Kayani. At the joint press conference following the meetings, the Special Envoy Grossman announced that dialogues would continue. On October 21, 2011, the U.S. Secretary of States Clinton visited Pakistan and met with the Foreign Minister Khar and announced at the joint press conference following the meeting that terrorism is a threat to both countries and the U.S. and Pakistan share a desire to annihilate radicals, such as the Taliban and Haqqani Network.

8 Then Prime Minister Gilani met with Premier Wen Jiabao and said "Pakistan and China have affirmed

that both countries will remain good neighbors, friends and partners no matter how the global situation may change."

9 Joint anti-terrorism exercise has thus far been conducted a total of four times since August 2004.

Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Chapter 1 National Defense Policies of Countries

Section 7 Australia

1. General Situation

Australia shares basic values with Japan such as respect for freedom and human rights, and democracy, and is allied with the United States, as are Japan and the Republic of Korea. Although the main focus is on neighboring regions such as Timor-Leste and the Solomon Islands, Australia has been broadly and actively involved in resolving international security issues such as the problem in Afghanistan.

2. Security and National Defense Policy

In May 2009, Australia released the defense white paper titled "Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030" for the first time in nine years since 2000, which presented national defense policies for the period to 2030 based on a strategic outlook for the future. The white paper states that Australia has strategic interests in (1) the defense of Australia against direct armed attack; (2) the security, stability and cohesion of the immediate neighborhood, which Australia shares with Indonesia, New Zealand, and other countries; (3) the stability of the wider Asia-Pacific region, which stretches from North Asia to the Eastern Indian Ocean; and (4) preserving an international order that restrains aggression by states against each other, and can effectively manage other risks and threats, such as the proliferation of WMD, terrorism, state fragility and failure, intra-state conflict, and the security impacts of climate change and resource scarcity.

It is stated that the defense policy should be founded on the principle of self-reliance in the direct defense of Australia and in relation to the country's unique strategic interests, but with a capacity to do more when required, consistent with those strategic interests that Australia might share with others and within the limits of its resources. This defense policy means that Australia must have the military capacity to 1) act independently where Australia has unique strategic interests at stake, and in the case it would not wish to be reliant on the combat forces of any foreign power; 2) lead military coalitions where Australia has shared strategic interests at stake with others, and in relation to which it would be willing to accept a leadership role; and 3) make appropriate contributions to military coalitions where Australia shares wider strategic interests with others and is willing to accept a share of the burden in securing those interests.

It then gives priorities to the tasks of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) as follows: 1) to deter and defeat armed attacks on Australia by conducting independent military operations without relying on the combat or combat support forces of other countries; 2) to contribute to stability and security in the South Pacific and Timor-Leste; 3) to contribute to military contingencies in the Asia-Pacific region; and 4) to

contribute to military contingencies in the rest of the world.

In order to carry out these tasks, the ADF will need to be more capable in certain areas, particularly undersea warfare and anti-submarine warfare (ASW), surface maritime warfare, air superiority, strategic strike, special forces, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and cyber warfare.

The government has reviewed the defense force posture including relocation of bases since June 2011 to assess whether the ADF is correctly geographically positioned to address current and future strategic and security challenges. The review's final report of the expert panel was released in May 2012[1].

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[1] The Australian Department of Defence indicates that this review will address issues including the rise of the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean rim as regions of global strategic significance, the growth of military power projection capabilities of countries in the Asia-Pacific region, and energy security and security issues associated with expanding offshore resource exploitation in the North West and Northern region. Following the progress report released in January 2012, the final report was released in May 2012, which includes recommendations for the strengthening of base facilities and expansion of the presence of the Australian forces in the Northern region, and strengthening and expansion of naval and air force bases. Concomitantly with the release of the final report, the Australian government announced its intention to deliver a new defense white paper in the first half of 2013 rather than initially scheduled 2014 because of the significant developments internationally and domestically, such as the ADF's drawdown from Afghanistan and global financial crisis.

3. Relationship with Other Countries

Australia attaches importance to its alliance with the United States and intends to strengthen cooperation through security policies with neighboring countries in order to maintain the stability of the region.

1. Relations with the United States

Australia recognizes that the strategic stability of the Asia-Pacific region relies significantly on the presence of the United States, and emphasizes the importance of its alliance with the United States based on the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America (ANZUS Treaty)[1]. Australia attributes the ADF's activities in Afghanistan to the importance of the alliance. The close alliance is being maintained through Australia's involvement in the review of U.S. strategy regarding Afghanistan and Pakistan, and a series of discussions for the preparation of the Quadrennial Defense Review.

The Australia-U.S. Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN), a cabinet-level meeting of foreign and defense ministers, have been held nearly every year[2]. Also, in November 2011, the governments of both countries announced the Australia-United States Force Posture Initiatives, including the deployment of U.S. Marines and U.S. aircraft in Australia.

See Section 1

Through joint training exercise including "Talisman Saber[3]", Australia and the United States are committed to improving interoperability to jointly deal with conflicts, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions. In addition to participating in the U.S.-led F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Project, Australia intends to cooperate in missile defense[4]. Furthermore, they are promoting cooperation in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), military satellite communications and intelligence.

2. Relations with China

Australia understands that China possesses strategic influence that extends beyond East Asia, and that U.S.–China relations are the most important factor for strategic stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Australia also understands that China's increased defense spending has, if not explained enough, the potential to give its neighbors cause for concern[5], and China is facing pressure for transparency. Australia and China are carrying out Australia–China Strategic Defense Dialogues regularly to further mutual understanding and cooperation in common areas of interest and, conduct exchanges to develop Australia–China defense relations[6].

3. Relations with Southeast Asian countries

Australia emphasizes cooperation with the various countries of Southeast Asia to fight against terrorism and crime in the region, and engages in security related cooperation with Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Brunei, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos[7].

Australia sees Indonesia as having the most important defense relations in neighboring regions[8]. Given the terrorist bombings in Bali in 2002 and 2005 and the terrorist bombing in front of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in September 2004, Australia has deepened counterterrorism cooperation[9] and the two countries concluded a framework agreement regarding security cooperation which described cooperation across a wide range of defense relationships in November 2006[10]. Also, in January 2009, the two countries signed the Australia Indonesia Joint Statement on Defence Cooperation[11] which focuses on counterterrorism, maritime security, intelligence, humanitarian aid, disaster relief, and peacekeeping. Australia is also carrying out combined and joint exercises with Malaysia and Singapore regarding non-traditional security challenges such as maritime security, humanitarian aid, and disaster relief, as well as working to expand the ability to cope with traditional threats, under the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) framework[12].

See Section 5

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1 A trilateral security treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, which went into effect in 1952. The United States has suspended its obligation to defend New Zealand since 1986 because of New Zealand's non-nuclear policy.

2 At the AUSMIN in September 2011, a joint communique was released to affirm collaboration in the Asia-Pacific region and the two nations signed a joint statement on cyberspace. The joint statement said that, mindful of their longstanding defense relationship and the ANZUS Treaty, the two would consult together and determine appropriate options to address the threat in the event of a cyber attack that threatens the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of either Australia or the United States.

3 Talisman Saber is a biennial joint exercise between the United States and Australia, first carried out in 2005, and aims to improve readiness and interoperability in operations ranging from traditional wars to peacekeeping and humanitarian aid. In 2011, it included 22,500 troops participating from the United States and Australia in amphibious assault training, urban combat training, and airborne training.

4 Australia announced its participation in the U.S. missile defense program in December 2003. At the AUSMIN in 2004, the United States and Australia signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that provides a 25-year framework for missile defense system development and testing (details of the MOU have not been disclosed). In August 2004, Australia selected the Aegis air warfare system as the combat system for new air warfare destroyers (AWD). It is suggested that the AWD would support the ballistic missile defense system.

5 The 2009 Defence White Paper states that "China will also be the strongest Asian military power, by a considerable margin… But the pace, scope and structure of China's military modernization have the potential to give its neighbors cause for concern if not carefully explained, and if China does not reach out to others to build confidence regarding its military plans. China has begun to do this in recent years, but needs to do more. If it does not, there is likely to be a question in the minds of regional states about the long-term strategic purpose of its force development plans, particularly as the modernization appears potentially to be beyond the scope of what would be required for a conflict over Taiwan."

[6] In September 2010, the frigate of the Australian Navy visited China and held joint exercise with Chinese naval vessels, including live firing practices, helicopter operations and search and rescue training. In November 2011, humanitarian and disaster rescue exercise was conducted in China participated by military experts of Australia and China. In June 2012, Minister for Defence Stephen Smith visited China and conducted the inaugural Australia-China Defence Minister's Dialogue.

[7] With regard to cooperation with South-East Asian countries, Australia emphasizes such areas as peacekeeping, maritime security and defense sector reform, in addition to counterterrorism. In July 2004, the ASEAN-Australia Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism was signed between Australia and ASEAN. Australia also signed a memorandum of understanding for counterterrorism with Brunei and Thailand in 2002 and with the Philippines in 2003, respectively. Australia also signed a memorandum of understanding for defense cooperation with Vietnam in October 2010.

[8] 2009 Defence White Paper.

[9] In addition to signing a memorandum of understanding for counterterrorism in February 2002, Australia and Indonesia jointly held a regional summit regarding counterterrorism in March 2007.

[10] The agreement, which is called the Lombok Agreement, took effect in February 2008. Its goals include the cooperation in the war on terror and transnational crimes, defense, law enforcement, counterterrorism, intelligence, maritime and aviation security, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and response to contingencies.

[11] Since 2010, Australian and Indonesian navies have jointly carried out annual maritime patrol duties every April.

[12] In addition to the joint army, navy, and air force exercise called "Bersama Shield" carried out annually around Malaysia and the South China Sea, the training exercise called "Bersama Padu" was also held in 2006 and 2010.
Australia signed a memorandum of understanding for counterterrorism with Malaysia in August 2002. Further, in addition to a permanent Australian Air Force presence in Malaysia's Butterworth air base, the Malaysian military receives training in Australia based on the Australia-Malaysia joint defense program drafted in 1992, and joint exercises are carried out every year. Australia signed a memorandum of understanding regarding defense cooperation with Singapore in August 2008.

4. Overseas Activities

Australia identifies the security, stability, and cohesion of the neighboring region as one of its strategic interests; fragile states in the neighboring region are potential havens for criminals and terrorists, and domestic conflicts would inflict considerable damage on the regional community, including Australia. Therefore, Australia is committed to contributing to regional stability by providing active support, including the deployment of military forces.

If the Australian government decides that it is in Australia's wider strategic interests to undertake operations in the Middle East or other remote regions, Australia would do so only after the Government has satisfied itself that its forces have the necessary environment to ensure the success of the operations with minimum risk to the deployed forces.

Based on this policy, Australia deploys approximately 3,300 personnel abroad out of its 57,000-strong force[1] mainly in the following areas[2].

1. Timor-Leste

Australia has actively supported the political and social stability of Timor-Leste since 1999, when the independence movement gained momentum there. The ADF leads the International Stabilisation Force (ISF), and about 400 troops are working with about 80 New Zealand troops[3].

2. Solomon Islands

Australia has actively supported the stability and development of the Solomon Islands since ethnic disputes intensified there in the late 1990s. The operation has been led by the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) since July 2003[4]. About 80 ADF troops comprise the military component of RAMSI together with the forces of New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and Tonga, and engage in providing security for RAMSI's multinational Participation Police Force.

3. Afghanistan

Australia announced its support for the United States immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 under the U.S.–Australia alliance, and dispatched its troops to Afghanistan in October 2001. Australia is participating as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to prevent the proliferation of terrorism and to prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a safe haven for terrorists by providing support to enable Afghanistan to become a peaceful and stable country. Currently, an approximate 1,550 troops are engaged in reconstruction support activities in Uruzgan Province and the training of Afghan

National Security Forces[5]. Furthermore, approximately an additional 800 troops are operating around the region in support of the Afghanistan mission[6].

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1 The breakdown of the military forces is as follows: Army: approx. 28,200 personnel, Navy: approx. 14,300 personnel, Air Force: approx. 14,100 personnel.

2 Australia has sent personnel at headquarters and military liaison officers to the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan since September 2011, and as of June 2012, 17 officers are engaged in the mission.

3 In April 2006 demonstrations by rebels in Dili, the capital of Timor-Leste, turned into riots, and the ADF was dispatched in response to a request from the Government of Timor-Leste. As the security conditions of Timor-Leste had improved, the Australian Department of Defence reduced the number of troops from 650 to 400 by February 2010. And the mission of the ISF would shift its emphasis on improving the capability of the Timor-Leste military.

4 The activities began with participation of South Pacific nations, led by Australia, in response to a request for assistance from the Government of the Solomon Islands, where a deteriorating security situation triggered by tribal conflict was out of control. The 15 participating countries include Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and Tonga.

5 Since the withdrawal of Dutch troops from Uruzgan Province in August 2010, the Australian forces have played extended roles in detainee management and others.

6 Sea patrol aircraft, transport aircraft, and a frigate are operating in the Middle East region. Since May 2009, in addition to their anti-terrorism mission, the patrol aircraft and frigate are on the mission of responding to piracy.

Part 1 Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Chapter 1 National Defense Policies of Countries

Section 8 Europe

1. General Situation

With the end of the Cold War, many European countries now recognize that the threat of large-scale invasion by other countries has disappeared and regard an outbreak of regional conflict within and around Europe, the rise of terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), increasing threats in cyberspace, and other developments as new security challenges.

To adapt to such new and emerging threats, Europe has sought to stabilize the security environment primarily by strengthening and expanding the frameworks of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO: 28 member states) and the European Union (EU: 27 member states). Moreover, many European countries are developing their own capacities to cope with these new challenges, taking into consideration their increasingly tough financial limitations.

2. Enhancement and Enlargement of Security Frameworks

1. Enhancement of Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and Peacekeeping Functions

(1) Development of a system necessary for a new role

Founded for the primary purpose of collective defense among member countries, NATO has been shifting the focus of its activities to conflict prevention and crisis management since the end of the Cold War[1]. This shift requires forces that can be quickly deployed to distant areas to perform a wide range of missions and fight against new threats. For this purpose, NATO has transformed its military capabilities[2] through the organizational reform and the development of the NATO Response Force (NRF)[3].

In the NATO Summit Meeting held in Lisbon in November 2010, NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept[4] for the first time in 11 years to propose a guideline for the next 10 years for a reform towards a more effective and flexible alliance. The document created by NATO lists the proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles, terrorism, instability or conflict beyond NATO borders, and cyber attacks as examples of major threats, defining three items as core tasks of NATO: 1) collective defense in accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which forms the basis for NATO, 2) management of developing crises before they escalate into conflicts and to help consolidate stability and reconstruction in post-conflict situations, and 3) cooperative security including active contribution to arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament.

The Lisbon Declaration, adopted at the same time, states that NATO will, in order to more effectively utilize its resources for such capacity developments that would be required to achieve these missions, continue further work on more cost effective and innovative ways of capability building, including multinational approaches, and promotion of the reform process.

NATO has been promoting the concept of Smart Defence[5] which is identified as an approach to innovative capacity building. This is the concept with the objective of building greater security with fewer resources through multinational coordination with the following three pillars: 1) selection of prioritized areas to be invested in[6], 2) specialization in areas where members have the strength[7] and 3) promotion of joint procurement and joint operations of equipment. The NATO Defence Ministers Meeting held in October 2011 approved the promotion of the concept of the Smart Defence and the NATO Defence Ministers Meeting in February 2012 reached an agreement on a way to share the cost for Alliance Ground Surveillance system by unmanned aircraft, which is the major program of this concept[8]. The Chicago NATO Summit declared Interim Capability[9] for missile defence system[10] that links together missile defence assets such as interceptors and radars from allied members under NATO's command and control to protect the people and the territory of NATO from ballistic missile attack and also approved a package of more than 20 multinational projects, including joint procurement of remotely-controlled robots which can clear roadside bombs and joint pooling of maritime patrol aircraft. With respect to the promotion of organizational reform, NATO Defence Ministers Meeting in June 2011 approved the reform plan for more deployable and streamlined command configuration and NATO-related organizations, which is currently under implementation[11].

The EU tries to enhance its initiatives in security under the strategy of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)[12]. The first security document adopted in 2003, "A Secure Europe in a Better World," says that the EU will enhance its capabilities to deal with new threats, will make a contribution to stability and good governance in its immediate neighborhood, and will play a leading role in building an international order based on effective multilateralism by working with the United States and other partner countries as well as international organizations including the United Nations.

Furthermore, unlike NATO, the EU does not assume the mission of defending its member states; however, it has been strengthening cooperation with NATO and working on the development of a necessary system in order to conduct military activities of its own, such as peacekeeping, in cases where NATO does not intervene. In January 2007, the EU prepared a posture to have two battle groups[13] in a permanent state of readiness and established its own operations center in Brussels. In 2009, the EU demonstrated a policy of improving effectiveness and flexibility for the operation of the battle group which had been limited to use only in emergency operations.

Under High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy[14], established in 2009, and the European External Action Service (EEAS), established in 2010[15] as a supportive organization of the former, the EU pursues more integrated approaches while keeping consistency among the policies of

the EU to produce synergistic effects.
(See Fig. I-1-8-1)

(2) Commitment to a New Role

As the first operation outside Europe, NATO has led the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan since August 2003. The NATO Summit Meeting held in Lisbon in November 2010 agreed to continue their support in line with the schedule of completing the transition to full Afghan security responsibilities and leadership by the end of 2014 and has engaged in the progressive transfer of security responsibilities to the Afghanistan National Security Force (ANSF) since July 2011. At the Chicago NATO Summit held in May 2012, leaders agreed to complete transition of security responsibilities at the end of 2014, shifting ISAF's main role from combat to supporting the ANSF, while the ANSF takes the lead for combat operations across the country in the mid-2013. It was also affirmed that NATO will continue to be involved in Afghanistan in activities such as training, advice, and support for the ANSF, even after the completion of the ISAF's missions.

Since June 2004, the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) had been training the Iraqi security forces in Iraq, but ended its mission in Iraq and NATO withdrew its personnel from the country in the end of 2011[16]. The Kosovo Force (KFOR) has been implementing its missions of maintaining security since June 1999 in Kosovo, which declared independence in February 2008. Following Qadhafi regime's assault on its people in Libya, NATO launched Operation Unified Protector in March 2011 and led the mission for about seven months, which included air strikes against Qadhafi forces to protect civilians, inspection of ships to enforce arms embargo, and establishing and maintaining a no-fly zone.

NATO has been implementing Operation Active Endeavor (OAE) since October 2001 based on its determination to maintain its solidarity for the war on terror and to help detect and deter terrorist activities in the Mediterranean area. For this purpose, the Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMG), composed of navy forces of member states, has been delivering on its responsibility activities such as monitoring shipping, providing escorts to non-military ships, and boarding any suspect ships[17].

In addition, various European countries have actively been engaged in anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia/Gulf of Aden . Since October 2008, NATO has deployed SNMG ships in these waters for anti-piracy operations. It has also shouldered the responsibility to assist in the development of capacity to combat piracy activities for requesting countries since August 2009, based on Operation Ocean Shield. The EU has been engaged in Operation Atalanta against piracy in these waters, its first maritime mission, since December 2008, deploying vessels and aircraft. The vessels and aircraft dispatched from Allied countries are engaged in escorting ships and surveillance activities in the waters[18].

The EU led peacekeeping operations in Macedonia in 2003 for the first time using NATO's assets and capabilities[19]. Since then, the EU has been actively involved in risk management and maintenance of

security by sending troops not only to Europe, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also to outside Europe including Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad and Central Africa[20].

(See Fig. I-1-8-2)

2. Geographical Expansion of Security Frameworks and Partnership

Since the end of the Cold War, efforts have been made to secure the stability of the so-called security vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe by enlarging the NATO framework[21].

The new Strategic Concept adopted in 2010 states, that the door to NATO membership is fully open to all European nations, which share its value[22]. It has also deployed the Partnership for Peace (PfP)[23] targeted for improved trust and interoperability with non-NATO states and the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD)[24] oriented for the stability in the Mediterranean area. The organization has gone beyond these existing initiatives and started to enhance its partnership with nations inside and outside its area and with international organizations including the U.N. and the EU by establishing collaborative relations similar to those established with the so-called Partners across the Globe[25], which include Australia, Japan, and the ROK.

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NATO and Russia have sought to improve relations, and established the NATO–Russia Council (NRC)[26] in 2002 in light of the need to deal with common issues concerning security. NATO and Russia have continued to pursue dialogue and cooperation in areas such as anti-terrorism efforts, arms control, and theater missile defense[27].

The number of EU member countries in Central and Eastern Europe has also been expanding, with the accession of 10 countries in 2004, including Poland and the Czech Republic, and the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in January 2007.

(See Fig. I-1-8-3)

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1 In contrast to the mission of collective defense (collective defense within the region) provided in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the mission of conflict prevention and crisis management is called a non-Article 5 mission.

2 The NATO defense ministers meeting held in June 2003 decided to transform its command structure based on functionality rather than geography, and divided it into Allied Command Operation (ACO) responsible for all alliance operations and Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in charge of the transformation of its military capabilities and promotion in interoperability through training and education, and studying and developing of doctrines. With regard to its civilian structure, the Emerging Security Challenges Division was established within the International Staff, in August 2010, which is in charge of new risks and challenges including terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, cyber defence, and energy security, and providing NATO with a strategic analysis capability to monitor and anticipate international developments.

3 The NRF enables NATO to respond swiftly to various types of crises anywhere in the world. The NRF initiative was announced in November 2002, and was declared to be at full operational capability in November 2006. It is operated through rotated management every six months by multinational high-readiness troops including the Eurocorps and the German/Dutch Corps.

[4] The Strategic Concept is an official document defining the objectives, characteristics, and basic security-related responsibilities of NATO. The document has so far been published seven times (1949, 1952, 1957, 1968, 1991, 1999, and 2010).

[5] Faced with the reduction of defense expenditures in European countries and an apparent gap in military capabilities between the United States and Europe, the concept of Smart Defence was first advocated in the keynote address delivered by NATO Secretary General Rasmussen entitled "Building Security in an Age of Austerity" at the Munich Security Conference in February 2011, and has been promoted by NATO.

[6] At the Lisbon NATO summit meeting in November 2010, the allies committed to focus their investment on 11 prioritized areas, including missile defence, cyber defense, medical assistance, and intelligence activities.

[7] It indicates that every Allied country does not necessarily need to possess all the defense capabilities, but each nation specializes in areas where it has the strength. As an example already in place, Baltic states depends its air policing operations on NATO allies while making a certain contribution to ISAF mission in Afghanistan and abandoning the investment in procurement and maintenance of expensive aircraft.

[8] Five unmanned aircraft RQ-4 (Global Hawk) of the United States will be procured by 13 countries, including the U.S., Germany and Italy and will be deployed between 2015 and 2017. The procurement contract was signed in the margins of the Chicago NATO summit in May 2012.

[9] Although details are not fully known, it seems to indicate that NATO acquired limited capability against missiles by installing command and control functions that links interceptors with radars.

[10] NATO has been developing its unique Theater Missile Defense system, called Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) since 2005 to protect deployed NATO forces from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles with a range of up to 3,000 kilometers. The Lisbon Declaration of 2010 has expanded the area protected by this system to all the NATO populations and territories.

[11] With respect to military command structure, it has been proposed to reduce the number of command bases from 11 to 7 and the overall number of staff from 13,000 to 8,800. All the command bases for operations will come under direct control of the existing Allied Command Operation/Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (ACO/SHAPE). As for reform of NATO-related agencies, 14 existing external agencies will be consolidated and streamlined into three sections: namely, procurement, communication and information and support.

[12] The EU, although it was non-binding multilateral cooperation in its characteristics, introduced the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which covers all areas of foreign and security policy, based on the Treaty of Maastricht, which took effect in 1993. In June 1999, the European Council decided to implement the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to offer peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance activities in conflict areas, as a part of the CFSP framework. The Treaty of Lisbon, made effective in 2009, renamed the ESDP the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and clearly positioned it as an integral part of the CFSP.

[13] An EU Battlegroup is engaged in the EU-led peacekeeping missions in which NATO is not involved. It has been developed since 2004 and reached full operational capacity in January 2007. Based on contribution from a single state or multinational framework, the groups are deployed on a rotational basis.

[14] By integrating separate contact points for diplomatic purposes, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy was given the position to represent the EU externally.

[15] The EEAS is an assisting organization to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and composed of regional desks covering Asia and Africa, as well as thematic desks covering development and cooperation, human rights and democratization, and so on. The organization coordinates and ensures the consistency of the CFSP as well as creates and executes policy proposals based on recommendations by the European Council.

[16] Failure to agree with Iraqi government on the renewal of immunity granted to NATO troops from prosecution is mentioned as a ground for the withdrawal of NATO troops from Iraq.

[17] The operation was implemented as one of the first NATO missions based on Article 5 initiated by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2011, basically allowing participation only by its member states. However, since 2004, it has positively accepted the support from its partner countries, with Russian

and Ukrainian deploying vessels in the operation by the end of 2010. In addition to the dispatch of personnel by Georgia to the operation, Morocco, Israel, Finland and Sweden have also shown their willingness to offer some assistance to the operation.

[18] As of 2011, units from EU member states are participating in the operation, and non-EU member states, such as Norway, Croatia and Ukraine have also took part in the operation.

[19] The EU-NATO Framework for Permanent Relation allowing the EU to have an access to NATO assets and capabilities was established in December 2002.

[20] They are called Petersberg tasks. They consist of combat unit missions in crisis management, including 1) humanitarian assistance and rescue operations, 2) peacekeeping, and 3) contingency management, including peace making.

[21] Four Central/Eastern European countries and three Baltic States (Romania, Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria and Slovakia) joined the NATO in March 2004 and Albania and Croatia joined in April 2009. Also, through the foreign ministers meeting held in April 2010, Bosnia-Herzegovina was allowed to join the Membership Action Plan (MAP) with certain conditions attached.

[22] The Lisbon Declaration showed the intention to integrate Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, existing members of the MAP, as well as Serbia into the Europe-Atlantic region. Furthermore, it also stated its support to integrate Ukraine and Georgia into the Europe-Atlantic region through existing frameworks (the NATO-Ukraine Commission and the NATO-Georgia Commission).

[23] This program was established in 1994. Through this program NATO and non-NATO countries of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), mainly from Central and Eastern Europe, established bilateral cooperation agreements.

[24] Established in 1994, currently joined by seven countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia). It aims to stabilize the Mediterranean region through political dialogues and the participation of Mediterranean nations in NATO-related activities.

[25] NATO defines “Partners across the Globe” as countries that cooperate in the area of common interests including emerging security issues, and that actively contribute to military affairs by NATO and other operations. Currently, “Partners across the Globe” include eight countries: Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Mongolia.

[26] The summit level meeting of the NRC has been held three times since its establishment in 2002: in Rome in May 2002 in Bucharest in April 2008 and in Lisbon in November 2010. Also, ministerial level (foreign ministers/defense ministers) and chief of staff level meetings are held on a twice a year basis.

[27] See Chapter 1, Section 4-5 for details concerning the relations between NATO and Russia

3. Efforts by Individual Countries to Maintain the Capability to Respond to Various Situations

Many countries in Europe are making efforts to reduce their defense budget with their financial situations becoming increasingly serious. They work on the modernization of their military capabilities along with the quantitative reduction and the rationalization, and aggressively trying to cooperate with other countries in defense and security, especially through joint research/development/procurement of weapons and joint operations[1]. The United Kingdom and France signed bilateral treaties on defense and security cooperation and on a joint nuclear facility[2] at the summit meeting held in November 2010, reaching an agreement to the establishment of joint forces, as well as joint use of equipment, and promoting training and research and development activities[3]. These initiatives implemented by each country to reform defense and military organizations, combined with bilateral and multilateral approaches, are going to be what is needed for further study in the future.

1. The United Kingdom

The United Kingdom has maintained the perception that it is not subject to any direct military threats after the end of the Cold War. In particular, the country regards international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD as major threats and has reformed its military organization to improve its overseas deployment capability and readiness.

The Cameron administration, formed in May 2010, has aimed to develop coherent defense capability and a sustainable defense program for the future, as it has been faced with the fatigue of its military organizations due to prolonged operations in Afghanistan and an increasing demand for reducing its defense budget due to deteriorating financial situation. It implemented the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) under the newly-established National Security Council (NSC)[4] and announced the results of the work together with the National Security Strategy (NSS) in October 2010[5].

The NSS identified the full range of potential risks which might materialize over a 5- and 20-year horizon, based on their likelihood and impact and defined four items, including international terrorism, attacks upon UK cyberspace, major accident or natural hazard, and international crisis as risks to be of highest priority[6]. The SDSR proposed what should be an ideal status of the British forces in 2020 under the restrictions related to its missions in Afghanistan and the British national defense budget[7] and stated that the UK would reduce the workload of its soldiers by forming mobile and flexible force structure and deployment schemes, decrease the number of military personnel and major equipment, and review its procurement plan[8].

Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense had conducted the Defense Reform Review since August 2010 with the aims of creating a simpler and more effective defense organization, and significantly reducing the running costs of defense. Then a report of the recommendation on reform developed by the Defense

Reform Steering Group composed of public and private sector experts was released in June 2011. All of the 53 recommendations in the report have been approved by the Minister of Defence[9]. Currently, efforts for each recommendation are under process with an aim to complete the reform by April 2014.

2. Germany

Germany has been implementing a large-scale reduction in its military personnel since the end of the Cold War and has been aggressively dispatching its federal forces outside the NATO areas, through the reform of its forces to enable them to execute multiple responsibilities encompassing conflict prevention and risk management in the context of multilateral organizations including NATO, the EU, and the United Nations[10].

The White Paper on National Defense, published for the first time in 12 years in 2006, concluded that while the core responsibility of the federal forces will remain national defense and collective defense in their traditional sense, conflict prevention and risk management including the fight against international terrorism are most likely to emerge as a responsibility. It also stated that the federal forces will develop into three integrated functional units, including intervention, stabilization, and support units, to be compatible with the above responsibility[11] and that the country will mainly allocate its resources to enhance its efficient and interoperable command capability[12]. The Verteidgungspolitischen Richitlinien (VPR), formulated for the first time in eight years, declares Germany's active participation in the prevention and containment of crisis and conflict. It also states that promotion of military collaboration, standardization and mutual operability within the NATO and EU framework is necessary in addition to taking cross-government measures, in order to address diversified threats within and outside Europe[13].

In April 2011, the Military Law Amendment Act suspending conscription for basic military service and reducing total personnel from the current 250,000 to 185,000[14] was enacted. In accordance with this law, the outline of reformed organizations of the military and the Ministry of Defense, the number of major equipment and Die Stationierung der Bundeswehr in Deutschland were disclosed through September to October, 2011. The details of the military reform plan will be sequentially developed in the future[15].

3. France

Since the end of the Cold War, France has focused on maintaining independence in its defense policies, while having led efforts to enhance the defense structure and capability in Europe. It has worked on the development of its military power by reducing military personnel and integrating military bases, dealing with operational requirements to strengthen its defense capability, and also enhancing its intelligence capabilities[16], and modernizing equipment required in the future.

The White Paper on Defense and National Security, issued in June 2008, states that France will enhance

its capabilities in five pillars of its national security strategy including 1) precise explanations and predictions of situations, 2) prevention of crisis, 3) nuclear deterrence[17], 4) protection of the people and land, and 5) overseas intervention[18], and will combine them in a flexible manner to deal with changing strategic environments in the next 15 years.

In July 2009, the "2009-2014 Military Program Law" was approved by the parliament as the first midterm plan to take into account the national defense and security strategies laid out in the White Paper on Defense and National Security. It includes the establishment of the Council for National Defense and Security and the Council for National Intelligence[19], an increase in the equipment-related budget, and a force reduction of 54,000 including military and civilian personnel.

Regarding France's foreign relations, France calls for strengthening of EU security and renovation of transatlantic relations, and restored its full participation in NATO integrated military structure in April 2009 in view of the changes in the situation since France's withdrawal from NATO's military structure and, in particular, the complementary relationship between the EU and NATO.

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1 In September 2010, four European countries, namely the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and France, established the European Air Transport Command (EATC) to jointly operate around 200 transport aircraft and aerial tankers in total owned by each country, including C-130s and A-310s. In addition, new frameworks have been created, including the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) Initiative to promote joint procurement/management/operation of 3 C-17 transport aircraft mainly targeted by NATO states and the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS) to jointly charter the two AN-124 large-scale transport aircraft owned by Russia and Ukraine.

2 The agreements were reached to jointly establish and operate an experimental facility in radioactive imaging and fluid dynamics in France and a technology development center in the United Kingdom.

3 Agreed on the creation of Combined Joint Expeditionary Forces, joint operation of aircraft carrier, the development of a common support plan and joint exercise for A400M transport aircraft and the promotion of joint research and development of equipment, including unmanned aircraft and next-generation nuclear submarine.

4 The Council is chaired by the Prime Minister and attended by major ministers related to national security and, if required, by the Chief of the Defense Staff, heads of intelligence agencies, and other senior officials. The newly-created National Security Adviser (NSA) coordinates the whole proceedings. The Council will coordinate responses to dangers the United Kingdom faces by integrating at the highest level the work of the foreign, defense, energy, and international development departments, and all other arms of government contributing to national security and proposing high-level strategic guidelines to the departments involved.

5 The Cameron administration leveraged the new NSS to analyze the strategic background surrounding the United Kingdom and to define the strategic objectives of the country. In the SDSR, it defined policies and measures required to achieve the goals specified by the NSS so that the comprehensive national strategy related to defense and security could be formed. It also stipulates that new NSS and SDSR are to be produced every five years based on periodical readjustments to be done by the NSC.

6 Analyzing the strategic background this way, the new NSS defined two strategic objectives comprising 1) ensuring a secure and resilient United Kingdom, and 2) shaping a stable world, and specified eight crosscutting National Security Tasks, including tackling at root the causes of instability and working in alliances and partnerships wherever possible to generate stronger responses.

7 "Spending Review 2010," published by the Treasury Department in October 2010 following the NSS and SDSR, plans to reduce the defense budget by 8% in real terms by 2014-2015, by saving at least 4.3 billion pounds for the country's non-frontline activities costs except for what is required for operations in Afghanistan.

[8] The SDSR has decided to reduce the Royal Navy, the Army, and the Royal Air Force personnel by 5,000, 7,000, and 5,000, respectively by 2015. It also plans to reduce the Ministry of Defense Civil Service by more than 25,000; decommission the aircraft carrier, Ark Royal immediately; reduce the holdings of main tanks by 40%; and reduce the planned number of F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft. In addition, the United Kingdom plans to withdraw half of the British forces stationed in Germany, currently estimated to number 20,000, by 2015 before they are completely withdrawn by 2020. With regard to new-type aircraft carriers, it will build two carriers but will only use one carrier.

[9] The report proposed establishing a new and smaller Defense Board chaired by the Defense Minister, and clarifying the responsibilities of senior leaders, including the Permanent Secretary and the Chief of the Defense Staff, and streamlining the central organizations, etc.

[10] Germany decreased its military personnel, numbering 500,000 at the time of its reunification, to the 250,000-strong organization by 2010. In July 1994, the Federal Constitutional Court judged that dispatching the federal forces to international missions implemented under the framework of the United Nations or NATO is constitutional, which has further prompted them to actively participate in various international operations, including security maintenance and reconstruction activities in the Balkan Peninsula and Afghanistan, and anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia/Gulf of Aden .

[11] The intervention force comprises combat readiness troops equipped with state-of-the-art weapons. It is designed to deal with opponents that have well-organized military formations in intensive multilateral operations, such as those executed by NATO combat readiness troops or EU battle groups, with the goal of providing the foundation for peace stabilization operations. The stabilization force deals with opponents that have a certain level of military formations and performs peace stabilization operations in low- and medium-intensity operations that last for a relatively long period. The assistance force supports the intervention and stabilization forces in preparing for and performing operations in Germany and in the target areas, through activities including the management of command, educational, and training organizations. Although the transformation to functional units has already been conducted, the arguments are still underway on its effectiveness: for instance, the report of the Organization Review Committee, an advisory council to the former Defence Minister Guttenberg, released a report in October 2010 requesting a review of the reorganization since the transformation of federal forces into functional units has caused “unnecessary complexity” in the operation of the military forces.

[12] Specifically, the introduction of A-400M transport aircraft is underway, and five satellites equipped with synthetic-aperture radar (SAR-LUPE) were launched by July 2008.

[13] The VPR of 2011 states that the federal forces work only with other allies and partner countries in any military operations abroad, under the framework of the United Nations, NATO, or the EU, except for evacuation and rescue operations. It also mentions the necessity for the reform of military personnel model caused by discontinuation of the draft system.

[14] The draft system ceased in July 1, 2011 in accordance with this Act, and was replaced by a new voluntary serviceman system recruiting 15,000 soldiers. However, the stipulation related to the draft system will continue to stay in the German basic law.

[15] Major decisions made as of this writing include 1) reduction of army, navy and air force personnel from some 220,000 to a maximum of 185,000 (among which 170,000 are career soldiers (including reserves) and 5,000-15,000 are volunteers), 2) reduction of Defence Ministry employees from 3,400 to approximately 2,000, promoting integration of soldiers and civilians in each department and section and 3) reduction of 394 garrisons to 264.

[16] Based on the 2009-2014 Military Program Law, France plans to increase intelligence personnel dealing with terrorism, organized crimes, and the non-proliferation of WMD and other weapons and to focus its investments in space-related projects, intending to double the budget for space initiatives and launch new optical satellites by 2020. In February 2009, it succeeded in launching “Spirale,” the first satellite in Europe verifying the technology for the early warning system. In July 2010, the country established the Integrated Space Command directly reporting to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

[17] At the launching ceremony of the ship submersible ballistic nuclear-powered (SSBN), Le Terrible, in March 2008, then French President Sarkozy expressed his view of the country’s nuclear capability: given the existing risk of nuclear proliferation and other threats, nuclear deterrence is the ultimate guarantee to protect France from any state’s aggression against vital national interests and it is essential to maintain its missile capabilities, both submarine-launched and air-launched. He also

announced his decision to reduce France's air-launched nuclear missile capability by one-third, which means the number of warheads owned by France would become 300 or less.

[18] France has defined the whole region including the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean as its priority area based on the White Paper on Defense and National Security and plans to intensively deploy its conflict prevention and intervention capabilities in the region. The 2009-2014 Military Program Law states that the country sets its military development goal of enabling to deploy 30,000 ground forces, 70 fighter jets, and one aircraft carrier unit within 8,000 kilometers from the country. In May 2009, the country established an overseas military base for the first time in almost 50 years in the UAE.

[19] The Council for National Defense and Security is chaired by the President and attended by the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Minister of the Interior, Minister of Defense, Minister of Economy, and Minister of the Budget as well as other ministers as required. It handles all issues related to national security, including military planning, nuclear deterrence, public order, and counterterrorism, based on the coordination provided by Secretary General of the Council for National Defense and Security. The Council for National Intelligence covers only intelligence issues within the framework of the Council for National Defense and Security, integrating various information from all intelligence agencies and defining strategic guidelines and priority areas for each agency under the leadership of the National Intelligence Coordinator.

Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Chapter 2 Issues in the International Community

Section 1 Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Transfer and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons, or of ballistic missiles carrying such weapons, has been recognized as a significant threat since the end of the Cold War. In particular, there still remain strong concerns that non-state actors, including terrorists, against whom traditional deterrence works less effectively, could acquire and use weapons of mass destruction.

1. Nuclear Weapons

During the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 demonstrated that a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union could take place. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that took effect in 1970 prohibited countries other than those that had conducted nuclear tests in or before 1966[1] from having nuclear weapons, and required nuclear-armed countries to control and reduce nuclear weapons through bilateral negotiations[2].

The NPT is currently signed by 190 countries[3]. While some countries that had previously possessed nuclear weapons became signatories of this treaty as non-nuclear weapon states by abandoning these weapons, India, Israel, and Pakistan still refuse to sign this treaty as non-nuclear weapon states[4]. There are other countries that have declared the development and possession of nuclear weapons, such as North Korea, which announced it had conducted a nuclear test in October 2006 and May 2009[5].

U.S. President Obama's speech for a world without nuclear weapons in April 2009 promoted efforts in the international community for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, showing the United States' resolution to take concrete steps towards the goal: specifically, the reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security while maintaining nuclear deterrence, the signing of a new treaty to replace the Strategic Arms Treaty I between the United States and Russia, and pursuit of ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)[6] by the U.S. government[7].

In April 2010, Presidents of the U.S. and Russia signed a new strategic arms reduction treaty to replace START I, which was issued in February 2011[8]. In addition, the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, D.C. in April 2010 adopted measures to ensure thorough control of all vulnerable nuclear materials within four years to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism. Furthermore, the NPT Review Conference held in May 2010 adopted the final document[9], which includes specific future action plans consisting of three pillars: nuclear disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The second Nuclear Security Summit convened in Seoul in March 2012 adopted approaches to nuclear security issues to be addressed by the international community, such as management,

transportation and illicit trade of nuclear materials, as well as nuclear forensics[10].

The international society has begun to take steady and major steps toward nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. This direction is welcome, as it contributes to improving the international security environment.

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1 The United States, the former Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China. France and China signed the NPT in 1992

2 Article 6 of the NPT sets out the obligation of signatory countries to negotiate nuclear disarmament in good faith

3 As of April 2012.

4 South Africa, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus.

5 After North Korea announced to withdraw from the NPT in 1993, it promised to remain as a contracting state, but it again declared to withdraw from the NPT in January 2003. In the Joint Statement adopted after the six-party talks in September 2005, North Korea promised to return to the NPT soon, but after that it announced two nuclear tests. North Korea's nuclear tests constitute a major challenge to the NPT.

6 Adopted in 1996, this treaty bans nuclear test explosions in all places. Of the 44 nations that are required to ratify it for the treaty to enter into force, 8 nations have not done so yet (United States, China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Israel, Egypt, North Korea). Indonesia ratified the CTBT in February 2012. The United States participated in the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT in September 2011, following in 2009 which marked the first time in 10 years that the United States participated in the Conference.

7 In addition to these, the President expressed his intentions to launch negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and indicated that new international undertakings on managing nuclear materials would be started with the aim of preventing nuclear proliferation to terrorists. The FMCT would, by banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons (highly enriched uranium and plutonium, etc., for nuclear weapons), prevent the emergence of new nuclear-armed nations and limit the production of nuclear weapons by nuclear-armed nations.

8 The treaty stipulates that both countries are to reduce the number of deployed strategic warheads to 1,550 and the number of deployed delivery vehicles to 700 by seven years following the treaty's enactment. The United States released the latest data in April 2012. As of March 1, the U.S. has 1,737 deployed strategic warheads and 812 deployed strategic delivery vehicles. Russia's numbers show that it has 1,492 strategic warheads and 494 delivery vehicles.

9 Major achievements in this Conference are as follows: ① the agreement on realistic measures regarding the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East (e.g., to support convening an international conference in 2012); ② the reconfirmation of clear commitment to nuclear disarmament; and ③ it was agreed that the nuclear-weapon states will be called upon to report to the Preparatory Committee of the NPT Review Conference in 2014 on progress with regard to concrete nuclear disarmament measures.

10 Nuclear forensics aims to provide evidence for prosecution of perpetrators of illicit trade or malicious use through identification of the source of detected nuclear materials and other radioactive substances.

2. Biological and Chemical Weapons

Biological and chemical weapons are easy to manufacture at a relatively low cost and easy to disguise because most of materials, equipment, and technology needed to manufacture these weapons can be used for both military and civilian purposes. Accordingly, biological and chemical weapons are attractive to states or non-state actors, such as terrorists, who seek asymmetric means of attack[1].

Biological weapons have the following characteristics: 1) manufacturing is easy and inexpensive, 2) there is usually an incubation period of a few days between exposure and onset, 3) their use is hard to detect, 4) even the threat of use can create great psychological effects, and 5) they can cause heavy casualties depending on circumstances and the type of weapons[2].

Concerning the response to biological weapons, it has also been pointed out that there is a possibility that advancements in life sciences will be misused or abused. With these concerns, in November 2009 the United States decided on a policy[3] to respond to the proliferation of biological weapons and the use of these weapons by terrorists, and took measures to thoroughly manage pathogens and toxins as well[4].

As for chemical weapons, Iraq repeatedly used mustard gas, tabun, and sarin[5] in the Iran-Iraq War. In the late 1980s, Iraq used chemical weapons to suppress Iraqi Kurds[6]. It is believed that other chemical weapons[7] that were used included VX, a highly toxic nerve agent, and easy-to-manage binary rounds[8].

North Korea is also one of the countries seeking such weapons. The Tokyo subway sarin attack in 1995, as well as incidents of bacillus anthracis being contained in mail items in the United States in 2001 and that of ricin being contained in a mail item in February 2004, have shown that the threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists is real and that these weapons could cause serious damage if used in cities.

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1 A means of attacking the counterpart's most vulnerable points other than by conventional weapons of war. (e.g., weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, terrorist attacks, and cyber attacks)

2 Japan Defense Agency, "Basic Concept for Dealing with Biological Weapons" (January 2002)

3 In November 2009, the National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats was released in order to dictate a response to the proliferation of biological weapons and their use by terrorists. At the State of the Union Address in January 2010, President Obama said that the United States was launching a new initiative to promptly and effectively respond to bioterrorism and infectious diseases.

4 U.S. Presidential order (2 July 2010)

5 Mustard gas is a slow-acting erosion agent. Tabun and sarin are fast-acting nerve agents

6 It was reported that a Kurdish village was attacked with chemical weapons in 1988, killing several thousand people.

7 It is a weapon whose two types of relatively harmless chemical materials, materials for a chemical agent, are separately filled in it. It is devised so that these materials are mixed by the impact of firing in the warhead, causing a chemical reaction and synthesizing the chemical agent. The handling and storage of this weapon is easier compared to one that is filled with a chemical agent beforehand.

8 Iraq joined the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in February 2009.

3. Ballistic Missiles

Ballistic missiles enable the projection of heavy payloads over long distances and can be used as a means of delivering weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Once launched, a ballistic missile makes a trajectory flight and falls at a steep angle at high speed, which makes it generally difficult to effectively defend against the missile.

If ballistic missiles are deployed in a region where military confrontation is underway, the conflict could intensify or expand, and tension in a region where armed antagonism exists could be further exacerbated, leading to the destabilization of that region. Furthermore, a country may use ballistic missiles as a means of attacking or threatening another country that is superior in terms of conventional forces.

In recent years, in addition to the threat of ballistic missiles, attention has been increasingly paid to the threat of cruise missiles as a weapon with potential for proliferation because they are comparatively easy for terrorist and other non-state actors to acquire[1]. Because cruise missiles are cheaper to produce compared to ballistic missiles and easy to maintain and train with, many countries either produce or modify cruise missiles. At the same time, it is said that cruise missiles have a higher degree of target accuracy and that they are difficult to detect while in flight[2]. Moreover, because they are smaller than ballistic missiles, cruise missiles can be concealed on a ship to secretly approach a target, and if they carry weapons of mass destruction on their warheads, they present an enormous threat[3].

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1 In the July 2006 conflict between Israel and Lebanon, it is believed that Hezbollah used a cruise missile to attack an Israeli naval vessel. Israel announced in March 2011 that it had uncovered six anti-ship cruise missiles amongst other things on cargo ships subject to inspection.

2 United States Congressional Research Service, “Cruise Missile Proliferation” (28 July 2005)

3 The United States is concerned about the possibility of a threat to its forward-deployed forces from the development and deployment of ballistic and cruise missiles by countries including China and Iran.

4. Growing Concerns about Transfer or Proliferation of WMDs

Even weapons that were purchased or developed for self-defense purposes could easily be exported or transferred once domestic manufacturing becomes successful. For example, certain states that do not heed political risks have transferred weapons of mass destruction and related technologies to other states that cannot afford to invest resources in conventional forces and instead intend to compensate for this with weapons of mass destruction. Some of these states seeking weapons of mass destruction do not hesitate to put their land and people at risk, and allow terrorist organizations to be active due to their poor governance. Therefore, the possibility of actual use of weapons of mass destruction may generally be high in these cases.

In addition, since there is a concern that such states may not be able to effectively manage the related technology and materials, the high possibility that chemical or nuclear substances will be transferred or smuggled out from these states has become a cause for concern. For example, because there is a danger that even terrorists who do not possess related technologies can use a dirty bomb[1] as a means of attack once they acquire a radioactive substance, nations across the world share the concern regarding the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists and other non-state entities[2].

Pakistan is suspected to have started its nuclear program in the 1970s. In February 2004, it became clear that nuclear-related technologies, including uranium enrichment technology, had been transferred to North Korea, Iran, and Libya by Dr. A.Q. Khan and other scientists[3].

When then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kerry visited North Korea in October 2002, the United States announced that North Korea had admitted the existence of a project to enrich uranium for use in nuclear weapons, which indicated the possibility that North Korea had pursued development not only of plutonium-based weapons but also of uranium-based nuclear weapons. In November 2010, North Korea revealed a uranium enrichment facility to U.S. experts visiting the country[4]. North Korea also announced that a uranium enrichment plant equipped with several thousand centrifuges for fueling light-water reactors was in operation. In addition, it was also pointed out that North Korea had given support to Syrian secret nuclear activities[5].

(See Chapter 1, Section 2)

The international community's uncompromising and decisive stance against the transfer and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has put enormous pressure on countries engaged in related activities, leading to some of them accepting inspections by international institutions or abandoning their WMD programs altogether[6].

Ballistic missiles have been significantly proliferated or transferred as well. The former Soviet Union exported Scud-Bs to many countries and regions, including Iraq, North Korea, and Afghanistan. China and North Korea also exported DF-3 (CSS-2) and Scud missiles, respectively. As a result, a considerable number of countries now possess ballistic missiles. In particular, Pakistan's Ghauri and Iran's Shahab-3

missiles are believed to be based on North Korea's Nodong missiles.

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[1] Dirty bombs are intended to cause radioactive contamination by spreading radioactive substances

[2] With these concerns, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 in April 2004, which provided to make decisions regarding adoption and enforcement of laws that are adequate and effective in making all states to refrain from providing any form of support to non-state entities that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism also entered into force in July 2007.

[3] In February 2004, the President of Pakistan Musharraf (then) revealed an involvement of Dr. Khan and others in proliferation of nuclear technologies while denying the involvement of the government of Pakistan. The U.S. President Bush (then) said in a speech in February 2004: "Khan and his associates provided Iran and Libya and North Korea with designs for Pakistan's older centrifuges, as well as designs for more advanced and efficient models. The network also provided these countries with components of centrifuges and, in some cases, with complete centrifuges." It is reported that in September 2005, the then Pakistani President Musharraf stated that the Khan network provided "probably a dozen" centrifuges to Pyongyang. It is also reported that a high court in Pakistan ordered Dr. Khan to refrain from making comment on the nuclear program of the country.

[4] In January 2012, "Worldwide Threat Assessment" by the U.S. Director of National Intelligence (DNI) points out that the North's disclosure (of uranium enrichment facilities) supports the United States' longstanding assessment that North Korea has pursued uranium enrichment capability. North Korea also mentioned its implementation of uranium enrichment in a June 2009 Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement, a September 2009 letter sent from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations to the President of the United Nations Security Council, news reports made November 2010, and in other ways.

[5] DNI "Worldwide Threat Assessment" by the DNI January 2012 states "North Korea's assistance to Syria in the construction of a nuclear reactor (destroyed in 2007) illustrates the reach of the North's proliferation activities." The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report of May 2011 states that the destroyed reactor was very likely a nuclear reactor that Syria should have declared it.

[6] Extensive behind-the-scenes negotiations began in March 2003 between Libya and the United States and the United Kingdom, and in December 2003, Libya agreed to dismantle all of its weapons of mass destruction and to allow an international organization to carry out inspections. Later, in August 2006, Libya ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol. However, after the military activity against Libya by multilateral force, in March 2011North Korea denounced the military attacks against Libya saying that attacking after disarmament was an "armed invasion."

5. Issues over Iran's Nuclear Program

Since the 1970s Iran has been pursuing a nuclear power plant construction project with cooperation from abroad, claiming that its nuclear-related activities would be for peaceful purposes in accordance with the NPT. In 2002, however, Iran's covert construction of facilities including a large-scale uranium enrichment plant was exposed by a group of dissidents. Subsequent IAEA inspection revealed that Iran, without notifying the IAEA, had been engaged for a long time in uranium enrichment and other activities potentially leading to the development of nuclear weapons. In September 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors recognized Iran's breach of compliance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement.

The international community expressed strong concerns about the lack of concrete proof regarding Iran's claim that it had no intent to develop nuclear weapons and that all of its nuclear activities were for peaceful purposes, and has demanded that Iran suspend all of its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities through a series of Security Council Resolutions[1] and IAEA Board of Governors Resolutions.

In September 2009, it became clear that Iran had failed to abide by reporting duties based on the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and was constructing a new uranium enrichment plant near Qom in central Iran[2]. Moreover, in February 2010, Iran began enriching uranium to increase the enrichment level from below 5% to up to 20%, saying that it is to supply fuel to a research reactor for medical isotope production. And in December 2011, Iran started the enrichment process at the above-mentioned new enrichment plant[3]. The IAEA has expressed concerns that these Iranian nuclear development activities may have military dimensions including those related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile[4], and they point out that they have been unable to obtain confirmation that the objectives are peaceful since Iran has not provided the IAEA with an access to military sites, which could be relevant to experiments using high explosives, and other necessary cooperation to clear up concerns above.

To deal with this issue, the United States and the European Union (EU) have taken individual measures to tighten sanctions against Iran. The United States enacted a bill that would prohibit foreign financial institutions, which conduct significant transaction with the Central Bank of Iran or another Iranian financial institution, from opening or maintaining bank accounts in the U.S.[5]. The EU decided to ban imports of Iranian crude oil and petroleum products in January 2012[6]. Iran, meanwhile, has intensified diplomatic bargaining[7]: accepting IAEA inspectors[8] and resuming talks with EU3+3 (U.K. France, Germany, U.S. China, and Russia) on its nuclear program[9], while alluding to the possibility of closing the Strait of Hormuz[10]. The international community, including the U.N. Security Council, continues to pursue peaceful and diplomatic solution to this issue through negotiation.

Although there is no significant sign of military escalation in Iran and surrounding region, Iranian Navy conducted military training in the surrounding waters, including the Strait of Hormuz from December 2011 to January 2012, while the U.S has maintained its naval presence in the surrounding waters.

Peace and stability in the Middle East is critical for Japan because, for example, around 80% of its crude

oil import is from the region. Thus, it is necessary to continue paying close attention to this issue.

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[1] U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1696 adopted in July 2006, UNSCR 1737 in December 2006, UNSCR 1747 in March 2007, UNSCR 1803 in March 2008, and UNSCR 1929 in June 2010. Resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803 and 1929 oblige the prevention of the supply, sell, or transfer to Iran of materials and technology that could contribute to Iran's enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water-related activities or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and oblige a freeze on financial assets of persons or entities supporting Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. These resolutions also include: preventing the supply, sale, or transfer of equipment such as battle tanks, combat aircraft, or missile systems to Iran; prohibiting any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons (including launches using ballistic missile technology); calling upon all States to inspect all cargo to and from Iran in their territory if it has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited; noting that States may request inspections of vessels on the high seas with the consent of the flag State; and calling upon States to take appropriate measures that prohibit in their territories the opening of new branches of Iranian banks if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that these activities could contribute to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.

[2] The U.S. assesses that the size and configuration of this facility is inconsistent with a peaceful program. Iranians began this facility with the intent that it be secret, but secrecy of the facility was compromised, so they came to believe that the value of the facility as a secret one was no longer valid and declare it to the IAEA (The Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials on Iranian Nuclear Facility in September 2009, and the statements by U.S. President Obama, then French President Sarkozy, and then British Prime Minister Brown on Iranian Nuclear Facility in September 2009).

[3] The May 2012 IAEA report by the Director General estimated that by May 2012 Iran had produced a total of 145.6kg of uranium enriched up to 20%. U-235 enriched to 20% or higher is considered highly enriched uranium, and is usually used for research purposes. For use in weapons, the same material is enriched to 90% or higher.

The report also stated the results of analysis of samples taken at the uranium enrichment facility near Qom showed the presence of particles with enrichment levels of up to 27% U-235, which are higher than the level stated by Iran. Iran indicated that the production of such particles above the target value may happen for technical reasons beyond the operator's control. The IAEA requested further details and took further samples from the site, which are currently being analyzed.

[4] In November 2011, the IAEA released a report listing the details of the possibility of military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program, such as the presence of information on initiation of high explosives. The U.S. published its assessment as follows: "Iranian military entities were working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons. In fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program. Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons." (National Intelligence Estimates, National Intelligence Conference, December 2007; Worldwide Threat Assessment, Director of National Intelligence, January 2012).

[5] It is applied to any financial transaction on or after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of the Act (December 31, 2011). It includes a clause providing an exception from sanctions in the case where a foreign country has significantly reduced its volume of crude oil purchases from Iran.

[6] Already concluded contracts can still be executed until July 1, 2012.

[7] In his State of the Union Address in January 2012, President Obama stated that America was determined to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon and he would take no options off the table to achieve that goal, while a peaceful resolution was still possible and far better. Israeli Defense Minister, Ehud Barak, is reported to have said in February 2012 that if sanctions on Iran failed to stop Iran's nuclear program, there would be a need to consider taking actions, while Israel would continue supporting the international community to work toward halting Iran's nuclear program without taking any option off the table.

[8] The IAEA held talks with Iran in an effort to solve the outstanding issues on Iran's nuclear program in January, February and May of 2012.

[9] The talks between Iran and EU3+3 had been suspended after the one in Turkey in January 2011. It resumed in Turkey in April 2012 for the first time in 15 months and they have agreed that the NPT would be a key basis for future negotiations. Subsequent meetings were held in Iraq in May 2012 and in Russia in June 2012, but Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, said in statements that there were significant gaps between both parties' positions. Successive talks are to be held.

[10] Iran's Navy commander is reported to have told in December 2011 that Iran had comprehensive control over the Strait of Hormuz and closing the Strait of Hormuz would be easier than drinking a glass of water.

Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Chapter 2 Issues in the International Community

Section 2 Trends Concerning Cyberspace

1. Cyberspace and Security

Owing to the information technology (IT) revolution in recent years, information and communication networks such as the Internet are becoming essential components across all facets of people's lives. But the other side of the coin is that cyber attacks against these information and communication networks, especially those which are the infrastructure for daily life, have the potential to seriously impact people's lives. As such, cyber security constitutes an important challenge in terms of security for each country.

Types of cyber attacks include data falsification or theft of information via unauthorized access to information and communication networks, the functional impairment of information and communication networks through the simultaneous transmission of large quantities of data, and so on. Internet related technologies are constantly evolving, with cyber attacks growing more sophisticated and complex day by day. The following points could be listed as characteristics of cyber attacks.

1) Attacks can be carried out that do not injure people or objects physically, and without actually coming into contact with them.

2) If they are able to generate hindrances for important information and communication networks then they can inflict enormous damage.

3) Since there are no geographical or temporal limitations, attacks can be carried out at any time and from anywhere.

4) They adopt a variety of different means, such as going through a countless number of computers that have been under control of computer viruses so that the involvement of the attackers themselves cannot be identified. Because of this, it is difficult to identify the attackers based on direct evidence.

For armed forces, information and communications forms the foundation for command and control which extends all the way from central command to ground-level forces, with the dependence of units on information and communication networks expanding still further due to the IT revolution. Given this dependence of armed forces on such information and communication networks, cyber attacks are being regarded as an asymmetrical strategy capable of mitigating the strengths of enemies by exploiting weak points in enemy armed forces, and it is said that many militaries are developing offensive capabilities in cyberspace[1]. It has also been pointed out that intrusions are carried out into information and communication networks of other countries for the purpose of gathering intelligence[2].

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[1] Paper by then Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn, "Defending a New Domain: The

Pentagon's Cyber Strategy", *Foreign Affairs* (Sep-Oct 2010). In addition, an annual report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (November 2011), a bipartisan consultative body of the U.S. Congress, indicated that the Chinese military engages in computer network attacks and assessed that China's military strategy envisions the use of computer network exploitation and attack against adversaries, including the United States.

[2] In a February 2011 speech, then Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn pointed out cases of intrusion by foreign intelligence agencies, including the extraction of military plans and weapons systems designs from governmental networks. Moreover, the United States Department of Defense report "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China" (May 2012) indicated that computer networks and systems around the world, including those owned by the U.S. Government, continued to be targets of intrusions and data theft, many of which originated within China.

2. Threats in cyberspace

Under such circumstances, cyber attacks are rampant against the information and communication networks of the governmental organizations and armed forces of various countries[1].

In 2008, removable memory devices were used to insert a computer virus into networks that handled classified and other information for the U.S. Central Command, the unit commanding the U.S. military's operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This spawned a grave situation where there was the possibility that information had been transferred externally[2]. What is more, cyber attacks also occurred in July 2009 against the websites of government agencies in the United States and the ROK including the U.S. Department of Defense and the ROK's Ministry of National Defense, and in March 2011 against the websites of the ROK's governmental agencies, including the Ministry of National Defense[3]. These attacks disrupted the access to those websites and caused other problems.

Stuxnet, an advanced computer virus with a complex structure discovered in July 2010, was the first virus program to target the control system incorporated in specific software and hardware. It has been pointed out that Stuxnet has the ability to access targeted systems without detection and to steal information and alter the system[4]. In October 2011, a new virus was discovered, which appeared to be very similar to Stuxnet in terms of its structure[5].

In September 2011, computers of Japanese private companies producing defense equipment were found infected with malware and legislative and administrative organs were also attacked in the same year.

Cyber attacks on the information and communications networks of governments and militaries as well as on critical infrastructure significantly affect national security. Japan must continue to pay close attention to developments in threats in cyberspace.

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1 An annual report released by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (November 2011) indicated that during 2010 there were a total of 55,812 counts of malicious cyber activity carried out on the United States Department of Defense.

2 Aforementioned paper by then Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn. An infected removable memory device was inserted into a computer at a U.S. base in the Middle East, and the virus, placed there by a foreign intelligence agency, was uploaded to the network of the Central Command. This virus was undetected and spread over systems that handle both classified and unclassified information, and data could have been transferred to servers under foreign control.

3 Speeches by Chairman of the then Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen (July 8, 2009) and then Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn (October 1, 2009). In April 2011, the Korean National Police Agency (ROK) reported that the cyber attack on the ROK's Government that occurred in March 2011 was carried out by the same source as the cyber attack of July 2009.

4 March 2011 testimony of Department of Homeland Security, then Deputy Under Secretary Reitinger before the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies.

5 ICS-CERT (a U.S. government organization in charge of cybersecurity of industrial control systems) released an alert on a computer virus called Duqu (W32.DUQU) in October 2011. According to analysis by a private research lab, the program of the virus has many similar characteristics to Stuxnet.

3. Efforts against Cyber Attacks

Given these growing threats in cyberspace, various efforts are under way on the overall government level and the ministerial level, including by defense ministries.

As per cyber security policy that is being employed by countries on the governmental level, there seem to be some trends, including: 1) organizations related to cyber security that are spread over multiple departments and agencies are being integrated, and their operational units are centralized; 2) policy and research units are being enhanced by establishing specialized posts, and creating new research divisions and enhancing such functions; 3) the roles of intelligence agencies in responding to cyber attacks are being expanded; and 4) more emphasis is being allotted to international cooperation.

Also, on the defense ministry level, response to cyber attacks and ensuring safety for activities conducted in cyberspace have become vital issues for the militaries of various countries. There are various undertakings being carried out against cyber attacks in different countries, including establishing new organizations to head military operations in cyberspace and placing response to cyber attacks as an important strategic objective in national defense strategies[1].

Furthermore, attention has been drawn to issues that must be debated in order to allow for an effective response to cyber attacks, which have become a new security challenge in recent years. For instance, there is still no wide consensus on the norms covering conduct of states and international cooperation in cyberspace. In consideration of these problems, debate has been taking place[2] with the aim of promoting new efforts, such as formulating certain norms of conduct within cyberspace based on international consensus[3].

In November 2011, the U.K. government hosted an international conference on cyberspace. Issues discussed at the conference include economic growth and development in cyberspace, social benefits, safe and reliable access, international security, and cybercrimes. Discussions will be further explored at the follow-up meetings to be held in the future[4].

1. United States

The International Strategy for Cyberspace released in May 2011 outlines the U.S. vision for the future of cyberspace, and sets an agenda for partnering with other nations and peoples to realize this vision. The Strategy also points out seven policy priorities. These priorities are economy, protecting national networks, law enforcement, military, internet governance, international development, and internet freedom.

In the United States, the Department of Homeland Security is in charge of protecting networks of the Federal government and critical infrastructure, and the National Cyber Security Division

(NCSD) of the Department is in charge of overall coordination[5].

As measures of the Department of Defense, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) released in February 2010 lists cyberspace as one of the global commons along with land, sea, air, and space, stating the necessity to assure access to global commons. Moreover, the QDR lists effective operations in cyberspace as one of the six key mission areas for which the U.S. military is to enhance its capability. The International Strategy for Cyberspace stipulates that the United States will respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as they would to any other threat to the country, and that it reserves the right to use all necessary means, including military, as appropriate and consistent with applicable international law[6]. Furthermore, the Strategy states that the United States will: (1) recognize and adapt to the military's increasing need for reliable and secure networks; (2) build and enhance existing military alliances to confront potential threats in cyberspace[7]; and (3) expand cyberspace cooperation with allies and partners to increase collective security.

The Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace released in July 2011 indicates that cybersecurity threats include internal threats imposed by insiders, in addition to external threats such as cyber attacks from foreign countries and that potential U.S. adversaries may seek to disrupt the networks and systems that the Department of Defense depends on. Then, the report advocates the following five strategic initiatives to respond to cyber threats: (1) taking full advantage of cyberspace's potential by treating cyberspace as an operational domain just as domains of land, sea, air and space; (2) employing new defense operating concepts to protect the Department's networks and systems[8]; (3) partnering with other U.S. government departments and agencies and the private sector to enable a whole-of-government cybersecurity; (4) building robust relationships with U.S. allies and international partners to strengthen collective cybersecurity; and (5) leveraging the nation's ingenuity through an exceptional cyber workforce and rapid technological innovation.

In terms of the Department's organization, then Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates directed to establish a new Cyber Command in June 2009, which supervises operations in cyberspace. The Cyber Command achieved the initial operational capability in May 2010 and the full operational capability in November 2010.

2. NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Defence Ministers Meeting in June 2011 adopted the new NATO Policy on Cyber Defence and its action plan. The policy clarifies political and operational mechanism of NATO's response to cyber attacks, and the framework for NATO assistance to member states in their own cyber defense efforts and provision of assistance in event of cyber attack against one of its member states, as well as sets out principles on cooperation with partners.

As for organization, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), which is the supreme decision making body

within NATO, provides political oversight on policies and operations concerned with NATO's cyber defense. In addition, the Defence Policy and Planning Committee (DPPC), which is a consultative body to NAC on defense issues, provides oversight and advice at the expert level. The Cyber Defence Management Board (CDMB)[9], which comprises the leaders of political, military, operational and technical staff with responsibilities for cyber defense, coordinates cyber defense throughout NATO headquarters and its associated agencies. The Emerging Security Challenges Division of the International Staff formulates policies and action plans concerning cyber defense. The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE), which was established in 2008, conducts research and development on cyber defense. Since 2008 NATO has been conducting cyber defense exercises on an annual basis with the aim of boosting cyber defense capabilities.

3. United Kingdom

In the United Kingdom, based on the June 2009 Cyber Security Strategy, the Office of Cyber Security (OCS) (later integrated with information assurance functions to form the Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance (OCSIA)) was established within the Cabinet Office to form and coordinate cybersecurity strategy for the overall government, as well as the Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC) under the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) to monitor cyberspace[10]. The National Security Strategy (NSS) and the Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR) released in October 2010 assessed cyber attacks as one of the highest priority risks and made the decision to newly establish the Defense Cyber Operations Group (DCOG), unifying cyber activities within the Ministry of Defense. In November 2011, the U.K. government unveiled the new UK Cyber Security Strategy which stipulates that an interim DCOG will be in place by April 2012 and will achieve full operational capability by April 2014.

4. Australia

In November 2009, Australia released its Cyber Security Strategy, indicating that the Cyber Security Policy and Coordination (CSPC) committee, which is an inter-departmental committee chaired by the Attorney General, shall coordinate and oversee overall government cybersecurity policy including crisis management and international collaborations[11]. Australia's Defense White Paper released in May 2009 points out the possibility for cyber attack threats to increase at a rate far above forecasted levels and highlights enhancing the military's cyber warfare capability as a priority area. Based on the concepts outlined in the White Paper, the Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC) was launched under the Defense Signals Directorate (DSD) in the Department of Defense in January 2010. CSOC provides the government with analyses on advanced threats in cyberspace, and coordinates and supports response to

major cybersecurity issues on governmental agencies and important infrastructures.

5. Republic of Korea

The Republic of Korea (ROK) formulated the National Cyber Security Master Plan in August 2011.The plan includes such elements as institutional developments, division of roles among concerned departments, and priorities by sector. It also clarifies the supervisory functions of the National Intelligence Service[12] in responsive actions against cyber attacks and places particular emphasis on strengthening the following five areas: prevention, detection, response, systems, and security base. In the national defense sector, the Cyberspace Command was established in January 2010 to carry out planning, implementation, training, and research and development for its cyberspace operations and it currently serves as the division under the direct control of the Ministry of National Defense. At the U.S.-Korea Security Consultative Meeting held in October 2011, the two nations agreed to strengthen their cooperation in cyberspace.

(See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 6; Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-3)

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1 Countries other than those outlined in the main text have also been making efforts within the defense structures. For example, the spokesperson of the Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China announced at the regular press conference held on May 25, 2011, that the "Online Blue Army" has been established within the People's Liberation Army in order to better safeguard the network security of armed forces.

2 Besides the mentioned discussions, it is difficult to identify the attacker in the case of cyber attack, and, as in many instances the attacker has nothing to protect, deterrence is said to be difficult. In addition, the international community has yet to form a consensus of the definition and status of cyber attacks under international law including the recognition of cyber attacks as armed attacks, making it difficult to apply the existing rules of engagement (ROE) of armed forces in response to cyber attacks.

3 For example, British Foreign Secretary Hague delivered a policy speech at the annual Munich Security Conference (MSC) held in February 2011, in which he set out the following seven principles: (1) the need for governments to act proportionately in cyberspace and in accordance with national and international law; (2) the need for everyone to have the ability—in terms of skills, technology, confidence, and opportunity—to access cyberspace; (3) the need for users of cyberspace to show tolerance and respect for diversity of language, culture, and ideas; (4) ensuring that cyberspace remains open to innovation and the free flow of ideas, information, and expression; (5) the need to respect individual rights of privacy and to provide proper protection to intellectual property; (6) the need to work collectively to tackle the threat from criminals acting online; and (7) the promotion of a competitive environment which ensures a fair return on investment in network, services, and content. In the International Strategy for Cyberspace released in May 2011, the United States outlined the following principles and norms in cyberspace: (1) upholding fundamental freedoms; (2) respect for property; (3) valuing privacy; (4) protection from crime; (5) right of self-defense; (6) global interoperability; (7) network stability; (8) reliable access; (9) multi-stakeholder Internet governance; and (10) cybersecurity due diligence.

4 At the conference held in 2011, more than 700 participants from governmental organizations, private sectors, and NGO representatives across 60 countries took part in. Follow-up conferences are scheduled to be held in Hungary in 2012 and in the Republic of Korea in 2013.

5 The National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) of the Department of Homeland Security integrates the operations of the governmental agencies related to cybersecurity and

functions as a 24-hour warning and surveillance center.

[6] The similar view is contained in the Department of Defense Cyberspace Policy Report submitted by the Department of Defense to the Congress in November 2011. The report further indicates that DoD will conduct offensive cyber operations if directed by the President, that the U.S. Government collects foreign intelligence via cyberspace, and that international legal norms, such as those found in the UN Charter and the law of armed conflict, apply to the cyberspace domain.

[7] Specifically, the International Strategy for Cyberspace states that the United States will continue to work with the militaries and civilian counterparts of their allies and partners to expand situational awareness and shared warning systems, enhance the ability to work together in times of peace and crisis, and develop the means and method of collective self-defense in cyberspace.

[8] The Department of Defense is enhancing its cyber hygiene best practices to improve its cybersecurity, will strengthen internal monitoring to deter and mitigate insider threats, and will employ an active cyber defense capability, along with developing new defense operating concept. Regarding the active cyber defense capability, on February 15, 2011, then Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn explained that, "It is not adequate to rely on passive defenses that employ only after-the-fact detection and notification. Active defenses operate at network speed, using sensors, software, and signatures derived from intelligence to detect and stop malicious code before it succeeds."

[9] CDMB receives support from ESCD, established within the International Staff in August 2010, for its management.

[10] OCS and CSOC comprise temporary transferred staff from related ministries and agencies and are inter-governmental organizations.

[11] Also, CERT Australia, which was newly established within the Department of Justice based on the Cyber Security Strategy, provides private sector businesses with information on threats and assists in handling attacks.

[12] Under the Director of the National Intelligence Service, the National Cybersecurity Strategy Council has been established to deliberate on important issues, including: 1) establishing and improving a national cybersecurity structure; 2) coordinating related policies and roles among institutions; and 3) deliberating measures and policies related to presidential orders. Moreover, the Defense Information Warfare Response Center of the Defense Security Command is in charge of protecting military networks, while the National Cybersecurity Center (NCSC) of the National Intelligence Service oversees networks of the government and public institutions, and the Korea Internet Security Center (KISC/KrCERT) of the Korea Communications Commission oversees private sector networks.

Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Chapter 2 Issues in the International Community

Section 3 International Terrorism

1. General Situation

The 9/11 attacks in 2001 prompted the entire world to reaffirm the threat of international terrorism, and was an opportunity to ignite the current fight against terrorism by the United States and other countries.

In the military operation in Afghanistan led by U.S. and U.K. forces shortly after the 9/11 attacks, many of the leaders of Al-Qaeda, who were believed to have directed the 9/11 attacks, and the Taliban, who harbored Al-Qaeda, were killed or captured. In May 2011, Osama Bin Laden, the leader of Al-Qaeda hiding in Pakistan, was killed in an operation conducted by the United States. The killing of Bin Laden, however, has not eradicated the possibility of Al-Qaeda attacks. In some areas including the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, where Al-Qaeda forces and the Taliban are considered to be hiding, the U.S.-led multinational forces, the Afghan, the Pakistani, and other militaries are continuously engaged in clearing operations[1].

Al-Qaeda now is much less active, with core members killed or captured; however, some point out that Al-Qaeda will seek to augment smaller and simpler plots while maintaining relationship with its affiliates[2].

Some also point out while command and control capabilities of the leaders of Al-Qaeda have been declining, its affiliates have been strengthening their power[3].

Al-Qaeda affiliates that include "Al-Qaeda" in their name perpetrate terrorism mainly in North Africa and the Middle East[4]; however, it is pointed out that these affiliates vary in their intentions and capabilities to conduct terrorist attacks in countries outside of their power base[5].

We have also seen in recent years, cases where radical individuals and groups who have had no official relations at all with the Al-Qaeda or its affiliates have been inspired by Al-Qaeda's ideology and have become terrorists[6]. In particular, since the attacks on the London transport network in 2005, threats posed by so-called "homegrown terrorists[7]" have gained attention. In the United States, 32 homegrown terrorists have apparently been indicted between May 2009 and October 2011[8]. Although it is difficult to detect common motives to incite such individuals to violence, possible motives could include the attraction of foreign conflict zones from an extremist perspective, disenchantment with living in the United States, anger against U.S. and Western foreign policy, and the increase in extremist propaganda in English[9].

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1 In his "National Strategy for Counterterrorism" in June 2011, President Obama noted that the preeminent security threat to the United States continue to be Al-Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents, and clarified that their eventual defeat was the ultimate objective. He laid out a policy of pursuing the ultimate defeat of Al-Qaeda in the Afghanistan-Pakistan theater.

[2] "Worldwide Threat Assessment" (January 2012). By U.S. Director of National Intelligence (DNI)

[3]United States Department of State "Country Reports on Terrorism 2010" (August 2011).

[4] Ditto

[5] "Worldwide Threat Assessment" by DNI (January 2012). Out of various affiliates of Al-Qaeda, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has been enhancing its new recruitment activities through such measures as launching a new English organizational journal, "Inspire," on the Internet in June 2010.

[6] "Worldwide Threat Assessment" by DNI (January 2012)

[7]While there is no clear definition of the term, they are referred to in the United States as those who have lived primarily inside the United States and commit acts of violence in furtherance of objectives promoted by a foreign terrorist organization, but who act without direction from a foreign terrorist organization (Statement of Robert Mueller, Director of the FBI, at committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the U.S. Senate, September 22, 2010).

[8] "American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat," the U.S. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (November 15, 2011). The report lists 21 cases of homegrown terrorist plots and attacks in the eight-year period between September 2001 and April 2009.

[9] Statement of Robert Mueller, Director of the FBI, at the committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the United States Senate (September 22, 2010).

2. Terrorist Attacks around the World

Terrorist attacks have recently been on the rise targeted at diplomatic delegates and other groups in Yemen. In October 2010, some explosive materials were discovered in multiple air cargoes, which were revealed to have originated in Yemen. It is thought that these attacks were conducted by groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda, and it has been pointed out that political instability triggered by student-led anti-government demonstrations since February 2011 could allow for further planning and execution of attacks by groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)[1].

Even after the Transitional Federal Government was established in Somalia in 2005, there continued to be no government that effectively governed the entire country, and battles between the radical Islamic group Al-Shabaab and government forces continued. Al-Shabaab is suspected to have a connection with Al-Qaeda[2]. In addition, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for terrorist attacks occurred in Uganda in July 2010.

In Algeria, there were a series of terrorist attacks in 2007 targeting the government and army. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)[3] claimed responsibility for these attacks. In addition to Algeria, in recent years AQIM factions have also been said to be active in sub-Saharan countries (Mali, Niger, and Mauritania). The group has mainly targeted westerners, and there have been cases of kidnappings of westerners apparently conducted by the group[4] since 2008.

South Asia has long been suffering frequent terrorist attacks. In India, many foreign citizens, including a Japanese national, fell victim to the Mumbai terrorist attacks in November 2008, and so-called Naxalites, a group of extremists active particularly in Eastern provinces, pose security threats[5]. Pakistan has also experienced a number of terrorist attacks targeting religious facilities and government organizations masterminded by Tahrike Taliban Pakistan (TTP)[6] or Al-Qaeda.

Southeast Asia is still subject to frequent terrorist threats, particularly by Islamic extremists, although some progress has been made in countering terrorist organizations. In Indonesia, a terrorist training camp in the northern Sumatran province of Aceh was discovered and more than 120 individuals were captured in February 2010, which indicate some progress with their efforts to crack down on terrorists. In the Philippines, it is pointed that the communist New People's Army (NPA) and the Islamic extremist Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), that have long been the biggest domestic public security concerns have now significantly weakened[7].

(See Fig. I-2-3-1)

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1 "Worldwide Threat Assessment" by DNI (January 2012) reports bombing attempts in February 2012 believed to be the work of AQAP and combat between Al-Qaeda-affiliated militants and government troops in March 2012.

2 Leaders of Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda have been reported to be united in February 2012.

3 An Islamic extremist organization established in Algeria in 1998 as the Salafist Group for Preaching

and Combat (GSPC). It then changed the name to the current one after it officially joined Al-Qaeda in September 2006.

[4] "Country Reports on Terrorism 2010," United States Department of State (August 2011). An anti-government group in northern Mali has declared independence in April 2012; escalation of AQIM activities is a growing concern.

[5] "Country Reports on Terrorism 2010," United States Department of State (August 2011)

[6] A terrorist organization based in Pakistan formed in 2007. It claimed responsibility for suicidal attack on U.S. military base in Afghanistan in December 2009 and suicidal attack on U.S. consulate in Peshawar in April 2010, and it is alleged to be involved in assassination of former Prime Minister Bhutto in 2007.

[7] "Country report on Terrorism 2010," United States Department of State (August 2011)

Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Chapter 2 Issues in the International Community

Section 4 Complex and Diverse Regional Conflicts and Approaches of the International Community

1. Efforts to Stabilize the International Community

The characteristics of regional conflicts recently emerging around the world differ from one to another. They may result from various ethnic, religious, territorial, or resource-related issues, and some are entangled at multiple levels in each region. They also range in form from armed conflict to sustained armed confrontation. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that the impact of global-scale problems such as climate change could also constitute a cause of conflict[1]. In addition, human rights violations, refugees, famine, poverty, and terrorism resulting from the conflicts sometimes evolve into international issues. For that reason, it has become increasingly important that the international community discern the character of such complex and diverse conflicts, consider international frameworks and involvements matched to their particular circumstances, and then seek out appropriate responses.

The end of the Cold War was accompanied by rising expectations for the peacekeeping system by the United Nations, which up to that time had not functioned adequately, and, as a result, many U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO) were established. Their roles have come to include civilian activities encompassing disarmament monitoring, security organization reforms, election and administration monitoring, and humanitarian assistance for refugees returning home, as well as their traditional roles of the monitoring of truce and withdrawals of armed forces[2]. In addition to the PKO activities, there are cases in which multinational forces and regional organizations, that have been authorized by the U.N. Security Council, are in charge of conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace-building operations.

However, the environment surrounding peacekeeping operations in recent years has grown increasingly harsh. Although some of their activities have been vested with strong authority under Article 7 of the Charter of the United Nations, there remain issues of securing equipment and materials, ensuring the security of personnel and the capability improvement of forces, all of which are essential for the effective performance of operations in areas with poor infrastructure. The Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support of the United Nations created “A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for U.N. Peacekeeping” in July 2009 to make an assessment of the major policy and strategy dilemma of U.N. peacekeeping and to discuss passive solutions among stakeholders[3]. The United Nations used this document to work on the so-called “New Horizon Process” and published the first report to update the status of the process in October 2010. The report mentions that intensified efforts have been made in developing guidelines for critical areas like protection of civilians[4] and peace-building and developing capabilities required to execute missions, all of which are the issues of the reform of the peacekeeping operations. The second report released in December 2011 describes the progress in these areas.

[1] In April 2007, a panel discussion on the impact of climate change on security was held at the Security Council, in which 55 member and non-member states participated. This shows that the awareness that climate change may have an impact on the security environment is becoming increasingly pervasive. Furthermore, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) released by the U.S. Department of Defense in February 2010 regards climate change as a key factor that will shape the future security environment. It claims that climate change may accelerate instability and conflict by causing water and food scarcity, the spread of disease, and so on.

[2] The number of personnel dispatched declined temporarily to about 12,000 after 1993 when large-scale PKO missions were sent to the Balkan Peninsula and Somalia, However, from around 2000, the number of personnel dispatched began to rise again following increase in large-scale missions mainly in Africa and the Middle East. The scale of the PKO peaked in 2010 (with 102,000 personnel dispatched to 15 missions as of the end of March 2010). As of the end of May 2012, 16 peacekeeping operations are conducted in 117 countries, with about 99,000 participants from around the world.

[3] As U.N. peacekeeping operation capabilities come close to their limit with increasing diversification and expansion of their roles, the paper revealed its analysis on the status quo of peacekeeping operations and a direction for their improvement. It also points out the necessity of continuous consultation among those concerned, and the necessity of developing guidelines and strategy regarding ways to implement peacekeeping operations mandates. Furthermore, it shows that U.N. peacekeeping operations critically lack mobility such as helicopters, logistics and transportation troops, police organizations with specific expertise, and female personnel.

[4] The protection of civilians has recently been becoming more important in peacekeeping operations (PKO). In 1999, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNASMIL) was the first mission that had the protection of civilians as its mandate. Currently, eight PKO missions have the protection of civilians as their mandates. However, host countries are mainly responsible for the protection of civilians. PKO which have the protection of civilians as their mandate are also allowed to use force only in self-defense and defense of the mandates under the principles of PKO: 1) consent of the parties, 2) impartiality, and 3) non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate For instance, during the United Nations Operation in Cote d' Ivoire (UNIOCI) in April 2011, military operations were launched to prevent the use of heavy weapons against civilians in accordance with the U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1962 and 1975.

2. Present Condition of Regional Conflicts

1. Situation in Afghanistan

The United States, together with other countries, has been engaged in military operations against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in and around Afghanistan since October 2001, in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

A number of efforts are being made in Afghanistan. These include operations to mop-up the Taliban as part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and support for the maintenance of security provided by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)[1], which is led by NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), as well as improvement of the security environment and reconstruction assistance in parts of Afghanistan by the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)[2]. In addition, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) provides coordination across various fields, such as politics, reconstruction and development, and humanitarian assistance between the Afghan Government, ISAF, and the relevant U.N. agencies. On top of this, the Afghan Government, with the assistance of the international community, is making efforts to improve the security situation in the country, such as improvement of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) (National Army and Police)[3].

With the efforts of the international community and the Afghan Government, the security situation is improving in many parts of Afghanistan; however, security in southern, southeastern and eastern Afghanistan which borders with Pakistan is still a matter of concern. There also occurred assassinations of high government officials and attacks on public organizations in the Capital Kabul[4].

The Taliban secures safe havens in Pakistan and remains resilient against ANSF-ISAF operations, but it is believed that the capacity has erodes[5]. The United States realizes the significance of the role of Pakistan in war on terror and seeks to build an effective partnership with Pakistan. However, U.S.-Pakistan relations have deteriorated throughout 2011[6].

The Afghan Government is committed to complete the transition of responsibility for security by the end of 2014 and its first phase commenced in seven areas in July 2011. Furthermore, President Hamid Karzai specified the areas for the second and third phase of the transition in November 2011 and May 2012 respectively.

In June 2011, President Obama announced a policy to commence the withdrawal of U.S. forces in July 2011, with 10,000 troops withdrawing by the end of the year, and additional 23,000 troops (a total of 33,000) by the summer of 2012. Major NATO countries also announced their policies for withdrawal of forces by 2014[7].

On the other hand, the reconstruction of Afghanistan continues to face a mountain of challenges, such as preventing corruption, strengthening the rule of law, restoring security, enhancing counternarcotics efforts and facilitating local development. Therefore, support from the international community is still needed. In

May 2012, President Karzai and President Obama signed the “Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement"[8] which provides for the possibility of U.S. forces in Afghanistan after 2014. At the NATO Chicago Summit held in May 2012, ISAF nations reaffirmed their enduring commitment to Afghan security beyond 2014 when the transition is completed and decided to make the shift from a combat mission to a new training, advising and assistance mission after 2014.

2. Situation over the Middle East peace effort

Between Israel and Palestine, the Oslo Agreement concluded in 1993 marked the beginning of a peace process through comprehensive negotiations; however, the Israelis and the Palestinians subsequently suspended negotiations due to the second intifada that started in 2000 and resulted in reciprocal violence between the two parties. In 2003, the Israelis and the Palestinians agreed on a “Roadmap” that laid out a course leading to the establishment of a Middle East peace initiative based on the principle of the peaceful coexistence between the two nations. However, the Roadmap has yet to be implemented. Negotiations between Israel and Palestine were then halted as the result of large-scale Israeli military operations, such as air raids and deployment of ground forces to the Gaza Strip from the end of 2008 through early 2009 in response to rocket attacks from the area against Israel. In September 2010, direct negotiations started between Israel and Palestine through arbitration by the United States, but the move was once again interrupted by Israel’s settlement activities in the West Bank of the Jordan River, with no peace agreement concluded as of now[9]. On the Palestinian side, Fatah, the mainstream faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) which seeks peace agreement through negotiations with Israel, and the Islamic fundamentalist organization, Hamas, which does not recognize Israel and advocates a continuation of armed conflict against Israel, had long been pitted against each other, perpetuating political disarray. In May 2011, however, a reconciliation agreement was reached between Fatah and Hamas on forming an interim government.

Israel has yet to sign peace treaties with Syria and Lebanon. Israel and Syria disagree on the return of the Golan Heights which Israel has occupied since the 1967 Arab – Israel War. The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) is deployed in the Golan Heights region to observe the implementation of ceasefire and military disengagement between the two parties[10]. Concerning Israel and Lebanon, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) increased its presence following the 2006 clash between Israel and Hezbollah, a Shiite Muslim organization[11]. Although there have not been any prominent conflicts since[12], there are reports that Hezbollah is enhancing its military strength again[13].

3 Situation in Syria

Since March 2011, anti-government pro-democracy demonstrations have taken place all over the country

in Syria, leading to large casualties through clashes with security forces. The Syrian Government, in response to this situation, took measures such as lifting the state of emergency in April 2011 and holding a referendum on its new constitution in February 2012[14], while deploying military and security forces in a number of cities to rein in demonstrations by force, and conflicts between military forces and defectors in some cities have been reported[15].

In response to the repression of demonstrations by Syrian security authorities, the United States and the European Union (EU) have called on President Bashar al-Assad to step down and imposed sanctions such as freezing assets and banning travel on Assad and other senior regime leaders, and banning oil imports from Syria. The League of Arab States[16] decided on suspension of the Syrian delegation from all Arab League meetings and economic sanctions against Syria in November 2011, and had sent observers to Syria to monitor a cessation of violence from December 2011 to January 2012. The U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolutions in December 2011 and February 2012 to call on the Syrian government to immediately end all human rights violations and attacks against civilians[17].

Under such circumstances, since the Syrian government accepted the six-point plan proposed by Kofi Annan, Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States[18], the U.N. Security Council adopted the Resolution 2043 in April 2012 to establish the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), comprising unarmed military observers and others, to monitor a cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties as well as to monitor and support the implementation of the Envoy's six-point proposal, and subsequently the UNSMIS personnel initiated its activities in Syria. Despite these efforts of the international community, it has been reported that violence across Syria has not stopped and casualties have been mounting. As UNSMIS suspended its activities in June 2012 due to an intensification of armed violence, the future prospect of Syrian situation remains uncertain.

4 Situation in Libya

With the continued control over Libya by the Brother Leader and Guide of the Revolution Qadhafi over a long period of time, his administration resorted to the use of violence against its own citizens, when it faced the anti-government demonstrations in February 2011. The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1973, which decides to establish a ban on all flights in Libyan airspace and authorizes U.N. Member States to take any necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas under threat of attack in Libya. Following this move, multinational forces, composed of forces from countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, and France, initiated military operations against Libya in March 19, 2011. The U.S. commanded and controlled the multinational forces at the initial stage, but the authority to command and control all the military operations was transferred to NATO by the end of March 2011[19].

After the military activities were initiated by the multinational forces, the Transitional National Council (TNC) organized by anti-government forces dominated the battle with the Qadhafi's regime and gradually expanded its zone of control. In August 2011, the TNC seized control of most of Tripoli, the nation's capital, leading to the de facto collapse of the 42-year rule of Qadhafi's regime.

Even after the fall of Tripoli, Pro-Qadhafi forces continued fighting in Sirte, birthplace of Qadhafi, and some other places, but the TNC took control of Sirte on October 20, 2011 and announced the death of Qadhafi, which was followed by the Declaration of Liberation on October 23. The NATO-led multinational forces ended its operation on October 31[20].

Then, an interim government headed by interim Prime Minister El-Keib was formed on November 22, 2011. Through the National Congress election, scheduled to be held in July 2012, Libya is slated to draw up a new constitution and transfer to a permanent government. The development of democratization process of the country attracts attention.

5. Situation in Sudan and South Sudan

In Sudan, a 20-year north-south civil war broke out in 1983 between the Sudanese Government, which is predominantly composed of Muslim Arabs from northern Sudan, and anti-government forces comprising African Christians from southern Sudan. In response to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that was concluded between the north and the south in 2005, the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), established by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1590, has been deployed and is assisting the implementation of the CPA and facilitation and coordination of returning refuges and internally displaced people. In July 2009 the Permanent Court of Arbitration announced its final decision on the boundary line for the Abyei area in the center of Sudan, which was premised on the settlement of the north-south boundary line. A referendum bill on the independence of the south and attribution of the Abyei area was enacted at the end of December 2009[21].

In January 2011, a referendum was held to determine the validity of the separation and the independence of the Southern Government in accordance with the CPA and the referendum committee for Southern Sudan announced that the final result showed that the independence of Southern Sudan was supported by a 98.83% supermajority. Then, the Republic of South Sudan became an independent nation on July 9, 2011. The United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) was established in accordance with the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1996, adopted on the day before[22]. Through the mediation by the African Union, the governments of Sudan and South Sudan signed a Memorandum of Understanding on, Non-aggression and cooperation in February 2012; however, even after the independence, little progress has been made in unsettled issues, such as North-South border dispute, including the attribution of Abyei area, and revenue sharing of South Sudan oil. Tensions between the two states have escalated after late March 2012; while the Sudan military launched air raids on South

Sudan's Unity state, the South Sudan military occupied Heglig, in the Sudanese province of South Kordofan. In response to these situations, the United Nations Security Council adopted the Resolution 2046 calling on both countries to cease all the hostilities immediately, and attention will be paid to the future trends.

In the Darfur region of western Sudan, conflict intensified between the Arab government and the African antigovernment forces in around 2003. The conflict in Darfur has produced a large number of internally displaced persons, which the international community, including the United Nations, regards as a serious humanitarian crisis. After the government and a fraction of the major anti-government forces concluded the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May 2006, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1769 in July 2007, which stipulated the creation of the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The Sudanese Government and anti-government groups based in Darfur, including the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), have engaged in peace negotiations intermittently since February 2010 in Doha, the capital of Qatar, through arbitration by the United Nations, the AU, and Qatar. In July 2011, the government of Sudan and the "Liberation and Justice Movement" (LIM) signed the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD). However, battles between the government and anti-government forces have continually occurred. In addition, anti-government forces refuse to participate in negotiations and funding is lacking. These factors cause delay in implementation of the peacekeeping process.

6 Situation in Somalia

Somalia had been in a state of anarchy since 1991, but in 2005, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was inaugurated. However, battle raged between the TFG and the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), an Islamic fundamentalist organization, and other groups opposed to the TFG. Ethiopian forces intervened in response to the request from the TFG and eliminated the UIC in December 2006. In January 2007, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was established, and in August 2008 in Djibouti a peace agreement was concluded between the TFG and Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS), which was formed by the UIC and other groups. In January 2009, ARS leader Sheikh Sharif was elected as new President of the TFG. However, as illustrated by intensified battles between TFG and anti-government Islamist militia groups such as Al-Shabaab since May 2009, tensions remains high in Somalia. In addition, Kenya claimed Al-Shabaab is responsible for a series of kidnappings of foreigners near the Kenya-Somalia border[23]. In October 2011, Kenya deployed its forces to Somalia with the aim of routing Al-Shabaab. The situation in Somalia has entered upon a new phase.

In the waters surrounding Somalia, the number of incidents of piracy and armed robbery increased rapidly in 2008[24]. The Security Council has adopted multiple resolutions since the summer of 2008, calling on member states to dispatch ships as anti-piracy measures. Against this background, a number of countries have dispatched their ships to waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden to undertake

anti-piracy missions.

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[1] Under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001), establishment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was approved with the principal mission of maintaining security in Kabul and the surrounding areas. ISAF has gradually expanded its area of deployment since December 2003. Since October 2006, ISAF has been deployed throughout Afghanistan. The mission of the ISAF will be completed by the end of 2014. As of May 2012, approximately 130,000 troops from 50 countries have been dispatched to ISAF.

[2] The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are designed to extend the authority of the Afghan Central Government across the country, and work to improve the security environment and implement reconstruction and development activities. The PRTs are comprised of military personnel and civilian reconstruction assistance personnel. As of April 2012, there are 28 teams active in various parts of the country.

[3] The Afghan National Security Forces have about 344,000 personnel (195,000 of the Afghan National Army and 149,000 of the Afghan National Police) (as of May 2012). The size of the Security Forces will grow to about 352,000 personnel by October 2012, which will be maintained for three years, and then will be reduced.

[4] Jan Mohammad Khan, a senior adviser to President Karzai, was murdered at his home in July 2011 and former president Burhanuddin Rabbani (Head of Afghan Supreme Council) was killed in a suicide bombing at home in September 2011. In the same month, rockets were fired at the U.S. Embassy, and in April 2012, foreign embassies including that of Japan, and ISAF headquarters got attacked by rockets. These incidents all took place in Kabul.

[5] U.S. Department of Defense, "Report on Progress Towards Security and Stability in Afghanistan" (April 2012), etc.

[6] The U.S. conducted a military raid to kill Osama Bin Laden in May 2011 without notifying Pakistan beforehand. The ISAF helicopters attacked border posts in Pakistan in November 2011. These incidents are thought to have caused the troubled U.S.-Pakistan relations.

[7] Canada started the withdrawal of its combat forces in July 2011 and currently, only the training forces are stationed. The U.K., Germany, France, Italy and Poland also expressed their intention to leave.

[8] As of May 2012, Afghanistan has also signed long-term strategic partnership agreements with India, Italy, France, U.K. and Australia.

[9] While there is no prospect of resuming the talks, Palestine applied for admission to membership as a nation in the United Nations in September 2011. In November 2011, however, a report was submitted from the Committee on the Admission of New Members of the U.N. Security Council, stating that the Committee was "unable to make a unanimous recommendation."

[10] Military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) are also active within this region.

[11] Ditto

[12] The tension along the border between Israel and Lebanon has occasionally been heightened with incidents such as the one that took place in August 2010, where troops from both sides initiated exchange of fire on a limited scale at border areas and caused casualties. However, the situation has not been aggravated.

[13] Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 1559 (April 2010), etc.

[14] Some reforms are included in the new constitution, such as the removal of the provision that stated that "the leading party in the society and the state is the Socialist Arab Ba'ath Party" from the old one and introduction of the presidential term limit.

[15] According to reports by the independent international committee of inquiry of the U.N. Human Rights Council, 8,079 had killed during the period from March 15, 2011 to February 15, 2012 and additional 207 deaths were confirmed from February 15 to May 10, 2012. Under these circumstances, in May and June 2011 pro-Palestine protestors opposing Israel tried to intrude in the Israel-controlled Golan Heights from the Syrian side, clashing with Israeli Defense Forces and causing casualties.

[16] The members are 21 states and one organization (Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan,

Yemen, Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Kuwait, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Comoro, and the Palestine Liberation Organization)

[17] The U.N. Security Council failed to adopt a resolution on Syria, which was vetoed by China and Russia twice in October 2011 and February 2012. In February 2012, meanwhile, the Chairman's Conclusions, whose substance was similar to the U.N. General Assembly resolutions mentioned in the main text, was adopted by the "Group of Friends of the Syrian People" participated by 60 countries and representatives from international organizations (the U.N. the EU, the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation, the Arab Maghreb Union, the League of Arab States, and the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf).

[18] The Plan contains the following six points, which asks the Syrian authorities to: (1) commit to work with the Special Envoy in a Syrian-led political process; (2) commit to stop fighting and achieve an effective United Nations supervised cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties; (3) accept and implement a daily two-hour humanitarian truce to ensure provision of humanitarian assistance; (4) intensify the pace and scale of release of arbitrarily detained persons; (5) ensure freedom of movement for journalists; and (6) respect freedom of association and the right to demonstrate peacefully as legally guaranteed.

[19] Initially the United States Africa Command, one of the Unified Combatant Commands of the U.S. Armed Forces, commanded and controlled the multinational forces. After the authority was transferred to NATO, the Allied Joint Force Command located in Naples, Italy, commanded and controlled the Allied Air Command in Izmir, Turkey, and the Allied Maritime Command in Naples.

[20] The military operation by NATO is called "Operation Unified Protector" with the following three elements: (1) protection of civilians from the attacks by the Libyan government forces; (2) establishment of a no-fly zone; and (3) enhancement of arms embargo to Libya. After the end of March 2011, when all the command and control authorities were transferred to NATO, the number of air mission by the multinational forces exceeded 26,500 sorties, of which more than 9,700 strike sorties have been carried out.

[21] The Abyei area was one of the bloodiest battlefields during the North-South conflict. Both the North and the South claim sovereignty over the area due to its abundant oil resources. Although the territorial issue was to be settled in referendum in January 2011 according to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the referendum has not yet been held and the issue remains to be settled. In May 2011, a battle began between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). In June 2011, the Security Council established under its Resolution 1990 the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) in the region.

[22] The initial period was one year with up to 7,000 military personnel and up to 900 police personnel. UNMISS is on the ground to consolidate peace and security and to help establish conditions for development in Republic of South Sudan. Specifically the mandate of UNMISS is as follows: (1) support for peace consolidation and thereby fostering long-term state building and economic development, (2) support the Government of the Republic of South Sudan in exercising its responsibilities for conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution and protect civilians, and (3) support the Government of the Republic of South Sudan in developing its capacity to provide security, to establish rule of law, and to strengthen the security and justice sectors.

[23] For example, it is reported that a British couple was attacked by an unknown group in Lamu island, a Kenyan resort, in September 2011 and a French woman was kidnapped on the opposite shore of the island of Lamu in October 2011.

[24] According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), there were 237 cases of piracy by Somali pirates in 2011 (37 in the Gulf of Aden, 160 along the Somali coast, 39 in the Red Sea, and 1 along the Oman coast).

Part II The Basics of Japan's Defense Policy and Dynamic Defense Force

Chapter 1 The Basic Concepts of Japan's Security and Defense Policy

Section 1 Measures to Ensure Japan's Security

Peace and safety are vital to ensuring that people can live without fear and so that Japan can continue to develop and prosper. In addition, national independence must be protected in order to allow Japan to individually determine how its politics, economy, and society should be, and maintain its culture, tradition, and values. Peace, safety, and independence cannot be secured by wishing alone. Indeed, these can only be secured by comprehensively implementing various measures in consideration of the current situation of the increasingly interdependent international community, including for Japan's own defense capabilities, diplomatic efforts, and cooperation between allied nations and the international community.

Dependence on foreign trade for resources and food is particularly high, and maintaining peace and cooperation in the international community is of tremendous importance to Japan, as it places the foundation for its development and prosperity on free trade. For this reason, Japan is working to strengthen bilateral cooperative relationships such as the Japan–U.S. alliance[1] while actively advancing regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and with the United Nations, and to prevent and resolve conflicts and disputes, develop economically, promote arms control and disarmament, ensure maritime security, and enhance mutual understanding and trust. Domestically Japan also works to enrich the backbone of the people, which is characterized by ensuring stable lifestyles for the people and protecting the country, while also working to establish a security foundation by implementing various measures in such sectors as the economy and education so as not to allow for openings that would invite an invasion.

Meanwhile, the reality of the current international community suggests that it is not necessarily possible to prevent invasions from the outside via nonmilitary means alone, and in the event that Japan was invaded it would not be able to remove said threat. Defense capabilities are Japan's ultimate guarantee for security, expressing the will and capacity of Japan to defend against foreign invasions. In this way, the function of defense capabilities cannot be substituted by any other method. For this reason, defense capabilities are vital for ensuring an appropriate response to various contingencies arising from the security challenges and destabilizing factors, which are diverse, complex, and intertwined, as outlined in Part I. Moreover, from the perspective of improving the security environment surrounding Japan and preventing threats to our country from emerging, importance is growing for the role played by defense capabilities in areas such as cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and working together as a member of the international community. In consideration of the factors above, Japan is advancing the development of a proper level of defense capabilities. The security of Japan is ensured through such individual efforts to develop adequate defense capabilities along with Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements to formulate watertight defense measures.

Japan recognizes the important role played by its defense capabilities and works in a variety of fields to

ensure national security while also aiming to create peace and safety for the Asia-Pacific region and consequently the entire world.

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[1] In general, this refers to the relationship, based on the Japan-U.S. Security System, whereby both nations, as countries sharing fundamental values and interests, coordinate and cooperate closely in a range of areas in security, politics and economics.

Part II The Basics of Japan's Defense Policy and Dynamic Defense Force

Chapter 1 The Basic Concepts of Japan's Security and Defense Policy

Section 2 The Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense

1. The Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense

Since the end of World War II, Japan has worked hard to build a peace-loving nation far from the miseries of war. The Japanese people desire lasting peace, and the principle of pacifism is enshrined in the Constitution, of which Article 9 renounces war, the possession of war potential, and the right of belligerency by the state. Nonetheless, since Japan is an independent nation, these provisions do not deny Japan's inherent right of self-defense as a sovereign state.

Since the right of self-defense is not denied, the Government interprets this to mean that the Constitution allows Japan to possess the minimum level of armed force needed to exercise that right. Therefore, the Government, as part of its exclusively national defense-oriented policy under the Constitution, maintains the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) as an armed organization, and continues to keep it equipped and ready for operations.

2. The Government's View on Article 9 of the Constitution

1. The Permitted Self-Defense Capability

Under the Constitution, Japan is permitted to possess the minimum necessary level of self-defense capability

The specific limit may vary with the prevailing international situation, the technologies available, and various other factors, and it is discussed and decided according to annual budgets and other factors by the Diet on behalf of the people. Whether such capability constitutes a "war potential" that is prohibited by Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution must be considered within the context of Japan's overall military strength. Therefore, whether the SDF should be allowed to possess certain armaments depends on whether such possession would cause its total military strength to exceed the constitutional limit.

The possession of armaments deemed to be offensive weapons designed to be used only for the mass destruction of another country, which would, by definition, exceed the minimum necessary level, is not permissible under any circumstances. For example, the SDF is not allowed to possess intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), long-range strategic bombers, or attack aircraft carriers.

2. Requirements for Exercising the Right of Self-Defense

The Government interprets Article 9 of the Constitution to mean that armed force can be used to exercise the right of self-defense only when the following three conditions are met: (1) When there is an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression against Japan; (2) When there is no appropriate means to deal with such aggression other than by resorting to the right of self-defense; and (3) When the use of armed force is confined to be the minimum necessary level.

3. Geographic Boundaries within which the Right of Self-Defense may be Exercised

The use of the minimum necessary force to defend Japan under the right of self-defense is not necessarily confined to the geographic boundaries of Japanese territory, territorial waters and airspace. However, it is difficult to give a general definition of the actual extent to which it may be used, as this would vary with the situation.

Nevertheless, the Government interprets that the Constitution does not permit armed troops to be dispatched to the land, sea, or airspace of other countries with the aim of using force; such overseas deployment of troops would exceed the definition of the minimum necessary level of self-defense.

4. The Right of Collective Self-Defense

International law permits a state to have the right of collective self-defense, which is the right to use force to stop an armed attack on a foreign country with which the state has close relations, even if the state itself is not under direct attack. Since Japan is a sovereign state, it naturally has the right of collective self-defense under international law. Nevertheless, the Japanese Government believes that the exercise of the right of collective self-defense exceeds the minimum necessary level of self-defense authorized under Article 9 of the Constitution and is not permissible.

5. The Right of Belligerency

Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution prescribes that “the right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized”. However, the “right of belligerency” does not mean the right to engage in battle; rather, it is a general term for various rights that a belligerent nation has under international law, including the authority to inflict casualties and damage upon the enemy’s military force and to occupy enemy territory.

On the other hand, Japan may of course use the minimum level of force necessary to defend itself. For example, if Japan inflicts casualties and damage upon the enemy’s military force in exercising its right of self-defense, this is conceptually distinguished from the exercise of the right of belligerency, even though those actions do not appear to be different. Occupation of enemy territory, however, would exceed the minimum necessary level of self-defense and is not permissible.

Part II The Basics of Japan's Defense Policy and Dynamic Defense Force

Chapter 1 The Basic Concepts of Japan's Security and Defense Policy

Section 3 The Basis of Defense Policy

1. Basic Policy for National Defense

Under the Constitution, Japan has adhered to its Basic Policy for National Defense, which was adopted by the National Defense Council[1] and approved by the Cabinet in 1957.

The national defense objectives provided in the Basic Policy for National Defense are to prevent direct and indirect invasions of Japan, eliminate threats for the remote chance that Japan is invaded, and thus protect the independence and peace of Japan as a democratic nation. In addition, the Basic Policy lays down the following four items as a basic policy for achieving these objectives.

(1) Support the activities of the United Nations, cooperate with other nations, and aim to achieve world peace.

(2) Establish the foundation necessary to ensure a stable quality of life for the people, boost nationalism, and guarantee the nation's safety.

(3) Progressively develop efficient national defense capabilities to the necessary limit for self-defense in accordance with national power and circumstances.

(4) Deal with foreign invasions of Japan based on security arrangements formed with the United States until the United Nations becomes able to effectively prevent the said threats.

See Reference 6

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1 The function of this Council was taken over by the Security Council of Japan in 1986.

2. Other Basic Policies

Under the Basic Policy for National Defense, Japan has been building a modest defense capability under the Constitution for exclusively defense-oriented purposes without becoming a military power that could threaten other countries, while adhering to the principle of civilian control of the military, observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, and firmly maintaining the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements.

1. Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy

The exclusively defense-oriented policy means that Japan will not employ defensive force unless and until an armed attack is mounted on Japan by another country, and even in such a case, only the minimum force necessary to defend itself may be used. Furthermore, only the minimum defense forces necessary for self-defense should be retained and used. This exclusively defense-oriented policy is a passive defense strategy that is consistent with the spirit of the Constitution.

2. Not Becoming a Military Power

There is no established definition for the term “military power”. For Japan, however, not becoming a military power that could threaten the security of other countries means that Japan will not possess more military force than is necessary for self-defense and that could pose a threat to other countries.

3. The Three Non-Nuclear Principles

The Three Non-Nuclear Principles are that Japan: will not possess nuclear weapons, will not produce nuclear weapons, and will not allow nuclear weapons into Japan. Japan adheres to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles as a fixed national policy.

Japan is prohibited from manufacturing or possessing nuclear weapons also under the Atomic Energy Basic Law[1]. In addition, Japan ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and as a non-nuclear weapons state, is not permitted to produce or acquire nuclear weapons[2].

4. Securing Civilian Control

Civilian control of the military means the subordination of the military to the political control in a democratic state, or in other words, control over the military by democratic political authority.

Learning lessons from World War II, Japan has adopted the following strict civilian control system that is entirely different from the one under the former Constitution[3]. Civilian control ensures that the SDF is

maintained and operated in accordance with the will of the people.

The Diet, representing Japanese people, decides laws and budget including the allotted number of uniformed SDF personnel and principal institutions of the MOD/SDF. It also approves issuance of Defense Operation Orders.

The function of national defense entirely falls under the executive power of the Cabinet as a part of general administrative functions. The Constitution requires the Prime Minister and other Ministers of State in the Cabinet to be civilians. Under the Constitution, the Prime Minister, on behalf of the whole Cabinet, is the commander-in-chief of the SDF. The Minister of Defense, who is exclusively in charge of national defense, exercises general control over SDF activities. In addition, the Security Council of Japan[4] under the Cabinet deliberates important matters on national defense.

As for the Ministry of Defense, the Minister of Defense is in charge of administrative affairs concerning national defense, and controls and manages the SDF. The Minister of Defense is assisted in planning policies by the Senior Vice-Minister and two Parliamentary Secretaries[5].

In addition, special advisors to the Minister of Defense counsel the Minister of Defense on important issues under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense based on their expertise and experience. The Defense Council consisting of political appointees, civil servants and uniformed SDF personnel of the Ministry of Defense deliberates on basic principles under the Ministry's jurisdiction. Through these ways, the Ministry of Defense aims to further enhance the civilian control system.

See Part III, Chapter 4, Section1

As mentioned above, the civilian control system is well-established. It is necessary that Japanese people have deep interests on national defense and we need both political and administrative efforts to ensure the civilian control function effectively.

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1 Article 2 of the Atomic Energy Basic Law states that "The research, development and utilization of atomic energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes, aimed at ensuring safety and performed independently under democratic management."

2 Article 2 of the NPT states that "Each non-nuclear weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes....not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices..."

3 The Cabinet's control over military matters was limited

4 Members of the Security Council are the Prime Minister (chairman); Minister designated pursuant to Article 9 of the Cabinet Law (Minister of State pre-designated to perform duties of the Prime Minister temporarily when the Prime Minister is absent, involved in an accident, or in a similar situation); Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications; Minister for Foreign Affairs; Minister of Finance; Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry; Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism; Minister of Defense; the Chief Cabinet Secretary; and Chairperson of the National Public Safety Commission.

5 In addition, to help the Minister of Defense effectively handle administrative work related to national defense and to reliably manage the SDF, other systems to assist the Minister have been established. See Part III, Chapter 4, Section 1 for the organization of the SDF, including such advisory systems to the Minister.

Part II The Basics of Japan's Defense Policy and Dynamic Defense Force

Chapter 2 The National Defense Program Guidelines

The National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) set forth the basic policies for Japan's security, as well as a basic guidelines for Japan's defense force in the future, including the significance and role of Japan's defense force, the specific organization of the SDF, and the target levels of major defense equipment to be developed.

The NDPG were first established as "the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY1977 and beyond" (1976 NDPG), and the guidelines have been revised three times in the following sequences: "the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY1996 and beyond" (1995 NDPG), "the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2005 and beyond" (2004 NDPG), and "the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2011 and beyond" (2010 NDPG).

This chapter explains the history and the contents of the 2010 NDPG.

See Reference 7

Section 1 Background of Establishing the 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines

The matters considered during the formulation of the 2010 National Defense program Guidelines are the following.

1. Overall state of international situation—the increasing complexity of issues and further diversification of the role of military capabilities

With the increasing interdependency among countries and the decreasing possibility of large-scale wars between major countries, the increasing risk that conflict and security issues in one country may impact the rest of the world directly is becoming more apparent. Amidst such circumstances, in addition to regional conflicts, there is also an increasing trend of "gray zone" conflicts, which are not to escalate to armed conflicts over territory and sovereignty, as well as economic interests. Furthermore, with the increasing strength of powers such as China, India, and Russia alongside the relative change of the influence of the United States, the global balance of power is also shifting.

Response to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, international terrorist organizations, and acts of piracy remains a pressing issue, and regional conflicts as well as the presence of countries with a weakened or collapsed governing system may also impact the global security environment. In addition, risks to the stable use of the seas, space, and cyberspace pose new problems, and, in the long run, there is also a need to pay attention to the impact of climate change on the security environment.

Such global security issues involve a complex web of complicated issues (international terrorism, weakening governing systems, etc.) and there is a trend for such issues to develop into cross-border security problems. It is exceedingly difficult for any country to tackle these issues alone, and it is important for countries that share common interests to work together even under normal conditions.

Amidst such circumstances, the role of the military in the international community is becoming even more diversified. There are increasing chances for the military, in cooperation with civilian sectors, to play an important role in the non-traditional security field, such as conflict prevention, reconstruction assistance and other peace-building efforts, humanitarian aid and disaster relief, and anti-piracy measures, in addition to deterring and dealing with military conflicts, and nurturing relationships of trust and friendship between countries.

2. Situation in the Asia-Pacific region—deepening cooperative relationships, and unpredictable and uncertain elements

With expanding and deepening relationships of interdependency, efforts are being made to enrich and strengthen cooperative relationships between countries in order to resolve security issues. In particular, concrete steps are being taken to work together toward resolution of the issues particularly in non-traditional security areas.

On the other hand, changes to the global balance of power brought about by the growing power of China, India, and Russia are becoming apparent in this region. Large-scale military capabilities, including nuclear force, are still concentrated in the region surrounding Japan, and many countries are modernizing their military capabilities and intensifying activities by military and related organizations. In addition, the presence of maritime and territorial issues, as well as problems relating to the Korean Peninsula and the Strait of Taiwan, leave behind a trail of unpredictable and uncertain elements.

North Korea has kept up the development, deployment, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles while maintaining a large-scale special operations force. It is also carrying out repeated military provocations on the Korean Peninsula. Such military actions are perceived as an urgent and serious destabilizing factor in the security of this region, including Japan, and pose a serious challenge to international non-proliferation efforts. China, which continues to grow as a major power, is playing an increasingly important role in the region and in the world. On the other hand, China has continued to increase its military expenditure, and is comprehensively modernizing its military capabilities—centered on nuclear and missile capabilities and its navy and air force—at a rapid rate. Besides putting in efforts to strengthen its power projection capability, it is also expanding and intensifying activities in the surrounding waters. Such trends, alongside a lack of transparency with regard to China's military and security affairs, are becoming a cause for concern in the region and within the international community. With regard to Russia, although the scale of military force in the Far East region

has shrunk significantly after the end of the Cold War, military activities continue to intensify.
Amidst such circumstances, the United States is placing a heavier emphasis on cooperating with its allies and partner countries, such as Japan, Korea, and Australia, and is making efforts to strengthen security relationships through bilateral and multilateral frameworks, with the aim of strengthening its ties with this region. Such efforts play an important role in ensuring peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and serve as a platform for U.S. efforts in tackling global security issues.

3. Characteristics of Japan

Japan's territory consists of vast areas of ocean. It is a trading nation that depends heavily on overseas markets and on foreign countries for food and resources. The security of the seas and the stability of international order are vital to Japan's prosperity. Japan's topography is marked by the seas that surround it, long coastlines, and numerous islands. Not only is it susceptible to disasters, the concentration of industries, population, and information infrastructure in the cities, as well as the large number of important facilities located at its coastal areas, make it vulnerable to security threats.

4. Issues to be tackled

In consideration of the issues raised in points 1 to 3, despite the unlikelihood of a full-scale invasion against Japan that may threaten its very existence, such as a large-scale landing invasion, the security issues and destabilizing factors faced by Japan are diverse, complex, and intertwined. While Japan must respond in an appropriate manner to contingencies arising from them, it is important, at the same time, to cooperate with allies, friendly nations, and other countries involved, to proactively tackle both regional and global security issues.

Part II The Basics of Japan's Defense Policy and Dynamic Defense Force

Chapter 2 The National Defense Program Guidelines

Section 2 Contents of the 2010 NDPG

This section explains the concept of the defense force described in the 2010 NDPG and the posture and structure of the SDF.

1. Basic Concept – Developing a Dynamic Defense Force

In order to react to the changing security environment, a major characteristic of the 2010 NDPG is the principle of developing a "Dynamic Defense Force."

In the regions surrounding Japan, there still exist large-scale military forces including nuclear forces, and many nations are modernizing their military forces and increasing their military activities. Under these conditions, not only deterrence through the existence of the defense force per se, but also "dynamic deterrence", which focuses on operational use of the defense force such as demonstrating the nation's will and its strong defense capabilities through timely and tailored military operations under normal conditions, is important. Additionally, warning times of contingencies is shortening due to exponential advances in military technology. Thus, in order to respond speedily and seamlessly to a contingency, comprehensive operational performance such as readiness is increasingly important.

Since many of security issues currently exist around the world may spread across national boundaries, international coordination and cooperation are becoming important. Under such circumstances, roles of military forces are tending to be increasingly diversified and becoming more involved in various everyday operations such as humanitarian aids and disaster relief, peace keeping, and providing countermeasures against piracy. The SDF has contributed to many international peace cooperation activities, and their activities abroad have been becoming routine. It is important for the SDF to be capable of continuing and supporting such activities.

Given these conditions, it is necessary that Japan's future defense force acquire dynamism to proactively perform various types of operations in order to effectively fulfill the given roles of the defense force without basing on the "Basic Defense Force Concept" that place priority on "the existence of the defense force." To this end, the 2010 NDPG calls for the development of "Dynamic Defense Force" that has readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability, and versatility, and is reinforced by advanced technology based on the latest trends in the levels of military technology and intelligence capabilities. The concept of this "Dynamic Defense Force" focuses on fulfilling the roles of the defense force through SDF operations.

In order to handle an increasingly challenging security environment, Japan needs to steadily build an appropriate-size defense force. In doing so, and in light of the difficult financial circumstances, the 2010

NDPG state that Japan will carry out “selection and concentration” to selectively concentrate resources on truly necessary functions and bring about structural reform to the defense force to produce increased outcome with limited resources after carrying out drastic optimization and streamlining the SDF overall through fundamental review of the equipment, personnel, organization, and force disposition. Through a fundamental review of personnel management system, it is also stated that Japan will curve personnel costs and improve its efficiency and increasing the SDF strength by lowering its average age, in order to improve the structure of the defense budget, which has a high promotion of personnel cost that currently suppresses the expenditure of SDF activities. One of the characteristics of the 2010 NDPG is that it touches upon structural reform to the defense force and personnel structure reforms as above.

2. Basic Principles of Japan’s Security

The 2010 NDPG begin by defining the basic security principles from the standpoint of clarifying the most basic items for national security of Japan.

Specifically, the following three items are presented: (1) the prevention and elimination of potential threats to Japan and the minimization of the damages thereof; (2) the further stabilization of the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region and the prevention of the occurrence of threats through the improvement of the global security environment; and (3) contribution to world peace and stability and establishing security for people.

To achieve these goals, Japan is committed to make efforts, cooperate with its allies, and promote multi-layered security cooperation in the international community in a comprehensive manner.

Also, under the Constitution, and in line with basic principles such as maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy and not becoming a military powers that poses a threat to other countries, Japan will continue to uphold its basic defense policies such as securing civilian control, maintaining the three non-nuclear principles, and building a modest defense force. At the same time, to address the threat of nuclear weapons, Japan will play a constructive and active role in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts so as to achieve the long-term goal of creating a world without nuclear weapons. At the same time, as long as nuclear weapons do exist, Japan will closely cooperate with the United States to maintain and improve the credibility of the extended deterrence[1], with nuclear deterrent as a vital element and also appropriately implement its own efforts including ballistic missile defense and civil protection.

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[1] This is the U.S. deterrence against attacks on allies and friendly nations of the U. S. such as Japan. Deterrence against attacks on the U. S. itself is called the basic deterrence.

3. Basic Policies to Ensure Japan's Security

1. Japan's own efforts

Based on the understanding that Japan's own efforts are the first and foremost factor in achieving the three goals presented in "2. Basic Principles of Japan's Security," the 2010 NDPG state that Japan will constantly utilize all means to ensure its security under the basic defense policies, and in cooperation with the ally, partners and other countries concerned. In the event of various contingencies arising from security challenges and destabilizing factors facing Japan (hereinafter referred to as "various contingencies"), the nation will seamlessly deal with the situation as it holds.
Furthermore, the Guidelines state that the nation will conduct integrated and strategic activities as follows:

a. The improvement of intelligence collection and analysis capabilities in the government ministries and agencies, a strengthened cross-governmental information security system, the promotion of space development and use of outer space from the perspective of information gathering, communications, and comprehensive strengthening of the posture and response capability to deal with cyber attacks.

b. Cooperation among government organizations under normal conditions; integrated response by the government in the occurrence of various contingencies; examination of functions and systems related to governmental decision-making and response through initiatives such as regular simulations and comprehensive training and exercises; and consideration of necessary actions including legal measures.

c. Establishment of a body in the Prime Minister's Office which will be responsible for national security policy coordination among relevant ministers and for providing advice to the Prime Minister after examination of organization, functions, and structure of the cabinet regarding security issues, including the Security Council.

d. Improvement of systems for responding to various disasters and for civil protection; and close cooperation between national and local governments to ensure an appropriate response.

e. Cooperation among governmental organizations in the efforts to improve the global security environment; participation in international peace cooperation activities in an efficient and effective manner through collaboration and cooperation with non-governmental organization and other entities; review and consideration of the five principles for participation in peacekeeping operations[1] and other policies regarding Japan's participation in consideration of actual situation of U.N. peacekeeping

operations.

f. Efforts to make Japan's security and defense policies easier to understand; and strengthened overseas information dissemination to further deepen international community's understanding of Japan's security and defense policies.

Regarding the defense force, the ultimate guarantee of Japan's national security, Japan will develop "Dynamic Defense Force" as explained in 1. of this section, based on the recognition that represents Japan's will and capability to prevent direct threats to Japan from reaching the country and to eliminate any threat that reached it.

2. Cooperation with its ally

To ensure Japan's peace and security, the Japan-U.S. Alliance is vital and the military presence of the U.S. armed forces in Japan allow countries in the Asia-Pacific region to have a strong sense of security by functioning as deterrence against and response to contingencies in this region. In addition, the Japan-U.S. Alliance is also important for Japan to participate in multilateral security cooperation and effectively respond to global security challenges.

In light of the significance of the Japan-U.S. Security Alliance as described above, Japan will further deepen and develop the Alliance to adapt to the evolving security environment, specifically through the following:

(1) Continuous engagement in strategic dialogue and specific policy coordination with the United States, including bilateral assessment of the security environment and bilateral consultations on common strategic objectives, and roles, missions and capabilities.

(2) The promotion of cooperation in existing fields, including intelligence cooperation, deepening of bilateral contingency planning, various operational cooperation including that upon situations in areas surrounding Japan, ballistic missile defense and equipment and technology cooperation, as well as consultations to improve the credibility of extended deterrence and information security.

(3) Studying measures to enhance Japan-U.S. cooperation with the United States in order to strengthen the U.S. forces' deterrent and response capability to regional contingencies.

(4) Strengthening various regular cooperation, such as joint training and joint/shared usage of facilities, and promote regional and global cooperation through international peace cooperation activities, maintenance and enhancement of global commons such as outer space, cyberspace and sea lanes, as well

as in the field of climate change.

Along with these measures, the new NDPG states that Japan will steadily implement specific measures to review the posture of the U.S. forces in Japan to reduce the burden on local communities such as Okinawa, while maintaining the deterrence provided by the U.S. forces, and it will also take active measures for smoother and more effective stationing of U.S. forces in Japan including Host Nation Support.

3. Multilayered security cooperation with the international community

(1) Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region

Forming a security network through a multilayered combination of bilateral and multilateral security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, together with the Japan-U.S. Alliance, is essential for engaging in efforts for the further stabilization of the security environment of the region effectively.

In light of this point, Japan will strengthen cooperation particular with South Korea and Australia through bilateral initiatives and multilateral cooperation involving the United States. Japan also will maintain and strengthen security cooperation with the nations of ASEAN, and cooperation with India and other nations that share common interest in ensuring the security of maritime navigation from Africa and the Middle East to East Asia.

Furthermore, Japan will promote mutual trust and establish and develop cooperative relationships with China and Russia, both of which have a significant influence on the security of the region. Specifically with China, in line with efforts to establish a “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests,” and recognizing that the reinforcement of a constructive and cooperative relations with China in numerous fields is extremely important, it calls for active engagement, together with the ally and other countries, in encouraging China to take responsible actions in the international community.

Regarding multilateral security cooperation, the new NDPG state that Japan will play an appropriate role in efforts toward establishment of regional order, norms, and practical cooperative relationships, particularly through such frameworks as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Defense-Military Meetings Plus (ADMM Plus).

(2) Cooperation as a member of the international community

Japan will actively promote such diplomatic efforts as the strategic and effective use of Official Development Assistance (ODA) for resolving root causes of conflicts and terrorism, and active engagement in international peace cooperation activities along with those diplomatic efforts, in order to improve the global security environment and contributing Japan's security and prosperity. In doing so,

Japan will strive to provide assistance that makes use of Japan's knowledge and experience and carrying out these activities strategically with a comprehensive consideration of the various conditions facing Japan.

With regard to efforts toward global security issues, the new NDPG state that Japan will cooperate with the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and European nations, and for playing an active role in international activities to maintain and strengthen international public goods including the stable use of the maritime domain, outer space, and cyberspace, and in international community's efforts for disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missiles and other means of delivery. Additionally, it is stated that Japan will actively participate in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the event of a large-scale natural disaster or pandemic[2] and in the reform of the United Nations.

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1 This is the basic policy for participation in U.N. peacekeeping forces (See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 4; Fig. III-3-4-3)

2 A phenomenon in which an infectious disease spreads throughout the world in a short period of time.

4. The Roles of Defense Forces

Japan plays the roles of “effective deterrence and response,” “further stabilization of the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region,” and “improvement of the global security environment”, while ensuring regular cooperation with relevant organizations, under the concept of “Dynamic Defense Force.”

1. Effective deterrence and response

The SDF ensures information supremacy through continuous intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance activities to closely follow trends in military activities of neighboring countries and to detect indications of various contingencies early, and will quickly and seamlessly respond as a situation unfolds.

With regard to this role, priorities are placed on (1) ensuring security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan, (2) response to attacks on offshore island, (3) response to cyber attacks, (4) response to attacks by guerrillas and special operation forces, (5) response to ballistic missile attacks, (6) response to complex contingencies, and (7) response to large-scale and/or chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) disasters.

2. Efforts to further stabilize the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region

Japan will aim to stabilize the security environment in surrounding areas by carrying out various activities such as continuous ISR, and training and exercises in a timely and appropriate manner.

In order to maintain the stability in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan will conduct the following:

Promote bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges as well as joint training and exercises in a multi-layered manner.

In the field of non-traditional security, Japan will promote practical cooperation by utilizing SDF capabilities including disposal of land mines and unexploded shells.

Development and strengthening of regional cooperation practice and capacity building support[1] for nations in the region.

3. Improvement of the global security environment

In order to “improve the global security environment”, Japan will conduct the following:

International peace cooperation activities, including peace building such as humanitarian and reconstruction assistance and ceasefire monitoring

Arms control and disarmament, nonproliferation, and capacity building support.

Tackling international terrorism, securing the safety of maritime traffic, and maintaining maritime order.

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[1] See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 3

5. Specific Details of Defense Forces

1. SDF Posture

In order to properly perform the role of the defense force, the SDF should possess as follows while retaining the necessary posture for responses to various contingencies.

(1) Readiness posture

The SDF should be able to carry out speedy and effective operations through maintaining a readiness posture, enhancing mobility, and sustaining and improving skills and operations tempo. Furthermore, fuel and ammunition supplies (including training ammunition) should be secured as well as securing the durable base functions, and ensuring the maintenance of equipment.

(2) Joint operations posture

In addition to maintaining the intelligence collection posture required for quick and effective response, there should be a command and control functions utilizing advanced information networks including satellite communications, as well as an information sharing system and cyber attack response posture.

(3) Posture for international peace cooperation activities

Efforts should be made to enhance capabilities and posture to handle diverse missions, rapid deployment, and long-term operations.

2. SDF organization, equipment and force disposition

(1) Basic concept

The SDF maintains a posture that was explained in “1. SDF Posture” while efficiently maintaining the organization that enable it to play the role of the defense force effectively. In doing so, from the standpoint of effective and efficient buildup of defense capabilities, it calls for the prioritized buildup of

functions usable for responding to various contingencies and in international peace cooperation activities, functions allowing asymmetrical response capability, and non-replaceable functions[1]. Specifically, it calls for drawing down Cold War-type equipment and organization such as reducing tanks and artillery acquired during the Cold War period and reviewing the geographical distribution of units and unit operations, while enhancing the defense posture by placing emphasis on building up the functions of warning and surveillance, maritime patrol, air defense, ballistic missile defense, transportation, and command communications in other regions including the southwest region.

Regarding the budget allocation to support this, according to changes of the security environment, the 2010 NDPG calls for drastic review from a comprehensive viewpoint, removing compartmentalization without adherence to precedent.

Furthermore, from the standpoint of promoting joint operations and the formation of a joint Japan-U.S. response posture, it calls for overall review of the state of GSDF basic operational units (divisions, brigades) and five Regional Armies, with consideration for improving the efficiency of command and control functions.

Note that based on the understanding that a full-scale invasion is unlikely to occur, the total number of tanks and artillery of the GSDF that were arranged in preparation for an amphibious landing invasion will be reduced and the organization of units which held them will be reviewed. However, it is inappropriate to deny the possibility that a full-scale invasion could occur in the future that could only be handled by tanks and artillery. For that reason, with regard to preparations against full-scale invasion, the 2010 NDPG calls for maintaining relevant knowledge and expertise at a minimum level to respond to uncertain future conditions. With regard to tanks and artillery, recent advances in the military technology such as network technology should be adopted to make them usable in diverse contingencies such as responding to special operations forces and in urban combat, and a minimum scope of expertise will be maintained with regard to combat using the mobile strike capabilities led by tanks to prevent and eliminate invasion by the enemy and combat using artillery to strike enemy territory.

(2) Priorities in strengthening SDF organization, equipment and force disposition

The following are priorities in strengthening the organization, equipment and force disposition.

a. Strengthening of joint operation

The SDF will enhance the basis for joint operations, including the functions of the Joint Staff, command and control system, information-collecting capability and education and training. The SDF will also develop effective and efficient systems applicable to joint operations[2] by reorganizing, merging, centralizing and creating hubs for functions that extend across all three services of the SDF, such as transportation, medical service, anti-aircraft artillery, search and rescue, procurement, supply and

maintenance of equipment, and management of camps and bases.

b. Enhancing capabilities to respond to attacks on offshore islands

The SDF will permanently station the minimum necessary units on off-shore islands where the SDF is not currently stationed. Also, the SDF will enhance its capability to respond to attacks on those islands and ensure the security of the surrounding sea and air space by securing bases, mobility, transport capacity and effective countermeasures necessary for conducting operations against such attacks.

c. Strengthening capabilities for international peace cooperation activities

The SDF will tackle on upgrading equipment, strengthening maritime and air transport capability, enhancing its logistical support posture and enhancing its engineering and medical functions, and reinforcing its education and training systems.

d. Enhancement of intelligence functions

In order to detect indications of various contingencies promptly and collect, analyze and share information appropriately, the SDF will strengthen its diverse information-collecting capabilities utilizing advanced technology, including space technology, and the all-source analysis and assessment capabilities of the Defense Intelligence Headquarters and other organizations. Additionally, the SDF will strengthen the information sharing system among sections responsible for information collection, operations and policy making. Furthermore, the SDF will improve the system for providing appropriate intelligence support for activities conducted by SDF units dispatched abroad in remote areas through such measures as strengthening capabilities to collect geospatial information, the SDF will make efforts to expand and enhance intelligence cooperation and exchanges with countries concerned.

e. Incorporating progress in science and technology into defense forces

In order to develop defense forces underpinned by advanced technology and information capabilities, the SDF will appropriately exploit the achievements of technological innovation. In particular, the SDF will ensure reliable command and control and quick information sharing by developing an advanced command communications system and information and communications network, as well as develop a system for responding to cyber attacks in an integrated manner.

f. Efficient and effective build up of defense forces

Mindful of increasingly severe fiscal conditions, Japan will control defense expenditures by further rationalizing and streamlining its defense forces. At the same time, Japan will make sure its defense forces smoothly and successfully perform their missions while harmonizing other measures taken by the Government. To that end, Japan will clearly prioritize among its defense projects, concentrate resources

on selected projects and promote efforts put forth in “VI. Basic Foundations to Maximize Defense Capability.”

(3) Organization, equipment and disposition of each service of the SDF

The following clarifies the approach to the organization, equipment and disposition of each service of the SDF.

a. Ground Self-Defense Force

In principle, the GSDF will achieve appropriate force disposition of highly mobile units with ISR capabilities according to geographical characteristics in order to integrally intertwine various functions and effectively respond to various contingencies. These units can be rapidly deployed to various locations, and are capable of performing diverse missions, including international peace cooperation activities. In so doing, priority will be placed on the defense of off-shore islands where SDF units are not currently stationed, and the organization and personnel structure of units will be reviewed so as to ensure thorough rationalization and streamlining of the defense forces.

Furthermore, the GSDF will continue to maintain the Central Readiness Force in order to effectively handle air transportation, airborne operations, defense against NBC weapons, special operations and international peace cooperation activities. Also, in order to provide air defense to protect operational units and key areas, seven surface-to-air guided missile units will be maintained, reducing one unit from the current eight units while adopting more advanced surface-to-air guided missiles for these units.

As a result, compared to the 2004 NDPG, the 2010 NDPG calls for the following:

(1) The authorized number of active duty personnel will be changed from 148,000 to 147,000, while total authorized personnel will be changed from 155,000 to 154,000;

(2) Tanks will be reduced from approximately 600 to approximately 400 vehicles, while artillery pieces (main artillery[3] in the 2004 NDPG) will be reduced from approximately 600 to approximately 400 pieces; and

(3) Surface-to-air missile units will be optimized/rationalized from eight anti-aircraft artillery groups to seven anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments (six anti-aircraft artillery groups and one anti-aircraft artillery regiment).

The basic tactical unit structure of eight divisions, six brigades, and one armored division will be maintained.

(See Figs. II-2-2-1 and II-2-2-2)

b. Maritime Self-Defense Force

The principal aims of the Maritime Self-Defense Force include defense of the seas surrounding Japan, ensuring the security of sea lanes, and international peace cooperation activities through regularly conducting such operations as ISR, and anti-submarine operations.

(1) The Destroyer unit was initially expected to consist of the mobile operations units (32 ships), which respond swiftly in various contingencies and in international peace cooperation activities, and the Area Deployment Units (3 ships in 5 guard zones, 15 ships in all), which conduct watch and defense in coastal waters. However, in light of growing demand for the Mobile Operations Squadron due to the expansion of international peace cooperation activities and other developments, the 2010 NDPG provides that the Area Deployment Units change their structure to function efficiently beyond guard zones, and to operate in watch and surveillance in the southwestern area and in international peace cooperation activities. As a result, the Escort Ship Squadron is restructuring its forces to maintain four-unit Escort Corps (16 ships) whose basic unit consists of four escort ships, in addition to the four-unit Escort Group (32 ships) whose basic unit consists of eight escort ships. The squadron now comprises 48 escort ships in all.
(See Fig. II-2-2-3)

(2) As the geographical relationship between strategic sea areas and military bases are taken into account in the 2010 NDPG, the submarine units have increased the number of vessels to 22 to reinforce the posture to deploy submarines in key sea traffic points in the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan, to regularly conduct ISR over a wide range of waters surrounding Japan including the southwestern area, and to ensure the superiority of information and swiftly detect indications of security.
(See Fig. II-2-2-4)

(3) The Patrol aircraft units continue to maintain a nine-unit aviation corps consisting of four-unit fixed-wing patrol aircraft units and a five-unit patrol helicopter units. The squadron’s capabilities are aimed at regularly conducting ISR over a broad range of seas surrounding Japan and to be effective in patrolling these seas and in ensuring the security of sea lanes.

(4) The Minesweeping units continue to maintain one-unit mine-sweeping group aimed at performing effectively in minesweeping operations in the seas surrounding Japan in order to ensure the safety of the lives of citizens which rely on marine transportation.

c. Air Self-Defense Force

The primary focus of the Air Self-Defense Force is conducting continuous ISR in the seas and airspace

surrounding Japan, general air defense, and air defense of kea areas using a full range of capabilities.

(1) The Aircraft control warning units, which conduct continuous ISR in the surrounding seas and airspace, have maintained an eight-unit warning group and a 20-unit warning corps. In view of limits on human resources, however, the units have been reorganized in order to achieve comprehensive air defense capabilities as effectively as possible, with the eight-unit warning group reduced by four units. The squadron now maintains a four-unit warning group and a 24-unit warning corps[4]. In addition, the Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Squadron continues to maintain a six-unit Air Defense Missile Group which provides air defense in key political, economic and defense areas.
(See Fig. II-2-2-5)

(2) To provide a full range of capabilities for use in the defense of Japan's airspace, the Air Self-Defense Force maintains a 12-squadron fighter unit (including a squadron that maintains new fighter aircraft with advanced capabilities), a one-squadron air reconnaissance unit that performs air reconnaissance, a three-squadron air transport unit which swiftly transports troops in a variety of situations and which is actively involved in international peace cooperation activities, and a one-unit flight corps consisting of an air refueling and transport squadron that has air refueling functions and transport functions that can also be used in international peace cooperation activities.
In light of the security environment surrounding Japan, the Government's severe financial situation, and other pertinent factors, the Air Self-Defense Force has sought efficiency relating to major equipment, reducing the number of strategic combat aircraft from approximately 350 to 340. However, it still maintains approximately 260 fighter aircraft.
(See Fig. II-2-2-6)

d. Principal equipment and core units used in ballistic missile defense
Japan's ballistic missile defense (BMD) has adopted a multi-tier defense system consisting of an upper-tier defense through the SM-3-equipped Aegis destroyers and a lower-tier defense through the Patriot PAC-3 for base protection.

(1) Under the four-ship structure for Aegis destroyers specified in the 2004 NDPG, if the necessity for regular maintenance, replenishment, recreation, and training is taken into account, basically two Aegis destroyers would be able at all times to execute their missions, and thus there would be limitations on maintaining a continuous readiness. In addition, in order to ensure the country's defense against the threat of ballistic missiles, including response to the future threat of ballistic missiles equipped with capabilities to avoid interceptor missiles, Aegis destroyers would have to be equipped with an Aegis BMD system, which, in case advanced interceptor missiles are developed in the future, could operate them.

In view of these circumstances, the 2010 NDPG, taking into account factors such as the Government's severe financial circumstances and the need for rapid improvement of anti-ballistic missile defense capabilities, provides a total of six Aegis destroyers equipped with ballistic missile defense capabilities, including two Aegis destroyers equipped with Aegis BMD systems capable of operating the advanced interceptor missiles mentioned above[5]. In addition, the 2010 NDPG states that additional acquisition of BMD-capable Aegis destroyers, if to be provided separately, will be allowed within the number of destroyers after consideration of development of BMD-related technologies and fiscal conditions in the future, among other factors.

(2) As a result of the reorganization of units described in (1) above, the air warning and control unit capable of ballistic missile defense are to be reformed into a 11-unit warning group/squadrons from a seven-unit warning group and a four-unit warning squadrons. While three anti-aircraft groups used to possess Patriot PAC-3, the entire six anti-aircraft groups will be equipped with PAC-3, in order to make quick responses across the nation possible. On this occasion, the newly introduced PAC-3 will be limited to a one-unit FU[6] under the 2010 NDPG in view of the severe financial circumstances, and together with the existing 16-unit FU (for anti-aircraft squadrons and that required for education), 17-unit FU are to be stationed uniformly throughout the country, creating the most efficient system possible.
(See Figs. II-2-2-7 and II-2-2-8)

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1 Although there is no fixed definition, "functions with asymmetrical response capabilities" refer to functions that can respond to hostile activities while efficiently and effectively maintaining advantage over the enemy, such as watch and surveillance carried out by a highly stealthy submarine against an enemy surface vessel. "Non-replaceable functions" refer to functions that, if they did not exist, the ability to respond to attacks by the enemy capable of causing severe damage would be lost completely, such as a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system.

2 Joint GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF units under the direct control of the Minister of Defense when unified joint operation is necessary to carry out the mission smoothly.

3 In the 2004 NDPG, howitzers, Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, and surface-to-ship missiles were categorized as "main artillery" whereas the 2010 NDPG categorizes these, with the exception of surface-to-air missiles, as "howitzers and rockets."

4 Although the level of authorized strength has been reduced as a result of incorporating the warning group into the warning squadron, the personnel cuts have been redirected into efforts such as strengthening fighter interceptors, which conduct such operations as interceptor control based on information obtained from radar sites, in an effort to strengthen warning and control functions comprehensively.

5 Renovations are scheduled for the existing Aegis destroyers *Atago* and *Ashigara* so that they can be equipped with Aegis BMD system and other hardware.

6 Fire Unit (smallest firing unit of the surface-to-air guided missile units)

6. Foundations to Maximize Defense Capability

In order to organize, maintain, and operate a defense force efficiently and effectively, the following were focused:

1. Effective utilization of human resources

(1) Maintain high morale and rigorous discipline among SDF personnel

Acquisition and training of high-quality personnel (take proper measures to deal with society of fewer children, popularization of higher education, and diversification of SDF missions)
Maintenance of health infrastructure (maintaining well-being of personnel)
Promotion of studies and educations on security issues, and enhancement and strengthening of intellectual infrastructure
Ensuring proper treatment regarding execution of harsh and dangerous missions

(2) Appropriately manage the total number and structure of SDF personnel so as to maintain the strength of the forces
Review the rank and age structure.
Reform SDF personnel management system, so as to give precedence to young personnel to be assigned to front-line units while applying an optimum level of salaries and else to personnel engaged in other duties.
Streamline logistical operations through effective utilization of private-sector resources and capabilities, which will lead to further rationalization of personnel and curbing of personnel costs. These measures will secure effective defense capability amid Japan’s severe fiscal conditions.
Promote effective use of retired SDF personnel in the society, implement measures to support their re-employment including reemployment not only in the private sector but also in the public sector, and ensure they receive adequate post-retirement treatment, along with introducing an early retirement system.

2. Measures for improving and strengthening the material foundation

(1) Enhancement of the basis for operating equipment

Enhance the operational basis of defense devices by keeping device maintenance efficient and effective and by maintaining high levels of operational availabilities.

(2) Enhancing cost-efficient acquisition of equipments

Improve cost-effectiveness through enhancement of overall system related to contracts and adopting more efficient procurement systems that contribute to reduction of lifecycle costs including equipment procurement costs.

(3) Development and maintenance of defense production capability and technological bases

Through selection and concentration, develop and maintain defense forces in a stable manner from the medium- to long-term perspective by concentrating resources on the development and maintenance of defense production capability and technological bases.

(4) Consideration of measures in response to changes in the international environment regarding defense equipment

Japan will study measures to respond to major changes in activities regarding peace-contribution, international cooperation, and cooperative international joint development and production.

3. Relationship between defense facilities and local communities

In order to promote efficient maintenance and improvement of defense facilities, Japan will implement various measures to reconcile interests between defense facilities and the surrounding local communities in close cooperation with relevant local governments.

7. Additional Points for Consideration

the 2010 NDPG provide the vision of Japan's defense forces for the next decade or so, to promote innovation of the defense forces. In case there are significant changes in circumstances, Japan will review and, if necessary, revise the Guidelines in light of the security environment and technological trends at that time, among other things. The new Guidelines do not specify the time for the review, unlike the 2004 NDPG, which prescribed to review five years later.

Japan will conduct systematic transition management through Mid-Term Defense Programs and annual budgets so as to ensure smooth, swift and appropriate transition to the defense forces outlined in the 2010 NDPG, in consideration of relevant factors such as fiscal condition, maintenance of unit readiness, influence on morale, impact on local communities and defense production and technological bases. In

addition, Japan will conduct ex-post verification and constant study on the future of its defense forces.

Part II The Basics of Japan's Defense Policy and Dynamic Defense Force

Chapter 3 Development of the Dynamic Defense Force

In order to proceed with a systematic transfer toward the defense structure indicated in the 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines, the Government decided the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2011-FY2015) (2011 MTDP), which was approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet in December 2010. The 2011 MTDP was the first MTDP formulated based on the 2010 NDPG, and it outlines the path toward realizing national defense capabilities provided in the 2010 NDPG.

Moreover, the Ministry of Defense is conducting vigorous studies toward the aim of building up the Dynamic Defense Force indicated in the 2010 NDPG and the 2011 MTDP, in order to promote structural reform for improving the effectiveness of Japan's national defense.

This chapter will describe the 2011 MTDP, the structural reforms for improving the effectiveness of national defense capabilities, and the national defense program for FY2012, etc.

See Reference 8

Section1 The Mid-Term Defense Program

1. The Program Guidelines

The 2011 MTDP, which is the update of the 2010 NDPG, consists of the following six fundamental objectives in effort to develop appropriate defense capacities:

○Developing systems that suit the role of defense force

○Appropriate resource allocation given priorities to important functions

○Efficient development of quality defense capabilities

○Implementation of measures regarding to build a foundation to maximize defense capabilities

○Continuing to strengthen the Japan-U.S. security arrangements

○Developing defense capabilities that are efficient and logical

2. Reviewing central units

The 2011 MTDP reorganizes necessary units in accordance with the future direction set by the 2010 NDPG.

(See Fig. II-3-1-1)

3. Major Programs Regarding SDF Capabilities

1. Effective Deterrence and Response

Various operations such as the improvement of the equipment used by each of the three Self-Defense Forces, etc., are carried out in response to situations that are important considerations as indicated as the role of defense capabilities in the 2010 NDPG.
(See Fig. II-3-1-2)

(1) Ensuring Security of Sea and Air space Surrounding Japan

The SDF will provide continuous ISR activities of the land, sea and air space around Japan, in order to gain early warning of all types of signs.

(2) Response to attacks on offshore islands

a. ISR capabilities
The SDF will develop a necessary system for establishing regular ISR and responding swiftly.

b. Improvement in Rapid Deployment and Response Capabilities
The SDF will ensure rapid deployment and attempt to improve effective response capabilities.

c. Improvement in Air Defense Capabilities
The SDF will attempt to improve its air defense capabilities including response to cruise missile attacks.

d. Security of Sea-lanes
The SDF will develop a system to ensure the security of sea-lanes in areas including southwestern Japan through reinforcing ISR activities and capabilities of various military operations.

(3) Response to Cyber Attacks

The SDF will improve security functions of its information networks by strengthening its joint network protection system, contributing to the government's overall response.

(4) Response to attacks by guerillas and special operation forces

The SDF will further increase unit readiness and mobility, etc, to respond rapidly and effectively to guerilla and special operation force attacks.

(5) Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

The SDF will strengthen its ability to deal with ballistic missile attacks.
Moreover, in order to take all possible measures to ensure its national defense and steadily improve the capabilities of interceptor missiles, the MOD will continue to promote the Japan-US cooperative development of advanced ballistic missile interceptor, study the possibility of transition to the production and deployment phase, and take necessary measures.

(6) Response to "Complex" Situations

The SDF will establish command and control system and logistic support system to respond promptly and appropriately to multiple contingencies occurring successively and simultaneously.

(7) Response to large-scale and /or chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) disasters

The SDF will respond promptly and appropriately to various large-scale or special disasters including a major earthquake and a nuclear accident, and to protect citizens' lives and property

2. Efforts to Further Stabilize the Security Environment of the Asia-Pacific Region

Japan will take the following measures in order to further stabilize the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region.
○Promote bilateral and multilateral security dialogues, defense cooperation and exchanges, and joint training and exercises in a multi-layered manner,
○Promote development and strengthening of the regional cooperative architecture.
○Capacity building assistance[1] (In the areas such as Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR). Japan will support countries in the region to improve their response capability and human resources development by utilizing the expertise and experience of the SDF in the military medicine and disposal of landmines and unexploded shells.

3. Efforts to Improve the Global Security Environment

In order to improve global security environment, Japan takes the following measures:
Actively engage in international peace cooperation activities.
Review the 5 principles of the U.N. Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) participation and discuss how

Japan will be involved in PKO.
Actively engage in capacity building assistance, international counter-terrorism measures, ensuring maritime security, and the maintenance of maritime order.
Conduct research on the impact of climate change and resource constraints on the security operational environments.
Provide education at Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center.
Japan will actively cooperate with arms control and disarmament conducted by international organizations including the U.N.

4. Priorities in strengthening SDF organization, equipment and force disposition

Regarding the system maintenance of the SDF, the following points are considered important: 1) strengthening of joint-ness, 2) strengthening capabilities for international cooperation activities, 3) enhancement of intelligence functions, 4) incorporating advancing science and technology into defense capability, and 5) enhancement of medical functions.

5. Foundations to Maximize Defense Capability

The following initiatives shall be carried out to maximize Japan's defense capability, in order to develop, maintain and operate defense capability efficiently and effectively.

(1) Effective Utilization of Human Resources

a. Recruiting, retaining and developing SDF personnel
Recruit, retain and develop high-quality human resources who can adapt to changes in social situations, and diversification and internationalization of SDF missions. Improve the foundation for training and educational training programs.

b. Reform of the SDF personnel management system including review of its personnel management policy
○Implement systematic management of authorized and actual personnel numbers, by establishing basic principles such as rank-based quota management.
○Design and introduce a system which provides precedence to young personnel to be assigned to front-line units, and apply optimum treatments to others engaged in various other duties.
○Implement measures to invigorate all ranks (officers, warrant officers, sergeants and privates).
○Promote effective use of retired SDF personnel in society, implement measures to support their

re-employment, and introduce an early retirement system that go with the above measures.

c. Rationalizing and streamlining logistical operations

With regard to garrison and base services, further advance streamlining of personnel and curb personnel costs, for example, by utilizing the private-sector to improve quality of services, thereby acquiring front-line unit personnel.

d. Utilizing the Research and Education Functions of the National Institute for Defense Studies

○Pursue more organized, efficient and effective management in order to conduct research and educational functions regarding security and military history

(2) Development and maintenance of defense production capability and technological bases

○Identify, maintain, and develop defense production capability and technological bases that are important to be kept in the country.

○Formulate strategies related to defense production capability and technological bases.

(3) Consideration of measures in response to changes in the international environment regarding defense equipment

○Consider measures to respond to changes associated with improving performance of defense equipments and dealing with rising costs of equipments that are commonly seen among developed countries.

(4) Promoting further effectiveness and efficiency in the procurement of equipment

○Establish and strengthen cost management procedures and systems concerning acquisition of equipment.

○Introduce procurement procedures that effectively capitalize on private business initiatives, and improve systems related to contracts.

(5) Enhancement of the basis for operating equipment

○Secure fuel and parts essential to the operation of equipment.

○Introduce a new contract method, “Performance Based Logistics,” for maintenance and service of equipment.

(6) Promoting cooperation with related organizations and local communities

○Strengthen coordination with relevant organizations such as the police, fire departments, and the Japan Coast Guard

○Promote cooperation with local governments and local community.

○Verify the functions and systems related to government decision-making and handling, and discuss necessary measures to deal with legal and other matters

○Maintain and improve defense facilities efficiently and promote countermeasures in areas near the bases.

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[1] See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-3

4. Measures to strengthen Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

The following measures are taken in order to strengthen Japan-U.S. security cooperation and achieve smoother and more effective stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan:

1. Strategic Dialogues and Policy Coordination

○Continue, with the U.S., to conduct security environment assessments, and examine common strategic objectives, roles, missions, and capabilities.

2. Strengthening Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

○Strengthen intelligence cooperation and bilateral contingency planning.

○Cooperate in various operations including handling situations in areas surrounding Japan.

○Cooperate in ballistic missile defense.

○Cooperate in matters related to equipment and technology

○Conduct bilateral consultations to improve the credibility of extended deterrence and information security.

○Consider measures to enhance bilateral cooperation.

○Strengthen regular cooperation in such matters as surveillance operations, and expansion of joint training facilities and areas.

○Strengthen regional and global cooperation with the U.S. in areas such as international peace cooperation activities.

○Promote cooperative Japan-U.S. relationships through coordination and discussions held between relevant ministries and agencies on global issues such as space and cyber-space.

3. Measures for the smooth and effective stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan

○From the viewpoint of securing smooth and effective stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan, Japan will ensure a stable Host Nation Support, while further promoting its efficiency and transparency.
See Part III, Chapter 2

5. Scale of Deployment and Required Expenditures

1. Scale of Deployment

See Fig. II-3-1-3 for a list of the major procurements described in 3 above.

2. Required Expenditures

The ceiling on total expenditures necessary for the implementation of 2011 MTDP is approximately ¥23,490 billion, in FY2010 valuation, which represents an average rate of increase of 0.1% in comparison with the FY2010 budget figure. These expenditures include expenses approved by the Security Council, which are needed to deal with unexpected incidences that may occur in the future.
The annual defense budgets will be allocated within a limit of approximately ¥23,390 billion over the next five years, in harmony with other measures of Japan and striving for further streamlining and rationalization.
Also, the 2011 MTDP will be reviewed after three years and revised as necessary, taking into consideration the international security environment, technological trends including information communication technology, and fiscal conditions. Total expenditure of the revised program would not exceed ¥23,490 billion.
(See Fig. II-3-1-4)

6. Other

1) The MOD will set up a system to collect and evaluate information on the status of the SDF's

equipment and personnel in order to conduct continuous review of the modality of the defense force, as well as a system for planning and programming pertaining to the developments of the defense force.

2) While maintaining the deterrence of the U.S. forces, Japan will steadily implement concrete measures for force posture review of U.S. forces in Japan, etc., and SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa) related projects to reduce the burden on local communities including that on Okinawa[1].

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[1] Although these measures need to be carried out steadily, GOJ and USG are still engaged in consultation in details and project plans should be formulated based on coordination with local communities. Therefore, it is difficult to forecast definite scale of the budget over the five-year period, and the expenditures for these items are not included in the required expenditures for the 2011 MTDP.

Part II The Basics of Japan's Defense Policy and Dynamic Defense Force

Chapter 3 Development of the Dynamic Defense Force

Section 2 Structural Reform of Defense Capability

1. Background

In order to develop the Dynamic Defense Force, based on 2010 NDPG and 2011 MTDP, it is necessary to fundamentally streamline and rationalize equipment, personnel, organization, deployment, etc. across all of the Self-Defense Forces from a comprehensive and cross-sectional perspective, selectively concentrate resources on the functions that are genuinely needed, and carry out structural reforms of the defense force.

For these reasons, the Ministry of Defense set up a committee for promotion of the structural reform based on the ministerial direction of December, 2010. The committee chairman is the Parliamentary Senior Vice Minister of Defense, and the committee is conducting deliberation based on the instruction of Defense Minister.

2. Specific Matters under Investigation

1. Deliberation Framework

The deliberations carried out by the Committee for Promotion of Structural Reform of Defense Capabilities are being carried out in close coordination with the deliberations of the Human Resources Base Reform Committee, the Comprehensive Acquisition Reform Project Team, and the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense, which had already been established within the Ministry of Defense, as well as the committee for the deliberation of the enhancement of medical functions, which was established in February 2011, and also the new Cyber Attack Countermeasures Committee, which was established in May 2012. Figure II-3-2-1 provides an overview of the framework.

2. Matters under Deliberation

Details of the matters to be deliberated are as follows:

(1) Study on the joint enhancement of the SDF functions on the future unit structure

To strengthen systems related to integrated operations, MOD explore strengthening command and control functions by newly appointing "Deputy Director of Operational Department" in the Joint Staff Office.

MOD also deliberates comprehensively to strengthen functions such as mobile and deployment, joint medical, information gathering; warning and surveillance; and reconnaissance (ISR), and air defense readiness system of antiaircraft artillery unit with offshore islands in mind.

(2) Study on the unification / optimization of cross-sectional resource allocation

MOD deliberates building systems of program management, budget allocation and R & D which lead to effective resource allocation by grasping the current capabilities of the SDF and in the cross-sectional view. MOD also work on building systems which realize unification and optimization of base / camp maintenance service and telecommunication network etc.

(3) Promotion of Fundamental Systemic Reforms Relating to the Human Foundation Base

In order to strengthen the SDF forces, manage SDF personnel numbers by rank, review the rank and age structures in accordance with the characteristics of each Self-Defense Force, for example by increasing the number of enlisted personnel, and investigate a new appointment system, policies for the revitalization of all ranks of SDF personnel (officers, warrant officers, sergeants and privates), the early retirement system, policies related to recruitment, and re-employment support, etc.

(4) Promotion of Comprehensive Acquisition Reform

Promote Comprehensive Acquisition Reform that deal with the changing international environment surrounding strategic measures concerning defense production and technology infrastructure, systems related to contracts for acquisition of equipment, and improving maintenance and service systems.

(5) Enhancement of Medical Functions

Deliberations will take place concerning various hygiene measures, such as making the Self-Defense Force hospitals function as hub hospitals, enhancing their functions, enhancement of functions of the National Medical College and hospitals, and enhancement of medical officer education.

(6) Cyber Attack Countermeasures

Deliberations will take place regarding policy initiatives concerning measures to deal with cyber attacks, etc., as well as the formation of a new specialist cyber security unit and projects relating to cyber attack countermeasures.

3. Current Status of Deliberation

With regard to items (1) to (5) detailed in "2. Matters under Deliberation" above, a report was publicized on August 5, 2011 which set forth the perception of the current situation and agenda, the direction of future deliberation, and the roadmap of the reform.

(See Figure II-3-2-2)

In accordance with the roadmap of the reform set forth in this report, the agenda will be under in-depth study, and the reform will be promoted. Accordingly, follow-up discussions will continue to take place through such frameworks as the Committee for Promotion of Structural Reform of Defense Capabilities. Furthermore, the Cyber Attack Countermeasures Committee was established in May 2012 to consider and implement comprehensive measures to deal with cyber attacks and is strengthening initiatives relating to such measures.

Part II The Basics of Japan's Defense Policy and Dynamic Defense Force

Chapter 3 Development of the Dynamic Defense Force

Section 3 Building Up the Defense Force in FY2012

1. Major Matters Related to Building Up the Defense Force in FY2012

In FY2012, with increasingly becoming difficult security environment and lessons learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake in mind, Japan is steadily working to develop effective and efficient defense force, namely the Dynamic Defense Force, based on the 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines and the 2011 Mid-Term Defense Program.

In doing so, we will continue to tackle the new roles of the defense force: 1) effectively deter and respond to contingencies, 2) further stabilize the security environment of the Asia-Pacific, and 3) improve the global security environment. To fulfill these roles, we attempt to improve our abilities to deal with large-scale disaster and nuclear plant disaster, in addition to emphasize versatile functions applicable to a wide range of operations, functions that have asymmetric response capability, and irreplaceable functions, and we will give priority to building up functions such as warning and surveillance, maritime patrols, air defense, response to ballistic missiles, transportation, and command control communications, including in southwestern areas of Japan. Furthermore, amidst growing fiscal austerity, detailed assessments will be made of the contents of each program, and then resources will be selectively concentrated only on truly necessary functions, and an effective defense force will be effectively developed.

(See Fig. II-3-3-1)

2. Background of the Budget Compilation

As to the FY2012 budget, in the Guidelines for FY2012 Budget Requests Reformulation (Cabinet decision on September 20, 2011) , "Measures Prioritized for the Revitalization of Japan" was established, which funded in four specific categories: new frontier and new growth strategy, human resource development through education and employment, vitalization of local communities, and development of safe and secure society. In these categories, the Ministry of Defense for instance, in the category "development of safe and secure society", requested the expenditure to prepare and maintain defense equipment needed to develop the Dynamic Defense Force, as well as to improve medical facilities. In the framework of this special budget allocation, the project "Upgrading response ability to disasters" was evaluated as a priority/focus project and the project "Formulation of Dynamic Defense Force" was also qualified as equivalent to a priority project by budget compilation conferences held by the government and the ruling party. Overall, the Ministry of Defense secured necessary expenditures.

(See Fig. II-3-3-2)

Starting FY2010, each ministry and agency conducts "project reviews"[1], and the check result thereof for FY2011 reflected the request for budget appropriations for FY2012. In addition, this procedure took place as a "project reviews public process" in June, 2012. Regarding the public process, the seven projects conducted by the Ministry of Defense in FY2011 were reviewed in terms of "necessity, efficiency, and effectiveness". The ministry plans to properly reflect the result of the reviews for the future expenditure and the request for budget appropriations for FY2013 while continuing to further streamline budget utilization and ensure accountability and transparency toward citizens.

(see Fig. II-3-3-3)

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[1] The process by which government agencies ascertain the facts on the ground regarding the recipients of budget expenditure and the uses of the funds, etc., inspect their own programs, including through a public process with external experts, and reflect the results in the implementation of the programs, budget requests, etc.

Part II The Basics of Japan's Defense Policy and Dynamic Defense Force

Chapter 3 Development of the Dynamic Defense Force

Section 4 Defense-Related Expenditures

1. Defense-Related Expenditures and Changes

Defense-related expenditures include spending for maintaining and managing the SDF, improving living conditions in the neighborhoods of defense facilities, and supporting U.S. forces in Japan.

Regarding defense-related expenditures in FY2012, amidst even more severe financial circumstances, excluding the reduction of burden on local communities in the expenditures related to SACO[1] and realignment of U.S. forces, there has been a decrease in budget expenditure compared to the previous fiscal year for the tenth consecutive year, at 4.6453 trillion yen, a reduction of 17.2 billion yen (0.4%)[2]. However, activity expenses of the SDF (general non-personnel expenses) increased by 4.9 billion yen on the previous year. Thus, sufficient expenditures have been secured for the Ministry of Defense / the SDF to achieve the role which would meet the expectations of the citizens, under the notion of concentrating resources into the most crucial functions.

Including 8.6 billion yen in SACO-related expenses (decreased 1.5 billion yen (14.7%) from the preceding fiscal year) and 59.9 billion yen in expenses for reducing the burden on local communities (decreased 42.7 billion yen (41.6%) from the preceding fiscal year), which is a part of the U.S. forces' realignment-related costs, Japan's total defense-related expenditures for the FY2012 general account amount to 4.7138 trillion yen, representing a decrease of 1.3% or 61.4 billion yen from the preceding fiscal year.

(See Figs. II-3-4-1 and 2)

In addition, regarding the budget for recovery and reconstruction from the Great East Japan Earthquake, supplementary budget was allocated in FY2011,-and the MOD has ensured necessary expenditure in FY 2012. Specifically, as the necessary expenditure for the SDF to effectively engage in disaster relief activities and to restore the SDF facilities and equipment, 188.6 billion yen was allocated in the first supplementary budget for FY2011[3] and 161.6 billion yen in the Third Supplementary Budget for FY2011. In addition, 113.6 billion yen was allocated in the budget for FY2012. This 113.6 billion yen was allocated separately from the General Account for FY2012, being allocated under the Special Account for Reconstruction from the Great East Japan Earthquake. Adding this to defense-related expenditures in the General Account for FY2012 (excluding SACO and restructuring-related expenses), the total amount becomes 4.7589 trillion yen (an increase of 96.4 billion yen, or 2.1% on the previous fiscal year).

Moreover, 28.1 billion yen was allocated under the Fourth Supplementary Budget for FY2011 as additional fuel expenses required to carry out operations such as anti-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden and expenditure necessary for the transport of personnel and supplies

required in the dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces to conduct peacekeeping operations.

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1 See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 3-1

2 "Personnel and food provisions expenses." A large factor is that the obligatory outlay expenses (discussed later) to be paid based on contracts concluded in earlier fiscal years have decreased compared with the previous fiscal year.

3 Reduction of 29.4 billion yen after the correction in the third supplementary budget for FY 2011.

2 Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures

Defense-related expenditures are broadly classified into "personnel and food provisions expenses," which cover such items as pay and meals for SDF personnel, and "material expenses," which finance the repair and maintenance of equipment, purchase of fuel, education and training of SDF personnel, procurement of equipment, and others. Material expenses are further classified into "obligatory outlay expenses[1]," which are paid under contracts concluded in previous fiscal years, and "general material expenses," which are paid under current-year contracts. Material expenses are also referred to as "operating expenses," and since general material expenses include repair costs for equipment, education and training expenses for personnel, and the purchase of oil, they are referred to also as "activity expenses." The Ministry of Defense terms this classification method as "classification by expenses."

(See Figs. II-3-4-3 and 4)

Personnel and food provisions expenses and obligatory outlay expenses, both of which are mandatory expenses, account for 80% of the total defense-related budget. A breakdown of general material expenses shows that mandatory costs account for a significant portion of the total, including cost-sharing for the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan, and expenses related to measures to alleviate the burden on local communities hosting U.S. bases in Japan[2].

Personnel and food provisions expenses decreased by 21.5 billion yen (1.0%) from the previous fiscal year. Obligatory outlay expenses for the year decreased by 0.6 billion yen or 0.0% from the previous year while general material expenses increased by 4.9 billion yen or 0.5% from the previous year[3].

The breakdown of FY2012 defense-related expenditures classified by organization, such as the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, and also by use, such as maintenance costs and equipment and material purchase expenses is shown in Fig. II-3-4-5.

In addition to the budget expenditure, the amount of new future obligation also indicates payments for the following year and beyond. In the improvement of defense capabilities, it is common for multiple years to be required from contract to delivery or completion, in areas such as the procurement of vessels, aircraft, and other primary equipment, as well as the construction of buildings such as aircraft hangars and barracks. However, the budget of Japan must meet with Cabinet approval each fiscal year, and therefore,

as a general rule, the spending of national expenditures prescribed in the budget is limited to the applicable year. Consequently, for the things which require multiple years between contract and delivery or completion, a procedure is undertaken whereby a contract that extends for multiple years is arranged, and it is promised in advance at the time of the agreement that payment will be made at a fixed time in the future (within five years in principle). The sum of money to be paid in the following year and beyond based on such contracts as extend for multiple years, is called future obligation. The amount of future obligation that newly came to be borne in FY2012 (future obligation concerning new contracts) increased from FY2011 by 135.6 billion yen[4] or 8.2 %.

Furthermore, if looked at on a contract basis which shows the scale of operations, then there is a reduction from FY2011 of 140.5 billion yen or 05.4%[5].

Also, in the supplementary budget for FY20011 that reflected the incidence of the Great East Japan Earthquake, 54.1 billion yen has been allocated for the future obligation in the first supplementary budget, and 248.5 billion yen in the third supplementary budget.

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1 In the improvement of defense capabilities, some things span multiple years. In these cases, the fiscal year in which the contract is concluded is different from the fiscal year in which the payment to the contractor is made. Therefore, first of all, the maximum future payment amount is appropriated in the budget as an act of bearing liabilities with national treasury funds (budget authority only to incur obligations is granted, i.e., the Ministry of Defense is able to conclude a contract but not to make payment). Then, based on such budgeting, in principle, in the fiscal year that construction is completed or that equipment is procured, expenses necessary for payment are allocated as budget expenditure (budget authority to incur obligations and make payment is granted, i.e., the Ministry of Defense is able to conclude contracts and allocate budget expenditure). Budget expenditure for payments incurred under contracts concluded in previous fiscal years is called “obligatory outlay expenses,” while expenditure for which the payment period has yet to come is termed “future obligation.”

2 A typical cost under this category is expenses for installation of a soundproof system in residences. (See Part III, Chapter 4, Section 3-3).

3 The comparison with the previous year does not account for SACO-related expenses and the U.S. forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community).

4 The amount includes the costs of developing and operating X-band SATCOM (122.4 billion yen). See Chapter 3, Section 6-1.

5 The sum total of general material expenses and future obligation concerning new contracts based on the act of bearing liabilities with national treasury funds. The contract is concluded in the applicable year. It is the scale of the material expenses (operating expenses) that are to be contracted in particular fiscal year and, to be paid in the same fiscal year and the following year. The amount was 2.7332 Trillion yen in FY2012.

3. Comparison with Other Countries

Understanding the defense expenditures of each country using a single standard is not possible in view of differences in the socioeconomic and budgetary systems. There is not an internationally unified definition of defense expenditures, and breakdowns of defense expenditures are often unclear even in many countries where such data is publicly disclosed.

See Reference 22

Furthermore, though there exists the method of converting defense expenditures into a dollar-termed value for comparison, defense spending based on this method does not necessarily reflect the precise value resulted from counting each country's price levels.

Thus, there are limits to how far a comparison can be significant simply by comparing Japan's defense-related expenditures with those of other countries in dollar terms. For reference, Fig. II−3-4-6 displays the defense expenditures of each country shown in dollar terms using the purchasing power parity[1] of each country as published by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)[2].

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1 For changes in defense expenditures of each country in its local currency, see Part I, Chapter 1, Fig. II-3-4-7, and Reference 19.

2 A gauge that measures each country's ability to purchase assets or services by taking into account their respective price levels.

Part II The Basics of Japan's Defense Policy and Dynamic Defense Force

Chapter 3 Development of the Dynamic Defense Force

Section 5 Development of Next-generation Fighter Aircraft

In the new fighter selection, the Ministry of Defense assessed the proposals fairly and rigorously, according to the predetermined evaluation criteria. Finally, a comprehensive evaluation was carried out regarding four elements - performance, costs, Japanese industrial participation, and logistics support - and on December 19, 2011, the Ministry of Defense selected F-35A as the new fighter and decided to procure 42 aircrafts. On the 20th of the same month, the Security Council of Japan decided that, "42 F-35A aircraft shall be procured from FY2012 as the new fighter, in order to supplement deficiencies resulting from aging of the currently used fighters of the Air Self-Defense Force and facilitate their modernization. In addition, except some initially imported aircrafts, Japanese industries shall participate in their manufacturing and the annual procurement in each fiscal year shall be made with the recognition of the economic and fiscal situation, seeking to harmonize this with the various other policies being implemented by the Government." This decision was approved by the Cabinet on the same day and 4 aircrafts are procured in FY2012, based on this policy.

On June 29, 2012, the Ministry of Defense signed the Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA)[1] in order to procure these 4 aircrafts using the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) provided by the U.S. Government.

This section explains the process of F-X selection by the Ministry of Defense.

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[1] The Letter of Offer and Acceptance is a document signed by the representatives of both the Japanese and U.S. Governments for each sale (the Japanese representative is the official for Treasury obligation such as the Director General of the Equipment Procurement and Construction Office). Through this process, the FMS is issued. The LOA describes such details as procurement items which both governments agreed on, their prices, and scheduled delivery time.

1. Necessity of the Introduction of Next-generation Fighter Aircraft

According to the 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines, the Air Self-Defense Force fighter units should consist of 12 fighter squadrons with approximately 260 fighter aircraft, and that the force is currently consist of 12 fighter squadrons, with approximately 260 fighters: 2 F-4 fighter squadrons, 7 F-15 fighter squadrons and 3 F-2 fighter squadrons.

Given that F-4 fighters are already decreasing in number, it is necessary to make a start on acquiring the new fighter aircraft as quickly as possible. Furthermore, it will become increasingly important to improve the comprehensive air defense capability through introducing new fighter with high performance, in which fighter aircraft and their support functions act in an integrated manner, due to the modernization of military capability in regions surrounding Japan, so in order to enable the Air Defense Force is to maintain 12 squadrons and 260 fighter aircrafts.

In light of this situation, the 2011 Mid-Term Defense Program stipulated that "New fighter aircraft shall be put in place as successors to the currently-active fighters (F-4)".

2. Background of the Selection of the Model

In response to the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2005-FY2009) stipulating that "New fighter aircraft shall be put in place as successors to the currently-active fighters (F-4)", work began in earnest in July 2005, aimed at the selection of the next generation of fighter aircraft.

Subsequently, F-22 (Lockheed Martin), F-35 (Lockheed Martin), F-15FX (Boeing), F/A-18E/F (Boeing), Eurofighter Typhoon (Eurofighter), and Dassault Rafale (Dassault Aviation) were selected as fighters that satisfied the four "capabilities required for next generation fighter aircraft" (aircraft surveyed). In order to obtain detailed information concerning these six models, questionnaires were sent during the period to March 2006, to the governments of the countries where the foreign companies are based. Apart from F-22, regarding which no response was received, the replies concerning these models were all broadly received by July 2007. Moreover, oversea surveys were conducted in order to continue gathering the requisite information, but as the intelligence gathering was not adequate in all cases, the acquisition of seven next-generation fighters was postponed, having initially been planned to take place during the period covered by the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2005-FY2009).

(See Figure II-3-5-1)

Subsequently, as well as striving to gather information by such means as conducting oversea studies in February and March 2010 in Australia, Norway, the UK and Italy, due to these countries being involved in the joint development or operation of the aircraft surveyed, they started to obtain necessary advice in January 2011 from domestic companies with technology and knowledge to manufacture fighter aircraft. As it was deemed that these endeavors had yielded the information required to issue a request for

proposals and that it was necessary to acquire new fighters as quickly as possible, given the decreasing number of F-4 fighters, a request for proposals was issued on April 13, 2011, in order to seek a budget allocation for expenses associated with the acquisition of the next generation fighter aircraft in the budget for FY2012.

On September 26, 2011, which was the deadline for the submission of proposals, proposals were submitted by the U.S. Government, which proposed F/A-18E and F-35A, and the British Government, which proposed the Typhoon; these proposals were then analyzed and evaluated using a three-stage evaluation method, in accordance with the predetermined evaluation criteria.

3. Background of the Adoption of the New Procedure for Selecting Aircraft Models

Until now, when selecting fighters, the Japan Defense Agency (as it was known at the time) decided on a specific model based on information gathered from on-the-ground studies, rather than adopting the competitive, transparent model selection procedure used on this most recent occasion; after a decision was made by the Security Council of Japan and approved by the Cabinet, the Agency cooperated with the domestic company selected by the Director General of the Defense Agency (as it was known at the time) as the main domestic manufacturing company and embarked upon negotiations with overseas companies manufacturing the selected model and government institutions in the countries where those companies were located, concerning the specific conditions for the granting of licenses.

However, in light of the following developments in recent years:

○ The fact that more stringent standards regarding the transparency and fairness are required in government procurement;

○ The fact that there have been successful examples of extracting better conditions through introducing the competitive procedure in the field of defense equipment, where there was a tendency towards monopoly or oligopoly;

○ The fact that it is becoming more difficult to obtain information concerning state-of-the-art equipment as the importance of advanced technologies in security are increasing, and the amount of information for selecting a model that can be obtained using conventional methods seems to be quite limited;

○ In light of the current status of the defense production and technology base, as well as the downward trend in defense budgets, it is necessary to focus not only on the performance of the fighter, but also on the degree to which domestic companies can be involved in the manufacture and repair of the fighter (participation by domestic companies) and the life-cycle costs, including the maintenance and running

costs of the fighter, on January 6, 2011, a directive entitled *Concerning Model Selection Procedures for the Next Generation of Fighter Aircraft to be Directly Acquired by the Air Self-Defense Force* was issued, in which it was stipulated that the Ministry would aim for the acquisition of the next generation fighter aircraft under more advantageous conditions, based on procedures with high levels of fairness and transparency.

4. Performances, etc. Required for the Next-generation Fighter Aircraft

1. Advanced Performance

As described above, since the military capacities in regions surrounding Japan are modernizing, it is becoming increasingly important to improve the comprehensive air defense capability, with fighter aircraft acting in an integrated fashion with their support functions; more specifically, the development of frameworks for air defense, etc. that can deal with the following situations is becoming a pressing issue:

○ The emergence of high-performance fighter aircraft with excellent stealth capability[1] and situational awareness (SA) capabilities[2];
○ Further increases in cruise missiles with excellent stealth capacity; and
○ The development of network-centric-warfare, in which fighter aircraft, the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), aerial refueling tankers, and surface-to-air missiles (SAM), etc. form part of an integrated system.

In other words, the new fighter aircraft needs to be able to effectively deal with high-performance fighters, as well as being equipped with sufficient performance to deal with cruise missiles and the ability to carry out its operations effectively in network-centric-warfare that has those functions as constituent elements. Moreover, with weapon systems becoming increasingly high-performance and expensive at present, all weapons are becoming increasingly multirole-focused (multifunctional), from the perspective of cost-effectiveness as well, and this trend is particularly pronounced in the field of fighter aircraft. Furthermore, in light of the fact that the security challenges and destabilizing factors surrounding Japan are becoming increasingly diverse, complex and multilayered, the new fighter aircraft are required to be multirole (multifunctional) aircraft equipped not only with air superiority combat ability, but also with the ability to carry out air interdiction[3] (air-to-ground attack capability), at least.

2. Efficient and Stable Logistics Support Arrangements

In order for fighter units to carry out their role effectively, it is extremely important to ensure that the unit

as a whole is able to operate stably with a high level of operational availability, in addition to high functional aircrafts. At the same time, the cost of maintaining and operating fighters is on the increase, and in light of the current harsh fiscal situation, if this tendency accelerates further, it will become impossible to procure the components required to maintain and operate the aircraft, so it will be impossible to maintain the operational availability at the level required as a unit, even if the performance of the individual aircraft is excellent. By extension, one cannot deny the possibility that this will give rise to a situation in which they cannot fully carry out the duties expected of them as a fighter unit.

Consequently, in introducing the next generation fighter aircraft, it is essential to select a model that is highly reliable and easy to maintain, and which makes it possible to establish efficient, stable logistical support arrangements for a reasonable cost regarding all aspects of preparation, replenishment and technical support.

3. Ensuring Participation of Japanese Industries

As set forth in the interim summary published by the Panel on Approaches to the Production Technology Base for Fighter Aircraft[4] in December 2009, in order to ensure the future safety of the fighter aircraft operated by the Air Self-Defense Force, while maintaining a high level of operational availability and implementing capacity improvements appropriate to operation by Japan, it is important to maintain and cultivate the defense indigenous capability. Accordingly, the participation of domestic companies in the manufacturer and repair, etc. of the next generation of fighter aircraft must be secured and it must be possible for domestic companies to provide timely and appropriate maintenance and operational support.

4. Consideration for Life-cycle Costs

As described above, it is necessary to take into consideration not only the procurement cost of the aircraft (unit price of the aircraft × number of aircraft due to be acquired), but also the life-cycle cost, including the cost of maintenance and operation after introduction, which could be several times higher than procurement cost itself.

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1 Generic term for technologies or effects for preventing the aircraft being detected by enemy sensors

2 Generic term for technologies or effects thereof that improve the pilot's understanding of the tactical situation or reduce the burden on the pilot by merging data from various sensors (including those not mounted on the aircraft itself) and showing it on a single display

3 This refers to a strategy to diminish the capabilities of an invading force. This is conducted mainly by fighter aircraft, which, in a marine environment, aim to destroy invading troops by attacking vessels (marine attack), and against a force already landed, attack targets such as the enemy’s logistic routes, material stock, and main traffic routes.

4 See Part III, Chapter 4, Section 1

5. Evaluation Method

In order to achieve the objective of the most recent model selection, namely acquiring fighter aircraft based on the most desirable conditions for the Ministry of Defense by bringing the principle of competition into play, it is essential to ensure fairness and transparency in the specific content of the selection procedures. As well as providing an outline of the evaluation method on the request for proposals, transparency was guaranteed by sharing details of the questions and answers relating to the request for proposals with all of those planning to submit proposals. Fairness was guaranteed by sealing it in an envelope before the eyes of those planning to submit proposals based on the evaluation criteria previously determined by the Minister of Defense on April 1, 2011, and by assessing the proposals impartially, in accordance with those evaluation criteria.

The method used to assess the proposals consists of three stages; an outline of these is provided in Figure II-3-5-2.

6. Evaluation Results

1 First-stage Evaluation

All three proposals fulfilled all mandatory requirements.

2. Second-stage Evaluation

a) Performance

F-35A received the best evaluation, having obtained the highest score in the simulation using mathematical analysis (Operations Research (OR)), as well as obtaining a good balance of high scores in regard to aircraft performance, fire control capability, electronic warfare capability, stealth target detection capability, and air interdiction capability (air-to-ground attack capability, etc.) and all other evaluation criteria.

b) Cost

The cost items that are most likely to mount up are the cost of purchasing the aircraft and the fuel expenses. Among these items, F/A-18E received the highest evaluation regarding the aircraft purchase cost (i.e. the cheapest), while the Typhoon received the highest appraisal in regard to fuel expenses (i.e. the lowest). However, in the overall appraisal of costs, F-35A was the runner-up in terms of both aircraft purchase cost and fuel expenses; moreover, as it uses the same aerial refueling system as the Air Self-Defense Force are currently using, there were no additional renovation expenses, so it received the

highest score overall. There was only a narrow margin between F-35A and the runner-up model.

c) Japanese industries' participation

A large number of proposals were made regarding F/A-18E and Typhoon, for components in whose manufacture domestic companies could participate. In the case of Typhoon, few of these proposals were within the scope of the prescribed cost bracket, so it was unable to secure the highest score in the evaluation of whether it fell within the appropriate cost bracket, but as there was a high level of participation permitted in the manufacture of the various components etc., as well as a high level of technology disclosure, it secured the highest score in the overall appraisal of participation by domestic companies.

d) Logistical Support

This was the evaluation criterion where there was the greatest competition between the three models; F-35A gained the highest score, due to its ability to identify failure sites on the aircraft in greater detail and the function to indicate the expected time to replace components. As a means of curbing maintenance and operation costs, all three models proposed to use a new contract system called performance-based logistics (PBL), under which remuneration is provided according to the achievement of maintenance outcomes, so all three scored the same for this criterion.

e) Overall Score

As a result of adding up the appraisal scores of each model in regard to the aforementioned appraisal elements, F-35A scored the highest.

3. Conclusion

As only one model acquired the highest score in the second-stage appraisal, the third-stage appraisal was not carried out and F-35A, which obtained the highest score, was selected as the next-generation fighter aircraft to replace the F-4.

Part II The Basics of Japan's Defense Policy and Dynamic Defense Force

Chapter 3 Development of the Dynamic Defense Force

Section 6 New Efforts Based on Recent Trends

1. Efforts for Development and Use of Space

Japan, a country which has an exclusively defense-oriented policy, is strongly required to use outer space, which does not belong to the national territory of any country and is not constrained by conditions such as surface topography, to strengthen information gathering functions for detecting signs of various contingencies in advance, and warning and surveillance functions in sea and air space surrounding Japan, and to ensure lines of communication during the international peace cooperation activities of the SDF.

The enactment of the Basic Space Law[1], passed by the Diet in May 2008, has made it clearer that the development and use of space by Japan shall be carried out under the pacifism enshrined in the Constitution of Japan in compliance with international commitments. The law also stipulates that the Government of Japan shall take necessary measures to promote the development and use of space that contributes to ensuring the peace and security of the international community, as well as to the security of Japan.

In 2009, the strategic Headquarters for Space Policy Cabinet Secretariat which was established based on the Basic Space Law formulated the Basic Plan for Space Policy, which includes the six key elements such as the realization of a secure, pleasant, and affluent society utilizing space, as well as the enhancement of national security utilizing space.

Furthermore, the 2010 NDPG stipulate promotion of the development and the use of outer space with a view to strengthening information gathering and communications functions, etc.

Meanwhile, on January 2009, the Committee on Promotion of Space Development and Use established in the Ministry of Defense formulated the "Basic Guidelines for Space Development and Use of Space" (Basic Guidelines). The Basic Guidelines stipulates that it is extremely beneficial to take advantage of the nature of space for defense purpose and it will be an effective means to strengthen C4ISR[2] capability in light of the focus of the buildup of defense capabilities on enabling accurate situational awareness, information sharing, command and control operations, and thereby achieving systemization – maximizing of the equipment's performance as an ensemble.

The Ministry of Defense will promote new development and use of space for the national security in coordination with related ministries, based on the Basic Plan for Space Policy, the 2010 NDPG, and the Basic Guidelines. In FY2012, it will address projects such as 1) research for enhancement of C4ISR utilizing space, 2) enhancement, maintenance, and operation of X-band SATCOM functions, and 3) participation in the USAF Space Fundamentals Course.

Of these, with regard to the enhancement of X-band SATCOM, in light of the fact that two of the

communications satellites (Superbird-B2 and Superbird-D) used by the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces for command and control of tactical forces are due to reach the end of their service lives in FY2015, these satellite communications networks will be reorganized. This reorganization will facilitate high-speed, large-capacity communications that are more resistant to interference, in order to accommodate the recent growth in communications requirements, as well as integrating communications systems, thereby contributing to the construction of a dynamic defense force. Moreover, from the perspective of maximizing cost-effectiveness, it has been decided to implement the project by means of the PFI (private finance initiative)[3] system, and 19 years' worth of costs (approximately 122.4 billion yen) has been allocated in the FY2012 budget, to cover expenses from the manufacture of the satellites through to the end of their service life. In this project, after guaranteeing transparency and fairness in tenders, etc. through open tendering, the content of the proposals will be screened impartially, from the perspective of security, with bidders being asked to implement the appropriate management systems and conservation measures.

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1 See <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/utyuu/about2.html>

2 Abbreviation "Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance" which is the collective term of each function.

3 See PartⅢ, Chapter 4, Section 2

2. Initiatives Related to the Stable Use of Cyberspace

Information and communications technology has developed and been widely adopted at great speed and, as a result, it is now essential as the infrastructure for socioeconomic activities. On the other hand, this means there is a possibility that people's lives and economic activities will be severely affected if the computer systems or networks are compromised. Based on this awareness, the Information Security Policy Council, which decides the basic strategy for Japan's information security measures, and its implementation agency, the National Information Security Center (NISC), were established in 2005, and since then a variety of initiatives related to the information security problems of Japan have been undertaken by public and private sector entities with the NISC playing the leading role[1].

In May 2010, the Information Security Policy Council formulated the Information Security Strategy for Protecting the Nation as a comprehensive strategy for the period from FY2010 to FY2013[2]. This strategy document incorporated extremely important policies with respect to the national security, including preparation of the government's initial response to a large-scale cyber attack, reinforcement of protection against cyber attacks, and reinforcement of international alliances against cyber attacks, etc.

Along with the National Police Agency, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Defense is designated one of the government agencies which must cooperate particularly closely with the NISC. Therefore, the Ministry contributes to

the cross-sector initiatives led by the NISC by providing it with the knowledge and skills possessed by the Ministry of Defense/the SDF. For example, the Ministry participates in cyber attack response drills and personnel exchanges, and provides information about cyber attacks, etc.

Moreover, in light of the cyber attacks on companies involved in the defense field which were reported in September 2011, the Ministry of Defense has conducted deliberations regarding the strengthening of measures to ensure information security in procurement, and revised its contractual agreements with companies that use internal servers, etc. to handle Ministry of Defense intelligence that should be protected, as follows:

1) Obligation introduced to submit a report to the Ministry of Defense immediately, in the event that a server or computer on which information that should be protected is stored becomes infected with a virus, etc. or is subject to unauthorized access, or if a server/computer connected to the same network as that server/computer is infected with a virus, etc.

2) Compilation of a communication diagram that clarifies those in charge and those who should be contacted

3) Implementation of a full scan by anti-virus software at least once a week

4) 24/7 year-round monitoring to ensure that no information that should be protected is leaked outside the company

5) Preservation for at least three months of records of access to information that should be protected

6) Strengthening of encryption measures

7) Audits of the status of education and training of staff

Furthermore, in response to cyber attacks on defense-related companies, the Government has conducted deliberations concerning measures to deal with these, via the Subcommittee for Strengthening Public-Private Cooperation, which was established in October 2011; the results of these deliberations were submitted to the Information Security Policy Council in the form of a report entitled *Approaches to Public-Private Cooperation in Information Security Measures*[3]. This report points out the need for all government bodies, ministries and agencies to put in place a computer security incident response team (CSIRT)[4] within their organizations and to seek expert, working-level collaboration between the CSIRT within each organization, including both the public and private sector; in addition, it highlights the

importance of forming a cyber incident version of the disaster medical assistant team (DMAT), in which capable personnel (primarily those from the NISC) can provide flexible support that transcends organizational boundaries in the event of an emergency, and states that the Ministry of Defense can also make a significant contribution through active participation in deliberations concerning concrete measures aimed at improving security throughout the government.

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[1] For more details about the activities, etc. of the National Information Security Center, see <http://www.nisc.go.jp>

[2] See <http://www.nisc.go.jp/eng/pdf/New_Strategy_English.pdf>

[3] See <http://www.nisc.go.jp/conference/seisaku/dai28/pdf/28shiryou1-1.pdf>

[4] A specialist unit with the ability to respond in the event of an emergency relating to incidents that might pose a risk to information security. In the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces, bodies such as the Self Defense Forces C4 Systems Command (see Part III, Chapter 2, Section 3 (P○)) correspond to this

3. Efforts Relating to the Environment

1. Effects Exerted by Climate Change on the Security Environment

With the mounting concern for climate change caused by global warming, there has been a growing tendency in recent years to give thought to the effects exerted by climate change on security. For example, in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) published by the U.S. Department of Defense on February 2010, climate change is positioned as one of the factors which exert an important effect on the shape of the security environment of the future.

In this way, there is increasingly shared understanding of the fact that a range of effects may be brought about by climate change even on the security environment. The 2010 NDPG recognizes that from a long-term perspective, Japan should be aware of the impact which climate change may have on the security environment. Therefore, for Japan too, it is necessary to pay attention to the effects that climate change will exert on the security environment.

1. Efforts for Environmental Conservation

As part of the government, the Ministry of Defense is developing action plans based on various government programs, and actively promoting a variety of efforts for the environment[1].

In 2001, the Ministry of Defense “Environment Month” and “Environment Week” were established. Garrisons nationwide also took part, performing diverse activities for the purpose of environmental conservation in areas such as preventing global warming. Their objective was to raise consciousness of people including SDF personnel in relation to environmental conservation.

In managing and maintaining its facilities and equipment, the SDF is promoting a range of efforts[2] to thoroughly conserve and reduce burdens on environment. Specifically, progress is being made in areas such as the installation of energy conservation equipment at SDF buildings, and the replacement of worn out vehicles with eco-cars, which are compatible with exhaust gas regulations, and which have excellent mileage. Thanks to efforts like these, great results can be expected in environmental conservation, such as reduced exhaust CO2, not to mention the substantial economic benefits.

Moreover, the Ministry of Defense is working on environmental conservation initiatives for the facilities and areas of the U.S. forces in Japan as well. The result of the comprehensive review of the Host Nation Support in December 2010 stipulated that, as part of the Japan-U.S. cooperation under the Green Alliance in the "2+2" joint statement issued in May that year, the two countries would endeavor to develop facilities that take the environment into account, for example by introducing designs that are environmentally-friendly because they are more energy-efficient.

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1 The action plan of the Ministry of Defense which was devised in October 2007 on the back of the "Action Plan for Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction in Government Operations" (Cabinet decision made in the same year), the "Defense Agency Guidelines on Environmental Consideration" enacted in 2003 based on the government's Basic Environment Plan, and a review of those guidelines carried out in January 2005, etc. For details on Ministry of Defense guidelines for environmental consideration, see <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/chouwa/index.html>.

2 Specifically, this includes measures for the purpose of conservation of the atmospheric environment, water quality conservation, recycling and waste disposal, improvement of environmental conservation facilities, and environmental surveys.

4. Efforts for Ocean Policy

Under various circumstances regarding the ocean, including the sea areas surrounding Japan, the Basic Act on Ocean Policy[1] was put into force in July 2007 with the aim of the sound development of the economic society and the stability and improvement of the lives of the people in Japan as well as our contribution to the coexistence of the ocean and human beings, recognizing that it is critical for Japan, as a maritime nation, to establish a new Oceanic State which harmonizes peaceful and proactive development and use of the sea with the preservation of the marine environment. Then, the Headquarters for Ocean Policy was established within the Cabinet as a system to promote ocean policy intensively and comprehensively.

Based on this act, a cabinet decision was made in March 2008 to adopt the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy[2], which stipulates the basic policy of various measures with regard to the oceans in order to promote such measures comprehensively and systematically.

The Basic Plan on Ocean Policy includes extremely important measures in terms of the security of our country: for example, maintaining order at sea carried out from the viewpoint of securing maritime safety, efforts for maritime transport safety, countermeasures against marine-derived natural disasters, and

securing maritime transport.

The Headquarters for Ocean Policy has been discussing coordination between ministries on the integration of marine survey data and the preservation and management of islands[3]. The Ministry of Defense participates in these discussions so that works in the related fields can be performed in closer coordination with other ministries.

The Basic Plan on Ocean Policy stipulates: the systematic development of ships and aircraft for the purpose of ensuring maritime safety; and the conducting of exercises based on the manuals on joint response to suspicious ships. Accordingly, the Ministry of Defense is engaging in a number of efforts in FY2012, including 1) build-up of equipment for ensuring maritime safety, such as construction of a destroyer and a submarine, acquisition of minesweeping and transporting aircrafts, and extension of the operating life of destroyers and rotary-wing patrol aircrafts, 2) research and development of sonar technologies and capabilities that can detect noise-reduced submarines, and improved torpedoes for submarines, 3) dealing with pirates off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, and 4) strengthening cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard through joint training to deal with unidentified ships.

(See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 3)

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1 See <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/kaiyou/about2.html>

2 See <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/kaiyou/kihonkeikaku/index.html>

3 In order to appropriately manage the sea under jurisdiction, the area of which (approximately 4.47 million km2) includes exclusive economic zones extending to roughly 12 times the land area (of approximately 380,000 km2), in December 2009, the Headquarters for Ocean Policy formulated the "Basic Policy concerning Preservation Management of Islands for Management of the Sea." Then, on May 2010, a bill was passed that pertained to the conservation of exclusive economic zones and the continental shelf, and to improvement of base facilities. On July, based on that same bill, the Cabinet approved a basic plan on the conservation and development of base facilities in low-water mark areas for the conservation and promotion of the utilization of the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf.

5. Guidelines for the Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment, etc.

Taking into account the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and beyond, which stated that Japan will study measures to respond to the major changes regarding peace contributions, international cooperation, and international joint development and production, the Guidelines for Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment, etc. were issued in December 2011 as a statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary.

Based on this guidelines, the Government, in line with the ideas behind the individual exemption measures of the Three Principles on Arms Exports conducted so far, and there related policy guidelines here in after referred to as the "Three Principles" takes comprehensive exemption measures in overseas transfer of defense equipment, etc. ① for cases related to peace contribution and international

cooperation, ② for cases regarding international joint development and production of defense equipment, etc., that contributes to Japan's security.

The overseas transfer of defense equipment, etc. will be allowed on the premise that strict control is in place, i.e. the counties participating in the pursuing in the projects are obliged to gain prior consent of the Government of Japan when pursuing extra-purpose use or transfer to third parties of the equipment, etc.

The Government is aware that the Three Principles are based on the basic philosophy of Japan as a peace-loving nation that seeks to avoid the aggravation of international conflicts, and will maintain the basic philosophy which underpins the Three Principles.

See References 20, 21

Part III Measures for Defense of Japan

Chapter 1 Operations of Self-Defense Forces for Defense of Japan and Responses to Diverse Situations

The foundation for achieving Japan's security is its own efforts.

Based on this understanding, the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2010 and beyond stipulates that the nation will constantly utilize all means and, in the event of various contingencies, will seamlessly deal with the situation as it unfolds. For this reason, the nation must carry out unified and strategic efforts, and the Ministry of Defense and SDF are engaged not only in the operation of the SDF during the occurrence of various contingencies, but in various activities under normal conditions, including the improvement of response capability.

The first section of this chapter explains this country's basic framework for armed attack situations including the operation of the SDF. The second section explains specific measures of the SDF for each of various situations. Finally, the third section explains the lessons learned from SDF responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake.

Section 1 Frameworks for Responses to Armed Attack Situations

It is of utmost importance for the national government to establish a national response framework as a basis for an SDF operational structure[1] to deal with serious situations that threaten the peace and security of the country, and its people, such as armed attacks against Japan. This establishment enables an effective response to armed attack situations and anticipated situations (both to armed attack situations[2] and to situations where armed attacks are anticipated[3], contributes to the deterrence of an armed attack, and is also vital from the perspective of achieving civilian control in an armed attack situation.

This section outlines the key aspects of Japan's response framework in the event of an armed attack situation, and the SDF operational structure that is based on this framework.

(See Fig. III-1-1-1)

1. The Framework for Responses to Armed Attack Situations

1. Responses to Armed Attack Situations

The Armed Attack Situation Response Law[4] determines the fundamental nature of Japan's response to armed attack situations and defines basic principles, basic policies (the Basic Response Plan), and the responsibilities of national and local governments in the event of an armed attack situation. That is to say, this legislation and other emergency legislation, such as the Civil Protection Law, prescribe that the

relevant organizations (designated government institutions, local governments and designated public institutions[5])
(See Fig. III-1-1-2)
See Reference 22, 23

(1) Basic Response Plan, etc.

In situations such as armed attack situations, the Cabinet must decide upon the following items for a Basic Response Plan and ask for approval by the Diet. In addition, when the Basic Response Plan has been decided, a temporary Task Force for Armed Attack Situations, etc., (the Task Force) is to be established within the Cabinet, and it will implement these measures:
1) Certification of the facts, and the premises to that certification supporting the armed attack situation or the situation where an armed attack situation is anticipated.
2) Overall plan to respond to the pertinent armed attack situation.
3) Important items related to the response measures.

(2) Response Measures

When responding to armed attack situations, the designated government institutions, local governments, and designated public institutions will implement the following countermeasures based on legal provisions between the period of formulation and termination of the Basic Response Plan.

a. Measures to Bring Armed Attack Situations to an End Depending on the Progress of the Situation
1) The use of military force, unit deployment and other activities conducted by the SDF.
2) Provision of materials, facilities and services, and other measures to facilitate the smooth and efficient implementation of the SDF and U.S. Forces' operations.
3) Diplomatic measures other than those described in items 1) and 2) above.

b. Measures to Protect Lives, Bodies and Properties of the People, and to Minimize the Effects on People's Lives and Economy
1) Warnings, evacuation instructions, rescue of disaster victims, emergency restoration of facilities and installations, and other measures.
2) Price stabilization, distribution of necessities of daily life, and other necessary measures.

(3) Responsibilities of the National and Local Governments

The responsibilities of the national and local governments as defined in the Armed Attack Situation Response Law are outlined in Fig. III-1-1-3

(4) Authority of the Prime Minister for Response Measures

Following the stipulation of the Basic Response Plan, for overall promotion of response measures, the Task Force for Armed Attack Situations, etc., (the Task Force) will be established within the Cabinet, with the Prime Minister appointed as leader of the Task Force and appropriate Ministers of State as Deputy Chief and other members of the Task Force.

If the Prime Minister recognizes that there are obstacles to protecting the lives, bodies, and properties of the people, and to eliminating an armed attack, when necessary response measures under comprehensive coordination are not implemented, he may instruct the head of the local government concerned and other relevant persons to implement the necessary measures. In circumstances where necessary response measures are not implemented or if there is an obstacle to protecting the lives, bodies, and properties of the people, in emergency response situations, the Prime Minister or the Minister of State responsible for operations relating to the relevant countermeasure may take responsibility for and implement the response measures that the local governments or designated public institutions have failed to implement, after notifying the relevant heads of local government or other relevant individuals.

(5) Report to the United Nations Security Council

In accordance with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, the government will immediately report measures it has implemented to terminate armed attacks on Japan to the U.N. Security Council.

2. Responses to Emergency Situations other than Armed Attack Situations

The Armed Attack Situation Response Law provides for appropriate and rapid response measures to be implemented in emergency situations[6] other than armed attacks, in order for the government to ensure the peace and independence of the country, and to maintain the security of the country and its people.

In addition, based on changes in various situations surrounding Japan, such as the appearance of unidentified vessels or mass terrorism incidents, measures shall be taken including the following: 1) Development of the systems for assembling information, analysis, and situational evaluations; 2) Preparation for formulating response measures in accordance with various situations; 3) Rapid implementation of measures to strengthen levels of coordination between the SDF, the police, the Japan Coast Guard and other relevant organizations.

(1) Emergency Response Situation Response Plan

In an emergency response situation, the Cabinet must decide the following items for those policies concerning emergency response situations (emergency response situation response plan) and must obtain approval of the plan by the Diet. Also, on the approval of the emergency response situation response plan, the Headquarters for the Emergency Response Situation will be temporarily established within the Cabinet to deal with the relevant situation.

① Certification of an emergency response situation and the facts supporting the certification

② General plan for responses

③ Important matters relating to emergency response measures

(2) Emergency Response Measures

The designated government institutions, local governments, and designated public institutions will implement the following emergency response measures based on legal provisions, during the period between the formulation and termination of an Emergency Response Situation Response Plan:

① Measures most appropriate to end the emergency response situation and measures to prevent or suppress attacks during emergency response situations.

② In order to protect the lives, bodies, and properties of the people from attacks or to minimize the impact on their daily lives and economic conditions in emergency response situations, the following measures will also be implemented according to current developments in the emergency response situation: the issuance of warnings, evacuation instructions, the rescue of disaster victims, the emergency restoration of facilities and equipment, etc.

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[1] Under the administrative policy announced in 2002, the Government would seek the concrete development of legal systems "so as to advance building of a nation that is strong in emergencies". In light of this, three pieces of legislation for responses to situations were enacted in 2003. Furthermore, seven pieces of legislation for responses to situations were enacted in 2004 and three related treaties were ratified in the same year. With this, a basis for emergency legislation was established. The development of these legal systems reflects many results of the "emergency legislation study", which had been conducted by the former Defense Agency since 1977
Note: a fixed concept has not necessarily been designated for the term "emergency legislation". For example, in the past, a study on legislation concerning operations of the SDF, in which defense operation orders shall be delivered pursuant to Article 76 of the Self-Defense Forces Act was conducted as an emergency legislation study. When used in this white paper, it refers to legislation for responses to situations that has been developed since 2003.

[2] situation in which an external armed attack on Japan emerges, or an imminent danger is clearly acknowledged

[3] A situation where an armed attack has yet to emerge, but circumstances are growing increasingly

strained and an armed attack is expected

[4] The Law for Ensuring Peace and Independence of Japan and Security of State and the People in Armed Attack Situations, etc.
See <http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/hourei/houritu/jitai_h.html>

[5] Independent administrative agencies, the Bank of Japan, the Japanese Red Cross Society, the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK), other public institutions, and corporations engaged in public service operations, including the provision of electricity, gas, transportation, communications, and other services

[6] An emergency response situation. (A situation arising due to actions that may kill or injure many people which uses methods equivalent to those used in an armed attack situation, or a situation where it is recognized that the relevant actions represent a clear and present threat that necessitate an emergency response by the state). Alternatively, a contingency situation other than an armed attack situation that may have a significant impact on the security of the nation and its people

2. Measures Based on the Armed Attack Situation Response Law

There were seven pieces of emergency legislation, and three treaties enacted and signed in June 2004 as a result of the Armed Attack Situation Response Law[1] that was enacted in June 2003. Based on that the framework to enable necessary measures for responding to armed attack situations, etc. to be taken was prepared. The following items summarize that.
See References 22, 23

1. Measures to Protect the Lives, etc. of the People and to Minimize the Effects on the Daily Lives of the People

Japan established the Civil Protection Law[2], which prescribes measures for three necessary items to protect the lives, etc., of the people in armed attack situations and emergency response situations[3]. In addition, it prescribes similar measures in the case of emergency response situations.
See subsection 3 of this section

2. Measures to Terminate Armed Attack Situations

(1) Facilitation of SDF Operations

The Emergency Legislation Study, resulting from the partial amendment of the SDF Law at the same time the Armed Attack Situation Response Law was enacted, required enactment of Classification 1 (laws pertaining to the Ministry of Defense) and Classification 2 (laws pertaining to ministries other than the Ministry of Defense) legislation, so that new laws were enacted such as measures for the construction of defense facilities before orders for defense operations, laws pertaining to emergency activities during defense operations, and specific regulations necessary for application of laws related to road and other laws.
Japan also enacted the Maritime Transportation Restriction Law[4], which enables the implementation of measures to restrict the maritime transportation of foreign military supplies (weapons, etc.) in Japanese territorial waters or in international waters surrounding Japan.

(2) Facilitation of U.S. Forces Operations

a. Japan established the Law Related to Measures Conducted by the Government in Line with U.S. Military Actions in Armed Attack Situations, etc[5]. (U.S. Military Actions Related Measures Law). In accordance with the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty, it prescribes measures to be implemented so that U.S.

forces may smoothly and effectively take the necessary actions to terminate armed attacks against Japan.

b. The Diet approved partial amendment of the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the SDF of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America (ACSA — Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement)[6]. The scope of application for this Agreement has been widened so that it now additionally applies to responses to armed attack situations, the efforts of the international community to contribute to global peace and security, and for disaster response measures. Also, the revision of one part of the SDF Law has enabled the SDF to provide logistic support, supplies, and services to U.S. forces implementing these actions.

(3) Other (Coordination of the Use of Facilities of Ports and Airfields, Roads and Others)

Japan established the Law Regarding the Use of Specific Public Facilities[7], ensuring that the SDF and U.S. forces' actions and measures to protect the people of Japan can be implemented appropriately and promptly. The Law enables the comprehensive coordination of specific public facilities, etc., (ports, airfields, roads, territorial waters and airspace, and radio frequencies) that may be required in armed attack situations.

3. Guarantee of Appropriate Implementation of International Humanitarian Laws

Japan established the Law Concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War and other Detainees in Armed Attack Situations (Prisoners of War Law)[8]. The Law was created to ensure that prisoners are always treated humanely in armed attack situations and to ensure that prisoners' lives, bodies, health, and dignity are always respected and protected from any violations or threats.

Moreover, Japan established the Law Concerning Punishment of Grave Breaches of the International Humanitarian Law[9] prescribing appropriate punishment for "grave breaches" of international humanitarian laws applicable to international armed conflicts.

Along with these individual emergency legislations, the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions[10] of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I[11]) and the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August, 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II[12]), which are the main International Humanitarian Laws, were ratified.

Japan has established legislation to protect cultural properties during armed conflict establishing a system to provide international protection for those cultural properties that can be considered valuable cultural assets for the entire human race, as well as legislation to cooperate with the International Criminal Court

which ensures the appropriate implementation of International Criminal Court regulations.
In addition to these laws, three treaties relating to the protection of cultural properties at a time of armed conflict and the regulations of the International Criminal Court were concluded in 2007.

4. Efforts towards High Readiness for Armed Attack Situations

With the passing of the emergency legislation, Japan has established a legal foundation but still needs to confirm the legislation's effectiveness and also ceaselessly strive to maintain the effectiveness of the required operational infrastructure to ensure an appropriate response in an ever-changing security environment.
As part of these efforts, during peacetime, the Special Advisory Committee for Contingency Planning, under the jurisdiction of the Security Council, will study responses to emergency situations, such as armed attacks, terrorist attacks, or the appearance of unidentified vessels. In addition, it will formulate plans for the specific response measures to be implemented by designated government institutions, local governments, and designated public institutions in armed attack situations. The Council will also take steps to formulate role-related plans and ensure that these plans are reflected into policies and operations.
The government also works to utilize a range of opportunities to educate the public on all of the important measures that it will implement to protect the lives, bodies, and properties of the people in armed attack situations. Also, it verifies the effectiveness of its operational structure through methods such as training, and maintains high levels of readiness for armed attack situations.
The Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces conducted integrated field training in November 2011 based on plans created by the Joint Staff, to maintain and improve their capabilities to jointly utilize those functions and capabilities in various situations.
Moreover, a U.S.-Japan joint exercise (command post exercise) was held in January 2012, focused on verifying and providing training regarding U.S.-Japan cooperation and the SDF's response to various situations, as well as the joint handling of Japan's defense by the U.S. and Japan; this exercise sought to increase proficiency and maintain and improve joint operational capability. Relevant government ministries and agencies, such as the Cabinet Secretariat and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, also participated in this exercise for the first time, so an exercise in inter-ministerial coordination was also carried out and the functions and frameworks for government decision-making and response measures set forth in the 2010 NDPG were put to the test.

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[1] Based on the framework established under the Armed Attack Situation Response Law, and on individual emergency legislation that was prepared, measures were created to protect peoples' lives, etc., to minimize the effects of armed attacks on their lives, etc., and to implement necessary measures so that the SDF and U.S. Forces might smoothly and effectively take necessary actions to terminate armed attacks against Japan. In addition, this kind of individual emergency legislation required the

guarantee of appropriate implementation of international humanitarian laws.

[2] Law concerning Measures for Protection of the Civilian Population in Armed Attack Situations. See <http://kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hogohousei/hourei/hogo.html>

[3] The responsibilities of national and local governments to minimize the effects on peoples' lives, measures for the cooperation of the Japanese people and related to evacuation of residents, measures related to relief of evacuated residents, and measures related to responses to armed attack disasters

[4] The Law concerning the Restriction of Maritime Transportation of Foreign Military Supplies, etc. in Armed Attack Situations. See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/j/presiding/law/yujihousei/002b.html>

[5] The Law Related to Measures Conducted by the Government in Line with U.S. Military Actions in Armed Attack Situations, etc. See <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hogohousei/hourei/beigun.html>

[6] The Agreement to Amend the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America concerning the Reciprocal Provision of Logistics Support, Supplies and Services between the SDF of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America (ACSA). See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/acsa/acsa_gaiyo.html>

[7] The Law Related to the Use of Specific Public Facilities, etc.
See <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hogohousei/hourei/koukyou.html>

[8] The Law concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War and other Detainees in Armed Attack Situations. See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/presiding/law/yujihousei/index02_03.html>

[9] The Law concerning Punishment of Grave Breaches of the International Humanitarian Law. See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/presiding/law/yujihousei/003b.html>

[10] The Geneva Conventions comprise four treaties: 1) The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949 (Convention I); 2) The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949 (Convention II); 3) The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Convention III); 4) The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Convention IV).

[11] Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)

[12] Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II)
See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/k_jindo/pdfs/giteisho_02.pdf>

3. Efforts for Civil Protection

1. Measures for Civil Protection in Armed Attack Situations (Civil Protection Measures)

All organizations and functions of the government will implement their measures for civil protection in armed attack situations based on the Basic Response Plan[1] and basic guidelines for civil protection in armed attack situation. Also, the country as a whole will give its unfailing support for all civil protection measures implemented by local governments and designated public institutions.

Local governments will implement their respective civil protection measures based on the national government policies, and will be responsible for the overall coordination for the civil protection measures implemented by relevant authorities in their jurisdiction.

See Reference 22

2. The Basic Guidelines for Civil Protection

In March 2005, the government established the Basic Guidelines for Civil Protection (hereinafter the "Basic Guidelines"), based on Article 32 of the Civil Protection Law. The Basic Guidelines presumes four types of armed attack situations, including amphibious landing invasion, guerilla or special forces unit attacks, ballistic missile attacks, and air attacks, and prescribes matters requiring attention to implement civil protection measures in response to each of them. In addition, it prescribes the content and distribution of roles to implement the measures for the national, prefectural and municipal governments and designated public institutions for civil protection measures in response to evacuation, relief and disasters.

Designated government institutions and prefectural governments, etc., established the plan concerning civil protection (the Civil Protection Plan) based on the Civil Protection Law and the Basic Guidelines.

3. Roles of the SDF in Civil Protection

In October 2005, the Defense Agency and the Defense Facilities Administration Agency, both designated government institutions, established the "Civil Protection Plan" [2], based on the Civil Protection Law, Article 33, Section 1, and the Basic Guidelines. The Plan included measures to be implemented in full force by the SDF to terminate armed attacks, which is a primary mission of the SDF. In addition, the Plan described civil protection measures to be implemented within a feasible range, relating to evacuation, relief support, and responses to armed attack disasters.

See Reference 24

(1) Civil Protection Dispatch

The outline of the stipulations of Civil Protection Dispatch is as follows:

a. Dispatch Procedure

For situations where it is recognized that a dispatch is required, the Minister of Defense may issue a Civil Protection Dispatch order to dispatch relevant units to implement civil protection measures following a request by a prefectural governor or the Task Force Chief[3].

(See Fig. III-1-1-4)

Also, when a defense operations order has been issued in an armed attack situation, or on the issuance of a public security operations order as a response measure in an emergency situation, the Minister of Defense may implement civil protection measures or emergency response protection measures as a part of the consistent defense or public security operations without civil protection dispatch orders.

b. Authorities

Only in cases when police officers are not at the scene, the SDF personnel ordered for a civil protection dispatch operation is authorized to execute evacuation and other measures, to prevent and control crime, and to enter private premises. And only in cases when officials other than police officers are not at the scene the SDF personnel are authorized to use weapons, as prescribed by the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials[4].

In addition, only in cases when the municipal mayors, etc., are not at the scene, the SDF personnel ordered for a civil protection dispatch operation are authorized to execute evacuation instructions, perform emergency public duties, to establish areas on alert, to request cooperation of residents and other measures.

c. Organization of Special Units

When civil protection dispatch operations are being conducted, special units may be organized temporarily based on necessity, and SDF ready and reserve personnel may be called to duty.

d. Emergency Response Protection Measures

The same provisions as measures in armed attack situations, based on the Civil Protection Law and the Basic Guidelines etc., shall apply for measures in emergency response situations.

(2) Measures implemented by the SDF

a. Evacuation of Residents

The SDF will collect and distribute essential information, coordinate with relevant organizations, and provide guidance and transportation services for the evacuation of residents.

b. Relief of Evacuated Residents

Centered on measures for the relief of lives (search, rescue, and emergency medical care) and following a request from the Task Force Chief or other authorized persons, the SDF will implement measures to support medical care activities (transporting injured people, etc.), to support the livelihood of the people when necessary (distributing hot meals, supplying water, transporting relief materials, etc.), and to gather safety information, etc., as required.

c. Responses to Armed Attack Disasters

The SDF will carry out the following response measures: confirming the damage, providing monitoring support, implementing measures for secure of lives (search, rescue, providing emergency medical care, etc.), preventing damage expansion (supporting evacuation of surrounding residents, extinguishing fires, etc.), and removing dangerous substances as a result of nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) attacks. Otherwise, the SDF will implement other important measures to maintain the security of facilities such as those related to daily life (guidance and advice, dispatching personnel, etc.) and other necessary measures as ordered by the Prime Minister.

d. Emergency Recovery

While implementing emergency recovery measures for SDF facilities and equipment support operations will be conducted including the removal of dangerous rubbles, and emergency repairs of roads and runways based on a request from prefectural governors, etc.

4. Activities by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF to Facilitate the Civil Protection Measures

(1) Training for Civil Protection

In order to appropriately and promptly implement civil protection measures in armed attack situations, etc., it is essential to jointly coordinate matters related to the implementation of civil protection measures with other ministries and agencies, local governments, and other relevant organizations.

From this perspective, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF actively participate and cooperate in civil protection training implemented by the Cabinet Secretariat, prefectural government organizations, or local governments. The Ministry of Defense and the SDF continue such efforts to strengthen coordination and response capabilities.

Joint exercises between the national and local governments regarding civil protection were started in

FY2005 and field exercises were conducted in five prefectures including Fukui that year, and exercises were conducted in Hokkaido, Saga, and Nagasaki in FY2011, with command post exercises in Yamagata, Niigata, Fukui, Gifu, Hyogo, Tokushima, Ehime, Fukuoka and Miyazaki.

In addition, the joint exercises regarding civil protection that were carried out in the city of Omura, Nagasaki Prefecture, in January 2012, were the first such exercises which envisioned a terrorist attack at an airport. The SDF, with participations of the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, Governor of Nagasaki, and relevant ministries and agencies, conducted training on initial response measures and medical rescue, in coordination with the central and local crisis management headquarters.

See Sections 2-4, Reference 25

(2) Coordination with Local Governments in Peacetime

During peacetime, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF closely coordinate with local governments, etc. The Provincial Liaison & Coordination Division was established within the GSDF Army Headquarters to achieve effective implementation for civil protection measures through close coordination. To strengthen functions relating to coordination and cooperation with local governments, etc., a Civil Protection and Disaster Countermeasures Liaison Coordination Officer post was established in each SDF Provincial Cooperation Office.

Civil protection councils were established in prefectures and municipalities as institutions to gather opinions from a wide range of citizens, and members of the Ground, Maritime or Air Self-Defense Force were assigned to be council members. Furthermore, related staff of the Regional Defense Bureaus, which are designated regional government institutions, are assigned to be members.

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1 See <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hogohousei/hourei/050325shishin.pdf>

2 The Civil Protection Plan of the Ministry of Defense. See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/kokumin_hogo.pdf>

3 The Prime Minister assumes the position of the Director of the Crisis Management Headquarters, but these positions are regulated as separate entities.

4 Police officers, coast guard officers or assistant coast guard officers.

4. The Joint Operational Structure of the Self-Defense Forces

In 2006, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF shifted to a joint operational structure. This established the basis for unified SDF operations among the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF in peacetime, and is enabling the SDF to fulfill its expanding range of already diversified duties in an effective and prompt manner.
The 2010 NDPG also emphasizes the strengthening of the Joint Staff[1], as well as joint operations infrastructure such as command and control, intelligence collection, and joint training, and reorganization, merger, centralization, and creation of hubs for functions that extend across all three services of the SDF.
(See Fig. III-1-1-5)

1. Outline of Joint Operational Structure

(1) Role of the Chief of Staff

a. The Chief of Staff, Joint Staff develops a joint operations concept for SDF operations, and solely supports the Minister of Defense on SDF operations from a military expert's perspective.

b. The Minister's commands concerning the operations of the SDF shall be delivered through the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff and orders concerning operations of the SDF shall be executed by the Chief of Joint Staff. In doing this, the Minister's commands and orders shall be delivered through the Chief of Joint Staff not only in cases where a joint task force[2] is organized, but also in cases where a single SDF unit is employed to take responses.

(2) Relationship between Chief of Staff, Joint Staff and Other Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Staff undertakes the functions relating to those SDF operations that were transferred and consolidated from the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF Staff. The GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF Staff Offices continue to undertake functions for unit maintenance, such as personnel, building-up defense capability, and education and training.
In addition, from the perspective of facilitating smooth SDF joint operations, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff creates medium- to long-term defense concepts and strategies, and annual planning policies to clarify the requirements of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF functions. Each of the Chiefs of Staff of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF will implement all measures in accordance with these plans.
The information necessary for the SDF to carry out its operations is provided by the Defense Intelligence Headquarters, which is the "central intelligence organization of the Ministry of Defense," to the Joint Staff and relevant units.

(See Fig. III-1-1-6)

2. Establishment of Infrastructure to Enhance the Joint Operational Structure

Within the joint operational structure, it is essential that the Joint Staff and each SDF unit maintain systems to communicate commands accurately and to share information promptly. Therefore, the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII), the common network of the Ministry of Defense and SDF, and the Central Command System (CSS) that supports command supervision for the Minister of Defense connecting with the primary command systems of each SDF to collect intelligence, were prepared as part of the foundation to support that essential requirement[3]. The New NDPG also stipulates the possession of a command and control function utilizing a high level communications network that includes satellites and a system for sharing intelligence[4] to strengthen the joint operational infrastructure, and the development of a flexible and wide-ranging communications system using advanced communications technology acquired from within and without.

Furthermore, as it is necessary for information systems and communications networks to be protected from threats such as cyber attacks, efforts are being made to strengthen the combined cyber attack response capability.

(See Section 2-3)

AT the unit level, commanders[5] of major units who may be required to take command of a joint task force will create plans for such forces' operations during peacetime. Also, they need to maintain a posture capable of executing duties through joint training and other methods. For this purpose, personnel from other SDF branches are to be stationed at major command headquarters during peacetime, and if necessary, the number of Joint Staff personnel will be increased.

In addition, through integrated exercises such as the SDF joint exercise (field training exercise) and the U.S.-Japan joint exercise (command post exercise) that took place in FY2011, efforts are being made to maintain and improve integrated operational capability, and to verify the effectiveness of the various plans that have been made.

Deliberation for a more effective joint operational structure continues and necessary measures will be taken, while bearing in mind past accomplishments. This deliberation includes topics such as the improvement of education and training, the SDF headquarter structure, and the development of human resources and common equipment to fit joint operations

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1 See II-2-2-5 footnote 2

2 Based on Article 22, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the SDF Law, a special unit shall be organized to carry out a specific duty, or the required troops will be placed under the authority of a commander outside of their usual command structure. This unit shall be made up of units of the GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF, or a combination of two or more of the branches of the SDF.

[3] Refer to "Defense Agency/SDF Outline for Comprehensive Measures Related to Handling the Information and Communications Technology Revolution" for details on each system. See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/others/security/it/youkou/index.html>

[4] Satellites are used for timely communication with destroyers and aircraft engaged in warning and surveillance operations in nearby seas by utilizing the advantages of wide range and immediacy, for communications during disasters, and for communications between Japan and units deployed overseas.

[5] GSDF Commanding General of Army and Central Response Readiness Force Headquarters; MSDF Commander of the Self-Defense Fleet and Commandant Regional District; ASDF Commander of Air Defense Command, Commander of Air Support Command and Commander of Air Defense Force, ASDF and so on

Part III Measures for Defense of Japan

Chapter 1 Operations of Self-Defense Forces for Defense of Japan and Responses to Diverse Situations

Section 2 Effective Deterrence and Response

The "National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) for FY2012 and beyond" defines effective deterrence and response as one of the roles of the defense forces of Japan. This section explains points of priority for the effective performance of this role. The explanations are illustrated with examples of responses provided by the SDF in diverse contingencies under a comprehensive operational system.

1. Ensuring Security of Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan

In order for the SDF to respond swiftly to various contingencies around Japan, which consists of more than 6,000 islands and is surrounded by a vast body of water, it is extremely important to ensure the safety of the country's territorial waters and airspace through constant, ongoing activities implemented by the SDF, including continuous intelligence-gathering, patrol and surveillance activities in Japan's territorial waters and airspace. The NDPG also places special importance on these efforts. Through such activities, Japan also contributes to the stabilization of the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region.

1. Watch and Surveillance in Sea Areas Surrounding Japan

The MSDF patrols the sea areas surrounding Hokkaido, the Sea of Japan, and the East China Sea, using P-3C patrol aircraft to monitor the numerous vessels that sail through those waters. Furthermore, surveillance activities such as surveillance of a possible missile launch are conducted with the flexible use of destroyers and aircraft as required. Thus, a state of readiness is maintained for responding quickly to situations in areas surrounding Japan. In addition, GSDF coastal surveillance units and MSDF security posts conduct 24-hour watch and surveillance activities in the major sea straits.
(See Fig. III-1-2-1)

2. Warnings and Emergency Takeoffs (Scrambles) in Preparation against Violation of Territorial Airspace

The ASDF conducts daily 24-hour surveillance of Japan's territorial and adjacent airspace using nationwide radar, E-2C early warning aircraft and E-767 early warning and control aircraft. Through this, it is possible to detect and identify aircraft flying close to Japan and, if any aircraft suspected of violating

Japan's territorial airspace are detected, fighters on standby will be scrambled to approach them to assess the situation and monitor the aircraft as necessary. In the event that an airspace violation does occur, an evacuation warning will be issued.

In FY2011, the ASDF scrambled 425 times[1].

(See Figs. III-1-2-2, III-1-2-3)

3. Response to Submarines Submerged in Japan's Territorial Waters

With respect to foreign national submarines navigating underwater in Japan's territorial waters[2], an order for maritime security operations[3] will be issued promptly. The submarine will be requested to navigate on the surface of the water and show its flag, in accordance with international law, and in the event that the submarine does not comply with the request, it will be requested by the SDF to leave Japanese territorial waters.

See References 22, 23

The MSDF is enhancing capabilities for detecting, identifying, and tracking foreign submarines navigating underwater in the territorial waters of Japan, as well as making Japanese government intentions clear to these submarines, and improving capabilities for responding to them in shallow water areas.

4. Response to Armed Special Operations Vessels

(1) Basic Concept

The Japan Coast Guard, as a police organization, is primarily responsible for responding to suspicious armed special operations vessels (unidentified vessels). However, in the event that it is deemed extremely difficult or impossible for the Japan Coast Guard to respond to a situation, an order for maritime security operations will be issued in a timely manner and the SDF will respond to the situation in cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard.

See References 22, 23

In light of lessons learned from the incident involving an unidentified vessel off Noto Peninsula in 1999[4] and the incident involving an unidentified vessel in the sea southwest of Kyushu in 2001[5], the Japanese Government has been taking all necessary precautionary measures in order to effectively and safely deal with unidentified vessels, while the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have strengthened cooperation with other relevant ministries and agencies.

(2) Ministry of Defense and SDF Efforts to Respond to Armed Special Operations Vessels

a. Enhancement of Equipment

The MSDF is taking the following steps: 1) deployment of missile boats with improved capability[6]; 2) establishment of the MSDF Special Boarding Unit[7]; 3) equipment of destroyers with machine guns; 4) furnishing forcible maritime interdiction equipment (flat-nose shells)[8]; and 5) improving the sufficiency ratio of essential military vessel personnel.

b. Measures for Strengthening Cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard

The Ministry of Defense and Japan Coast Guard carry out regular mutual training, information exchange, joint exercises, etc. In 1999, the Defense Agency prepared the "Manual on Joint Strategies concerning Unidentified Vessels" with the Japan Coast Guard stipulating the communications protocol and initial response procedures for when unidentified vessels are discovered, and the division of responsibility (joint response procedures), etc., before and after orders are issued for maritime security operations.

Based on the manual, the MSDF and the Japan Coast Guard carry out joint exercises involving pursuit and capture guidelines for unidentified vessels and communications, etc., strengthening cooperation between the two organizations.

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1 Share by country of aircraft subject to emergency scrambles: Russia, approximately 58%; China, approximately 37%; Taiwan, approximately 1%; and others, approximately 4%.

2 Including territorial waters and inland waters.

3 Maritime security operations (Article 82 of the SDF Law) refer to actions taken at sea by the SDF with the particular need to protect lives or property, or maintain peace and order. Approval by Prime Minister is required.

4 An SDF patrol aircraft (P-3C) discovered two unidentified vessels in a surveillance operation in Japanese territorial waters east of the Noto Peninsula and west of Sadogashima Island. These were suspected to be North Korean spy ships disguised as Japanese fishing vessels. The two vessels were pursued around the clock by patrol vessels, destroyers, and aircraft but fled to outside the air defense identification zones (ADIZ). They are presumed to have reached a port in the northern part of North Korea.

5 An SDF patrol aircraft (P-3C) discovered an unidentified vessel in a surveillance operation and monitored it with patrol vessels and aircraft. The vessel did not stop despite repeated orders by the Japan Coast Guard. As a result, the JCG fired warning shots after alerting the vessel. However, the vessel continued to make its getaway and made an armed attack on the patrol ship which fired shots in self-defense. The vessel subsequently exploded from possible self-destruction and sunk. Based on facts revealed in the investigation process the vessel was identified as a North Korean spy ship. Further, in 2002, a patrol aircraft (P-3C) discovered an unidentified vessel in waters approximately 400 km north-northwest off the Noto Peninsula (beyond the exclusive economic zone of Japan) in a surveillance operation. The vessel was tracked and observed by patrol vessels of the Japan Coast Guard, destroyers and aircraft.

6 Six vessels have been deployed by March 2004 with the following main improvements: 1) 62-caliber 76 mm rapid-fire guns installed, 2) improved livability through enlargement of the hull, 3) expansion of the cruising range, 4) bullet-proof measures implemented on the bridge, and 5) fitted with night vision devices.

7 A special unit of the MSDF was newly established in March 2001 to deter expected resistance, and disarm suspicious vessels in the event of onboard inspections under maritime security operations.

[8] The flat front edge of the destroyer prevents a non-bursting shell from scattering when launched from the 76-mm gun equipped on the ship.

2. Response to Attacks on Japan's Offshore Islands

The 2010 NDPG offers the following description of the geographical characteristics of Japan: "Japan is geographically surrounded by water and has a long coastline and numerous islands." In particular, invasion of these islands can be anticipated as one form of armed attack against Japan.

1. Response of the SDF

In order to respond to attacks on islands, it is important to detect signs at an early stage through activities routinely conducted by the SDF including continuous intelligence patrols and surveillance activities. Response to such attacks has many points in common with ground defense strategy (see Section 2-8), but if signs of attack are detected in advance, operations will be conducted to prevent invasion of the enemy forces, and when no signs of aggression are detected in advance and islands are occupied, operations will be conducted to defeat the enemy.

See References 22, 23

Joint operations of integrated Ground, Maritime, and Air SDF are particularly important in the implementation of such strategies. Such joint operations will enable the SDF to swiftly deploy and concentrate mobile troops, and to prevent and destroy enemy forces through cooperation with routinely deployed troops. When implementing such operations, it is important to establish air-defense preparedness in the airspace of islands, including cruise missile response, and to secure air superiority[1], command of the sea, and safety of marine transportation routes in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan.

2. Initiatives of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF

Pursuant to the 2010 NDPG and the 2011 Mid-Term Defense Program, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF will establish a routine posture for intelligence gathering and patrol and a system necessary for the swift response to various contingencies. These efforts should include consideration of deployment of coastal surveillance units to islands in the southwestern region of Japan, where no SDF units are deployed, and reorganization of units in charge of initial response operations.

In order to ensure the capability for swift deployment of units and response, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF secure equipment such as transportation aircraft and surface-to-ship missiles, and carry out drills for deterrence of and response to attacks on islands. Also, in order to enhance the response capability on islands, various exercises are carried out in the southwestern region with the objective of improving joint

operation capabilities of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF. The SDF is also actively involved in joint field training with U.S. forces aimed at acquisition of knowledge and skills as well as establishment of mutual alliance procedures.

Initiatives for improvement of air defense capacities through equipment with fighters and surface-to-air missiles, and initiatives for ensuring the safety of marine transportation through improvement of antisubmarine warfare capacities of submarines and maritime patrol aircraft, are extremely important from the perspective of securing response to attack on islands.

See Section 2-8

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[1] The degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another that permits the conduct of operations by the former without prohibitive inference by opposing air forces.

3. Response to Cyber Attacks

In recent years, cyber attacks on information and communications systems have become more sophisticated and complicated, and the risks threatening the stable utilization of the cyberspace have been recognized as a new challenge in national security. In such a situation, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF must continue to improve our functions to safeguard the information systems and communications networks of the SDF.

1. Response of the SDF

The 2010 NDPG stipulate that the SDF will respond to cyber attacks by jointly operating functions necessary for defending its own information systems, and that by accumulating advanced expertise and skills needed to tackle cyber attacks, the SDF will contribute to the government-wide response to cyber attacks.

In order to strengthen the SDF's capability to respond to cyber attacks, it is important to strengthen the SDF structure for joint response to such attacks against the SDF, and to improve research and exercise initiatives regarding response to cyber attacks.

2. Initiatives of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF

In March 2008, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF inaugurated the SDF C4 (Command, Control, Communication & Computers) Systems Command, which is in charge of maintenance and operation of the SDF's defense information infrastructure system and the Central Command System[1]. Moreover, while the SDF continually monitor their communications networks, in dealing with cyber attacks, which are becoming increasingly diverse and complex by the day, it is necessary not only to introduce intrusion prevention systems in order to increase the safety of information and communications systems, and develop defense systems such as the security and analysis device for cyber defense, but also to formulate comprehensive measures, including those focused on developing the human and technological infrastructure, so the Ministry of Defense and SDF are engaged in such initiatives as enacting regulations[2] stipulating postures and procedures for responding to cyber attacks, as well as conducting research into cutting-edge technology.

Moreover, to strengthen the ability to deal with cyber attacks, in FY2012, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF plan to enhance the capability of the security and analysis device for cyber defense in terms of collecting latest viruses information from the internet, as well as conducting practical trainings. The Ministry of Defense and the SDF also continue to implement initiatives for development of human resources with sophisticated knowledge, including efforts for enhancement of research regarding response

to cyber attacks, establishment and improvement of a system for education and research in the field of network security at the National Defense Academy, and dispatch of officials to study at graduates schools in Japan and abroad.

(See Fig. III-1-2-4)

At the same time, it is difficult for the Ministry of Defense and SDF alone to achieve the stable use of cyberspace. Thus, in addition to collaborating with relevant ministries and agencies, such as NISC (National Information Security Center)[3], information will be exchanged on information security and issues concerning cyberspace, through such initiatives as the Japan-U.S. Strategic Policy Dialogue on Cybersecurity Issues within the National Security Context, which was referred to in the Joint Statement of the "2+2" meeting held in June 2011 and held for the first time in September that year. The Ministry of Defense and SDF are also promoting cooperation with the international community, including the U.S., by such means as holding joint exercises on the supposition of cyber attacks.

In other words, comprehensive measures are needed to respond to cyber attacks, which are becoming increasingly diversified. In order to consider and implement measures to this end, the Cyber Attack Countermeasures Committee, chaired by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense, was established in May 2012 and is conducting deliberations regarding the formulation of a comprehensive policy for the stable use of cyberspace, as well as the establishment of a special unit for cyber defense that will play a core role in SDF responses to cyber attacks.

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1 Refer to Note 3 in Section 1-4. The Joint Operational Structure of the Self-Defense Forces

2 There are directives relating to information assurance of the Ministry of Defense (Ministry of Defense Directive No. 160, 2007)

3 Refer to Part II, Chapter 3, Section 6-2 Initiatives Concerning the Stable Use of Cyberspace

4. Response to Attacks by Guerillas and Special Operations Forces

Since Japan is highly urbanized, small-scale infiltrations and attacks can pose a serious threat to peace and security. Such cases may take various forms including illegal actions by armed agents[1], and destructive actions by guerillas and special operations forces, which constitute a form of armed attack on the territory of Japan.
See References 22, 23

1. Responses to Attacks by Guerillas and Special Operations Forces

(1) Basic Concept

Possible forms of armed attack on Japan can include 1) destruction of facilities and attacks on people by irregular forces such as guerillas and 2) subversive activities, assassination of important figures, and raids on operation centers by regular forces such as special operations forces.
In the event of armed attack on Japan by guerilla or special forces, Japan will respond with defensive operations.

(2) Operations to Respond to Attacks by Guerillas and Special Operations Forces

In operations to respond to attacks by guerillas or special operations forces, an intelligence gathering posture is established to detect the attacks at the earliest possible time and to respond in a swift and flexible manner using rapid-respond units while placing priority on mobility. Particular importance is given to patrol and surveillance to prevent invasion in coastal areas, safeguarding of key facilities, and search and defeat of invading units. It is important at this time to quickly gain control of the situation to minimize damage from assault.

a. Search and Detection of Guerillas and Special Operations Forces
Efforts will be made to detect various types of vessels and submarines that transport guerillas or special operations forces at an early stage, and interdict them at sea through patrols[2] in surrounding waters by escort ships or aircraft. When the possibility of infiltration into Japanese territory by guerillas and special operations forces is suspected, GSDF patrol units will engage in warning and surveillance activities in coastal areas.
In the event of an infiltration, patrol and air units will search and detect the guerillas or special operations forces.
Furthermore, as required, a guarding posture will be established for the prompt deployment of guarding

units to secure key facilities.

b. Capture and Defeat of Guerillas and Special Operations Forces

In the event that guerillas or special operations forces are detected, combat forces will be promptly deployed in the area to besiege them, upon which they will be captured or destroyed.

(See Fig. III-1-2-5)

2. Response to Armed Agents

(1) Basic Concept

While the police assume primary responsibility for responding to illegal activities of armed agents, the SDF will respond in accordance with situational developments.

(See Fig. III-1-2-6)

(2) Measures for Strengthening Cooperation with the Police

a. Establishing the Framework for Strengthening Cooperation

For the SDF to deal with armed agents it is important to cooperate with the police agency. Accordingly, in 2000, the Basic Agreement concluded in 1954 between the JDA and the National Public Safety Commission, to provide cooperation procedures in case of public security operations to suppress mass violence was revised, enabling its application to illegal activities by armed agents[3]. In addition, local agreements were concluded in 2002 regarding public security operations between GSDF divisions/brigades and prefectural police forces.

Furthermore, guidelines were jointly formulated with the National Police Agency in 2004 for dealing jointly with public security dispatches in the event of armed agent concerns.

b. Joint Exercises with the Police

By July 2005, the GSDF divisions/brigades and each prefectural police force, which are parties to the local agreements, had conducted joint simulation exercises to strengthen mutual cooperation at the local level in preparation for dealing with armed agents. Based on the results of these joint simulation exercises, joint field exercises were carried out through FY2009 between all divisions and brigades and the police of all prefectures starting with the field exercises between the GSDF Northern Army and the Hokkaido prefectural police. These joint exercises were carried out on a continuous basis to confirm cooperation procedures in cases of security operations.

3. Response to Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons

In recent years, there has been strong recognition of the danger of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons proliferation and the means for transporting such weapons, as well as related equipment and materials, to terrorists and rogue states. In the event that such weapons of mass destruction are used, it is likely there will be indiscriminate mass casualties and contamination of an extensive area. The sarin gas attack[4] on the Tokyo subway in 1995 and the incidents of mail in the United States containing anthrax[5] in 2001 are evidence of the fact that these weapons have already been used.

(1) Basic Concept

In the event of the use of NBC weapons in Japan in a way that corresponds to an armed attack, the SDF will conduct defense operations to abate the armed attack and rescue victims. Furthermore, in the event of the use of NBC weapons in a way that does not correspond to an armed attack but against which the general police alone cannot maintain public security, the SDF will conduct public security operations to suppress the armed attack and assist victims in cooperation with related agencies. Furthermore, when the incident does not fall under the category of defense operations or public security operations, the chemical protection units of the GSDF and medical units of the ASDF, GSDF, and MSDF will support relative organizations about disaster relief dispatches and civilian protection dispatches to conduct intelligence gathering concerning the extent of the damage; decontamination activities; transport of the sick and injured; and medical activities.

(2) Initiatives of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF in Response to NBC Weapons

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF have improved the capability for responding to NBC weapon attacks. Specifically, the Central NBC Weapon Defense Unit was formed under the Central Readiness Force, and there has been an increase of chemical protection unit personnel, improvement of NBC reconnaissance vehicles, chemical surveillance devices, decontamination vehicles, personnel protection equipment, portable automatic biological sensors, chemical protection clothing, and research and development for decontamination kits is ongoing. Also, the GSDF has designated personnel to take initial action in the event of special-type disasters in order to allow operations to begin within approximately one hour. The MSDF and ASDF have also acquired protective equipment and materials to be used on vessels and at bases. The SDF is engaged in efforts to improve the capability for responding to NBC weapon attacks, including through establishing partnerships with relevant external institutions, such as local authorities, the police, and fire departments. Such efforts include the first ever joint training exercise for civil protection that envisioned a terrorist bombing involving radioactive materials. The exercise was

carried out in January 2011.

See Section 1-3

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[1] Refers to persons engaging in illegal acts such as subversive activities in Japan while possessing weapons with significant killing power, those cooperating with such persons, etc.

[2] To systematically patrol a specific area for purposes such as prevention of surprise attack and information collection.

[3] The Agreement on the Maintenance of Public Order in the Event of Public Security Operations which was concluded between the former Defense Agency and the National Public Safety Commission.

[4] An incident in which members of Aum Shinrikyo spread extremely poisonous sarin gas in subway trains crowded with commuters, claiming the lives of 12 people (the number refers to the number of deaths indicated in the judgment rendered to Chizuo Matsumoto (commonly known as Shoko Asahara, a guru of Aum Shinrikyo) . The SDF conducted decontamination operations of the trains and stations as well as supported police forensics.

[5] Since September 2001, postal mail containing anthrax was delivered to individuals including members of the U.S. Senate and those related to the mass media.

5. Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

While various efforts have been made by the international community for the non-proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, the proliferation of these weapons still continues.

Among the countries surrounding Japan, China and Russia have deployed a considerable number of ballistic missiles which can mount nuclear weapons. In 2006, North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles and carried out a launch which was purported to be "an experimental communications satellite" in April, 2009. In July the same year, North Korea again launched seven ballistic missiles and in April 2012, North Korea launched a missile so-called a "satellite". These events have reconfirmed that the threat from ballistic missiles is a reality.

See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 2; References 1, 2)

Japan began developing the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system in FY2004 in order to improve readiness in response to ballistic missile attacks. Necessary amendments were subsequently made to the SDF Law in 2005. In the same year, the Security Council and Cabinet decided to begin Japan–U.S. cooperative development of advanced ballistic missile interceptor.

In addition to the assignment of ballistic missile defense capability to the 4 Aegis destroyers[1], the success in the flight tests of the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)[2] shows that Japan is steadily building up its own multi-tiered defense system against ballistic missile attacks.

(See Fig. III-1-2-7)

1. Japan's Ballistic Missile Defense

(1) The Outline of BMD System Equipment

a. Basic Concept

Japan's BMD is an effective multi-tier defense system with the upper tier interception by Aegis destroyers and the lower tier by Patriot PAC-3, both interconnected and coordinated by Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE). To establish this multi-tier defense structure, the MOD and SDF have been improving the capability of existing Aegis destroyers and Patriot systems and further promoting the BMD system development.

See References 26, 27
(See Fig. III-1-2-8)

b. Development Status of the BMD System

By the end of FY2010, the MSDF equipped its four Aegis destroyers[3] with Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) missiles, and the ASDF deployed a total of 16[4] FUs[5] of Patriot PAC-3, achieving the deployment targets

set in the annex table of the 2004 NDPG. The MOD and SDF are to continue the development of the BMD system, based on the latest NDPG and Mid-Term Defense Program. Immediate objective is to establish a system consisted of six BMD-capable Aegis destroyers (two vessels added), 17 Patriot PAC-3 FUs (six Air Defense Missile Groups, Air Missile Training Group, and 2nd Technical School) (one additional FU), four FPS-5[6] radars (already deployed), and seven upgraded FPS-3 radars (already deployed) with these assets interconnected through various types of command, control, battle management and communications systems, such as JADGE.

(2) Future Capability Improvement

The proliferation of ballistic missile technology continues and the possibility remains that ballistic missiles will be furnished with countermeasures to avoid interception in the future. Furthermore, expansion of the defense coverage and improvement of interception probability are also required in response to conventional ballistic missiles. Thus, it is essential to improve the kinetic performance of interceptor missiles and undertake initiatives to advance the efficiency and reliability of the BMD system.
From this perspective, Japan–U.S. cooperative development project concerning an advanced interceptor missile commenced in 2006 based on results obtained from Japan–U.S. cooperative research, which had started in 1999. Thus, efforts to improve future capabilities are under way.
(See Figs. III-1-2-9, 10)

2. Improvement in Legislation and Operations

(1) Legal Measures regarding Responses to Ballistic Missiles

In case ballistic missiles or other objects[7] are launched toward Japan and if the situation is recognized as an armed attack, defense operation order for armed attack situations will be issued to respond.
On the other hand, when ballistic missiles are launched towards Japan and if the situation is not acknowledged as an armed attack, the following measures will be taken with enough consideration to 1) carrying out a prompt and appropriate response and 2) ensuring civilian control;

a. When the Minister of Defense determines that there is a possibility that ballistic missiles or other objects will fly toward Japan, the Minister of Defense may order SDF units to take measures to destroy the ballistic missiles upon approval of the Prime Minister[8].

b. In addition to the above case, there may be cases that almost no information is available concerning missile launch, or that suddenly the situation changes due to accidents or failure in launch, allowing no

time for the Minister of Defense to obtain the approval of the Prime Minister. In case of such contingencies, the Minister of Defense may prepare emergency response procedures in advance that are to be preapproved by the Prime Minister. Subsequently, in accordance with these emergency response procedures, the Minister of Defense may issue an order with a specified period of validity in advance to SDF units to take the necessary measures to destroy ballistic missiles and other objects when they actually fly toward Japan.

(See Fig. III-1-2-11)
See References 22, 23, 28

(2) Concept of Ensuring Civilian Control of the Military

Response against ballistic missiles requires the government to assess the possibility of missiles flying toward Japan by comprehensively analyzing and evaluating the specific situation and international circumstances. In addition to the SDF destroying the missile, interagency actions are required, for example, measures for civil protection such as alert and evacuation, diplomatic activities, information gathering by related agencies, and enhancement of readiness for emergencies.

In view of the importance of the matter and the necessity of action by the Japanese government as a whole, Prime Minister's approval (Cabinet decision) and orders by the Minister of Defense are required so that the Cabinet and Minister of Defense can sufficiently fulfill their responsibilities. Furthermore, the participation of the Diet is also defined with a provision in the law on reporting to the Diet.

(3) Operational Efforts

a. Responses to Ballistic Missiles through Joint Operations

Responding to ballistic missiles fly toward Japan, if BMD Joint Task Force is formed, the Commander of the Air Defense Command is to serve as the Commander of the task force, and various postures for effective defense are to be taken under a unified command through JADGE. Furthermore, the GSDF will play a leading role in dealing with damage caused by the impact of ballistic missiles.

b. Japan–U.S. Cooperation in Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

Further cooperation with U.S. forces in Japan as well as with the U.S. government is required for efficient and effective operation of the BMD system. Thus, related measures were agreed upon at the Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2) meetings in 2005, 2006, and 2007.

Also, at the Japan–U.S. defense ministers meeting in November 2007, with progress in development of the BMD system, both Japan and the United States agreed to advance cooperation with a focus on operational aspects.

In addition, maintenance, development and validation of Japan-U.S. bilateral response capability have been conducted actively through training and other activities. In February 2012, following the previous year, a special BMD exercise was held between the MSDF and the U.S. Navy, connecting their ships via a network and conducting a simulation of response to ballistic missiles, to improve tactical capabilities and strengthen bilateral cooperation between their units.
(See Chapter 2, Section 2)

3. Missile Defense of the United States and Japan–U.S. BMD Technical Cooperation

(1) Missile Defense of the United States

The United States aims to develop a multi-tier missile defense system consisted of mutually complementary interception systems suited for each of 1) the boost phase, 2) the mid-course phase, and 3) the terminal phase of the ballistic missile flight path, and these systems are to be deployed as they become available.
(See Fig. III-1-2-12)
Japan and the United States have developed close coordination concerning ballistic missile defense, and a part of the missile defense system possessed by the United States has been deployed in our country in a step-by-step manner.
Specifically, in June 2006, the USFJ deployed a mobile radar for BMD at the ASDF Shariki sub-base (Aomori Prefecture)[9]. Also, BMD-capable Aegis destroyers have been forward deployed in Japan and surrounding areas since December 2006. Furthermore, in October 2006, Patriot PAC-3 were deployed at Kadena Air Base in Okinawa Prefecture, and in October 2007, Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS)[10] was deployed at Misawa Air Force Base in Aomori Prefecture.
The deployment of a part of the U.S. missile defense system in Japan will serve to secure the safety of the people of Japan.

(2) Japan–U.S. Cooperative Development of Advanced Ballistic Missile Interceptor and Other Initiatives

In 1998, the government decided to commence Japan–U.S. joint cooperative research project on a sea-based upper-tier system in FY1999.
This purpose of the Japan-U.S. cooperative research project was to improve future interceptor missile's capability, and conducted design, prototype production and necessary testing for main four components[11].
In December 2005, the Security Council and the Cabinet made a decision to use results of the project as a technical foundation of development of an advanced ballistic missile interceptor, because the results showed good prospects for initial technical issues. Japan-U.S. cooperative development has been ongoing

since June 2006, and it will continue as promoted by the 2010 NDPG and the 2011 Mid-Term Defense Program.

Moreover, in September 2011, in order to certainly achieve the development targets such as defended area expansion and response capability against future threats (see Fig. III-1-2-9), the end of the development program, which was originally scheduled for FY2014, was extended by about two years.

In FY2012, as well as conducting system simulation tests, Japan and the U.S. will carry out preparatory work for launch tests.

(See Fig. III-1-2-13)

See Reference 29

(3) Relationship to the Three Principles on Arms Exports

With regard to the Japan–U.S. cooperative development, which is aimed for improved future BMD capability, it is necessary to export BMD related arms from Japan to the United States as part of development. In accordance with the Chief Cabinet Secretary's statement issued in December 2004, it was determined that the Three Principles on Arms Exports would not apply to the BMD system and related matters under the condition that strict controls are maintained. When the transition to cooperative development was decided in December 2005, a framework for transfer of arms was set to be coordinated with the U.S. in regard with necessary arms export.

In June 2006, notes concerning transfer of arms and military technology to the United States were exchanged, thereby establishing a framework to transfer arms and military technology under tight controls, banning their transfer to third countries without Japan's prior consent.

At the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers meeting in January 2011, the two countries concurred that they began to consider the transition to the production and deployment phase of the advanced ballistic missile interceptor (SM-3 Block IIA), as well as third party transfer of the missile.

Based on these circumstances, the third party transfer was discussed, and it was decided that transfer of the SM-3 Block ⅡA could be approved in advance in accordance with the Exchange of Notes concerning transfer of arms and military technologies to the U.S., in case where the transfer supports the national security of Japan and/or contributes to international peace and stability, and when the third party has sufficient policies to prevent the future transfer of the SM-3 Block ⅡA, because it will firmly maintain Japan's basic philosophy as a peaceful country to avoid fostering international disputes. This decision was formally announced in the Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2) on June 21, 2011.

See Part II, Chapter 2

4. Response to North Korea's Missile Launch

On March 12, 2009, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) informed member countries that it had received warning in advance from North Korea of an intended test launch of an “experimental communication satellite.”

As the actions of North Korea violated U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1695 and 1718, the government requested that North Korea stop the launch, and confirmed the response policy toward North Korean missile launches at the Security Council on March 27.

Further, based on Article 82 Section 2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law (currently Article 82 Section 3), the Minister of Defense issued the “Order for destruction measures against ballistic missiles.” The SDF formed the BMD Joint Task Force and deployed two Aegis Destroyers (*Kongo* and *Chokai*) to the central Sea of Japan as well as Patriot PAC-3 units to SDF bases in the Tohoku region (Iwate and Akita prefectures) and the Tokyo metropolitan area (Saitama, Chiba and Tokyo) to protect Japanese territory from falling missiles.

At 11:30 AM on April 5 of the same year, one missile was launched from North Korea toward the east and was calculated to have passed over the Tohoku region to the Pacific Ocean at approximately 11:37.

The MOD and the SDF swiftly transmitted information to the Prime Minister’s Office and other agencies, collected from Shared Early Warning[12] (SEW) and the various SDF radar units[13]. Further, aerial reconnaissance was carried out to confirm whether any harm was caused in the Tohoku region.

On April 6, the Minister of Defense issued an order to terminate the destruction measures against ballistic missiles and recalled the units. On May 15, a comprehensive and expertise analysis of the missile launched by North Korea was made public[14].

On March 19, 2012, a formal notification was sent from the IMO that it had received warning in advance from North Korea concerning a launch of an "earth observation satellite". According to this notification, the North Korean authorities had specified the launch period between 07:00 and 12:00 (Japan time) every day from April 12 to 16, as well as designated 2-stage falling areas where the debris would fall as the offshore area west of Jeolla Province, in the south of South Korea, and the offshore area east of the island of Luzon in the Philippines.

Based on these facts, on March 27, the Minister of Defense issued an order for preparations for destruction measures against ballistic missiles and preparations commenced. Moreover, on March 30, the Japanese government confirmed response policy at the Security Council against the launch of a missile, which was announced as satellites. Also on the same day, the Minister of Defense issued an order for the implementation of destruction measures against ballistic missiles based on Article 82-3, Paragraph 3 of the Self-Defense Forces Law; the SDF deployed Aegis destroyers equipped with SM-3 missile in the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea, and Patriot PAC-3 units on the islands of Okinawa Prefecture and within the Tokyo metropolitan area. Also, MOD and SDF responded by dispatching the requisite units to the southwestern islands to conduct quick response in the event of any damage due to falling debris.

Around 07:40 on April 13, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF confirmed receiving information from SEW concerning a launch of a flying object from the west coast of North Korea. Subsequently, it was determined that this launch was of the missile called by North Korea to be a "satellite". The missile flew for over a minute and then broke up into several pieces which fell into the Yellow Sea, so it is believed that the launch failed.

The same evening, the Minister of Defense issued an order to terminate the destruction measures against ballistic missiles and the units were quickly recalled[15].

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1 Vessels equipped with Aegis air defense systems, which automatically process a series of activities including target search, detection, identification/classification, and attack using high performance computers.

2 The Patriot PAC-3 system is one of the air defense systems for countering airborne threats. Unlike the conventional type of anti-aircraft PAC-2 missiles, which mainly target the interception of aircraft, the PAC-3 missiles are designed primarily to intercept ballistic missiles.

3 Kongo, Chokai, Myoko and Kirishima

4 4 FUs of the 1st Air Defense Missile Group (Narashino, Takeyama, Kasumigaura, and Iruma), 4 FUs of the 2nd Air Defense Missile Group (Ashiya (2), Tsuiki, and Kouradai), 4 FUs of the 4th Air Defense Missile Group (Aibano, Gifu (2), and Hakusan), and 4 FUs of the Air Defense Training Group and 2nd Technical School (Hamamatsu)

5 Fire Unit (the minimum unit of surface-to-air fire corps).

6 A newly developed radar system that enables detection and tracking of ballistic missiles whose development started in FY1999 (former name: FPS-XX). The radar can respond to conventional threats such as aircraft as well as ballistic missiles.

7 Objects other than aircraft such as ballistic missiles which could cause grave damage to human life and property when they fall to the ground.

8 A specific example of SDF activity is deployment of PAC-3 units by the ASDF and Aegis destroyers by the MSDF, upon receipt of an appropriate order from the Minister of Defense in preparation for incoming ballistic missiles and other objects. In case that missiles actually flies toward Japan, based on the aforementioned order, SDF units will destroy them.

9 Later on, the radar moved to the neighboring U.S. Forces Shariki Communication Site.

10 A ballistic missile information processing system.

11 The four components are the nose cone, second-stage rocket motor, kinetic warhead, and infrared seeker.

12 This is information conveyed by the U.S. to the SDF after the U.S. Forces analyzes data relating to ballistic missiles launched in the direction of Japan; the analysis takes place within a short period immediately after the launch and the information provided to the SDF includes area where the launch took place, time of the launch, area where debris is expected to fall and anticipated time when it is likely to fall. Under the security arrangements between Japan and the U.S., the SDF has exchanged various kind of information with the U.S. Forces, and the SEW is one of such information (since in April 1996). It cannot be denied that there are limits to the accuracy of this kind of information due to its nature, but it is valuable enough as an “initial report” of any ballistic missile launches in the direction of Japan.

13 On the day before the actual launch, false information related to the launch was distributed due to mishandling of information by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF. At the time of the actual launch, information was properly collected and transmitted checking information with SEW by several staff including the Chief of Joint Staff.
See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/defense/bmd/20090515-1.html>

14 For further information about the North Korean missile launch, see <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/defense/bmd/20090515.html>

15 Concerning the transition of information from the Ministry of Defense to the official residence of the

prime minister and the information transmitted from the official residence of the prime minister to the citizens, an investigation was conducted by “the governmental risk management team regarding the launch of missiles by North Korea”
(see <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/topics/2012/pdf/0426houkokusho.pdf>). For details concerning the investigation of the response by the Ministry of Defense,
see <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2012/06/15b.html>

6. Responses to Complex Situations

There is a possibility that the various situations detailed above might occur consecutively or simultaneously, in which case a more complex response would be required. In order to implement an effective response to such complex situations, deliberations are being conducted regarding the relevant matters, such as strengthening the functions of the Joint Staff, in light of the lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake, etc.
(See Fig. III-1-2-14)

7. Response to Large-Scale and Unconventional Disasters

When disasters such as natural disasters occur in any part of the country, the SDF works in collaboration with municipal governments, engaging in the search for and rescue of disaster victims or missing ships or aircraft, controlling floods, offering medical treatment, preventing epidemics, supplying water, and transporting personnel and goods. In particular, over 100,000 SDF personnel were dispatched at a peak time for relief operations for the large-scale earthquake and nuclear disaster based on the Great East Japan Earthquake in March 2011.

1. Outline of Disaster Relief Dispatches

(1) Types and Frameworks of Disaster Relief Dispatches

a. Dispatches upon Request (General Form of Disaster Relief Dispatch)
In principle, disaster dispatch is carried out at the request of prefectural governors and other officials[1]. This is because prefectural governors and other officials assume primary responsibility for disaster control measures and are in a position to grasp the overall conditions of the disaster, and it is considered most appropriate for dispatches to be made upon their request in consideration of disaster relief capabilities within the prefecture or municipality including police and firefighting.
Municipal mayors can ask prefectural governors to request a disaster relief dispatch by the SDF. In the event that mayors are unable to make such a request to the prefectural governor, they can inform the Minister of Defense, or those designated by the Minister of the disaster conditions.
After receiving such requests from governors, the Minister of Defense or other personnel designated by the Minister can immediately dispatch units as necessary according to the disaster situation.
Under circumstances of particular urgency when there is no time to wait for a request, the Minister of Defense or those designated by the Minister may authorize an exceptional dispatch (discretionary dispatch). In order to render discretionary dispatches even more effective, the Disaster Prevention Plan[2]

was amended in 1995 to establish the basis[3] for SDF unit commanders and other officials to order discretionary dispatches.
(See Fig III-1-2-15)

b. Earthquake Disaster Relief Dispatch

When an alert[4] is issued based on the Law Concerning Special Measures for Large-Scale Earthquakes Countermeasures[5], the Minister of Defense is authorized to order an earthquake disaster relief dispatch based on the request of the Director of the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters (the Prime Minister), even prior to the occurrence of an earthquake.

c. Nuclear Disaster Dispatch

When a nuclear emergency alert is issued based on the Special Law on Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures[6], the Minister of Defense is authorized to order a nuclear disaster dispatch upon request of the Director of the Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters (the Prime Minister).

(2) Authority of SDF Officers in Disaster Relief Dispatches

Under the Self-Defense Forces Law and other legislation, the authority of the officers of units requested for disaster relief dispatches, earthquake disaster prevention dispatches, or nuclear disaster dispatches to conduct effective operations is stipulated.
See Reference 22

(3) Initial Response to Disasters

Based on lessons learned from the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake disaster, the SDF has put in place arrangements for an initial response, as shown in Fig. III-1-2-16, to ensure disaster relief operations are conducted promptly.
The SDF has formulated various contingency plans for responses to large-scale earthquakes, which are under consideration at the Central Disaster Management Council. For instance, because of concern about massive humanitarian and material damage in addition to damage to the central political, government, and financial functions of the capital, the Contingency Plan for Tokyo inland earthquakes stipulates that each Self-Defense Force shall systematically cooperate to respond in an organized manner. By calling in SDF reserve officers and other personnel, up to around 110,000 personnel up to around 60 ships and up to around 120 aircraft can be mobilized.
In addition, a plan is being formulated to enable a similar level of response to be mobilized in response to an earthquake in the Tokai region or an earthquake in the Tonankai or Nankai regions. It is also necessary

for the Government to consider countermeasures to be implemented in the event of an earthquake occurring in the Tokai region in conjunction with quakes in the Tonankai and Nankai regions (triple earthquake), so on March 31, 2012, the Committee for Modeling a Nankai Trough Megaquake, established by the Cabinet Office, published its first report concerning the distribution of seismic intensity and tsunami height in the event of a megaquake occurring along the Nankai Trough. The Ministry of Defense and SDF are also conducting the requisite deliberations in response to discussions by the Central Disaster Prevention Council.
(See Fig. III-1-2-17)

2. Response to Disasters

(1) Transportation of Emergency Patients

The SDF uses its aircraft to transport emergency patients from isolated islands and remote areas with insufficient medical facilities (transportation of emergency patients). In FY2011, out of a total of 586 cases of disaster relief operations, 444 cases involved the transportation of emergency patients, with dispatches to the Nansei Islands (Okinawa and Kagoshima Prefectures), the Goto Islands (Nagasaki Prefecture), the Izu Islands, and the Ogasawara Islands representing the majority of such cases.
Furthermore, in the event that aircraft of other organizations are unable to respond, due to reasons including a short flight range, SDF aircraft will handle transportation of emergency patients from vessels navigating areas of ocean far from the mainland and transport patients in critical condition with C-130 transport aircraft operated by the Mobile Medical Unit as a part of wide-area medical transportation operations.

(2) Firefighting Support

In FY2011, there were 60 dispatches of firefighting support, the second largest number of dispatches after transportation of emergency patients. Within this category, responses to fires in areas nearby SDF facilities were the largest in number, with 54 cases in FY2011. Furthermore, upon the request of prefectural governors for disaster relief dispatches, the SDF also conducts aerial firefighting activities in locations where firefighting conditions are difficult, such as mountain and forest areas.
(See Fig. III-1-2-18)
See Reference 30

(3) Response to Natural Disasters

In September 2011, landslides occurred and the water supply was cut off on the Kii Peninsula, due to Typhoon No. 12. Consequently, on the 3rd and 4th of that month, the governors of Wakayama Prefecture, Mie Prefecture and Nara Prefecture submitted a request for a disaster relief deployment, in order to save lives. In the Wakayama Prefecture municipalities of Shingu, Tanabe, Nachikatsuura and Hidakagawa, a team consisting mainly of troops from the 37th Infantry Regiment rescued stranded people, searched for missing people, and provided support for the supply of water; the Governor of Wakayama Prefecture requested their withdrawal on the 29th of that month. In Mie Prefecture, a team consisting mainly of troops from the 33rd Infantry Regiment provided support for the supply of water and transported supplies; the Governor of Mie Prefecture requested their withdrawal on the 14th of that month. In Nara Prefecture, a team consisting mainly of troops from the GSDF 4th Engineer Brigade provided support for the supply of water, transported supplies and eliminated road obstacles; the Governor of Nara Prefecture requested their withdrawal on October 14. During this period, units including the GSDF Middle Army Aviation Group conducted search activities and transported supplies to the Kii Peninsula using aircraft. A total of approximately 31,093 personnel, around 10,479 vehicles and 170 aircraft were dispatched during this disaster relief deployment.

Moreover, due to Typhoon No. 12 and Typhoon No. 15, which occurred in the same month, requests for disaster relief deployments to save lives were received between the 20th and the 22nd of the same month from the governors of Aichi, Miyagi and Fukushima Prefectures. In Aichi Prefecture, a team consisting mainly of troops from the 35th Infantry Regiment and the ASDF 1st Tactical Airlift Group carried out rescue and flood prevention activities, such as building walls of sandbags, in Nagoya and Kasugai. In the town of Matsushima in Miyagi Prefecture, the 22nd Infantry Regiment carried out rescue operations to assist local citizens who had been cut off by the heavy rain; the 6th Artillery Regiment carried out similar operations in the city of Koriyama, in Fukushima Prefecture. A total of approximately 935 personnel and around 111 vehicles were dispatched during this disaster relief deployment.

During the period from mid-January to early February 2012, heavy snow resulted in severe damage, so the governors of Hokkaido, Aomori Prefecture and Shiga Prefecture requested disaster relief deployments to provide support in clearing the snow. In Hokkaido, the GSDF 12th Engineer Group (Construction) carried out disaster relief operations, providing support for the removal of snow from municipal roads in the cities of Iwamizawa and Mikasa from January 17 to 22, and in Mikasa City from February 14 to 16. In Aomori Prefecture, vehicles became stranded on the national highway in Yokohama Town on February 2, due to a blizzard, so troops from the MSDF Ominato District and the 25th Air Squadron carried out disaster relief operations focused on confirming the safety of those inside stranded vehicles, checking the status of the national highway, and mobilizing helicopters to gather information. In Shiga Prefecture, on February 2 and 3, the 3rd and 10th Tank Battalions, etc. carried out disaster relief operations, providing support in clearing snow from community roads in mountainous areas of Takashima.

3. Efforts for Preparation for Disaster Relief

(1) Efforts in Preparation for Disaster Relief

In order to respond to various disasters – including large-scale earthquakes – with speed and accuracy, the SDF carries out various disaster prevention drills including joint exercises for rescue, in addition to formulating disaster relief plans. The SDF also actively participates in local government disaster prevention drills.

In FY2011, various emergency drills were carried out with the objective of maintaining and improving the ability to carry out disaster relief missions swiftly and accurately in times of disaster, such as major earthquakes, and many of the issues relating to the response in the event of a disaster that arose due to the Great East Japan Earthquake were actively incorporated into disaster prevention exercises. Specifically, this included 1) participation in the "Disaster Prevention Day" government headquarters management exercise (exercise for responding to an earthquake directly hitting the Tokyo metropolitan area), 2) implementation of a Ministry of Defense disaster operations headquarters management exercise (exercise for responding to an earthquake directly hitting the Tokyo metropolitan area), 3) participation in a comprehensive training exercise in conjunction with a joint disaster prevention exercise involving nine cities and prefectures, 4) participation in an exercise in conjunction with Shizuoka Prefecture's comprehensive disaster prevention exercise, and 5) participation in comprehensive disaster prevention exercises carried out by related local governments.

In addition, in June 2011, in light of responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake, the Ministry of Defense concluded agreements[7] with civilian communications carriers concerning the installation of temporary lines for use by local SDF units in their activities in the event of a disaster, and the provision of mobile phones and satellite phones.

(2) Cooperation with Local Governments

It is also important for the SDF to strengthen cooperation with local governments in peacetime in order to conduct disaster relief operations smoothly.

For this reason, the SDF participates in a number of disaster prevention drills and is proceeding with the strengthening of cooperation with local governments including enhancing information liaison systems and consistency with disaster control plans.

Specifically, 1) the post of Liaison and Coordination Officer for Citizen Protection and Disaster Relief Operation Countermeasures was created at the SDF Regional Cooperation Headquarters to work at ensuring cooperation with local governments in peacetime.

Also, 2) in addition to assigning an SDF officer to the department in charge of disaster prevention for

Tokyo, mutual exchange is being carried out between administrative officials of both the GSDF Middle Army Headquarters and Hyogo Prefecture. Furthermore, 3) in response to requests from local governments, retired SDF officers with knowledge in disaster prevention are being endorsed. As of the end of March 2012, the total number of retired SDF officers working in disaster prevention in local governments was 227 individuals in 45 prefectures and 134 municipalities throughout the country.

Personnel-related cooperation with local governments using the knowledge of SDF personnel is a very effective method of improving cooperation with those governments, and its efficacy was confirmed during the Great East Japan Earthquake.

See Reference 31

At the same time, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF believe that carrying out efforts such as the following are important in order to carry out operations more effectively during disaster dispatch in local governments as well.

○ Securing Staging Areas and Heliports

○ Marking Building Numbers

○ Securing Facilities for Liaison and Coordination

○ Arrangements for Materials and Equipment

(3) Development of a Response Manual for Various Disasters

Clarifying basic responses in advance and consolidating the recognition of parties concerned is an effective way of responding more promptly and appropriately to disasters that occur in various forms. For this purpose, in November 2000, the Defense Agency and SDF developed a response manual[8] for various types of disasters which compiled issues to be noted for each type of disaster. Copies of this manual were distributed to relevant organizations and local public bodies.

(4) Response to Nuclear Disasters

The Special Measures Law on Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures was enacted based on lessons learned from the critical accident that occurred at the uranium processing plant in Tokaimura, Ibaraki Prefecture in 1999. In accordance with this, the Self-Defense Forces Law was partially revised.[9]

Following the nuclear criticality accident at Tokaimura, the ASDF, GSDF, and MSDF have provided transport support, assistance for evacuating residents and monitoring of airborne and seaborne radiation

levels in comprehensive nuclear disaster prevention exercises conducted primarily by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry since 2000. This serves to improve effectiveness including a review of cooperation guidelines between government agencies and local bodies at the time of a nuclear disaster. Furthermore, efforts are being made to improve capabilities for responding to NBC in order to deal not only with nuclear disasters, but also with other special disasters[10].

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1 The Director General of the Japan Coast Guard, the Director General of the Regional Maritime Safety Headquarters, and the Director of Airport Administrative Office may request disaster dispatch.

2 The Ministry of Defense Disaster Prevention Plan.
See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/defense/saigai/bousai.html>

3 Unit commanders may make a dispatch in the event that 1) intelligence gathering is necessary in order to provide information to relevant organizations and bodies, 2) it is deemed impossible for the prefectural governor to make a dispatch request and immediate rescue measures are required, or 3) life-saving rescue operations occur or a fire or disaster occurs in the vicinity of Ministry of Defense facilities.

4 The Prime Minister issues an earthquake alert with the endorsement of the Cabinet in the event that an earthquake has been predicted and when it is deemed necessary to urgently implement emergency earthquake disaster prevention measures.

5 See <http://www.bousai.go.jp/jishin/law/014-1.html>

6 See <http://www.bousai.go.jp/jishin/law/002-1.html>

7 In addition to regular practice drills and exchanges of opinions in times of peace, agreements have been drawn up that cover matters arising in the event of a disaster, such as 1) the sharing of information about the disaster and the situation on the ground (including the transmission of video footage obtained from helicopters); 2) the installation of temporary lines for use by local SDF units in their activities in the event of a disaster, and the provision of mobile phones and satellite phones by civilian communications carriers; and 3) the provision to civilian communications carriers by the SDF of the equipment and materials required in order to restore communication lines, as well as the transport of their personnel.

8 Manual for Responses to Disasters in Urban Areas, Hilly and Mountainous Areas, Islands and Special Disasters.
See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/defense/saigai/pdf/hyoushi02.pdf>

9 1) SDF units can be dispatched to provide assistance upon a request of the Director of the Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters, 2) SDF personnel dispatched for nuclear disaster relief may exercise necessary authority, 3) special units may be temporarily formed when necessary for nuclear disaster relief dispatches, and 4) SDF Ready Reserve Personnel may be called up for service in the event of nuclear disaster relief dispatches.

10 Special-type disasters may be caused by terrorist or armed attacks using weapons of mass destruction.

8. Readiness against Full-Scale Invasions

The 2010 NDPG requires Japan to ensure superiority in obtaining information through continual information collection, monitoring and surveillance, and reconnaissance operations within and around Japan as well as to immediately and seamlessly respond to various changing situations. It states that it is highly unlikely that large-scale invasions against Japan will take place through massive landing of enemy aircraft or troops, but that Japan needs to make minimum necessary preparations to address unpredictable changes in situations since the country should not deny the possibility of such events ever taking place in the future.

In case Japan faces a large-scale invasion, the SDF will respond to the situation in an aligned and systemic manner based on their integrated operations. Their operations are categorized into 1) operations for aerial defense, 2) defense operations protecting waters around Japan, 3) operations protecting the land, and 4) operations ensuring security in maritime transportation, based on the characteristic of their purposes. In executing these operations, the U.S. forces will assist the operations implemented by the SDF and deploy operations to complement the capabilities of the SDF, including the use of striking power, in line with the Guideline for the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation.

The following explains how the SDF will typically implement operations.

See Chapter 1, Section 1-3; References 22, 23

1. Operations for Aerial Defense

Based on the physical condition of Japan surrounded by the sea and the features of modern wars[1], it is expected that Japan will be hit by repeated rapid aerial attacks by aircraft and missiles in case a full-scale invasion against Japan occurs.

Operations for aerial defense are characterized by the importance of initial response influencing the whole operations. Thus, Japan needs to maintain its readiness for quick initial response on an ongoing basis, regularly collect information, and rapidly and comprehensively exert combat capabilities from the onset of operations.

Operations for aerial defense can be categorized into the comprehensive aerial defense mainly conducted by the ASDF and the individual aerial defense conducted by the GSDF, MSDF, or ASDF for their bases or troops. The comprehensive aerial defense aims to deal with enemy aerial attacks at the farthest point from our territory, prohibit enemies from gaining air superiority[2], and prevent the damage to our citizens and territory as well as inflict great damage to enemies and curb their capability to continue aerial attacks.

(See Fig. III-1-2-19)

(1) Detecting Invading Aircraft

We need to leverage the radars of the Aerial Defense Alert Unit and early alert aircraft to virtually monitor all the airspace around our territory and detect invading aircraft and other object at the earliest timing.

(2) Recognizing the Types of Detected Aircraft

We need to leverage JADGE[3] or other systems to recognize whether detected aircraft are either for or against us.

(3) Intercepting or attacking enemy aircraft

As we detect enemy aircraft, the Aerial Defense Alert Unit defines targets for fighter jets or surface-to-air missile units on the ground to attack and destroys enemy aircraft with controlled or guided fighter jets and surface-to-air missiles.

2. Defense Operations Protecting Waters around Japan

As the islands of Japan are attacked with arms, aerial attacks are expected to be combined with attacks against our ships and territory by enemy destroyers. In addition, transport vessels could be deployed to enable massive enemy ground forces to invade our territory.
Our defense operations protecting the waters around Japan are composed of measures at sea, measures in waters around our coasts, measures in major straits, and aerial defense above waters around Japan. We need to protect the waters around our country by combining the results of these multiple operations, blocking the invasion of our enemies, and attacking and depleting their capabilities.
(See Fig. III-1-2-20)

(1) Measures At Sea

We patrol a vast area of water with our patrol aircraft and monitor sea areas used for ship navigation by our escort vessels. Should enemy ships or submarines trying to attack our ships be detected, we need to use our escort vessels, submarines, and patrol aircraft to destroy them by leveraging the support of our fighter jets as required (anti-surface or anti-submarine warfare).

(2) Measures in Waters around Our Coasts

Our escort vessels, mine sweepers, patrol aircraft, and reconnaissance aircraft patrol our major ports to

detect enemy attacks at an early stage. In particular, we need to leverage our escort vessels, submarines, fighter jets, and surface-to-air missiles to attack them (anti-surface or anti-submarine warfare) and ensure the safety of our ships and waters around our coasts.
If enemies deploy mines at sea, we will remove them by our mine sweepers and other vessels (anti-mine warfare).

(3) Measures in Major Straits

We patrol our major straits with our escort vessels, patrol aircraft, and reconnaissance aircraft to detect enemy ships and submarines trying to pass them at an early stage. In particular, we need to leverage our escort vessels, patrol aircraft, submarines, fighter jets, and land-to-sea missiles to attack them (anti-surface or anti-submarine warfare). We also deploy mines in major waters with our minesweeper tenders, submarines, and aircraft (mine deployment warfare).

(4) Aerial Defense above Waters around Japan

We engage in the aerial defense above waters around Japan by our escort ships (anti-air warfare) with the support of our fighter jets as required.

3. Operations Protecting the Land

As enemies try to invade the islands of Japan, they are expected to obtain sea and air superiority by attacking our country head-on, following the move by landing ground troops from the sea and airlift troops from the air.
Invading ground and airborne troops find it difficult to exert systemic capabilities while they are moving on their vessels or aircraft or right before or after they land in our territory. As we protect our land, we need to take note of this weakness to deal with our enemies between coastal and sea areas or at landing points as much as possible and attack them at an early stage.
(See Fig. III-1-2-21)

(1) Measures in Waters around Our Coasts

We need to leverage our escort vessels, submarines, patrol aircraft, fighter aircraft, and land-to-sea missiles to attack at sea enemy vessels transporting ground troops to the maximum extent, destroying their capabilities and annihilating their intention to invade our country.
We also leverage our fighter aircraft and surface-to-air missiles to destroy enemy aircraft in the air

transporting ground troops as much as possible.

(2) Measures in Coastal Areas

We need to deploy mines with our minesweeper tenders and coastal mines with our coastal mine deployment equipment, blocking and preventing the actions of our enemies.

We deal with enemy troops trying to land in our territory by blocking their actions with our tanks, anti-tank weapons, and battlefield firearms[4] deployed in coastal areas at the initial stage. In case they land in our territory, we block and attack their invasion with our mobile attack capability[5] based on battlefield firearms, anti-tank missiles, and tanks. Fighter jets assist the battles being conducted in affected areas.

As we deal with airborne attacks[6] and heliborne attacks[7] conducted in conjunction with the landing of enemy ground troops, we will destroy them at an early stage by leveraging our battlefield firearms and the mobile attack capability.

We also use anti-air firearms including surface-to-air missiles to wage in anti-air warfare (individual aerial defense operations).

(3) Measures in the Inner Territory

In case we cannot destroy enemy ground troops as or before they land in our territory, we leverage our deployed troops to block their invasion with the support of fighter jets (endurance operations). In the meantime, we accumulate as many troops as possible to attack our enemies and destroy invading enemy ground troops.

(4) Measures Taken in Each Phase

In each of these phases, we use our escort vessels, submarines, fighter jets, and patrol aircraft to block enemy vessel transportation assisting enemy ground troops and disrupt logistical routes at sea as well as to protect our air space, collect information, and transport troops and supplies as required by our operations.

4. Operations Ensuring Security in Maritime Transportation

Japan depends upon other countries for the supply of much of its resources and food, making maritime transportation routes vital assets of our country. Furthermore, in case our country comes under armed attacked, they ensure the survival and prosperity of our country as well as set the foundation to maintain

our warfare capabilities and enable the U.S. forces to come and assist in the defense of Japan. Therefore, we need to enhance our operations to ensure the safety of our maritime transportation.

Our operations ensuring security in maritime transportation can be done in waters several hundred nautical miles around Japan or in sea lanes.[8]

In case we implement operations in several hundred nautical mile waters around our country, we combine anti-sea, anti-submarine, anti-air, and anti-mine operations to patrol and defend our ships and protect our straits and ports for the security of our maritime transportation.

In case we implement our operations based on sea lanes, we define them in waters covering around 1,000 nautical miles, periodically patrol the defined areas, detect and address attacks by emery vessels or submarines at an early stage, and directly defend Japanese ships as required.

Escort vessels engage in the aerial defense for Japanese ships on maritime transportation routes (anti-air warfare), with the support provided by fighter jets and other aircraft as required.

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1 Aerial attacks are important elements influencing the results of modern wars. It is vital to obtain air superiority before or at the same time as implementing ground or maritime operations.

2 The degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another that permits the conduct of operations by the former without prohibitive inference by opposing air forces

3 A nationwide air defense system that automates the process of conveying and dealing with commands and tracking information

4 Equipped with long-haul and large-diameter howitzers and rockets and used to attack and block infantry troops, light armored vehicles, and facilities.

5 The action based on the attacks by tanks and armored vehicles to destroy enemy attacks

6 The operation based on invading troops on board transport aircraft, landing near important locations and engaging in attacks on the ground. Conducted by specially created, equipped, and trained troops that can quickly move for a long distance through the air

7 The operation implemented on the ground after attacking troops are transported near important locations by helicopter and other aircraft, enabling simpler preparation and easier operations in comparison with airlift attacks

8 Relatively safe marine areas defined to enable the transportation of ships. The locations and width of sea lanes change depending on the situation of a specific threat.

9. Response to Other Events

1. Improvement in Guard Postures for SDF Facilities

(1) Operations for Guarding SDF Facilities

When there is a danger of a terrorist attack on facilities and areas of the SDF and USFJ within Japan and in the event that it is deemed particularly necessary to prevent damage, the Prime Minister may order SDF units to conduct operations to guard facilities and areas (guarding operations).

Part of the authority given to police officials under the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials are applied correspondingly to SDF personnel dispatched for guarding operations[1]. Further, the amended Self-Defense Forces Law provides that SDF personnel have authority to use weapons beyond the limitations of Article 7 of this law.

See References 22, 23

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF exchange opinions concerning guarding operations with the police and Japan Coast Guard in order to ensure the effectiveness of such operations. In addition, exercises for guarding operations have been conducted at USFJ facilities and areas throughout Japan since 2003.

(2) Use of Arms to Regularly Protect SDF Facilities

Rules have been defined[2] for SDF officers to use arms for the protection of domestic SDF facilities[3] based on their specified purposes.

2. Maintaining Posture to Transport Japanese Nationals Overseas

In the event of disasters, insurgency, and other emergencies overseas, the Minister of Defense may transport overseas Japanese nationals upon request from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and subsequent consultations. In such cases, the SDF receive the Japanese nationals from diplomatic establishments abroad at an airport or a sea port in the country of deployment, and have custody of them to safely guide them to transport aircraft and ships. All service branches of the Self-Defense Forces maintain operational readiness, with the GSDF designating helicopter unit and escort unit[4] personnel, the MSDF designating transport ships and air units, and the ASDF designating airlift units and personnel.

Since the transport of overseas Japanese nationals needs to be carried out through the collaboration among the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces, joint exercises are carried out using transport aircraft and vessels.

The Ministry of Defense participates in the exercise for the transportation of Japanese nationals abroad, in

the annual multinational joint exercise “Cobra Gold” in Thailand, with local Japanese Embassy staff, their family members, and Japanese Embassy staff located outside of Thailand, based on the support provided by the Japanese Embassy in Thailand. Through such exercises, our implementation of the coordination procedures with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and operational skills for the SDF overseas have been improved, which have been contributing to enhance our capabilities to carry out the mission. Transport of overseas Japanese nationals has been assigned as an SDF primary mission since January 2007.

(See Fig. III-1-2-22)
See References 22, 23

3. Response to Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan

In the event of situations in areas surrounding Japan, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF will provide materials and services as rear area support and conduct rear area search and rescue activities or ship inspection activities as stipulated in the Law to Ensure Security for Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan and the Ship Inspections Operations Law.

Furthermore, these activities were designated a primary mission of the SDF in January 2007.

See Chapter 2, Section1-2; References 22, 23

4. Responses to “New-Type Flu”

Based on the government’s action plan for countermeasures against the new-type flu[5], the Ministry of Defense and the SDF has prepared an MOD Contingency Plan for countermeasures against the new-type flu[6] with the goal of expressing the policy for the necessary arrangements and measures needed for swiftly and effectively carrying out new-type flu countermeasures.

As its basic policies, this plan stipulates that 1) the Ministry of Defense and the SDF will collaborate and cooperate closely with related organizations under normal circumstances, 2) in the case of an outbreak of the new-type flu, they will carry out their duties flawlessly, and 3) they will carry out the new-type flu countermeasures upon requests from relevant organizations while ensuring the safety of SDF personnel. Further, specific examples of SDF activities include epidemic control measures for poultry[7], transportation of Japanese nationals overseas, quarantine support by medical officers, transportation of relief supplies, and diagnosis/treatment at the National Defense Medical College Hospital and SDF hospitals.

In order to make this plan effective, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF are proceeding with the consideration of specific operational procedures. Given this situation, in August 2009 the Joint Staff presented the specific implementation procedures for each Self-Defense Force in the event of a new-type flu outbreak and prepared “SDF Operational Procedures for New-Type Flu Measures” conducive to the

swift execution of each operation. Furthermore, in June 2010, the Ministry of Defense prepared the "Ministry of Defense Operational Continuity Plan for the New-Type Flu"[8] so that functions can be maintained and necessary operations continued without interruption in the case of an outbreak of the new-type flu.

5. Military Intelligence Collection

In order for the effective operation of defense capabilities to deal with diverse situations, it is ever more necessary to acquire signs of various situations in advance and collect, analyze, and share information promptly and appropriately. In this context, broader and more comprehensive intelligence capabilities are essential for Japanese national security.

In consideration of this, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF comprehensively analyze and assess a variety of information, and have diversified the means of collecting intelligence. Some examples of intelligence collection activities include 1) collecting, processing and analyzing radio waves on military communications and radio waves emitted from electronic weapons, which are transmitted from overseas; 2) collecting and analyzing high resolution commercial satellite imagery data[9] 3) ISR activities by ships and aircraft and so on; 4) collecting and organizing a variety of open source information; 5) information exchanges with defense authorities of other nations; and 6) intelligence activities conducted by Defense Attachés and other officials[10]. Moreover, in order to enhance the capability of collecting a variety of intelligence, and comprehensively analyzing and assessing information by responding to the security environment and technical trends, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF develop capable personnel, improve equipment and devices for intelligence collection as well as strengthen the capability of intelligence organizations such as the Defense Intelligence Headquarters, which supports the abovementioned intelligence capabilities.

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1 Limited to cases where there are no police officers at the scene, SDF personnel on duty are authorized to make enquiries, undertake evacuation measures and enter property in addition to their authorized duties of preventing and controlling crimes and usage of weapons.

2 Facilities and equipment for the storage, accommodation or maintenance of SDF weapons, ammunition, explosives, ships, aircraft, vehicles, wired telecommunications equipment, wireless telecommunications equipment or liquid fuels, barracks, harbors, and airports

3 SDF personnel may use weapons to the extent deemed to be reasonably necessary in situations within applicable facilities in the event that it is considered that the use of such weapons is required to execute duties or to protect themselves or others. Weapons must not be used to cause harm to other people except in cases of self-defense or acts of emergency evacuation.

4 Units temporarily organized to be dispatched along with transport units (SDF aircraft or ships) to guide and protect Japanese nationals overseas on site

5 See <http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/ful/kettei/110920keikaku.pdf>

6 See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2009/03/17b-02.pdf>

7 Domestic birds such as chickens, ducks, and quails

8 To deal with the new-type flu (A H1N1) based on this plan, the Ministry of Defense and the

Self-Defense Forces dispatched a total of 1,260 doctors from the National Defense Medical College and the SDF to quarantine offices of Narita, Kansai, and Chubu Airports between April and June in 2010 following the request from the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare to assist in quarantine operations.

[9] In order to enhance Japan's capability for gathering image intelligence, five intelligence-gathering satellites have been launched so far. The Ministry of Defense has properly utilized the information provided by these satellites.

[10] As of January 1, 2012, 49 Defense Attachés (SDF personnel temporarily reassigned from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who are composed of 23 GSDF, 13 MSDF, and 13 ASDF officers) are posted to diplomatic missions overseas in 38 locations. Utilizing their experience as SDF personnel, these attachés are engaged in military information gathering through exchanges with defense-related personnel of their countries of assignment, as well as military attachés from other nations.

Part III Measures for Defense of Japan

Chapter 1 Operations of Self-Defense Forces for Defense of Japan and Responses to Diverse Situations

Section 3 Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake

1. Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake

At 14:46 on March 11, 2011, a major earthquake occurred off the coast of Sanriku in the Tohoku region that measured 7.0 on the Japanese scale (magnitude 9.0, making it the largest observed in Japanese history). The massive tsunami triggered by the earthquake engulfed settlements located along an extensive section of the coast of Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima Prefectures, and damaged the nuclear reactors at the Tokyo Electric Power Company's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, causing a radiation leak. In terms of the extent of the area affected and the immense damage caused, it was a major disaster without precedent in Japanese history.

Directly following the earthquake, at 14:50, the Ministry of Defense established an Emergency Headquarters and commenced information gathering operations using aircraft and other means. At 15:40, the Emergency Headquarters[1] held its first meeting and at 18:00 and 19:30 the Defense Minister ordered SDF units to dispatch to respond to the earthquake and the nuclear power station accident, respectively. In response to these orders, the SDF dispatched approximately 8,400 personnel on the day of the earthquake and commenced activities. GSDF Camp Tagajo and ASDF Matsushima Airbase were damaged in the earthquake and their aircraft and vehicles were submerged underwater, but the SDF dispatched as many personnel and as much equipment as possible amid these difficult circumstances, implementing a swift, large-scale initial response in order to save the lives of disaster victims.

In order to further strengthen arrangements for disaster relief operations and undertake more effective activities in the disaster area, on March 14 a joint task force for the Great East Japan Earthquake was formed under the overall command of the Commanding General of the GSDF Northeastern Army, which included the participation of a GSDF disaster relief unit under the command of that Commanding General, an MSDF disaster relief unit under the commandants of the MSDF Yokosuka Districts and an ASDF disaster relief unit under the command of the ASDF Air Defense Commander. This joint task force uniting the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF carried out various activities to support those affected by the disaster, including searching for missing persons. Furthermore, approximately 500 GSDF, MSDF and ASDF personnel under the overall command of the Commanding Officer of the Central Readiness Force were mobilized to deal with the nuclear disaster resulting from the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, spraying the plant compound with water. These activities marked the largest mobilization of personnel and equipment in history, and close cooperation was carried out between the military of the United States and other countries, the various headquarters of the Government, related ministries and

agencies, local governments, and others. This also marked the first time that ready reserves and reserves were summoned based on the Self-Defense Forces Law other than in exercises. Thus, the SDF employed full-scale efforts in order to ensure the safety of disaster victims and stability for the lives of those in the region.

Having received an order from Prime Minister to make preparations to dispatch 100,000 personnel, the number of dispatched SDF personnel surpassed 100,000 by March 18. When numbers were at their largest, the number of personnel reached approximately 107,000 (including ready reserves and regular reserves[2]), about 543 aircraft, and nearly 54 ships. Under this posture, bases and camps in the disaster area and other areas provided major logistic support in order to assist the smooth activities of dispatched units, including receiving units and providing them with shelter and procuring large amounts of needed food, clothing, and equipment on an emergency basis. In this way, the bases and camps in the disaster area played a vital role in the provision of assistance.

(See Fig. III-1-3-1)

About three and a half months after the disaster occurred, on July 1, the joint task force was dissolved, as the arrangements for the Government and local authorities to provide support for the livelihoods of people in the disaster-stricken areas were being put in place; the disaster relief units of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF switched to collaborative activities and the large-scale disaster relief deployment in response to the earthquake was concluded on August 31. On July 19, responsibility for the disaster relief operation in response to the nuclear disaster was transferred from the Commanding Officer of the Central Readiness Force to the Commanding Officer of the GSDF disaster relief unit (Commanding General of the North Eastern Army).

On December 6, 2011, the Ministerial Meeting on Decontamination and Special Waste Treatment took place and, based on the awareness that carrying out decontamination as a matter of urgency was a pressing issue for the whole Government, in order to facilitate at the earliest possible date the reconstruction of the areas contaminated by radioactive material discharged due to the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, it was decided that the GSDF would undertake decontamination activities, with the cooperation of bodies such as the Ministry of the Environment. For two weeks from the following day, approximately 900 troops, consisting mainly of personnel from the 44th Infantry Regiment and the 6th Artillery Regiment, carried out work at the municipal offices in Naraha, Tomioka, Namie and Iitate, which were due to be the bases for the full-scale decontamination activities to be implemented under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Environment from January 2012. The troops decontaminated the areas by removing sludge and collecting fallen leaves from gutters around the offices, and using high-pressure washers to decontaminate surfaces, such as the asphalt in the car parks, thereby putting in place the infrastructure to enable the Government and local authorities to carry out decontamination in the area.

The disaster relief operation in response to the nuclear disaster was concluded on December 26.

(See Fig. III-1-3-2 & 3)

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[1] Large-scale disaster dispatch is conducted by order of the Defense Minister based on the Self-Defense Forces Law and Article 14 of the Order concerning SDF Disaster Dispatch (1980 Defense Agency Order 28). Commanding Generals, Self-Defense Fleet Commanders, Commanders of Regional District, or Air Defense Command Commander serve as the commanding officer of the disaster relief dispatch unit and units are dispatched.

[2] In response to the great disaster in East Japan, 2,210 ready reserves (actual number: 1,373) and 496 reserves (actual number: 317) were summoned for the first time other than for a training purpose, and most of them served for 1 to 2 weeks at a time.

2. Overview of the Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake

The Great East Japan Earthquake was a complex situation in which a nuclear disaster occurred, in addition to a major earthquake and tsunami. An overview of the response to this disaster by the Ministry of Defense and SDF is provided below, focusing on the following three categories.

1. Response to the major earthquake and tsunami

Due to the immense scale of the earthquake, the districts stricken by the Great East Japan Earthquake were spread over a wide area, from the Tohoku to the Kanto regions, while the functions of many local authorities located in coastal areas were reduced because of the tsunami. As a result of this situation, the Ministry of Defense and SDF formed a joint task force that not only represented the largest-ever mobilization of troops in the SDF's history, exceeding 100,000 personnel, but also marked the first time that such a task force had been formed in response to a disaster; not only GSDF, MSDF and ASDF units, but also reserves worked together in responding to the disaster.

Moreover, in some disaster-afflicted areas, the troops were involved not only in the shipping of relief supplies, but also provided support for the transport of the mortal remains of the deceased.

2. Response to the nuclear disaster

Amid an unexpected situation, the Ministry of Defense and SDF played a central role in dealing with the nuclear disaster, determining the guidelines for spraying water at the plant and carrying out the work, and provided a unified response in partnership with other ministries and agencies.

Troops worked without regard for the danger of exposure to radiation, and contributed to averting a critical situation due to the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. In addition, they also contributed to radioactive material decontamination, monitoring the air dose rate, etc., and providing support for the evacuation of residents living in the vicinity of the plant.

3. Joint operations involving Japan and the U.S.

During Operation Tomodachi, the U.S. military deployed approximately 16,000 troops, not to mention the aircraft carrier Ronald Reagan; as well as assisting tirelessly with rescue operations in the disaster-afflicted areas, they provided cooperation and support in various forms in regard to the nuclear disaster[1]. In doing so, the Ministry of Defense (Ichigaya), U.S. Forces, Japan (Yokota Base) and the joint task force headquarters (Sendai; GSDF North Eastern Army Headquarters) established bilateral coordination centers and close collaboration took place between the Ministry of Defense and SDF, and the U.S. military, enabling us to reaffirm the strong links forged through the Japan-U.S. Alliance, even in the midst of a state of emergency.

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[1] In response to the nuclear disaster, the U.S. military dispatched a specialist unit from the Marine Corps - the Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF); this marked the first time that the unit had been deployed overseas.

3. Lessons Learned from the Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake

The response to the Great East Japan Earthquake implemented by the Ministry of Defense and SDF was on an unprecedentedly large scale, so lessons have been learned from it that will contribute to strengthening not only responses to future disasters, such as earthquakes, but also our ability to respond to a range of situations, including military emergencies affecting Japan. The various lessons learned are shown in Fig. III-1-3-4[1].

Moreover, the status of deliberations concerning these lessons and their reflection in policies and procedures is shown in Fig. III-1-3-5.

1) The Ministry of Defense and SDF are striving to reflect these lessons in their policies and procedures; on March 28, 2012, the Ground Staff Office held a briefing to provide concrete details of the lessons learned on the ground, at the unit level, in order to disseminate these to SDF units and ensure that they serve as a point of reference in the running of military affairs involving SDF units in the future.

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4. Evaluation of the Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake

In an opinion poll carried out by the Cabinet Office in January 2012, 97.7% of respondents answered that they "have a high opinion"[1] of the SDF in relation to their disaster relief mission associated with the Great East Japan Earthquake. Moreover, many messages of encouragement, hope and thanks have been received through various media from people - including those affected by the disaster - in response to the activities of the Ministry of Defense and SDF in the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake.

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[1] The figure for “have a high opinion” is the total for the responses “I have a very high opinion of them” and “I have a fairly high opinion of them”.

Part III Measures for Defense of Japan

Chapter 2 Strengthening of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements

Section 1 The Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements

Based on the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty[1], the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements constitute one of the pillars of Japan's national defense. And the Japan–U.S. Alliance, having the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements as its core, is indispensable to maintain not only the peace and security of Japan, but also that of the entire Asia-Pacific region. In addition, the close cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States based on the alliance is proving to be extremely significant for effectively dealing with numerous and complex global security issues. Furthermore, the Japan–U.S. Alliance is playing an increasingly important role in promoting the shared fundamental values in the international community such as democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and a capitalist economy. Under the 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), Japan is further deepening and developing the Japan–U.S. Alliance to adapt to the evolving security environment.

(See Fig. III-2-0-1)

The military presence of the U.S. forces in Japan not only contributes to the defense of Japan, but also functions as deterrence against and response to contingencies in the Asia-Pacific region, and serves as a core element of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. On the other hand, the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan impacts upon the living environment of local residents, and efforts corresponding to the situation on the ground must be made to reduce the burden on regions such as Okinawa.

With regard to the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, which holds great significance to the security of Japan, Section 1 of this chapter explains the significance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and its basic framework and provides an overview of the U.S. forces stationed in Japan. Section 2 focuses on the deepening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and explains its historical background and the Japan-U.S. agreement and discussions concerning the coordination of the plan to realign U.S. forces in Japan, aimed at deepening and widening the Japan-U.S. Alliance for the future. Finally, Section 3 describes the relocation of the Futenma Air Station as well as measures pertaining to the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan.

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[1] Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan. See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/hosho/jyoyaku.html>

Section 1. The Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements

This section presents an overview of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, such as the significance of the Arrangements for Japan's security, the basic framework that supports the Arrangements, and the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan, as well as the framework relating to this.

1. The Significance of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements

1. Maintenance of Japan's Peace and Security

In the current international community, a watertight defense system capable of responding to every contingency, ranging from all types of armed attacks including the use of nuclear weapons to coercion or intimidation by the military power, is necessary to secure the peace, security, and sovereignty of the nation. In today's globalized international community, it is impossible even for a superpower like the United States to guarantee its security on its own. Therefore, it would be practically impossible for Japan to ensure its national security solely through its unilateral efforts given its population, land, and economy. Moreover, such a strategy would not be politically appropriate for our country and would not necessarily contribute to regional stability.

Consequently, Japan has maintained its peace and security, centered on the Security Arrangements with the world's dominant military superpower, the United States, with which it shares the aforementioned basic values as well as an interest in maintaining the peace and security of the world and has strong economic ties.

Specifically, as well as providing facilities and areas for the U.S. military, based on Article 6 of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty, Article 5 of that treaty stipulates that Japan and the United States will take bilateral action in the event of an armed attack against Japan. The U.S. obligation to defend Japan in the event of an armed attack means that an attacker must be prepared to confront not only the defense capability of the SDF, but also the overwhelming military strength of the United States when planning such an act. As a result, the opposing nation becomes aware that they will suffer grievously if they carry out an invasion and such desires are stopped at the planning stage. In other words, this serves to deter attacks.

Japan intends to continue to effectively utilize the deterrence power of the U.S. military in addition to maintaining adequate Japanese defense forces in order to create a seamless posture and secure Japan's peace and safety.

2. Maintenance of Peace and Stability in the Region Surrounding Japan

Article 6 of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty provides for the use of facilities and areas by the U.S. forces within Japan for the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan, and also for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East. This provision is based on the recognition that the security of Japan is closely tied to the peace and security of the Far East region to which Japan belongs.

Large-scale military forces, including nuclear forces, still exist in the areas surrounding Japan, and many countries are modernizing their military forces and increasing their military activities. In addition, there remain unclear and uncertain elements in the region, such as disputes over territories and the maritime domain, and issues over the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait. In such a security environment, the military presence of the U.S. armed forces in Japan provides deterrence against unexpected contingencies caused by unclear and indeterminate regional factors, providing a great sense of security to the nations of the region and thus fulfilling a role as public goods. Also, the close bonds of cooperation based on the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements constitute the foundation of the United States commitment to the peace and security of the region. These arrangements, complemented by the alliances established between the U.S. and other countries in the region such as South Korea and the Philippines and also by the friendly relations developed with other countries, play an essential role in maintaining the peace and security of the region.

3. Improvement of the International Security Environment

The Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements are the foundation for a comprehensive and friendly cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States, not only in the defense but also in a wide range of areas, including political, economic, and social aspects. The cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States, founded on their security arrangements, also forms the basis for Japan's foreign policy. It contributes to Japan's ability to implement positive measures to maintain the peace and security of the international community, including promoting multinational security dialogue and cooperation and cooperation in various activities of the United Nations.

Current security issues in the international community include responses to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, international terrorism, and acts of piracy, as well as new risks concerning stable access to the seas, space, and cyberspace. It is extremely difficult for any single country to tackle such global security challenges alone, and it is important for countries with common interests to work together regularly. In this international environment, the strong bonds forged between Japan and the United States are also playing an important role in the efforts implemented by Japan to effectively respond to such issues faced by the international community.

In particular, under the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements, the SDF and U.S. forces are working together in peacetime in a variety of areas to improve the levels of coordination. This kind of close coordination forms the foundation for various international collaboration, such as antipiracy, undertaken by the SDF

and U.S. forces, and is resulting in the heightened operational effectiveness of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements.

The peace and prosperity of the international community are closely linked to that of Japan. Accordingly, by cooperating with the United States, which possesses preeminent international operational capabilities, Japan is able to advance its measures to improve the international security environment. This in turn is enhancing the security and prosperity of Japan.

2. Basic Framework Supporting the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements

1. Policy Consultations between Japan and the United States

Close policy consultations on security are conducted through diplomatic channels as well as between officials in charge of defense and foreign affairs at multiple levels of the Governments of Japan and the United States through meetings such as the Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee ("2+2" meeting), the Security Subcommittee (SSC) and the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC). (See Fig. III-2-1-1)

In addition, the Ministry of Defense organizes Japan–U.S. defense ministerial meetings between the Japanese Minister of Defense and the U.S. Secretary of Defense as necessary where discussions are made with a focus on the defense policies of the respective governments and defense cooperation. (See Fig. III-2-1-2)

Furthermore, the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense, Chiefs of Staff of SDFs, and other MOD officials have working-level meetings when necessary and exchange information with the U.S. Department of Defense and others under the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements. The importance of these opportunities has further increased as Japan–U.S. defense cooperation has been enhanced in recent years.

The sharing of information and views at every opportunity and level between Japan and the United States is undoubtedly conducive to increased credibility of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements, and results in further enhancement of close collaboration between the two countries. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense is proactively engaging in these efforts.

2. Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation and Policies to Ensure Their Effectiveness

It is necessary for both Japan and the United States to discuss and decide the roles each will fill in case of an armed attack on Japan or other situation in advance in order to respond rapidly in that event. There is a framework pertaining to those roles between Japan and the United States, the Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation (Guidelines) and the various policies for ensuring its effectiveness. Based on that framework and the changing security environment surrounding Japan, both Japan and the United States

continuously study bilateral cooperation plans for the two countries, and hold consultations on them.
The following is an overview of the framework.

(1) The Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation

The outline of the Guidelines acknowledged at the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) ("2+2" meeting) in 1997 is as follows.
See Reference 32

a. Objectives of the Guidelines
The Guidelines aim to create a solid basis for more effective and more credible Japan–U.S. cooperation under normal circumstances, as well as in the event of an armed attack against Japan and in situations in areas surrounding Japan[1].

b. Cooperation Items Prescribed in the Guidelines
(a) Cooperation under Normal Circumstances
Both governments will maintain close cooperation for the defense of Japan and for the creation of a more stable international security environment, and will promote cooperation in various fields under normal circumstances. Such cooperation includes information sharing and policy consultations; security dialogues and defense exchanges; U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO) and international humanitarian operations; bilateral defense planning, and mutual cooperation planning; enhancing bilateral exercises and training; and establishing a bilateral coordination mechanism.

(b) Actions in Response to Armed Attack against Japan
Bilateral actions in response to an armed attack against Japan remain a core aspect of Japan–U.S. defense cooperation. The SDF will primarily conduct defensive operations[2]while U.S. forces conduct operations to supplement and support the SDF's operations. Both parties will respond based on respective concepts of operations in a coordinated manner.
See Reference 33

(c) Cooperation in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan
The Governments of both Japan and the United States will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to prevent situations in areas surrounding Japan from occurring.
See Reference 34

d. Bilateral Programs under the Guidelines

In order to promote Japan–U.S. cooperation under the Guidelines in an effective manner and to ensure successful bilateral defense cooperation, the two countries need to conduct consultative dialogue throughout the spectrum of security conditions mentioned above. In addition, both sides must share information adequately at multiple levels to accomplish such objectives. To that end, the two governments will strengthen their information and intelligence-sharing and policy consultations by taking advantage of all available opportunities, and will establish the following two mechanisms to facilitate consultations, coordinate policies, and coordinate operational functions.

(a) Comprehensive Mechanism

The Comprehensive Mechanism has been created so that not only the SDF and U.S. forces but also the relevant agencies of the respective governments conduct bilateral works based on the Guidelines under normal circumstances. In the comprehensive mechanism, bilateral work such as bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning will be conducted so as to be able to respond smoothly and effectively to armed attacks against Japan and to situations in areas surrounding Japan.

(See Fig. III-2-1-3)

(b) Coordination Mechanism

The coordination mechanism is being set up in peacetime so that the two countries may coordinate their respective activities in the event of an armed attack against Japan and in situations in areas surrounding Japan.

(See Fig. III-2-1-4)

(2) Various Policies for Ensuring the Effectiveness of the Guidelines

a. Measures for Ensuring the Effectiveness of the Guidelines

In order to ensure the effectiveness of the Guidelines, it is important to properly take necessary measures, including legal ones, regarding Japan–U.S. cooperation in case of armed attack situations and situations in areas surrounding Japan. From this perspective, it is necessary for the Government of Japan as a whole to collaborate in advancing bilateral work between Japan and the United States, including examination of bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning of the Guidelines in peacetime.

Based on this, laws such as the Law concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan (1999) and the Ship Inspection Operations Law (2000) were established in light of Japan–U.S. cooperation in areas surrounding Japan.

Also, measures are being taken to facilitate U.S. force operations as a part of strengthening of security cooperation legislation for situations such as armed attacks.

See Part III, Chapter1, Section1

b. Outline of the Law concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan and the Ship Inspection Operations Law

The Law concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan establishes the measures (response measures)[3] that Japan will implement in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan and the actual implementation procedures. The Ship Inspection Operations Law provides for the types, measures, and other matters of ship inspection operations implemented by Japan in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan.

○ The Prime Minister, facing a situation in areas surrounding Japan and deeming it necessary to adopt measures including such SDF activities as rear area support[4], rear area search and rescue operations, and ship inspection operations, must request a Cabinet decision on such measures and on a draft basic plan of response measures. The Prime Minister must obtain prior approval, or ex post facto approval in case of emergency, from the Diet in order for the SDF to conduct response measures. Furthermore, the Prime Minister reports to the Diet without delay when the Cabinet has made a decision or approved a revision, or when the response measures have been completed.

○ In accordance with the basic plan, the Minister of Defense will draw up an implementation guideline (including designation of implementation areas), obtain approval for the guideline from the Prime Minister, and give the SDF orders to conduct rear area support, rear area search and rescue activities, and ship inspection operations.

○ Heads of relevant administrative organizations will implement response measures and may request the heads of local governments to provide the necessary cooperation for the organizations to exercise their authorities in accordance with relevant laws and regulations and the basic plan. In addition, the heads of relevant administrative organizations may ask persons other than those from the national government to cooperate as necessary in accordance with relevant laws and regulations and the basic plan[5].

c. Rear Area Support

Rear area support means support measures, including the provision of goods, services, and conveniences, given by Japan in rear areas to U.S. forces conducting activities that contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty in situations in areas surrounding Japan[6].

As rear area support, the SDF provides goods and services, including supplies, transportation, repair, maintenance, medical services, communications, airport and seaport activities, and base activities.

MSDF Chief of Staff Admiral Sugimoto and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Roughead

ASDF Chief of Staff General Iwasaki and U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff General Schwartz

d. Rear Area Search and Rescue Operations

Rear area search and rescue operations mean operations conducted by the SDF in situations in areas surrounding Japan to search and rescue those who were engaged in combat and were stranded in rear areas (including transporting those rescued)[7]. If there are non-combatants who face a mishap, he/she will be also rescued. In addition, if there is anyone in the territorial waters of a foreign country adjacent to the implementation area in which the SDF is conducting activities, the SDF will also rescue that person, after having obtained approval from that foreign country. However, this is limited to cases in which no combat operations are conducted at that time and are expected to be conducted in those waters throughout the period during which the SDF conducts rescue activities.

e. Ship Inspection Operations

Ship inspection operations mean operations conducted by Japan in situations in areas surrounding Japan to inspect and confirm the cargo and destination of ships (excluding warships and others[8]) and to request, if necessary, a change of sea route, or destination port or place, for the purpose of strictly enforcing the regulatory measures concerning trade or other economic activities to which Japan is a party. These activities are conducted based on the U.N. Security Council Resolution or the consent of the flag state[9]in the territorial waters of Japan or in the surrounding high seas[10] (including the EEZ[11]).

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1 Situations that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security, including situations that could develop into a direct armed attack against Japan if left unaddressed. (Article 1 of the Law concerning the Measures for Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan)

2 Operations conducted to interdict an enemy's offensive and to prevent their purpose from being achieved. Offensive operations mean aggressive forms of operations to search for and defeat enemies.

3 Law stipulating ship inspection operations and other necessary measures to respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan to implement rear area support, rear area search and rescue operations, and ship inspection operations conducted in relation to situations in surrounding areas (Article 2 of the Law concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan)

4 The term "rear area" refers to Japan's territorial waters and international waters surrounding Japan (including the exclusive economic zone up to 200 nautical miles, or approximately 370 km, from the baseline of the territorial waters) in which no combat operations are conducted at that time and no combat operations are expected to be conducted throughout the period when the rear activities are carried out, and the space over these international waters.

5 If any person other than the central government who had been requested to cooperate suffers a loss as a result of such cooperation, the Government shall take necessary fiscal measures for the loss.

6 Article 3, Paragraph 1, Item 1 of the Law concerning the Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan

7 Article 3, Paragraph 1, Item 2 of the Law concerning the Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan

8 Warships and such vessels that are possessed or operated by foreign governments that are exclusively used for non-commercial purposes

9 The state that has the right to fly its flag as prescribed in Article 91 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

10 Article 2 of the Ship Inspection Operations Law

11 Article 1 of the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf. See <http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/H08/H08HO074.html>

3. Stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan

1. Significance of the Presence of U.S. Forces in Japan

In order for the Japan-U.S. Alliance, which is based on the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements, to adequately function as a deterrent that contributes to Japan's defense as well as peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region, it is necessary to secure the presence of the U.S. military in Japan, and to maintain a posture in Japan and the surrounding areas that enables the U.S. forces in Japan to respond swiftly and expeditiously to emergencies.

For this purpose, based on the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty, Japan allows the stationing of the U.S. military in Japan. (See Fig. III-2-1-5) This results in the necessity for opposing countries to be prepared to find themselves in direct confrontation with the U.S. forces in addition to the SDF when attacking Japan as mentioned previously. Thus the U.S. forces in Japan serve as deterrence against aggression towards Japan. Further, the realization of a stable U.S. military presence is necessary for a swift Japan–U.S. joint response based on Article 5 of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty in the event of an armed attack on Japan. Additionally, the actions of the U.S. forces in Japan in the defense of Japan will be assisted by the timely reinforcement of other U.S. forces, and the U.S. forces in Japan will serve as the basis of such support.

In order for the U.S. forces in Japan to carry out the above-mentioned role, it is necessary that all the services of the U.S. forces, including those in Japan, are functionally integrated. For instance, the U.S. forces hold a primarily offensive role as a "spear" when responding to armed aggression to Japan in cooperation with the SDF. When the U.S. forces function in this way, it can be expected that the U.S. Navy, Air Force, and Marines stationed in Japan work as one to fully exert their functions.

In addition, while Article 5 of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty stipulates the obligation of the United States to defend Japan, Article 6 allows for the use by the United States of facilities and areas in Japan for maintaining the security of Japan and international peace and security in the Far East, and overall Japan–U.S. obligations are kept in balance. This point is different in contrast to the North Atlantic Treaty which stipulates only joint defense of member countries.

2. USFJ Facilities and Areas and the Local Communities

In order for USFJ facilities and areas to fully exert their capabilities, it is vital to gain the cooperation and understanding of the local communities. Meanwhile, the social conditions in the surrounding areas have changed a lot through, for example, their urbanization over the past several decades since the conclusion of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty. In light of such changes, it is necessary to reduce the impact of the facilities and areas as much as possible in order to gain the acceptance and support of the public in the

true sense as well as to allow them to perform to the best of their capabilities.

Our national land is narrow with limited plains and there are many cases where USFJ facilities and areas are located close to urban and business areas. In such areas, factors including the existence of those facilities and areas and the takeoff and landing of U.S. forces' aircraft have considerable impact on the residents' living environment and local development. It is therefore necessary to make efforts to reduce the burden with the realities of each area in mind.

3. U.S. Forces in Okinawa

In comparison to areas such as the U.S. mainland, Hawaii, and Guam, Okinawa is located closer to East Asia. Consequently, when it is necessary for units to respond rapidly in the region, U.S. forces stationed in Okinawa are able to do so swiftly. In addition, Okinawa has the geographic advantage that it has a certain distance from countries neighboring Japan. Furthermore, it is situated in the extremely important location with regard to security—it is located roughly in the center of the Nansei Islands and is close to Japan's sea lanes. Thus, the stationing of U.S. forces in Okinawa — including the U.S. Marine Corps which has high mobility and readiness and is in charge for a variety of contingencies — with the abovementioned geographical characteristics, contributes greatly not only to the security of Japan but also to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.

Meanwhile, many USFJ facilities and areas are located within Okinawa Prefecture, including airfields, maneuver areas, and logistics support facilities. As of January 2012, about 74% of the land area of the USFJ facilities and areas nationwide (for their exclusive use) was concentrated in Okinawa. Utmost efforts must therefore be given to reduce the burden on Okinawa while keeping in mind the aforementioned security considerations.

(See Fig. III-2-1-6)

4. Measures to Ensure the Smooth Stationing of the USFJ

The stationing of the U.S. forces in Japan forms the core of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements and also demonstrates the deep commitment of the United States to Japan and the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. forces in Japan greatly contribute to the peace and stability of Japan and the region in various ways. In particular, their presence itself is considered to function as a visible deterrent. Thus, the Government of Japan tries to enhance the credibility of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements by actively taking various measures to ensure the smooth stationing of the U.S. forces in Japan.

1. Japan's Measures, etc., Based on the Status of Forces Agreement

Matters pertaining to USFJ facilities and areas and the status of the U.S. forces in Japan are stipulated in the Status of Forces Agreement[1] (SOFA), which has provisions regarding facilities and areas for the use by the U.S. forces (USFJ facilities and areas), satisfying labor requirements of the USFJ, etc.

(1) Provision of USFJ Facilities and Areas

Japan provides USFJ facilities and areas for the U.S. forces under the provisions of the SOFA, in accordance with agreements reached through the Japan–U.S. Joint Committee between the governments of Japan and the United States.

The Government of Japan has entered into agreements and concluded lease contracts with owners of private and public land on which these facilities and areas exist in order to ensure the stable use of necessary USFJ facilities and areas. However, should the Government be unable to obtain the approval of landowners, it will acquire an entitlement under the Special Measures Law Regarding Use and Expropriation of Land, etc.[2], after compensating the landowners for any loss they may have suffered in the process[3].

(2) Satisfying Labor requirements of the USFJ

The USFJ requires manpower (labor) to maintain its forces, and SOFA stipulates that the labor requirements of the USFJ shall be satisfied with the assistance of the Government of Japan.

As of the end of FY2011, approximately 26,000 USFJ local employees (hereinafter referred to as the "employees") work at USFJ facilities and areas throughout Japan, working as office workers at headquarters, engineers at maintenance/supply facilities, members of security units and fire departments on base, and sales staff at welfare/recreational facilities. They perform functions essential for the smooth operations of the USFJ, and support its activities.

The Government of Japan hires these employees in accordance with the provisions of SOFA. The Ministry of Defense supports the stationing of the U.S. forces in Japan by performing administrative work for personnel management, payment of wages, health care, and welfare, etc.

2. Burden of Host Nation Support (HNS)

HNS plays an important role to ensure the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements.

Due to soaring prices and wages in Japan since the mid-1970s, and changes in the international economy, the United States has felt considerable pressure in bearing the costs for the stationing of the U.S. forces in Japan. In consideration of such circumstances, and with a view to making efforts to the greatest extent

possible within the framework of SOFA, the Government of Japan began to bear labor costs such as welfare costs (costs for the employee's welfare) in FY1978. Then in FY1979, due to the suddenly stronger yen against the dollar, Japan began to bear the burden of the Facilities Improvement Program (FIP).

Furthermore, as the labor costs soared due to changes in economic conditions that affected both countries, employment stability of the employees was adversely impacted, and there was even concern that it would affect the activities of the USFJ. Therefore in 1987 the governments of Japan and the United States agreed on a special measure in Article 24 of SOFA (the Special Measures Agreement)[4] as a provisional measure for an exception to the cost principle in SOFA. Based on this agreement, the Government of Japan would bear labor costs such as the adjustment allowance (currently replaced by the regional allowance), and as the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) was revised later on, the costs borne by the Government of Japan expanded to cover labor costs for base pay, etc., and utility costs from FY1991, and its financial responsibility further expanded to cover training relocation costs from FY1996.

Still, Japan carefully considered its own difficult financial situation when reviewing HNS, and it peaked in the FY1999 budget (annual expenditure base) and has since been declining.

According to the comprehensive review conducted in 2010, the Japanese and the U.S. Governments agreed that the overall expense borne by Japan to station the U.S. Forces in Japan during the period in which the SMA is in effect (for 5 years from FY2011 to FY2015), was determined to be at the same level of FY 2010 (approximately 188.1 billion yen).

3. The Special Measures Agreement (SMA)

The key points of the SMA that took effect in April 2011 are as follows:

(1) Effective period: Five years

(2) Cost sharing: Japan shall bear labor costs, utilities costs, and all or part of the costs incurred in training relocation. With regard to training relocation costs, on top of the additional costs incurred on domestic relocations, costs incurred on training relocation to areas under the control of the U.S. Government, such as Guam, have also been added.

<Operational Guidelines (Exchange of Notes)>

Labor costs: The upper limit of the number of workers to be funded by Japan will be reduced in stages from 23,055 to 22,625[5]. The adjustment will be phased in over the new SMA period

Utilities costs: The upper limit for utilities costs is set at 24.9 billion yen for each fiscal year. At the same time, the share of costs to be borne by Japan is reduced in stages from the current 76% (approximate) to

72% (approximate). The adjustment will be phased in over the new SMA period

(3) Cost-saving efforts[6]: It is clearly stipulated that the United States shall make further efforts to reduce these expenditures

(See Figure III-2-1-7)

4. Costs Associated with the U.S. Forces Stationed in Japan

In addition to costs of stationing U.S. forces in Japan the various costs associated with the U.S. forces in Japan include costs for implementing the stipulations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report (see Section 3-1) for alleviating the burden on the people of Okinawa, as well as costs for implementing measures that will contribute to reducing the burden on local communities associated with the initiatives for the realignment of the U.S. armed forces. (See Fig. III-2-1-8)

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1 The official title is the Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan

2 The official title is the Law for Special Measures Regarding the Use and Expropriation of Land, etc., Incidental to the Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan

3 The term "title" means a legal cause that justifies a certain act.

4 The official title is the Agreement between Japan and the United States of America concerning New Special Measures relating to Article XXIV of the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan

5 The Security Consultative Committee Document issued on June 21, 2011: "The Ministers shared the view to continue to exert maximum effort to maintain stable employment of the employees of the U.S. Armed Forces in Japan while reducing labor costs."

6 The decreased labor and utility costs resulted from the measures described above are applied to make up the increased costs of FIP.

5. Japan–U.S. Bilateral Training and Exercises

Bilateral training and exercises conducted by the SDF and U.S. forces are categorized as command post exercises, in which hypothetical situations are set up, with the objectives of improving the decision making of commanding officers and the coordination ability of staff, and field training, in which actual units move in training areas in the sea and air space with the objective of improving overall coordination between Japan and the United States. Such joint training exercises are indispensable as a means of improving interoperability and ensuring the smooth implementation of Japan–U.S. bilateral actions by facilitating mutual understanding in regard to technical aspects and close communication during

peacetime. In addition, these exercises are useful in improving the tactical skills[1] of both Japanese and U.S. forces, and it is important for the SDF to conduct the requisite training for collaboration and coordination between the SDF and U.S. forces in peacetime, so that the SDF may carry out the missions conferred by the Armed Attack Situation Response Law and the Law concerning the Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, and other laws. Such efforts also serve to maintain and enhance the credibility and deterrent effect of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements.

Therefore, the SDF has conducted a variety of bilateral training and exercises with the U.S. forces. For example, the Japan–U.S. Bilateral Joint Training Exercise that commenced in 1985 involves a generally annual, alternative command post exercise and field training exercise; the command post exercise held in January 2012 was the 19th to be held.

In addition, the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF are expanding the scope of joint exercises, by such means as dispatching units not only to areas within Japan, but also to the U.S., to participate in exercises such as the Japan–U.S. Joint Regional Army command post exercises, special anti-submarine exercises, and Japan–U.S. Joint Fighter combat training; thus, continuous efforts are being made to improve interoperability at the military service and unit levels.

(See Fig. III-2-1-9)

These joint exercises between Japan and the United States contribute significantly to maintaining and enhancing joint response capability, and efforts are being made to enrich the contents of the exercises. In response to the Great East Japan Earthquake that struck Japan in 2011, the smooth response provided in cooperation between Japan and the United States stood testament to the relations built up through the Japan-U.S. joint training exercises conducted thus far.

See Reference 35

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1 The capabilities required to operate a unit of a certain size in addition to the use of individual items of equipment

6. The Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement between Japan and the United States

The basic principle of the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)[1] between Japan and the United States is that if either of the SDF and the U.S. forces requests the provision of goods or services, the other side can provide them.[2] The Agreement is designed to positively contribute to the smooth and effective operation under the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty and to efforts for international peace made under the leadership of the United Nations. Its scope of application includes various occasions such as bilateral training and exercises in peacetime, disaster relief activities, U.N. peacekeeping operations, situations in areas surrounding Japan, and armed attack situations.

(See Fig. III-2-1-10)

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1 The official title is the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the SDF of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America

2 The categories of supplies and services as provided under the Agreement include: food, water, billeting, transportation (including airlift), petroleum, oil and lubricant, clothing, communications, medical services, base support, storage, use of facilities, training services, spare parts and components, repair and maintenance, airport and seaport services, and ammunition (only in armed attack situations and anticipated situations). (Provision of weapons is not included.)

7. Mutual Exchanges in the Areas of Defense Equipment and Technology

Japan proactively promotes cooperation in areas of defense equipment and technology while bearing in mind the maintenance of Japan's technology and production base and the mutual cooperation principle based on the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America.

In view of the progress in technological cooperation between Japan and the United States, the improvement of technological level, and other factors, Japan decided to transfer its military technology to the United States regardless of the provisions of the Three Principles on Armed Exports and related regulations. And, in 1983, Japan concluded the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America[1] In June 2006, the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America[2] was concluded to replace the foregoing Exchange of Notes.

Under these frameworks, the Government of Japan decided to provide the United States with 19 items of arms and military technology, including portable surface-to-air missile (PSAM) technology and weapon technologies related to joint technological research on BMD.

Japan and the United States consult with each other at forums such as the Systems and Technology Forum (S&TF), which provides opportunities for exchanging opinions about military equipment and technology, and conduct cooperative research and development regarding the specific projects agreed upon at the forums. Since 1992, the two countries have concluded the joint project agreement, and conducted 18 joint projects (14 of which have been completed). Japan–U.S. cooperation in defense equipment and technology is significant for improving interoperability and reducing R&D costs and risks, and the two countries have been examining the possibility of expanding joint research projects in the future. Moreover, while bearing in mind discussions with the Chief Cabinet Secretary concerning the Standards for the Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment, etc., which were issued in December 2011, further cooperation with the U.S.A. will be promoted, in terms of equipment and technology.

See Part 1, Chapter 2, Section 5; Reference 36

[1] The official title is the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America

[2] The official title is the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America

8. Cooperation in Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake

The cooperation between Japan and the U.S. in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake that occurred on March 11, 2011 can be considered proof of the strong ties that have developed over the years.

The success of the joint response in which the U.S. military provided large-scale support in disaster-afflicted areas in partnership with the SDF in "Operation Tomodachi" was the result of joint exercises involving Japanese and U.S. troops over many years, and will lead to the Alliance being deepened further in the future.

"Operation Tomodachi", as the U.S. military named its humanitarian Assistance and Relief rescue operation following the Great East Japan Earthquake, involved the deployment of a large-scale force, including up to approximately 16,000 troops, around 15 ships, and around 140 aircraft; in this operation, the U.S. military carried out extensive support activities in disaster-afflicted areas, including search and rescue, transporting supplies, restoring Sendai Airport, cleaning schools ahead of the new semester, removing rubble on Oshima Island, Kesennuma, and participating in an intensive search for the missing, which was a joint Japan-U.S. endeavor.

(See Fig. III-2-1-11)

The support activities of the U.S. military took place on an unprecedented scale; as well as contributing greatly to the recovery and reconstruction of Japan, the lessons learned from the response to the disaster will be of considerable assistance in further deepening the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

The main factors behind the success of the joint Japan-U.S. response were the cooperation between the two countries that takes place even under normal circumstances, the swift, thorough implementation of coordination between them, and the presence of the U.S. military in Japan. In addition, the success of these endeavors was also due not only to the ongoing policy discussions and joint exercises carried out between the two countries, but also to the fact that the stationing of the U.S. military in Japan means that their troops here are well-acquainted with the geography and culture of the country.

At the same time, some issues for the future have emerged. It is necessary to conduct deliberations concerning such matters as clarifying the roles, mission and capability of Japan and the U.S. in the event of a disaster within Japan, as well as stipulating more concrete joint guidelines to facilitate greater participation by the U.S. military in disaster prevention drills, and examining mechanisms for the sharing of information and more effective coordination, seeking to deepen the Japan-U.S. Alliance further through these endeavors.

In light of these facts, in order to enable the SDF and the U.S. military to support each other so that they can respond to a diverse range of situations in the future, it is important to make better preparations and the Ministry of Defense and SDF are at present conducting concrete deliberations based on the lessons learned.

Part III Measures for Defense of Japan

Chapter 2 Strengthening of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements

Section 2 Deepening and Widening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

Japan and the United States have traditionally developed security cooperation based on factors such as the security environment surrounding Japan.

(See Fig. III-2-2-1)

This section explains the deepening and widening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, including the background to and the development of defense cooperation between the two countries.

1. Historical Background

During the Cold War era, the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements ensured the safety of Japan as a country with a liberal ideology. It also contributed to peace and stability in the region.

Following the end of the Cold War, the leaders of Japan and the United States announced the Japan–U.S. Joint Declaration on Security (Declaration) in 1996, reaffirming the importance of the Japan–U.S. Alliance in light of the state of affairs in the Asia-Pacific region following the Cold War. At the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2") meeting held the following year (1997), as part of the promotion of cooperative relations presented in the Declaration, new Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation (Guidelines) were approved, revising the previous Guidelines, which had been formulated in 1978[1].

Afterwards, in light of further changes to the security environment due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Japan and the United States have enhanced consultations related to security. Through these Japan–U.S. consultations, as shown in Figure III-2-2-2, the direction of the Japan–U.S. Alliance was arranged in three stages. These stages are: confirmation of common strategic objectives to both countries, including enhancing peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region (first stage), the examination of the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan and the United States for accomplishing the common strategic objectives (second stage), and the examination of a force posture realignment (third stage). Their contents were confirmed at the "2+2" meeting in May 2007, and were supplemented at the "2+2" meeting in May 2010. Figure III-2-2-3 provides an outline of the realignment of U.S. forces set forth in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation, which was formulated in May 2006 in the process of these discussions.

See References 37-43

In parallel with such bilateral political discussions, the two countries enhanced their cooperative relations in various aspects, including military operations, by dealing with specific issues. For instance, as part of the cooperation under normal circumstances stipulated in the aforementioned Guidelines, as well as

working together on studies of joint operation plans to respond to armed attacks against Japan, and carrying out joint exercises, such as joint Japan-U.S. field training drills based on those studies, Japan also participates in trilateral training exercises with the armed forces of the U.S. and Australia, and in multilateral exercises such as Cobra Gold. As a result, the cooperative arrangements between Japan and the U.S. have made significant progress in a variety of fields. In recent years U.S. forces stationed in Japan have also participated in emergency drills organized by local governments, thereby deepening cooperation with relevant institutions and local governments. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, the U.S. forces carried out relief activities as part of "Operation Tomodachi" in cooperation with the SDF, putting into practice the capacities acquired through joint Japan-U.S. exercises.

Regarding the response to ballistic missiles, efforts are being made to improve the joint response capability, such as the sharing of operational information and guidelines for responding to an attack. Accordingly, Japan and the U.S closely cooperated and coordinated their responses to the missile launch carried out by North Korea in April 2009 and its launch of what was purported to be an "artificial satellite" in 2012 and the two sides are also promoting the joint development of new ballistic missile defense (BMD) interceptors with enhanced capabilities (SM-3 Block IIA).

Concerning efforts to improve the international security environment, through activities pursuant to the former Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, international disaster relief activities and international peace-keeping operations in Haiti, and anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, Japan is conducting activities in close cooperation with the U.S. Moreover, Japan-U.S. cooperation is also being steadily promoted through logistical support based on the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) signed in 1996, as a result of increased opportunities for cooperation between the two countries.

The importance of such cooperative relations between Japan and the U.S. is increasing in the context of Japan's efforts for achieving stabilization in the Asia-Pacific region and for improving the global security environment.

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[1] Previous Guidelines formulated in 1978. They prescribed the approach to Japan-U.S. cooperation, in order to effectively achieve the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

2. Bilateral Agreement for a Deeper and Broader Japan-U.S. Alliance

The cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States, which has borne numerous results thus far, as noted above, marked the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 2010.

At the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held on November 13, 2009[1], as part of efforts to deepen the Japan-U.S. Alliance, then Prime Minister Hatoyama agreed to start dialogue processes to deepen the

Japan-U.S. Alliance (processes for deepening the alliance) as the countries welcomed the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. (On January 19, 2010, the actual day of the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the remarks and statements by the Japanese and U.S. leaders were published, and a joint statement on the "2+2" meeting was released).

Thus, Japan and the United States have sought to enhance dialogue in order to further promote and deepen Japan–U.S. security cooperation over a broad range of areas in the future, so as to make the Japan–U.S. Alliance even more unshakable. At the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting[2] held on November 13, 2010, the two countries expressed their desire to deepen and develop the Japan-U.S. Alliance with three pillars at its center: security, economy and cultural and people-to-people exchanges; at the Cabinet level as well, repeated commitments have been made to the deepening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, such as in the "2+2" joint statement on May 28, 2010 and at the talks between the Defense Ministers of the two countries held on January 13, 2011, and concrete bilateral discussions have taken place at the working level, based on ministerial instructions.

See References 42, 43

1. Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee "2+2" Meeting (June 21, 2011)

As a result of bilateral discussions on the deepening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance carried out on various levels under the aforementioned political leadership, on June 21, 2011, in Washington D.C., the first "2+2" meeting was held since the previous one four years earlier, in 2007, and the two sides confirmed the achievements of the process of deliberations in terms of security and defense cooperation.

1) The "2+2" Joint Statement revised and reaffirmed the common strategic objectives stipulated in the 2005 and 2007 "2+2" Joint Statements, based on an assessment of the changing security environment, including deterring provocation by North Korea, encouraging China to play a responsible and constructive role and improve openness and transparency with respect to China's military modernization and activities, strengthening trilateral security and defense cooperation with both Australia and South Korea discouraging the pursuit and acquisition of military capabilities that could destabilize the regional security environment, maintenance of maritime security including ensuring the Freedom of Navigation and maintaining Japan-U.S. cooperation with respect to the protection of and access to space and cyberspace.

2) As to a deeper and broader Japan-U.S. security and defense cooperation, the Joint Statement refers to a wide range of matters as follows:

○ Expanding joint training and exercises, study further joint and shared use of facilities, and promoting cooperation in areas such as expanding information sharing and joint intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance (ISR) activities

○ Designating consultative bodies and standards that could facilitate permission of the transfer of SM-3 Block IIA to third-party countries

○ Deepening bilateral space security partnerships and welcoming the establishment of bilateral strategic policy dialogue on cybersecurity issues

○ Further cooperation in international operations, including disaster relief, peacekeeping, reconstruction, and anti-terrorism

○ Emphasizing the importance of further improving information security systems

○ Continuously examining and enhancing bilateral frameworks in order to make operational cooperation more effective, more tailored to the emerging security challenges, and more responsive to various situations

3) Furthermore, as to the realignment of U.S. forces, the joint statement reaffirmed the commitment to completing the verification and confirmation of the location, configuration, and construction method for the replacement facility for Futenma Air Station and to transferring the Marines stationed in Okinawa to Guam. The Ministers supplemented the statements in the 2006 United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation, revising the previous target date for the completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) and the relocation of and confirming their commitment to completing these projects at the earliest possible date after 2014.

4) In conjunction with this, in the Joint Statement, as well as agreeing to seek the strengthening of U.S. and Japanese abilities to deal with a diverse range of situations, in light of the collaboration between the SDF and the U.S. military in the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake and the nuclear power plant accident, both sides confirmed the agreement concerning Host Nation Support.

See Reference 44

2. Japan - U.S. Defense Ministers Conference

Following the "2+2" meeting in June 2011, the Ministry of Defense continued to undertake working-level discussions with bodies including the U.S. Department of Defense, with the aim of implementing the content of the Joint Statement published as a result of "2+2". On October 25, U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta visited Japan and held talks at the Ministry with Minister of Defense Yasuo Ichikawa, during which they exchanged opinions on a broad range of subjects relating to security and defense cooperation between their two countries, as well as USFJ realignment.

During the talks, Minister Ichikawa firstly expressed gratitude for the cooperation provided by the U.S. in the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake. He then stated that the Japan-U.S. Alliance is an

essential cornerstone for the peace and stability not only of Japan but also of the entire Asia-Pacific region, and that the close cooperative relationship between Japan and the U.S. based on the Alliance plays an important role in effectively dealing with many challenging security issues around the world. Secretary Panetta stated that, despite the harsh situation surrounding his country's defense spending, the U.S. would maintain and further strengthen its presence in the Asia-Pacific region.

With regard to security and defense cooperation between Japan and the U.S., in light of the increasingly uncertain security environment, due to such matters as the expansion of military activity in the region, Minister Ichikawa and Secretary Panetta were unanimous in their agreement that, as well as exchanging opinions concerning cooperation regarding such matters as information security, space, cyberspace and BMD, Japan and the U.S. should revitalize the activities of military units and demonstrate the presence and capabilities of both countries. The two ministers affirmed that dynamic defense cooperation should be promoted between the two countries, by such means as conducting timely, effective joint training and joint surveillance, and encouraging the joint use of facilities in both countries, in order to increase the options for bases for these activities.

With regard to USFJ realignment, Minister Ichikawa and Secretary Panetta were in accord that the risks posed by MCAS Futenma should be eliminated promptly, while securing the understanding of Okinawa, and that the relocation and return of the air station should be carried out as soon as possible, based on the Japan-U.S. Agreement. Moreover, with regard to the relocation to Guam of Marines stationed in Okinawa, Minister Ichikawa requested that the U.S. secure the requisite budget and cooperate in ensuring that the various tasks involved in relocation are carried out swiftly and without interruption. In response to this, Secretary Panetta stated that it is vital to ensure solid progress towards completing the FRF, in order to move forward with the Guam relocation project, and that he wanted both countries to cooperate with each other to this end.

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[1] See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/visit/president_0911/index.html>

[2] See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/visit/president_1011/index.html>

3. Discussions Concerning the Coordination of USFJ Realignment

1. Background of Bilateral Discussions

As to the USFJ realignment, while carrying out tasks such as sending the environmental impact assessment statement concerning the FRF to the Okinawa Prefectural Government, from the end of 2011 to the beginning of 2012, Japan continued to hold discussions with the U.S. at various levels. These included exchanges of opinions concerning the relocation of MCAS Futenma and relocation of U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam between Secretary Panetta and Minister Tanaka, who was appointed to

the position on January 16、2012. Following these discussions, the Governments of Japan and the U.S. decided to conduct full-scale bilateral discussions concerning the plan for USFJ realignment, in light of factors including the following:

1) The necessity of implementing measures promptly and steadily alleviating the visible burden on Okinawa;

2) The necessity of coordinating the realignment package, placing a greater emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region, which was set out in the U.S. defense strategic guidance released in January 2012; and

3) The fact that a reduction in the cost associated with the relocation of U.S. to Guam has been demanded by the U.S. Senate.

Accordingly, a joint press release was issued on February 8, 2012, stating that formal discussions had commenced about separating the issue of the relocation to Guam of Marines stationed in Okinawa and the return of land south of Kadena from the issue of the relocation of MCAS Futenma, and indicating the direction of discussions concerning such matters as the review of the composition of the Marine Corps units to be relocated to Guam and the number of personnel involved.
Subsequently, as well as exchanging opinions with Defense Secretary Panetta and the U.S. Ambassador to Japan John Roos, Defense Minister Tanaka tirelessly took various opportunities to hold discussions, including holding successive rounds of talks at the deputy assistant secretary level. As a result, the Governments of Japan and the U.S. reached an agreement on the plan for the realignment of the U.S. military, and the "2+2" Joint Statement was released on April 27, 2012.

2. The "2+2" Joint Statement

This recent "2+2" Joint Statement stated that, in light of important progress made in regard to the plan for USFJ realignment since the "2+2" Joint Statement in June 2011 and the increasingly uncertain security environment in the Asia-Pacific region, it had been decided to adjust the plans outlined in the 2006 Roadmap.
Factors behind the adjustment of the realignment plan include, first, the fact that the U.S. is undertaking a review of the composition of the Marine Corps in order to achieve a more geographically distributed, operationally resilient and politically sustainable posture, in light of the recent changes in the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. This is so that the U.S., which emphasizes the Asia-Pacific region, can adopt a posture that enables it to deal with large-scale situations in Northeast Asia, in order to secure a stable presence in the region, as well as seeking to make efficient preparations that will enable the U.S.

to deal effectively with a diverse range of situations across the region. The Roadmap stated that, among the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) stationed in Okinawa, the main focus of the relocation to Guam would be the command elements, such as headquarters, with ground, aviation and logistic support elements remaining in Okinawa, but the U.S. decided to alter the composition of the units in line with the basic approach detailed above. As a result, the U.S. Government decided to continue to retain the U.S. Forces in Okinawa, and deploy Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) - consisting of headquarters, ground, aviation and logistic support elements - in Japan, Guam, and Hawaii, as well as in Australia as a rotational force, in order to continue to ensure the presence of the U.S. forces in Okinawa, while securing a geographically distributed unit posture. Through this, preparations will be made that enable the U.S. military to respond more flexibly and promptly to a diverse range of situations in the Asia-Pacific region, by creating an agile posture in which each MAGTF unit has a high level of readiness and collaborates with each other, while increasing the vertical depth of unit deployment.

The recent Joint Statement makes specific adjustments to the realignment plan based on this new unit composition, balancing the maintenance of the deterrent effect of the Japan-U.S. Alliance with a reduction of the burden on Okinawa; an outline of the statement is provided below.

① Preamble

(1) The Ministers decided to adjust the plan set forth in the May 2006 Roadmap for Realignment.

(2) The Ministers decided to delink the progress in regard to the Futenma Replacement Facility from the question of the relocation of Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to Guam, and the return of land south of Kadena that would arise as a result.

(3) The Ministers confirmed that the overall deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance would be reinforced by strengthening Japan's defense posture and promoting dynamic defense cooperation between Japan and the U.S., as well as through the new posture of the U.S. Marine Corps.

② The Unit Composition in Guam and Okinawa (at capacity)

(1) As well as stationing Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) in Okinawa, Guam and Hawaii, a rotational presence will be established in Australia.

(2) Approximately 9,000 U.S. Marines, along with their associated dependents, are to be relocated from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan.

(3) The final Marine Corps presence in Okinawa will be consistent with the levels envisioned in the Realignment Roadmap.

(4) The number of Marine Corps personnel in Guam will be approximately 5,000.

(5) The preliminary cost estimate by the U.S. Government for the relocation of the Marine Corps to Guam is $8.6 billion (in U.S. Fiscal Year 2012 dollars). Japan's financial commitment will consist of direct cash contribution up to the amount of $2.8 billion (in U.S. FY2008 dollars), as stipulated in Article 1 of the 2009 Guam International Agreement. Other forms of financial support such as loans or equity investment will not be utilized. Even if Japan makes a contribution through cooperation with Item ③ (2) below, it shall be included in this commitment.

③ New initiatives aimed at promoting regional peace, stability and prosperity

(1) The Ministers confirmed the importance of promoting peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. The Japanese Government will take various measures, including the strategic use of ODA (e.g. provision of patrol boats to coastal states).

(2) The Governments of Japan and the U.S. will consider cooperation aimed at developing training grounds in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands for joint use by Japanese and U.S. forces, and will identify fields for cooperation by the end of 2012.

④ The land returns in Okinawa

(1) 1. Areas that can be returned quickly after completing procedures:
Part of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) (West Futenma Housing area and a portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound), part of the Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) (north access road, area near Gate 5)

2. Areas that can be returned after relocation within the prefecture:
Part of the Makiminato Service Area (the majority of the storage area), part of Camp Zukeran (Industrial Corridor, etc.), Camp Kuwae, Naha Port, Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No.1

3. Areas that can be returned after relocation of the Marine Corps overseas:
Additional elements of Camp Zukeran, the remainder of Makiminato Service Area

(2) A consolidation plan concerning the facilities and areas remaining in Okinawa will be compiled jointly by Japan and the U.S. by the end of 2012.

⑤ Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) and MCAS Futenma

(1) The Ministers reaffirmed that the existing relocation proposal is the only viable solution.

(2) Japan and the U.S. will both contribute to any refurbishment projects required at MCAS Futenma in order to protect the environment and ensure that the air station can be run safely until the FRF is fully operational.
See Reference 45

4. Dynamic Defense Cooperation

As stated above, consultations between Japan and the U.S. aimed at deepening and widening the Japan-U.S. Alliance include discussions concerning "dynamic defense cooperation" between the two countries as efforts to respond to the changing security environment. Translating this concept into reality is a key challenge in advancing Japan-U.S. defense cooperation.
In the regions surrounding Japan, many nations are modernizing their military forces and increasing their military activities. In addition, it is increasingly important for nations with shared interests to cooperate with each other on security issues in peacetime. Considering these trends in the current security environment, the 2010 NDPG states that Japan will develop “dynamic defense force,” which focuses on operational use of defense force, instead of basing its defense on the traditional “basic defense force concept,” which places an emphasis on the existence of defense force.
Based on this concept of dynamic defense force, the Ministry of Defense and SDF are supposed to put its defense force into operation with an emphasis on conducting regular activities such as intelligence gathering and surveillance in peacetime constantly, continuously, and strategically, responding to emergencies in Japan and overseas promptly and seamlessly, and promoting bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the Asia Pacific region and other ones in a multilayered manner.
It is important to apply this concept of dynamic defense force to defense cooperation between Japan and the U.S. and realize Japan-U.S. “dynamic defense cooperation,” which will ensure effective deterrence and responses and stabilize the security environment in the Asia Pacific region. This dynamic defense cooperation includes reacting to various situations not responsively but proactively, conducting prompt and seamless cooperation from peacetime through to contingencies, demonstrating intentions and capabilities and strengthening deterrence and presence of the two countries by enhancing activities of

units of the SDF and U.S. forces in peacetime, and advancing Japan-U.S. defense cooperation in a multilayered manner through trilateral defense cooperation with such countries as South Korea and Australia and Japan-U.S. cooperation within multilateral frameworks.

Based on this approach, Japan and the U.S. agreed in the "2+2" Joint Statement issued in June of 2011 to expand joint training and exercises, study further joint and shared use of facilities, and promote cooperation in areas such as expanding information sharing and joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities. Moreover, in the Defense Ministers' meeting held in October of 2011, the two countries agreed to promote dynamic defense cooperation, which aims to enhance activities of units of the SDF and U.S. forces and demonstrate the presence and capabilities of both countries, by conducting timely and effective bilateral training and cooperative surveillance activities and advancing joint and shared use of facilities in both countries to increase the number of options for bases used for these activities.

Furthermore, in the "2+2" Joint Statement dated April 27, 2012, the two countries noted that bilateral dynamic defense cooperation would strengthen deterrence and expressed their intention to explore new efforts to promote bilateral dynamic defense cooperation in the region. At the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held on May 1, 2012, this "2+2" Joint Statement was highly appreciated as an important step toward the deepening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. In particular, both leaders agreed that dynamic defense cooperation opened the way for new Alliance initiatives to enhance operational cooperation between the two countries and that they would steadily implement it.

Thus, the two governments are considering the expansion of joint training, cooperative surveillance activities, and joint and shared use of facilities in both countries as bases for these activities as specific measures to promote dynamic defense cooperation.

Expanding joint training increases cooperative activities in peacetime, thereby improving readiness and operational capability of units as well as interoperability between the SDF and U.S. forces. Moreover, conducting joint training at an effective time and venue and on an effective scale demonstrates common intentions and unified capabilities between Japan and the U.S., thereby functioning as a deterrent.

Similarly, expanding joint surveillance activities, etc. do not only ensure that the two countries gain information superiority over other countries but also function as a deterrent. Expanding joint use of facilities increases bases for the SDF's activities such as maneuver areas, harbors, and airfields, which in turn enhances the diversity and efficiency of Japan-U.S. bilateral training and expands the scope and raises the frequency of such activities as surveillance. Furthermore, it is also expected that advancing shared use of USFJ facilities and areas by the SDF will lead to a reduced burden on local communities.

In this way, synergy effect created by joint use of facilities, bilateral training, and cooperative surveillance activities can further strengthen and improve operational capabilities of the SDF and U.S. forces, including efficiency, interoperability, readiness, mobility, and sustainability.

Both Japan and the U.S. are continuing to examine specific measures to promote dynamic defense

cooperation while taking into consideration such factors as responses to the changing security environment, the strategic importance of Guam, defense of Japan's southwestern islands, and reduction of the burden on local communities hosting the U.S. forces. In particular, the two governments are to identify specific areas of cooperation by the end of 2012 concerning development of training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.

Part III Measures for Defense of Japan

Chapter 2 Strengthening of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements

Section 3 Measures Relating to the Stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan

Measures such as force posture realignment of U.S. forces in Japan are extremely important in reducing the burden on local communities, such as those in Okinawa, while maintaining deterrence. The Ministry of Defense will steadily advance the U.S. forces realignment described in the Roadmap while making continuous efforts to gain the understanding and cooperation of local communities accommodating USFJ facilities and areas.

This chapter describes measures aimed at making the stationing of U.S. forces truly acceptable to the people of Japan.

1. Stationing of U.S. Forces in Okinawa

As of January 2012, approximately 74% of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) is concentrated in Okinawa Prefecture, occupying approximately 10% of the land area of the prefecture and 18% of the main island of Okinawa. The Government of Japan recognizes that the current situation in which USFJ facilities and areas are concentrated in Okinawa imposes a major burden on the local people. The Government of Japan has been making the maximum efforts to implement a range of measures in light of the security perspective in order to reduce the burden as much as possible.

1. Efforts for Realignment, Consolidation, and Reduction of USFJ Facilities and Areas

When Okinawa was returned to Japan in 1972, the Government of Japan provided 83 facilities and areas covering approximately 278 km^2 for exclusive use by the U.S. forces under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. However, their concentration in Okinawa has led to strong calls for their realignment and reduction on the grounds that they seriously affect the lives of people in Okinawa Prefecture.

Both countries have continued their efforts to realign, consolidate, and reduce USFJ facilities and areas, and, in relation to the so-called 23 issues[1], it was agreed in 1990 that both sides would proceed with the necessary adjustments and procedures for the return of land. Moreover, regarding the so-called Three Okinawa Issues such as the return of Naha Port[2], it was agreed in 1995 that efforts would be made to resolve these issues.

Subsequently, in response to an unfortunate incident that occurred in 1995, as well as the refusal of the then Governor of Okinawa to sign land lease renewal documents under the Special Measures Law regarding Use and Expropriation of Land, the Government of Japan decided to devote even greater efforts towards realignment, consolidation, and reduction, believing that the burden should be shared by the

whole nation. In order to hold consultations on issues related to USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa, the Government of Japan established the Okinawa Action Council between the central government and Okinawa Prefecture, and the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) between Japan and the United States and the so-called SACO Final Report was compiled in 1996.
See Reference 46

2. SACO Final Report and Progress

The SACO Final Report stipulates the return of land, the adjustment of training and operational procedures, the implementation of noise-reduction initiatives, and the improvement of operational procedures regarding the Status of Forces Agreement; the facilities and areas concerned are shown in Figure III-2-3-1. The land to be returned based on the SACO Final Report represents approximately 21% (about 50 km^2) of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa at that time, exceeding the amount of land returned during the period between the reversion of Okinawa and the implementation of the SACO Final Report, which is roughly 43 km^2.
Major progress in regard to the SACO Final Report includes return of Gimbaru Training Area on July 31, 2011, and is shown in Figure III-2-3-2.
Moreover, as a result of such efforts, the number of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) in Okinawa, as well as the land area, has changed, as shown in Figure III-2-3-3.
See Reference 47

3. History and Progress of U.S. Forces Realignment in Okinawa

As well as efforts relating to realignment of the U.S. forces based on the Roadmap, measures have been taken to reduce the burden on the local communities in Okinawa Prefecture.

(1) Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma Replacement Facility, etc.

MCAS Futenma fulfills the following functions relating to the aerial capabilities of the U.S. Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa (USMC in Okinawa):
○ Transport of Marine ground forces by helicopter, etc.
○ Operation of air refueling aircraft
○ A base for accepting aircraft in emergency

However, since the MCAS Futenma is located in an urban area, its prompt return has been strongly desired by the local residents due to problems such as the safety of the community, noise, and traffic.

Therefore, coordination has been made toward the goal of returning the air station by implementing the following steps:

a. Transport of Marine Ground Forces by Helicopter, etc.

(a) The Necessity of Locating the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) within Okinawa Prefecture

The U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa consist of air, ground, logistics, and command elements. The interaction of those elements in operations is necessary, so it has been determined that the FRF needs to be located within Okinawa Prefecture so that rotary-wing aircraft stationed at MCAS Futenma will be located near the elements with which they train or operate on a regular basis.

(b) Background Concerning the Futenma Replacement Facility

Considering the occurrence of a U.S. forces helicopter crash in Ginowan City in August 2004, bilateral discussions on realignment have been made toward realizing the relocation and return of MCAS Futenma at the earliest possible date in order to resolve the unease of the residents living in the vicinity.

In the SCC document compiled in October 2005, the initiative to "locate the FRF in an 'L'-shaped configuration that combines the shoreline areas of Camp Schwab and adjacent water areas of Oura Bay" was approved. Then, based on negotiation and agreement with the local municipalities including Nago City, it was decided to stipulate in the Roadmap that the FRF be located in a configuration that "combines Henoko-saki and adjacent water areas of Oura and Henoko Bays." In regard to construction of this replacement facility, "a Memorandum of Basic Understanding" was exchanged between the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture and then Minister of State for Defense in May 2006.

The developments that have taken place since the SACO Final Report was published are shown in Figure III-2-3-4.

See Reference 40

(c) Review of Destination for MCAS Futenma Relocation

Following the change of government in September 2009, the entire government has carried out intensive studies on the FRF from the perspective of maintaining deterrence, while aiming to eliminate the risk posed to residents near MCAS Futenma and reducing the burden on Okinawa.

In December 2009, the Exploratory Committee for Okinawa Base Issues was established. As a result of the reviews conducted by the Committee, at the "2+2" meeting held in May 2010, both Governments confirmed the intention to locate the FRF in the Camp Schwab Henoko-saki area and the adjacent waters, and also agreed to take concrete measures to reduce the burden on Okinawa. Moreover, details regarding the location, configuration, and construction method for the two FRF options – the "V" Plan and "I" Plan - were studied by bilateral experts study group, and a report was compiled in August of the same year based on this study [3].

Subsequently, at the “2+2” meeting held in June 2011, it was decided that the runway would take a “V” shape, and the Ministers confirmed their commitment to complete the relocation project at the earliest possible date after 2014 in order to avoid the indefinite use of MCAS Futenma and to remove the risks as early as possible.

During the deliberation process which led to these conclusions, first of all, it was determined that, from a security perspective, the deterrence of the U.S. forces including that of the Marine Corps cannot be lessened while there remains instability and uncertainty in the East Asian security environment. Furthermore, there was concern that the functions of the Marine Corps would be weakened if the helicopter units stationed at MCAS Futenma were to be detached from the other Marine units stationed in Okinawa and moved abroad or out of the prefecture. Therefore, it was concluded that the FRF had to be within Okinawa Prefecture.

Moreover, at the SCC Joint Statement in April 2012, the Governments of Japan and the U.S. reconfirmed their view that the FRF, planned for construction at the Camp Schwab Henoko-saki area and adjacent waters, remains the only viable solution that has been identified to date.

The Government of Japan will continue to do its utmost to reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa and eliminate the risks of MCAS Futenma. (See Fig. III-2-3-4)

See References 42, 44, 45

(d) Implementation Status of Environmental Impact Assessment

Procedures for the environmental impact assessment have been underway in accordance with applicable laws and regulations, since the scoping document was submitted to stakeholders including the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture in August 2007.

In light of the decision at the "2+2" meeting in June 2011 and the Okinawa Prefectural Governor's opinions on the environmental impact assessment preliminary documents presented in October 2009, the environmental impact statement (hereinafter referred to as “EIS”) was compiled and sent to the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture from the end of 2011 to the beginning of 2012.

In light of the announcement that the U.S. Department of Defense intended to replace the CH-46s deployed at MCAS Futenma with MV-22s, the aircraft for the prediction and evaluation in the EIS were switched from CH-46s to MV-22s, and the flight path at the FRF was altered from trapezoidal to elliptical.

At present, amendments are being made to the EIS, in light of the opinions expressed by the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture on February 20 and March 27, 2012. Moreover, in making these amendments, the Ministry of Defense organizes study groups involving nine external experts in the fields of the natural environment and the living environment, and examines the amendments from both scientific and technical perspectives.

b. Operation of Air Refueling Aircraft

Air refueling aircraft KC-130 (12 in total) are to be relocated from MCAS Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni (in Yamaguchi Prefecture).

They will be regularly deployed on a rotational basis to the MSDF Kanoya Base (in Kagoshima Prefecture) and Guam for training and operations. Consultations are being held between Japan and the United States pertaining to training and operations at Kanoya Base.

c. A Base for Accepting Aircraft in Emergency

Use by U.S forces of the ASDF Nyutabaru Air Base (in Miyazaki Prefecture) and Tsuiki Air Base (in Fukuoka Prefecture) in case of emergency will be enhanced. When site surveys are completed, facility improvements for this will be made according to necessity before Futenma Air Station is returned. These improved facilities, when completed, will also support bilateral training activities, which should be expanded according to the studies on roles, missions, and capabilities.

Furthermore, the improvement of use of civilian facilities by U.S. forces in case of emergency will be examined at the bilateral planning work, and appropriate measures will be taken in order to realize the return of MCAS Futenma.

d. Efforts to Eliminate Risks at MCAS Futenma

In August 2007, the Ministry of Defense announced various measures as efforts to remove risks at MCAS Futenma, including the improvement in approach and takeoff routes to avoid areas of high residential density as much as possible. The Ministry of Defense has steadily implemented these measures, and in May 2009, they were all completed.

Responding to claims made by the residents around MCAS Futenma that the traffic patterns, etc. prescribed in the aforementioned measures are not properly observed, the Ministry of Defense has been continuously conducting rotary-wing aircraft flight situation survey since January 2010 in order to obtain objective data of flight situation. In October 2011, the survey result from January 2010 to March 2011 was made public.

(2) Force Reductions and Relocation to Guam

In conjunction with the realignment of U.S. Marine Corps in the Asia-Pacific region, the “2+2” meeting in June 2011 and other agreements prescribe that approximately 8,000 personnel of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF), and their approximately 9,000 dependents, will be relocated from Okinawa to Guam at the earliest possible date after 2014.

Regarding the costs of the relocation, the Government of Japan held consultations with the United States with a view that each side should share an appropriate portion of the costs, and reached an agreement that,

of the estimated $10.27 billion (in U.S. fiscal year 2008 dollars) cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs, Japan would provide $6.09 billion, including $2.8 billion in direct cash contribution, while the U.S. would fund the remainder, estimated $3.18 billion in fiscal spending plus approximately $1 billion for a road.

Of the costs to be borne by Japan, with regard to projects for which Japan takes measures in the form of direct cash contributions (so-called *Mamizu* projects)[4], in order to legally guarantee that actions taken by Japan and the United States such as funding over multiple years by Japan are on a more solid footing, the Japanese government signed the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam (the Guam International Agreement) in February 2009 (entered into force in May of the same year). As part of the measures based on this Agreement, the transfer of funds to the U.S. Government in relation to the *Mamizu* projects has been taking place since JFY2009[5].

Subsequently, in the "2+2" Joint Statement in April 2012, the unit composition and the number of personnel to be relocated to Guam were revised. More specifically, in the Roadmap, it was stated that, of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) located in Okinawa, the main focus of the relocation to Guam would be the command elements such as headquarters, but as a result of the adjustment , it is planned that Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF), consisting of command, ground, aviation and logistic support elements, will be positioned and deployed in Japan, Guam, and Hawaii as well as in Australia as a rotational force. While approximately 9,000 U.S. Marine Corps personnel along with their associated dependents will be relocated from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan and the authorized strength of U.S. Marine Corps forces in Guam is to be around 5,000 personnel, the end-state for the presence of Marines in Okinawa will be consistent with the levels envisioned in the Roadmap.

In this Joint Statement, the preliminary cost estimate by the U.S. Government for the relocation is $8.6 billion (in 2012 U.S. fiscal year dollars). With regard to Japan's financial commitment, it was reaffirmed that it was to be the direct cash contribution up to the amount of $2.8 billion (in U.S. fiscal year 2008 dollars) as stipulated in Article 1 of the Guam International Agreement. It was also confirmed that Japan’s equity investment and loans for family housing projects and infrastructure projects would not be utilized. Moreover, it was stipulated that any funds that had already been transferred to the U.S. Government under the Guam International Agreement would be counted as part of the Japanese contribution. Furthermore, as new initiatives, both governments are to consider cooperation in developing training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands as shared-use facilities by Japan and the U.S., and identify specific fields of cooperation by the end of 2012. Any contributions from Japan in developing such training areas are to be part of the aforementioned commitment. In addition, it was agreed that the remaining costs and any additional costs would be borne by the U.S., and that the two governments were to complete a bilateral cost breakdown.

See References 45, 48
See Section 2-3

(3) Land Returns and Joint/Shared Use of Facilities

a. Return of Significant Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base

The Roadmap stipulated that, following the relocation and return of Futenma Air Station, and the transfer of III MEF personnel to Guam, the remaining facilities and areas on Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling the return of significant land areas south of Kadena, and total or partial return of land of the six candidate facilities will be examined (Camp Kuwae, Camp Zukeran, Futenma Air Station, Makiminato Service Area, Naha Port, and Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No.1). However, at the SCC Joint Statement in April 2012, it was decided to delink the progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility from both the relocation of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) personnel from Okinawa to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena. In addition, with regard to the land to be returned, it was agreed to conduct consultations focusing on three stages, namely 1) land eligible for immediate return; 2) land eligible for return once the relocation of functions is completed; and 3) land eligible for return after the relocation abroad.

(See Fig. III-2-3-5)

Moreover, it was stipulated that a working group should be established between Japan and the U.S., which should jointly develop a consolidation plan concerning the remaining facilities and areas on Okinawa by the end of 2012. Work is progressing steadily, aimed at achieving the return of land south of Kadena as soon as possible.

See Section 2-1

c. Joint/Shared Use of USFJ Facilities and Areas

The SDF has only a limited number of facilities in Okinawa, including Naha Air Base, and most of them are located in urban areas, which put some operational restriction. The joint/shared use of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa will greatly improve the SDF's training environment in Okinawa, and facilitate bilateral training and interoperability between the SDF and U.S. forces. It will become possible to improve readiness and contribute to maintaining the safety of local people at a time of disaster.

Based on such concepts, it was decided that Camp Hansen would be used for GSDF training, and the training has been conducted since March 2008. The ASDF will use Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with U.S. forces while taking into account noise impacts on local communities.

4. Measures Aimed at Reducing the Burden of the U.S. Bases on Okinawa

A large number of USFJ facilities and areas still remain on Okinawa today as a result of historical backgrounds and issues, beginning with the United States' occupation of Okinawa and slower progress of returning bases compared to other areas of Japan even after the occupation ended. In order to reduce the burden of the concentrated bases in Okinawa, the Government of Japan has taken efforts for realizing the SACO Final Report and the Roadmap. Moreover, with the aim of addressing issues pertaining to the Status of Forces Agreement and to reducing the burden posed by the U.S. bases, in September 2010, the Government of Japan established the Subcommittee on Burden Reduction under the Okinawa Policy Council[6]. Chief Cabinet Secretary, Minister of Defense, Minister for Foreign Affairs and others participated in this Council to report various initiatives and discuss them with the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture and the Vice-President of the Council for Promotion of Dezoning and Reutilization of Military Land in Okinawa[7]. At the Council held in December 2011, it was reported that the training involving aircraft from Iwakuni Air Station that had originally been due to take place at Kadena Air Base in October and December 2011 had been relocated to Guam. This training relocation to Guam was the first such relocation to take place since the January 2011 agreement by the Japan–U.S. Joint Committee, and was achieved as a result of the close cooperative relationship between the two Governments.

Furthermore, efforts are being made to reduce the burden of Okinawan bases, by such means as relocating the aviation training involving aircraft from Kadena Air Base to Guam, which took place for the first time in February 2012.

Thus, through the subcommittee and other means, the Ministry of Defense listens to the opinions of the local residents, and intends to do its utmost to further reduce the burden on Okinawa.

5. Efforts for the Use of Lands Previously Provided for Use by the Stationed Forces

Matters concerning the use of returned lands previously used for USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa Prefecture were originally prescribed in the Act on Special Measures Incidental to Reversion of Lands in Okinawa Provided for Use by the Stationed Forces (Reversion Special Measures Act) and Chapter 7 of Special Measures Act on the Promotion and Development of Okinawa.

Due to the expiration of these Acts at the end of FY 2012, in response to the requests from Okinawa Prefecture, etc., "Act on Special Measures Concerning Promotion of Effective and Appropriate Use of the Lands in Okinawa Prefecture Previously Provided for Use by the Stationed Forces" (partial revision of Reversion Special Measures Act) was enacted on March 30, 2012, which integrates the provisions regarding use of the returned lands prescribed in the aforementioned two Acts. The new Act stipulates obligation for the Government of Japan to mediate in relation to access for surveys and measurements implemented by local governments in Okinawa Prefecture on the lands which are agreed to be returned; measures applying to the whole returned lands to remove impediments such as soil pollution and unexploded ordnance, not only those caused by the activities of the stationed forces; expansion of systems

for benefit to be paid to the owners of the returned lands in order to reduce the burden on them.

The Ministry of Defense will continue its efforts to promote the effective and appropriate use of returned lands in coordination and cooperation with related ministries and local governments in Okinawa Prefecture.

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[1] See Reference 46

[2] The return of Naha Port, the return of Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield, and the relocation of artillery live fire training over Highway 104

[3] See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/sankou/report/20100831_j.html>

[4] With regard to Japanese *Mamizu* projects, approximately 34.6 billion yen, 46.8 billion yen and 14.9 billion yen, in FY2009, FY2010 and FY2011 respectively, were budgeted for expenses relating to construction projects and design projects. In FY2012, approximately 700 million yen was budgeted.

[5] Funds of approximately 34.6 billion yen in FY2009 and approximately 46.8 billion yen in FY2010 were transferred to the United States.

[6] Based on the "Establishment of the Okinawa Policy Council" (decided by the cabinet on 17 September 1996), the Council was established to provide an opportunity for discussing Okinawa-related basic policies, in order to contribute to the independence of the Okinawan economy, employment security, and the improvement of lives for Okinawan residents, as well as to develop the region so that it may contribute to the development of Japanese economy and society

[7] Established with the objective of mutual cooperation between the Okinawa Prefectural Government and other local governments in Okinawa Prefecture which accommodate military bases for the resolution of various issues arising from the USFJ and JSDF bases and the promotion of the use of returned lands

2. Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Regions Other than Okinawa

In regions other than Okinawa, the Ministry of Defense is implementing measures to secure the stable presence of the U.S. forces by maintaining its deterrence and trying to reduce the burden on local communities. This section will explain the current situation regarding measures of this kind, such as the realignment of U.S. forces, including the question of how they are being executed in each of the regions other than Okinawa.

1. Realignment of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Kanagawa Prefecture

The ideal state of USFJ facilities and areas in Kanagawa Prefecture has been discussed between Japan and the United States due to the strong desire from local public bodies and other organizations for their return. As a result, the basic concept pertaining to the return of six facilities and areas (including Naval Communication Facility Kamiseya in Yokohama), as well as the construction of approximately 700 housing units for U.S. forces families in the Yokohama area of the "Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex" were agreed in October 2004, by the Japan–U.S. Joint Committee.

Thereafter, two facilities and areas (Koshiba oil storage facility and Tomioka warehouse district) were

returned; with regard to the construction of housing units for U.S. forces families the Japan–U.S. Joint Committee[1] stipulated in September 2010 that the number of housing units would be around 400, as an interim measure to facilitate the relocation of the Negishi Housing Area, and although deliberations are continuing regarding the partial return of land in the Zushi area for the Ikego Housing Area, which was requested by Japan to the U.S., it has been agreed that joint use will take place once the requirements have been fulfilled, as a stopgap measure until the land is returned.

Furthermore, in November 2011, the Japan–U.S. Joint Committee agreed on the basic matters relating to the construction of housing units for U.S. forces families and the basic requirements for their shared use.

The construction of these U.S. forces family housing units ① paves the way to the return of four USFJ facilities and areas remaining in Yokohama and ② solves the current housing shortage faced by the U.S. Navy in Japan, and is thus vital to attaining the objectives of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense is continuing to coordinate with the United States and local public entities and others, and striving toward the realization of this goal.

(See Fig. III-2-3-6)

2. Current Situation Regarding the Realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan as Laid Out in the Roadmap

(1) Improvement of U.S. Army Japan Command and Control Capability

To have enhanced mobility and readiness as well as to enable joint missions, the headquarters of U.S. Army Japan (USARJ) at Camp Zama (in Kanagawa Prefecture) was reorganized into the headquarters of the USARJ I Corps (Forward) in December 2007 and the reorganization[2] took place at the end of September 2008.

This reorganization is based on the global realignment of the U.S. Army as part of the overall transformation of U.S. forces. The reorganized USARJ headquarters in Japan will continue to hold the same core mission of “defending Japan and maintaining the peace and security of the Far East”.

To enable rapid responses to various contingencies, the GSDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters that unitarily controls mobile operation units and specialized units will be relocated to Camp Zama[3] by FY2012 so as to strengthen coordination with the reorganized USARJ headquarters.

In accordance with the transformation of USARJ headquarters, a mission command training center and other support facilities were constructed within U.S. Forces Sagami General Depot (SGD, in Kanagawa Prefecture) using U.S. funding. In addition, measures will be implemented for more effective and efficient use of Camp Zama and the SGD, including partial release of facilities and areas. The partial release of land (approx. 17 ha) at SGD was approved by the Japan–U.S. Joint Committee in June 2008, while the partial release of land (approx. 5.4ha) at Camp Zama, and the joint use of a portion of land at SGD

(approx. 35ha) were approved in October 2011 and June 2012, respectively, by the Japan–U.S. Joint Committee.

(2) Yokota Air Base and Airspace

a. Establishment of the Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination Center (BJOCC)

Enhancement of coordination between headquarters, combined with the transition to joint operational posture, is quite important from the perspective of ensuring flexible and rapid responses of the SDF and U.S. forces. The headquarters of the USFJ located at Yokota Air Base (in Tokyo) plays an important role in the various mechanisms[4] under the Guidelines. Therefore, along with the relocation of ASDF Air Defense Command HQ as mentioned below, the Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination Center (BJOCC)[5] was established and commenced operations at the end of FY2011.

b. Relocation of ASDF Air Defense Command HQ

The ASDF Air Defense Command HQ not only defends the airspace, but also functions as a headquarters for ballistic missile defense (BMD) operations. In the case of air defense and BMD, response time is very short. Therefore, it is quite important for the SDF and U.S. forces to immediately share necessary information. Thus, at the end of FY2011, approximately 800 personnel from the ASDF Air Defense Command HQ, which was located in Fuchu (Tokyo), and its relevant units relocated to Yokota Air Base where the headquarters of the U.S. 5th Air Force is located. This arrangement and the establishment of the above-mentioned BJOCC have made it possible to enhance coordination between the headquarters of the SDF and the U.S. forces, including the sharing of information concerning air defense and BMD.

c. Yokota Airspace

At Yokota Air Base, U.S. forces conduct radar approach control for the Yokota airspace spreading from the western part of the Tokyo Metropolitan area to Niigata Prefecture. Measures have been taken to facilitate the operation of civilian airplanes that enter the airspace.

Since September 2006, the temporary transfer of responsibility for air traffic control of portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese authorities, when not required by military purposes, has been started.

Moreover, the collocation of U.S. forces and ASDF air traffic controllers at the Yokota Radar Approach Control (Yokota RAPCON) facility started in May 2007. The area adjacent to the west side of Haneda Airport was reduced by about 40% in September 2008 and the control operation was returned to Japan. In addition, the review of the conditions required for the possible return of the entire Yokota air space[6] was completed in May 2010.

(See Fig. III-2-3-7)

d. Civilian-Military Dual Use of Yokota Air Base

At the Japan–U.S. Summit Meeting held in May 2003, it was agreed that the dual civilian-military use of Yokota Air Base would be studied, and a Liaison Conference was then established as a working panel attended by relevant government ministries and agencies[7] and the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, with discussions ongoing since then.

The Governments of Japan and the United States have conducted a study, starting in October 2006, on the specific conditions and modalities, with the understanding that dual use will not compromise the military operations and safety of Yokota Air Base. Based on further coordination and the outcome of the study, both governments will consult and then make appropriate decisions.

(3) Measures relating to U.S. Fleet Activities Yokosuka, Atsugi Air Base and Iwakuni Air Base

a. Deployment of U.S. Aircraft Carriers

The presence of the U.S. Pacific Fleet plays an important role in maintaining the regional peace and stability, including the safety of maritime traffic, in the Asia-Pacific region. U.S. aircraft carriers are the core capability of the Fleet. In order to ensure the long-term forward deployment capabilities of aircraft carriers and carrier-based aircraft, it is necessary to secure an operational base in Japan. The nuclear aircraft carrier[8] USS George Washington is currently forward deployed to Yokosuka (Kanagawa Prefecture). Having a strong U.S. Navy presence continuously maintained in areas surrounding Japan, as a result of this forward deployment, contributes to the security of Japan and to the maintenance of peace and security in the region. Furthermore, it symbolizes the deep commitment of the United States to the Japan–U.S. Alliance.

The U.S. Navy vows that it will continue to ensure that all of its nuclear-powered warships (including the nuclear carrier USS George Washington) adhere to the relevant safety policies. For example, the nuclear reactor will normally be shut down while the aircraft carrier is anchored, and repair work and fuel changes will not be carried out in Japan. The Government of Japan intends to continue taking all possible measures to ensure safety.

With regard to the nuclear aircraft carrier USS George Washington, since September 2006, working level talks for disaster prevention and safety measures pertaining to nuclear aircraft carriers have been underway between Japan and the United States. Since 2007, organizations such as government agencies, Yokosuka City, and the U.S. Navy have been participating in joint Japan–U.S. training, and the nuclear aircraft carrier George Washington has been taking part as of 2008.

b. Relocation of Carrier Air Wing

When the U.S. aircraft carrier is in port in Yokosuka, Atsugi Air Facility (in Kanagawa Prefecture) is currently used as a base for carrier-based aircraft. Since Atsugi Air Facility is located in the center of an

urban district, noise of carrier jets taking off and landing particularly has been a problem for a long time. It is necessary to resolve such problems as soon as possible in order to stably maintain the operations of carriers.

On the other hand, after the completion of the runway relocation project[9] at MCAS Iwakuni (the relocation of the runway approximately 1,000 meters offshore), the safe aircraft operations will be realized with less impact on the living environment of the surrounding communities.

In consideration of these, Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) squadrons will be relocated from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni. This relocation, consisting of F/A-18 and other aircraft, will be completed by 2014, subsequent to the following: 1) completion of necessary facilities, and 2) adjustment of training airspace and the Iwakuni RAPCON airspace.

The relocation will be ① conducted after the runway is moved offshore to mitigate impacts of the increased operations at MCAS Iwakuni due to this relocation. Related measures will also be taken, including ② the relocation of MSDF EP-3 and other aircraft from MCAS Iwakuni to Atsugi Air Facility, ③ the regular rotational deployment of KC-130 aircraft (which are to be relocated from Futenma Air Station to MCAS Iwakuni) to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam, and ④ the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters from MCAS Iwakuni to Guam.

As a result of these measures, it is expected that the noise around MCAS Iwakuni will be alleviated. For instance, area requiring residential noise-abatement work (so-called first category area) will decrease from approximately 1,600 ha to 500 ha. Furthermore, the safety will be enhanced as the runway relocation enabled the approach and takeoff routes to be established above the water.

With regard to the site (Atagoyama) for constructing family housing required for the relocation of carrier-based aircraft to MCAS Iwakuni, as a result of coordination with Yamaguchi Prefecture, etc., the Prefectural Governor of Yamaguchi and the Mayor of Iwakuni advised the Minister of Defense that they would sell the site to the Ministry of Defense. The sales contract of the site was concluded on March 23, 2012.

c. Field-Carrier Landing Practice (FCLP)

A bilateral framework to conduct a study on a permanent FCLP facility is to be established with the goal of selecting a permanent site at the earliest possible date in the Roadmap. In the “2+2” document of June 2011, it was stated that the government of Japan will explain to local authorities that Mageshima is considered to be the candidate for the new SDF facility. This SDF facility would be used to support operations in response to a variety of situations including large-scale disasters as well as regular exercises and other activities, including use by U.S. forces as a permanent field carrier landing practice site. In addition, the 2005 SCC document confirmed that U.S. forces will continue to conduct FCLPs at Iwo Jima in accordance with existing temporary arrangements until a permanent FCLP training facility is identified.

See Reference 43

d. Resumption of Commercial Aviation at MCAS Iwakuni

Considering that the local public entities, including Yamaguchi Prefecture and Iwakuni City, have been working together to request the resumption of commercial aviation operations, in October 2005, it was agreed that commercial aviation operations of four round trips per day would be allowed as long as such operations do not compromise U.S. military operational requirements.

It was then agreed in the Roadmap that portions of the future civilian air facility would be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni. Furthermore, in the "2+2" document of June 2011, it was determined to work toward the resumption of commercial aviation at MCAS Iwakuni in FY2012.

(4) Ballistic Missile Defense

Japan and the United States will continue close coordination on ballistic missile defense (BMD) as the two countries improve their respective BMD capabilities.

In June 2006, the new X-Band Radar System (AN/TPY-2) was deployed to ASDF Shariki Base (in Aomori Prefecture) and has commenced operating[10]. Also in October 2006 U.S. Army Patriot PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability 3) were deployed to Kadena Air Base and Kadena Ammunition Storage Area, and in addition, Aegis-equipped ships, which are forward-deployed in the Western Pacific region, have been installed with BMD capabilities over some phases since August 2006.

This deployment of U.S. Forces' BMD capabilities to Japan contributes to the improvement of our country's defense capabilities against missile attacks, the maintenance of deterrence of the U.S. forces in Japan and the safety of Japanese citizens.

See Chapter 1, Section 2-5

(5) Training Relocation

Concerning training relocation[11], aircraft from three U.S. military facilities — Kadena Air Base, Misawa Air Base (in Aomori Prefecture), and Iwakuni Air Station — participated in bilateral training with the SDF at the following SDF facilities: Chitose (in Hokkaido), Misawa, Hyakuri (in Ibaraki Prefecture), Komatsu (in Ishikawa Prefecture), Tsuiki, and Nyutabaru for the time being. Based on this, since March 2007, U.S. forces in Japan have conducted training relocation from Misawa Air Base, Iwakuni Air Station, and Kadena Air Base to JASDF Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Tsuiki, and Nyutabaru Air Bases. Based on the past site surveys, the Ministry of Defense, is now making necessary improvements to infrastructure to facilitate the training relocation at the SDF facilities.

Relevant Regional Defense Bureaus are currently striving to ensure the smooth implementation of the relocation of training in order to support the U.S. forces (cooperating with the JASDF) and achieve the

safety and peace of mind of the local residents during training periods. These efforts include the establishment of local contact headquarters, establishment of liaison with concerned government institutions, and support for local residents.

Furthermore, based on the "2+2" meeting in May 2010, at the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee held in January 2011, the addition of Guam as a relocation site for aircraft training and the increase in the scale of training were agreed upon. Further discussions subsequently took place between Japan and the U.S. and, after agreement was reached at the meeting of the Japan–U.S. Joint Committee[12] in October that year, concerning details such as the locations where training should take place, training involving USFJ aircraft was relocated to areas such as Guam for the first time, with steady progress being achieved in regard to this since then.

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1 See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2010/09/30a.html>

2 According to the United States there are approximately 70 personnel as of the end of September 2008.

3 An agreement was approved at the Japan–U.S. Joint Committee on March 5, 2009 regarding the joint use of land, such as the site for GSDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters building.

4 See Section 1-2.

5 The Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination Center (BJOCC) functions to contribute to providing a joint response for Japan's defense. To that end, it works to enhance information sharing between the Japanese and U.S. headquarters, close coordination, and interoperability.

6 This study was conducted as part of a comprehensive study of options for related airspace reconfigurations and changes in air traffic control procedures that would satisfy future patterns of civilian and military demand for use of Japanese airspace.

7 Cabinet Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, Japan Defense Agency (then), Defense Facilities Administration Agency (then)

8 Nuclear-powered aircraft carriers are driven by energy generated in a nuclear reactor, so there is no need to replenish their fuel and they are able to maintain the high speeds necessary for the operation of aircraft, giving them excellent combatant and operational capabilities.

9 A project involving the relocation of the runway at MCAS Iwakuni by approx. 1,000m to the east (offshore), in response to requests from Iwakuni City and other local authorities. The new runway began operations in May 2010. The project was completed at the end of FY2010.

10 The radar was thereafter transferred to the neighboring U.S. Shariki Communication Site.

11 USFJ aircraft conduct bilateral exercises at SDF facilities in order to improve interoperability and reduce the impact of training activities on the areas surrounding USFJ air bases.

12 See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2011/10/04a.html>

3. Initiatives for Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan

In order to smoothly implement the realignment of the U.S. forces in Japan based on the Roadmap, the "Law concerning Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and Related SDF Forces[1] ("USFJ Realignment Special Measures Law") was enacted in August 2007. The following is a general description of that law.

1. Realignment Grants

During a period of time before and after the implementation of realignment (10 years in principle), realignment grants will be awarded to help cover the expenses of projects[2] which contribute to increasing the convenience of the lives of residents of local municipalities[3] affected by the realignment, and to stimulate local industries. To this end, they will be awarded in accordance with progress in steps of the U.S. forces realignment, after the Defense Minister designates the specified defense facilities and neighboring municipalities affected by realignment[4].

Based on the Realignment Special Measures Law, in October 2007, 14 defense facilities and 33 municipalities were designated, and by 2008 further 6 municipalities had been additionally designated. At present, 39 municipalities have been designated to receive realignment grants.

2. Special Subsidy Rates for Public Projects, etc.

Due to large-scale relocation of forces, some municipalities must promptly carry out public projects (such as improvement of roads and harbors). Therefore, special subsidy rates have been set for such projects.

The public works, as mentioned above, will be implemented by the national government or prefectures and, in some cases, will be beyond the areas of certain municipalities. In these cases, public works may be infeasible with the realignment grants. Therefore, the Realignment Special Measures Law provides such measures as the establishment of a Council for Local Development concerning Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and Related SDF Forces[5] in order to promote industrial development of the areas consisting of municipalities with particularly heavy burdens and surrounding municipalities (Special Area for Development concerning Realignment)[6].

(See Fig. III-2-3-8)

3. Measures Such as Special Provisions Concerning the Operations of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC)

To properly and stably implement long-term overseas projects for which private-sector initiatives are utilized, it will be necessary to utilize the capability of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC)[7] which has expertise and experience in this field. Therefore, a special provision to JBIC's operations was provided that adds U.S. Forces Realignment Expenditure Financial Service and authorizes JBIC to conduct financial services to facilitate the U.S. forces realignment as exceptional operations so that JBIC can conduct such operations as the equity investments and loans that will be needed for projects to facilitate the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam, and furthermore, a special provision that the Government of Japan will take special financial measures for such operations. However, in light of the fact that the financial commitment on Japan's part was stipulated in the April 2012 "2+2"

Joint Statement to involve solely direct cash contribution, further deliberations are taking place concerning the future handling of these measures.

See Section 3-1

4. Measures for USFJ Local Employees

Under the U.S. forces realignment, some USFJ facilities and areas will be returned, and U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa will be relocated to Guam. Since this may affect the employment of USFJ local employees, the Government of Japan will take measures to maintain their employment, including education and skills training.

5. The Term of Validity of the Law

Although the Realignment Special Measures Law shall be valid for 10 years, measures including special operations of the JFC shall remain effective for a considerable length of time even after its term has passed.

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1 See <http://law.e-gov.go.jp/announce/H19HO067.html>

2 Approximately 9.3 billion yen in the FY2012 budget

3 Under the Realignment Special Measures Law, changes in the composition of units of those naval vessels that conduct operations integrally with US air wings subject to realignment (replacement of the aircraft carrier at Yokosuka Naval Base with a nuclear aircraft carrier) will be treated in the same way as the realignment of the U.S. forces in Japan.

4 The scope of specific projects includes 14 projects identified by Article 2 of the enforcement ordinance of the Realignment Special Measures Law, including education, sports, and cultural projects.

5 With regard to neighboring municipalities, based on the natural, economic, and social conditions, it will be limited to those that have a recognized need for revitalization efforts to be undertaken as a single unit with municipalities that suffer under a particularly heavy burden.

6 The Council is chaired by the Defense Minister, and composed of those designated by the Prime Minister from the Chief Cabinet Secretary; the Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications; Minister for Foreign Affairs; Minister of Finance; Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology; Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare; Minister of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries; Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry; Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport; Minister of the Environment; and the Ministers of State.
As for public works projects under the Development Plan for Special Area for Development concerning Realignment that have been deliberated and approved at the Council, the percentage of costs borne by the Government, or grant rate, will apply to the seven projects concerning road, ports, fishing ports, water supply, sewage system, land reform, and facilities for compulsory education that should be immediately implemented in consideration of the content and degree of adverse influences caused by the realignment of the U.S. forces in Japan on local communities and funding will be higher than those for ordinary cases.

7 The Japan Bank for International Cooperation merged with National Life Finance Corporation, etc., on October 1, 2008, to become the Japan Finance Corporation. However, in order to enhance the functions of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation and expand its operations, it became a

separate entity from the Japan Finance Corporation on April 1, 2012. As a result, the financial services for the U.S. Forces realignment of the U.S. forces in Japan have been taken over by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation.

4. Measures to Alleviate the Impacts Caused by USFJ Facilities and Areas

1. Efforts to Conserve the Environments Around USFJ Facilities and Areas

At the "2+2" meeting in September 2000, based on the recognition that environmental conservation is important, the governments of both nations agreed to make it a common objective to ensure the health and safety of residents in the vicinity of USFJ facilities and areas, U.S. forces personnel, their families and other such parties, and made the "Joint Statement of Environmental Principles[1]." In order to follow up on this statement, discussions between Japan and the United States were intensified. Specifically, the concerned ministries and agencies have been working together to address the issue of discussions relating to the strengthening of collaboration in periodical reviews of the Japan Environmental Governing Standards (JEGS)[2], information exchange pertaining to the environment, and dealing with environmental pollution[3].

Additionally, at the "2+2" meeting in May 2010, from the perspective of shared responsibility for environmental conservation, Japan and the United States instructed their staffs to discuss the possibility of taking a "Green Alliance" approach for the U.S. forces facilities and areas in Japan, and the adoption of renewable energy for U.S. bases under development in Japan as one of the elements of the Host Nation Support (HNS) was reviewed along with other issues. The result was reflected in the comprehensive review of HNS.

Furthermore, it was stipulated that a prompt and serious review of environmental-related agreements was to be conducted, including the reasonable access to U.S. forces facilities and areas in the event of an environmental accident and for environmental survey prior to the return of such U.S. facilities and areas. In response to this, a working group was established and the action officers of both the Japanese and U.S. sides have conducted many discussion sessions toward the realization of these objectives.

2. Other Measures

Japan is engaged in steps[4] for the improvement of the living environment in regions surrounding USFJ facilities and areas. It also provides municipalities with base grants[5] which have alternate features in terms of municipal tax on real estate.

Moreover, in the vicinities of USFJ facilities and areas, incidents and accidents caused by U.S. military personnel and others have affected local areas and their residents, so the Government of Japan has requested USFJ to take effective measures for the prevention of recurrence, such as educating military

personnel and others, and enforcing strict discipline among them. The Government of Japan is cooperating with USFJ in these preventive measures; at the same time it has taken measures for prompt and appropriate compensation for the damage caused by the incidents and accidents.

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[1] Consisting of four items, ① environmental governing standards, ② information sharing and access, ③ response to environmental contamination, and ④ environmental consultation.

[2] The Japan Environmental Governing Standards were drawn up by the USFJ with an objective of guaranteeing that the activities and facilities of the USFJ can protect the health of citizens and the natural environment. It establishes handling and storage methods for environment polluting materials.

[3] Japanese translation of the Japan Environmental Governing Standards (provisional translation) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/chouwa/2010_jegs/index.html>

[4] See Chapter 4, Section 3.

[5] Furnished by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.

Part III Measures for the Defense of Japan

Chapter 3 Multi-layered Security Cooperation with the International Community

It is extremely difficult for countries to tackle international security challenges on their own today and it is becoming a matter of great importance for Japan to work together with its ally, friendly nations, and other countries involved to tackle regional or global security issues.

Based on such circumstances, the 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) locates the building of "multi-layered security cooperation with the international community," through cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and cooperation as a member of the international community, as one of the pillars of Japan's basic security policy.

To that end, Japan is 1) making efforts to combine bilateral and multilateral security cooperation and create a network in a multi-layered manner, and in line with the Japan-U.S. Alliance, taking effective steps to further stabilize the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as 2) taking proactive steps in international peace cooperation activities as a member of the international community, in order to contribute to improving the global security environment and to ensuring the security and prosperity of Japan.

This chapter explains the measures relating to ① further stabilizing the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region in Sections 1 and 2, and the measures relating to ② improving the global security environment in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6.

Section 1 Promoting Multilateral Security Cooperation and Dialogues in the Asia-Pacific Region

1. Significance and Evolution of Security Cooperation and Dialogues and Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

After the end of the Cold War, there was increased awareness on the importance of preventing unnecessary arms buildup as well as the occurrence and escalation of contingencies through enhancing transparency in military capabilities and defense policies, as well as deepening mutual trust through dialogues and exchanges between defense authorities and various joint exercises. In addition, there is also an increasingly pervasive perception of the need for the international community to work together to tackle various security issues, amidst mutual cooperation and interdependency between countries are developing. As Japan takes proactive steps to improve the security environment, defense exchanges are expanding in terms of both quality and quantity.

Specifically, 1) in addition to the confidence building, moves toward establishing and strengthening cooperation are accelerating, 2) dialogue and exchange partners have expanded from the neighboring countries to those across the world, and 3) substantial exchanges, rather than those only for goodwill,

have come to be of increasing importance, as have exchanges accompanied by concrete activities rather than those that involve only dialogue. With some partners, our defense exchanges have developed well and deepened to include practical cooperation not limited to exchanges. In addition, 4) with regard to multilateral security frameworks,, efforts in the security field in the Asia-Pacific region are also gradually shifting from dialogues focused on confidence building, to practical cooperation including building regional order and common norms and standards.

In light of these developments, the Ministry of Defense is also taking proactive steps in developing multi-layered security cooperation in the international community today, while effectively and efficiently making use of limited resources. In doing so, there is a need to pursue security cooperation and dialogues as well as conduct defense cooperation and exchanges in a strategic manner, while considering the characteristics of each country or region.

In particular, in non-traditional security areas such as disaster relief and counter-terrorism, it is important to nurture an overall sense of cooperation and coordination. Based on such activities, it is necessary to promote practical and concrete cooperation for building regional order and establishing common norms and standards. In our neighboring countries and region, it is essential to eliminate the sense of confrontation and sense of vigilance, to create a cooperative atmosphere with a future-oriented perspective, and to actively promote cooperation in bilateral or multilateral arenas.

In the 2010 NDPG, "efforts to further stabilize the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region" have also been highlighted as one of the roles of defense forces. To that end, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF will promote security cooperation and dialogues, defense cooperation and exchanges, and joint training and exercises in a multi-layered manner.

(See Figs. III-3-1-1, 2, 3)
See References 49, 50, 53

2. Efforts under the Multilateral Security Framework and through Dialogues

1. Efforts under the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus)

In addition to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) established in 1994, which serves as a security framework for the region, the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM), a ministerial level meeting between defense authorities in the ASEAN countries, has been held since May 2006. In addition to this, the establishment of the ADMM-Plus was decided at the 4th ADMM in May 2010. The ADMM-Plus includes eight[1] non-ASEAN countries, and the 1st ADMM-Plus was held in October 2010 in Hanoi, Vietnam.

Until the establishment of the ADMM-Plus, there had been no official meeting for the region's defense ministers. The establishment of the ADMM-Plus is highly significant from the perspective of encouraging

the development and deepening of security and defense cooperation in the region. Furthermore, the ADMM-Plus is a framework that tackles a broad, diverse range of security issues in the region; the Ministry of Defense and the SDF are also of the view that the ADMM-Plus should be developed as a major pillar of security cooperation in the region, and are providing active support for its efforts.

At the 1st ADMM-Plus, discussions were held on mutually beneficial and practical areas of cooperation including the following five: 1) humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, 2) maritime security, 3) counter-terrorism, 4) military medicine, and 5) peacekeeping operations. The participants also discussed issues regarding the South China Sea, which affects the stability of the region, stressing the complete implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC)[2] as well as peaceful resolution of conflicts through international law, such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

The participants welcomed the establishment of the ADMM-Plus and signed the Hanoi Joint Declaration, which called for the future strengthening of security cooperation in the region.

The Hanoi Joint Declaration locates the ADMM-Plus as “an integral part of the ADMM”, which will be a part of the ASEAN Political Security Community, and states that the ADMM-Plus is a framework for concrete and practical cooperation, not just as a venue for discussion. For that reason, it was decided that the following decision-making bodies would be established within the ADMM-Plus: 1) ADMM-Plus, a ministerial meeting held once every three years, 2) ADSOM-Plus (ASEAN Defense Senior Officials’ Meeting-Plus), a senior-level meeting held every year, 3) ADSOM-Plus Working Group, and 4) the Expert Working Groups (EWG) to address the abovementioned five common regional security matters.

The EWGs were formally inaugurated at the ADSOM-Plus meeting in April 2011, with Japan and Singapore serving as co-chairs of the EWG on Military Medicine[3]. The latter EWG held its first meeting in July 2011 in Singapore, at which participants shared their experiences and information about issues relating to military medicine in the fields of humanitarian aid and disaster relief, as well as exchanging opinions on the tabletop exercise to be carried out at the next meeting. In the meantime, other EWGs have all successively held meetings[4] and are promoting practical cooperation in their various fields through the exchange of opinions between the participant countries. Japan is also participating in each EWG and is endeavoring to further strengthen security cooperation in the region through the active exchange of opinions with the other participants, as well as by submitting proposals.

(See Fig. III-3-1-4-5)

2. ASEAN Regional Forum

The ARF currently comprises 26 countries and one organization[5].

At present, the ARF is different from security organizations such as NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE); however, the ARF serves as an important venue for both

foreign and defense officials to get together in various inter-governmental meetings on security.

The Ministry of Defense believes that it is important for the respective defense authorities to promote trust in order for the ARF to develop a sense of community within the Asia-Pacific region, thereby making the framework to stabilize the regional security environment. To this end, the Ministry has been continuing its efforts to deepen mutual understanding within the ARF through regular participation, encouraging ARF members to increase the transparency of their defense policies while explaining Japan's policies and efforts, and promoting frank discussion among defense officials.

In addition, in recent years, non-traditional security areas such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime security, and peacekeeping and peacebuilding have been discussed as common regional security challenges. Every year, meetings such as the Senior Officials Meeting (SOM)[6] are held, at which lively discussions take place in addition to annual ministerial meeting. Furthermore, in the maritime security field, an Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ISM-MS) has been held annually since March 2009. In 2011, Japan, Indonesia, and New Zealand co-hosted the third meeting in Tokyo. Thus, through these various opportunities, ways of achieving practical cooperation and the establishment of rules have been sought.

In such non-traditional security fields, efforts are being made to seek more practical cooperation. For instance, in the field of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, following the establishment of "the ARF General Guidelines" that serves as guidelines for international cooperation, "the ARF Strategic Guidance for HA/DR" is currently being drafted as guidelines that lay down procedures for more detailed cooperation.

In 2009, the first ARF disaster relief field exercise (ARF-VDR) was held in the Philippines, co-hosted by the United States. Japan dispatched GSDF medical, sanitation, and water supply units, one MSDF rescue amphibious aircraft (US-2), and two ASDF transport aircraft (C-130), with about 100 personnel. Japan sent the second-largest number of participants, behind only the Philippines, the host country.

Japan co-hosted the second ARF disaster relief field exercise (ARF-DiREx 2011) with Indonesia in March 2011 in Indonesia, but the dispatch of troops scheduled to participate in this exercise was called off, as they were required for disaster relief operations following the Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11. At the same time, in order to demonstrate to the international community the resolve of the Japanese Government to fulfill its responsibility as the co-host, about ten members from the Ministry of Defense and SDF who had been liaising with the Indonesian Government in preparation for the exercise, as well as key personnel from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and JICA, took part in the exercise in Indonesia as representatives from the co-host country. This attitude on the part of Japan toward the event was highly appreciated by the Indonesian Government and served as an opportunity to make a strong appeal on the importance of international cooperation to the international community during earthquake and tsunami disasters.

The ARF disaster relief exercise holds great significance, as it demonstrates that the ARF has moved from

the stage of dialogue to that of practical field training. The ARF thus plays an important role in promoting practical and concrete security cooperation in the region.

In this way, in various fields, the nations of the Asia-Pacific region have been repeating a process of discussing practical cooperation and coordination methods, setting certain rules, conducting training and exercises, then reflecting the feedback on the cooperation and coordination methods in the region, thereby leading to improving the capacity for addressing challenges such as natural disasters in the region, as well as promoting mutual understanding and confidence building between participating nations. Therefore, it is important for Japan to further advance these efforts.

3. Multilateral Security Dialogue Hosted by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF

(1) Tokyo Defense Forum

As Japan's own initiative regarding security in the Asia-Pacific region, the Ministry of Defense has held since 1996 the Asia-Pacific Defense Forum (Tokyo Defense Forum) with the participation of officers in charge of defense policy (Directors General of defense ministries and General-class officers) from the countries of the region. At the forum, discussions are being held on defense policy issues and confidence-building measures in the region.

Twenty-four countries from the Asia-Pacific region, as well as the European Union (EU), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) took part in the 16th forum in March 2012. At this forum, discussions took place on the subject of 1) military-civilian relations in disaster relief, and 2) initiatives relating to maritime security. Moreover, in conjunction with this forum, we organized a public seminar entitled "The Tokyo Defense Forum Seminar"[7], inviting distinguished experts as well as defense officials, with the aim of contributing to the promotion of dialogue and cooperation within the region.

2. Japan–ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministers' Meeting

Every year since 2009, the Ministry of Defense has held the Japan–ASEAN Defense Vice-Minister-level meeting, with the purpose of creating a foundation for strengthening multilateral and bilateral relationships through establishing human networks between Japanese and ASEAN vice-ministerial-level officials. In conjunction with this, the Ministry holds bilateral talks at the vice-ministerial level, as well as the "Tokyo Seminar on Common Security Challenges", a public seminar held annually, to which security experts, including both academics and government officials, from Japan and other countries are invited, in order to discuss security challenges in the region and the roles of defense authorities in tackling them[8].

The third meeting was held in September 2011, with the participation of vice-ministerial-level officials

from ASEAN member states and the ASEAN Secretariat. Views were exchanged concerning 1) regional initiatives focused on strengthening maritime security; and 2)support for capacity building, focused primarily on non-traditional security fields. In addition, as well as expressing their best wishes for Japan's recovery following the Great East Japan Earthquake, the participating countries praised the response of the SDF to the disaster. Moreover, the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense held bilateral talks with the participants from Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar (first vice-ministerial-level talks with this country), the Philippines and Vietnam.

See Reference 51

(3) Other

a. International conferences held by private organizations

In the field of security, besides official intergovernmental conferences, various international conferences are also held by private organizations, which are attended by government officials, academics, and journalists. Such conferences not only contribute to disseminating policy and building confidence between governments, but they are also important as venues for sharing and exchanging opinions on medium- to long-term security issues, which the Ministry of Defense highly appreciates.

Among these international conferences, the IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue)[9] and the IISS Regional Security Conference (Manama Dialogue), both hosted by the international Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) are good examples in which the Ministry of Defense has engaged..

IISS Asia Security Summit was established to build a regional security framework and has taken place annually in Singapore. The eleventh meeting was held in June 2012, in which Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Shu Watanabe participated on behalf of Japan. He delivered a speech entitled "Protecting Maritime Freedoms". In his speech, Senior Vice-Minister Watanabe pointed out the importance of 1) free navigation as an overriding principle, 2)good seamanship as a form of manner on the seas, and 3)practical cooperation with the countries in the region, in order to establish a stable international order of the seas in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, at the meeting, as well as participating in trilateral discussions between Japan, the U.S.A. and R.O.K, and Japan, the U.S.A. and Australia, Senior Vice-Minister Watanabe took the opportunity to meet with counterparts from Australia, Singapore, New Zealand, Indonesia, the U.K. and France in a series of bilateral discussions.

The IISS Regional Security Conference is an international conference at which exchanges of opinions on security are carried out primarily among parties concerned such as foreign and defense ministers from countries in the Middle East. The conference is convened in Manama, Bahrain[10]. The stability of the Middle East is extremely important to Japan, from the perspective of energy security, as well as the safety and security of sea lanes, so the Ministry of Defense has participated in this conference every year, since the 2nd conference in 2005.

b. Asia-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference (CHOD)

The CHOD is a meeting of the chiefs of defense, mostly from the Asia-Pacific region, aimed at nurturing trust among countries in the region and enhancing security relations through free exchanges of opinions on regional security and bilateral dialogues, among other activities.

The conference has been held every year since the 1st conference in 1998, and Japan has participated in each conference from the beginning. In 2004, Japan hosted the 7th conference together with the United States Pacific Command. In 2011, the 14th Conference, hosted by the United States Pacific Command, convened in Hawaii, and the Joint Chief of Staff attended it.

See Reference 52

c. Invitations to opinion leaders

Since 2001, the Ministry has invited to Japan key figures – primarily those involved in security policy – from countries in the Asia-Pacific region with which deepening relationships of trust is thought to be particularly beneficial, with the objective of promoting an understanding of our security and defense policy, and the current status of the SDF. In FY2011, defense ministry officials from Indonesia and Myanmar were invited to Japan for the first time as part of this initiative.

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1 Japan, Australia, China, India, New Zealand, Russia, Republic of Korea, and the United States.

2 Declaration that lays out the fundamental principles for the peaceful resolution of conflicts in the South China Sea, signed between ASEAN and China in 2002.

3 The countries holding co-chairmanship of the respective Expert Working Groups (EWG) are as follows: Vietnam and China for the EWG on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR), Malaysia and Australia for the EWG on Maritime Security, Indonesia and the United States for the EWG on Counter-Terrorism , Singapore and Japan for the EWG on Military Medicine, and the Philippines and New Zealand for the EWG on Peacekeeping Operations (PKO).

4 The first meeting of the EWG on Maritime Security was held in July 2011, the EWG on Counter-Terrorism in September the same year, and the EWGs on HA/DR and PKO both in November that year.

5 26 countries, consisting of 10 ASEAN countries (Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia (from 1995) and Myanmar (from 1996)), Japan, Australia, Canada, China, India (from 1996), New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Korea, Russia, the U.S.A., Mongolia (from 1998), North Korea (from 2000), Pakistan (from 2004), East Timor (from 2005), Bangladesh (from 2006), and Sri Lanka (2007), plus the European Union (EU).

6 As well as the Senior Officials Meeting (SOM), meetings of the Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy (ISG on CBM/PD) and the ARF Security Policy Conference (ASPC) are also held. Moreover, since the Cabinet-level meeting in 2002, ARF Defense Officials' Dialogue (DOD) meetings and Inter-Sessional Meetings (ISM) are held ahead of the main meeting.

7 Discussions at the FY2011 Tokyo Defense Forum Seminar focused on the same theme as the main meeting.

8 In FY2011, the Tokyo Seminar on Common Security Challenges was held the day after the main meeting, with discussions focusing on 1) resource problems and security problems; and 2) regional initiatives aimed at strengthening maritime security.

9 This is a multilateral conference instituted at the initiative of the International Institute for Strategic

Studies, a private British think tank, in which defense ministers from across the Asia-Pacific region participate with the objective of discussing defense-related issues and regional defense cooperation. Since the first conference in 2002, it has been held in Singapore each year and is known as the Shangri-La Dialogue, from the name of the hotel at which it takes place. See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/exchange/dialogue/others/iiss.html>

[10] Then-Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Hirota attended the 7th conference, which took place in December 2010. At that conference, he took the opportunity to exchange opinions separately with U.K. Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence Lord Astor, Parliamentary State Secretary to the Federal Minister of Defence Schmidt, Minister of State for Defense Affairs of Bahrain Mohammed, and Commander Fox of the U.S. Fifth Fleet. The conference did not take place in 2011.

3. Promoting Practical Multilateral Security Cooperation

1. Support for capacity building

In recent years, the role of and cooperation between defense authorities have been deepening and widening in non-traditional security fields, such as humanitarian aid and disaster relief, disposal of land mines and unexploded ordnance, and military medicine; in particular, there is an awareness of the importance of cooperation by the international community in providing support for capacity building aimed at improving the capabilities of stakeholder countries in such fields. In light of this situation, the 2010 NDPG clearly stipulates that as well as utilizing the capabilities of the SDF and promoting concrete, practical cooperation, Japan will build and strengthen cooperation frameworks within the region and provide support for capacity building of the countries in the region.

As part of the country's endeavors in international cooperation, the Ministry of Defense and SDF have hitherto carried out such activities as 1) United Nations peacekeeping operations; 2) international disaster relief activities; and 3) anti-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden; these activities can be regarded as reactive or "ex post facto" responses to security problems that have actually occurred, such as disputes and large-scale disasters. Support for capacity building is an initiative based on a new concept, which seeks to improve the ability of developing countries to deal with such situations themselves, through human resource development and technical support in non-traditional security fields in peacetime, thereby actively creating stability within the region and improving the international security environment. Providing support for capacity building has the following advantages: 1) strengthening bilateral relationships by providing support in capacity building in a form that satisfies each country's requests for support; 2) strengthening bilateral relationships by providing support in capacity building in a form that satisfies requests from military and military-related organizations of each country; 3) promoting an accurate awareness among the Japanese people and the countries receiving such support of Japan's stance of working proactively and independently to promote regional peace and stability, thereby increasing trust in the Ministry of Defense and SDF, as well as Japan as a whole, leading, by extension, to an increase in Japan's influence in the international community; and 4) increasing the possibility that,

compared with an ex post facto response, it will be possible to prevent situations occurring, or reduce the damage in the event that a situation does actually arise, thereby considerably reducing the costs involved in dealing with that situation.

In particular, requests have been received from Southeast Asian countries for support in improving their abilities to handle non-traditional security fields, and the Ministry of Defense and SDF believe that it is necessary to use our knowledge and experience to improve the capabilities of the militaries and military-related authorities of relevant countries and actively work on human resource development.

Accordingly, in FY2011, the Ministry carried out field surveys and efforts to grasp and analyze specific needs, focusing mainly on Southeast Asian countries, and conducted research concerning the fields in which support for capacity building should be provided in the future, as well as the forms that this support should take. In FY2012, the Ministry plans to determine the countries that will be targeted by specific support projects and the content of that support, and then implement full-scale capacity building support projects. An example of such a project would be that the Ministry of Defense concludes a contract with private sectors such as a NGO (Non-Governmental Organization) with expertise on the relevant support area, and provides military and military-related authorities of relevant countries with support for capacity building in collaboration with these private sectors.

(See Fig. III-3-1-6)

2 The Pacific Partnership

The Pacific Partnership (PP), which started in 2007, is an initiative in which naval vessels, primarily those from the U.S. Navy, visit countries in the region to provide medical care and engage in cultural exchange and seek to strengthen collaboration with the participating countries and facilitate disaster relief activities, through cooperation with the governments, militaries, international organizations and NGOs in those countries in the course of these endeavors. Since 2007, Japan has dispatched MSDF medical officers, amongst others, to conduct research as part of this initiative.

Participation in PP promotes mutual understanding and cooperation with the countries involved, and contributes to improving the international security environment, as well as strengthening the Japan-U.S. security alliance, so it is important from the perspective of ensuring the peace and safety of our country. Moreover, it is seen as a valuable opportunity to gain know-how in coordinating and collaborating with private sector groups, as well as improving the proficiency and skills of the SDF in relation to medical care and transport in international disaster relief activities and international peace cooperation duties through undertaking specific activities.

SDF troops were dispatched for the first time in 2010, when the MSDF transport vessel "Kunisaki" and an SDF medical team participated, in cooperation with NGOs while providing medical care and engaging in cultural exchange in Vietnam and Cambodia. In 2011, participation was scaled down compared with

the previous year, due to the Great East Japan Earthquake, but those who did participate provided medical care and education in public health in East Timor and Micronesia. In 2012, the scale of participation returned to that seen in 2010, and in addition to an MSDF transport vessel and an SDF medical team, an ASDF transport aircraft was also dispatched, with participants cooperating with NGOs while providing medical care and engaging in cultural exchange in the Philippines and Vietnam.

Part III: Measures for Defense of Japan

Chapter 3 Multi-layered Security Cooperation with the International Community

Section 2 Promotion of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

In order to improve the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as across the globe, and ensure the safety and prosperity of Japan, it is important to utilize the Japan-U.S. Alliance as an axis, while developing networks that combine bilateral and multilateral dialogue, exchanges and cooperation frameworks in a complementary and multilayered manner.

Accordingly, the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces are conducting strategic defense cooperation and exchanges based on the characteristics of each country and region in question.

(See Fig. III-3-2-1)

See Reference 53

See Section 1

1. Japan–Australia Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

1. The Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchange with Australia

Australia is an important partner for Japan in the Asia-Pacific region: Japan and Australia are allies of the United States and share not only fundamental values such as democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and capitalist economies, but also strategic stakes and interests in the security field. In particular, the norm that different countries should work in concert to address global challenges has been becoming widespread in the international community in recent years. Therefore, as responsible countries in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan and Australia are strengthening mutual cooperation focused primarily on non-traditional security areas such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities.

In terms of Japan–Australia bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges, the Japan–Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation[1], the first such joint declaration in the realm of security with a country other than the United States, was announced at the Japan-Australia summit meeting in March 2007. It has been making steady progress since then and has now reached the stage of more concrete and practical cooperation.

At the third Joint Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations (“2+2”) in May 2010, the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)[2] and its Procedural Arrangement were signed. During the Japan-Australia “2+2” and the Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting held on the same day as the signing ceremony, as well as expressing hopes for Japanese cooperation with the Australian Defense Force in frontline activities such as United Nations peacekeeping operations (PKO) and disaster relief, it was mentioned that the broadening of the areas of future cooperation between our two countries would be

considered.

When the SDF and Australian Defense Force (ADF) engage in PKO, international disaster relief, and other activities based on the Japan-Australia ACSA, the reciprocal provision of supplies and services such as water, food, fuel, and transport becomes possible, and the strategic partnership between the two countries is further facilitated and consolidated. Furthermore, such facilitated and strengthened cooperation between Japan and Australia is expected to contribute to the peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region, while also being conducive to fostering an intraregional order through cooperation.

In addition, the conclusion of Japan's first ACSA other than the one concluded with the United States is considered to be significant for Japan's future defense cooperation and exchanges.

Although Diet approval has been obtained for the Japan-Australia ACSA, prompt adjustment of domestic legislation is necessary for its implementation. Moreover, the Japan-Australia Information Security Agreement was signed in May 2012, with the objective of promoting the sharing of information between.

2. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchange

At the talks between Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Watanabe and Australian Defense Minister Smith, which was held in conjunction with the 11th IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue) in June 2012, the two countries, as close friends in the Asia-Pacific region, shared awareness concerning the promotion of cooperation in various fields, including in regard to international peace cooperation activities and cooperation in equipment and technology-related fields.

In recent years, trilateral cooperation between Japan, the United States, and Australia has been increasing. Japan and Australia are both allied with the United States, and share fundamental values. They cooperate closely in order to resolve the various challenges the Asia-Pacific region and the international community are facing. In order to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of such cooperation, it is important that trilateral cooperation be promoted among Japan, Australia and the United States, whose presence is indispensable for regional peace and stability.

At the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2012, the 2nd Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (attended by Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Watanabe) was held and the Joint Statement by the Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Leaders was issued for the first time, in which the three participants agreed to deal with diverse security issues in the Asia-Pacific region, based on the cooperative relationships established among the three countries.

At the working level too, the Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF), which is a Director General-level meeting among the three countries, has been held four times since April 2007, with discussions taking place on such issues as trilateral defense cooperation. In addition to this, joint training exercises were carried out in June 2012 for the fifth time, by Japan, the United States, and Australia involving the MSDF, the U.S. Navy and the Royal Australian Navy. Furthermore, in February 2012,

“Cope North Guam” took place in Guam with the participation of the ASDF, the U.S. Air Force and the Royal Australian Air Force, marking the first time that the Japan-U.S.-Australia joint exercise had been held. In July 2011, the GSDF Chief of Staff and the Australian Chief of Army agreed to promote future joint training by dispatching observers to each other's joint training with the U.S. military, with the objective of strengthening relations between Japan, the U.S. and Australia, and , an observer from the Australian Army was accepted for the first time at the joint Japan-U.S. command post exercise, which took place between the GSDF and the U.S. Army in February 2012.

Through these discussions and cooperation, understanding of the situation can be shared by the three countries and policies coordinated. After ASCA comes into force, it will be important to further develop and deepen the collaborative relationship among the three countries, by promoting trilateral cooperation more proactively in the operational area such as disaster relief and joint exercises.

(See Fig. III-3-2-2)

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[1] See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/youjin/2007/06/06d.html>

[2] Official title: The Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia concerning reciprocal provision of supplies and services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Australian Defense Force

2. Japan–Republic of Korea Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

1. The Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchange with Republic of Korea

The Republic of Korea (ROK) has historically maintained the closest relations with Japan in economic, cultural, and other areas. it is a country that is extremely vital to Japan in geopolitical terms. In addition,, the two countries also share many strategic interests and basic values as allies of the United States, such as permitting the stationing of U.S. armed forces. Therefore, the fact that the two countries collaborate closely on not only the economic front, but also the security front, has enormous significance for the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.

At the same time, both Japan and the ROK are confronted with wide-ranging and complex security challenges. These include not only the North Korean nuclear and missile issues, but also counter-terrorism, peacekeeping operations, responding to large-scale natural disasters, anti-piracy measures, and maritime security. Therefore, for the two countries to effectively respond to such security challenges, it is important to carry out more broad-ranging and concrete defense cooperation.

With this in mind, at talks between the defense ministers of the two countries held in January 2011, it was agreed to further exchange views concerning an ACSA to enable reciprocal provision of water, food, fuel, and so on in PKO activities, humanitarian support, disaster relief, and search and rescue exercises, etc. Furthermore, recognizing the importance of information sharing to promote defense cooperation and

exchanges between Japan and the ROK, the two ministers also agreed to proceed with negotiations for the contents of agreement on the protection of military information between the defense authorities of their respective countries. At the Japan-ROK Defense Ministers' Meeting held in June 2011, the ministers affirmed the importance of such cooperation Japan and the ROK are continuing negotiations towards early conclusions.

2. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchange

The defense authorities of Japan and ROK are promoting mutual understanding and forging deeper relationships of trust through working-level defense dialogue at the Director-General and Deputy Director level and security dialogue that also includes the foreign affairs authorities; in addition, the defense ministers of the two countries have met almost every year since 1994, taking turns to visit each other.

In November 2011, the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense visited ROK and held a vice-ministerial-level talk with the Korean Vice-Minister of Defense. The two vice-ministers exchanged opinions concerning the defense policies of their two countries, and the regional situation, including North Korea, in order to strengthen defense cooperation between Japan and the ROK.

With regard to interaction between the SDF and the ROK Armed Forces, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of ROK visited Japan in October 2011 and exchanged opinions with the Joint Chief of Staff, Joint Staff concerning the strengthening of collaboration between Japan and the ROK Armed Forces and the importance of cooperation in the event of a natural disaster, sharing lessons learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake.

Furthermore, as both Japan and the ROK are allied with the United States, which plays an indispensable role for the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region, trilateral cooperation among Japan, the United States, and the ROK has been developing in much the same way as it has among Japan, the United States, and Australia. At the 11th Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2012, a Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministers Conference (attended by Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Watanabe) was held, at which the participants shared their understanding of the regional security situation, including the April 2011 launch by North Korea of a missile purported to be an "artificial satellite", affirmed the importance of cooperation between the three countries, and agreed to strengthen trilateral coordination in policy making in order to suppress provocative behavior by North Korea, and expand the range of cooperation in humanitarian aid and disaster relief for regional peace and stability, maritime security, ensuring Freedom of Navigation, and nonproliferation. In addition, they stated to pursue trilateral talks between the defense ministers at the Shangri-La Dialogue.

Furthermore, the Japan-U.S.-ROK joint exercise was conducted on the sea in the south waters of the ROK in June 2012, strengthening coordination and cooperation among the three countries. This strengthening of cooperation among Japan, the United States, and the ROK contributes to the peace and stability of the

region.

Japan considers it important to continue developing future-oriented cooperative relations with the ROK in the fields of defense and security into the future.

(See Fig. III-3-2-3)

3. Japan–India Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

1. The Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchange with India

India is located in the center of sea lanes which connect Japan with the Middle East and Africa, making it an extremely important country in a geopolitical sense for Japan, which relies on maritime transportation for most of its trade. Furthermore, Japan and India share fundamental values, as well as having a common interest in the peace, stability, and prosperity of Asia and the world, and have constructed a strategic global partnership. Therefore, in recent years both Japan and India have been strengthening relations in security areas.

In October 2008, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India visited Japan and the two Prime Ministers signed the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India (Joint Declaration)[1], which is a joint declaration regarding the area of security coming after similar declarations with the United States and Australia. This is the third country with whom a joint declaration has been signed in the area of security. This Joint Declaration specifies that cooperation will be conducted between the two defense authorities by way of, for example, meetings between the Defense Ministers, meetings between the Vice-Minister of Defense of Japan and the Defense Secretary of India including Defense Policy Dialogue, military-to-military talks at the Director General/Joint Secretary-level, and service-to-service exchanges including bilateral and multilateral exercises. The declaration serves as a guideline for future cooperation in security areas between Japan and India.

Moreover, in December 2009 the then Prime Minister Hatoyama visited India. Together with the Indian Prime Minister Singh, he formulated the Action Plan to promote security cooperation between Japan and India. The Action Plan includes items for the actual promotion of cooperation in maritime security such as cooperation in anti-piracy activities and the holding of joint exercises at sea.

Furthermore, in December 2011, when Prime Minister Noda visited India, he agreed to further efforts to reinforce the Strategic Global Partnership between Japan and India, which in 2012 are celebrating the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, as well as strengthening cooperation in the field of maritime security, in regard to the political and security-related aspects. These outcomes were issued as the Japan-India Joint Statement.

2. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchange

In November 2011, Indian Defense Minister Antony visited Japan and held talks with the Japanese Minister of Defense. At these talks, as well as exchanging opinions concerning the regional security situation, the two ministers were in accord that the cooperative relationship between Japan and India in the field of maritime security is important, and noted that defense cooperation between the two countries is progressing steadily, through such developments as agreements concerning reciprocal visits by the MSDF and the Indian Navy, the first bilateral exercise involving Japan and India, and reciprocal visits between the GSDF and the Indian Army by troops in relation to education and training concerning international peace cooperation activities; this situation was welcomed in the Japan-India Joint Statement. In June, 2012, the first Bilateral exercise was carried out between MSDF and Indian Navy off the coast of the sagami Gulf based on the joint.

(See Fig. III-3-2-4)

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[1] See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/kisha/2009/11/09.html>

4. Japan–China Defense Exchanges and Cooperation

1. The Significance of Defense Exchange and Cooperation with China

China's economic development and the modernization of its military capabilities in recent years have raised its presence within the international community. Although there are pending issues with China, such as slow progress of Japan-China bilateral cooperation resource development in the East China Sea and the question of transparency in regard to military capabilities, comprehensive promotion by Japan and China of the "Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests"[1], and further deepening of friendly and cooperative relations are the common interests of both countries. Furthermore, continuing to promote defense exchanges in a continuous and stable manner without being swayed by political circumstances will not only bolster mutual understanding and trust between Japan and China and increase the transparency of China's defense policy, but is also essential to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.

2. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Exchange

Japan and China have hitherto been striving to promote defense exchange at various levels, as well as seeking to increase mutual understanding and relationships of trust, based on the approach of comprehensively promoting a "Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests".

At the ministerial level, at a meeting held in Tokyo in November 2009, agreement was reached on considering and exchanging views on implementing concrete bilateral cooperation, including the implementation of joint exercises related to maritime search and rescue, sharing experiences and cooperation concerning humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and swiftly establishing a maritime communication mechanism between the Japanese and Chinese defense authorities. The ministers also released a Joint Press Statement[2] and after the meeting held their first-ever joint press conference.

Furthermore, at the Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting held at the 6th IISS Asia Security Summit in Singapore in June 2011, the two countries agreed that advancing dialogue between the defense authorities of the two countries in a calm manner and promoting Japan-China defense exchanges in a stable fashion was the basis for such a "Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests", and that this would lead to the strengthening of trust and friendly relations, as well as improving the transparency of defense and other policies. Accordingly, the ministers confirmed their intention to continue to develop Japan-China defense exchange.

At the vice-ministerial-level, in July 2011, the Chief of Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army visited Japan and the 9th Japan-China Defense Authorities Talks (vice-ministerial-level) took place after a gap of about three years; both sides agreed to promote sound and stable progress in Japan-China defense

exchange in a range of fields and at a variety of levels, through calm, candid dialogue between the defense authorities of the two countries.

Furthermore, in light of the intensifying maritime activities of the Chinese Navy, etc. in recent years, the construction of a maritime communication mechanism between the two countries' defense authorities has become an urgent matter. At the June 2011 Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting, then Defense Minister Kitazawa requested that the Chinese Navy prevent the recurrence of incidents in which Chinese naval aircraft approach MSDF vessels, and the two agreed to hold the 3rd Working-Level Talks in the near future. Based on it, the Talks was held in June 2012 in order to establish a maritime communication mechanism.

In regard to exchanges between troops, since 2007, the Chinese Navy destroyer *Shenzhen* and training vessel *Zhenghe* have visited Japan, while the MSDF destroyers *Sazanami* and, most recently (in December 2011), *Kirisame* have visited China. Moreover, in June 2010, the Commanding General of the Jinan Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army visited the GSDF Middle Army, while in March 2012, the Commanding General of the GSDF Middle Army visited the Jinan Military Region.

Furthermore, officer-level exchanges between Japan and China have been implemented since 2001, organized by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation. Although it is implemented by a private sector body, this project fulfills a significant role not only in the promotion of mutual understanding and relationships of trust between the leaders of the defense authorities of these two countries, but also in increasing the coverage of defense exchanges themselves.

Hereafter, as part of efforts to construct a "Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests", it will be essential to strive to promote mutual trust and understanding between Japan and China at various levels and in a wider range of areas, while also actively promoting concrete cooperation in non-traditional security areas, such as anti-piracy measures.

(See Fig. III-3-2-5)

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1 See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/s_abe/cn_kr_06/china_kpress.html>

2 See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/kisha/2009/11/27b.html>

5. Japan–Russia Defense Exchanges and Cooperation

1. The Significance of Defense Exchange and Cooperation with Russia

Russia has great influence on the security of Europe, Central Asia, and the Asia-Pacific region, and is a neighboring country of Japan. It is therefore very important for Japan to deepen defense exchanges and promote mutual trust and cooperation with Russia. As Japan–Russia relations have continuously been developing in a wide range of areas, the Ministry of Defense and SDF have been steadily promoting exchanges with Russia at various levels in accordance with the Memorandum on Japan–Russia Defense Exchanges drawn up in 1999 (revised in 2006). Security consultations between foreign and defense authorities, and Military-Military Talks at the Director General-level and Councilor-level, as well as annual meetings based on the Japan–Russia Agreement on Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas and joint search and rescue exercises are all held continuously.

2. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Exchange

Defense exchanges with Russia have not been very active in recent years, due to the reorganization of the Russian Army, however in September 2011, the MSDF and the Russian Navy held the 12th Japan-Russia Joint Search and Rescue Exercise and Russian naval vessels visited Japan.
(See Fig. III-3-2-6)

6. Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Southeast Asian Countries

Southeast Asian countries are located in an area strategically important for maritime traffic that connects Japan with the Middle East and Europe, and have long been traditional partners, having close economic relations with Japan. Promoting trust and cooperative relations for issues in various security challenges with these countries is meaningful for both Japan and Southeast Asian countries. Moreover, as the countries of Southeast Asia are members of ADMM-Plus and ARF, it is important to build relationships of trust and cooperation with each country, with a view to cooperation in multilateral frameworks.
In particular, as well as the interaction with Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore and the Philippines detailed below, Japan is engaged in active exchanges of opinions with Cambodia, Malaysia and Thailand at various levels, concerning approaches to defense cooperation and exchange, and frameworks for regional security cooperation. In addition, Japan is proactively engaged in discussions with defense officials, unit exchanges, and the dispatch and hosting of international students. Furthermore, we are also striving to strengthen relationships with Myanmar, Brunei Darussalam, and Laos, with which defense cooperation and exchange has not been very intensive.

1. Indonesia

Indonesia accounts for the majority of the land and population of Southeast Asia and is a major power in the region, as well as being the largest island country in the world. In the talks between Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Watanabe and Defense Minister Purnomo during the June 2012 Shangri-La Dialogue, as well as during Minister Purnomo's visit to Japan in January 2011, Japan exchanged opinions with Indonesia regarding the holding of regular discussions between the defense ministers of the two countries, as well as concerning a memorandum on defense cooperation and cooperation in the ADMM-Plus framework. In addition to this, great progress has been made in defense cooperation and exchange through the visit to Japan by the Vice-Minister of Defense in September 2011, as well as talks at the army, navy and air force chief of staff level held during FY2011. In particular, when Minister Purnomo visited Japan in January 2011, Indonesia presented Japan with the gift of a bronze statue of General Sudirman, who had close links to Japan. This statue of the General symbolizes the development of friendship and amicable cooperation between Japan and Indonesia. Moreover, when President Yudhoyono visited Japan in June 2011, he and then Prime Minister Kan agreed to institute regular talks between the defense ministers of their countries. There have been numerous developments at the working level, including the discussions involving the foreign affairs and defense authorities that began in November 2011, discussions between the defense authorities alone, and the sharing of knowledge and experience through various education and research exchange initiatives.

2. Vietnam

Vietnam is a major power in Southeast Asia, and is a strategic partner for peace and prosperity in Asia. Japan is deepening cooperation with Vietnam, not only in economic fields, but also in the fields of security and defense. A Japan-Vietnam Joint Statement was published when Vietnamese Prime Minister Dung visited Japan in October 2011; in addition, the same month, Defense Minister Thanh became the first Vietnamese Defense Minister to visit Japan in 13 years, holding talks with Japan's Minister of Defense at which the two ministers exchanged opinions concerning the international and regional security situations, including maritime security. Following the talks, the two ministers signed a memorandum concerning Japan-Vietnam defense cooperation and exchange, and agreed to promote high-level exchanges, regular dialogue at the vice-ministerial level, and cooperation in such fields as humanitarian aid and disaster relief, so it was an important visit in terms of the development of the strategic partnership. Moreover, in January 2012, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Shimojo visited Vietnam, where, as well as making a courtesy visit to Defense Minister Thanh, he conducted an exchange of opinions with the Vietnamese Vice-Minister of Defense, discussing the regional situation, as well as Japan-Vietnam

defense cooperation. Thus, Japan has put in place a memorandum on defense cooperation and exchange with Vietnam, as well as developing defense cooperation and exchange frameworks, such as for high-level exchange.

In addition, in December 2011, the 2nd Japan-Vietnam Strategic Partnership Dialogue (between the foreign affairs and defense authorities of the two countries) and talks between the Japanese and Vietnamese defense authorities alone took place in December 2011; in the future, it will be vital to strengthen relationships in order to achieve more concrete, practical cooperation, with the memorandum on defense cooperation and exchange as the cornerstone of this.

3. Singapore

In December 2009, Singapore became the first country in Southeast Asia with which Japan concluded a memorandum on defense cooperation and exchange, and cooperative relationships progress steadily based on this memorandum. In particular, MM talks between the defense authorities of Japan and Singapore have the longest history of any of Japan's defense discussions with the countries of Southeast Asia; in November 2011, 12th MM talks was held in Singapore and various issues were discussed including regional situation and security issues.

In terms of high-level exchange, at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2012, Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Watanabe held talks with Singaporean Defense Minister Dr. Ng, at which they exchanged opinions concerning the regional situation and maritime security, as well as agreeing to engage in further cooperation in the ADMM-Plus Military Medicine Expert Working Group (EWG), which the two countries co-chair.

4. The Philippines

As well as high-level exchanges with the Philippines, such as the September 2011 visit to Japan by Undersecretary of the Philippine Department of National Defense and the June 2012 visit to Philippines by Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Watanabe, there have been frequent exchanges among the working level officials, including visits by naval vessels and discussions between the defense authorities of the two countries. In particular, exchanges between the MSDF and the Philippine Navy were discussed at the first Japan-Philippines Dialogue on Maritime and Oceanic Affairs, which was held in Tokyo in September 2011. In the Japan-Philippines Joint Statement issued by President Aquino and Prime Minister Noda at the time of the former's visit to Japan the same month, the two leaders welcomed the Japan-Philippines Dialogue on Maritime and Oceanic Affairs and agreed that they would promote exchange and cooperation between the defense authorities of the two countries, through such initiatives as reciprocal visits at the naval chief of staff level and port calls in the Philippines by the MSDF vessels.

Having been stipulated in the Joint Statement, the visit to the Philippines by the MSDF Chief of Staff took place in November 2011, while the visit to Japan by the Flag Officer of the Philippine Navy took place in April 2012; in addition, talks between the foreign affairs and defense authorities of both countries and between the defense authorities alone were held in Manila in March 2012.
(See Fig. III-3-2-7)

7. Japan–U.K. Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

1. The Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchange with the U.K.

The United Kingdom, being a major power that has influence not only on Europe but also the rest of the world, has historically maintained close relations with Japan. On the security front, Japan shares the same strategic interests with the United Kingdom, as both countries are important allies of the United States. Given this relationship, it is extremely important for Japan to promote cooperation through such global issues as international peace cooperation activities and anti-terrorism and piracy, and through information exchange relating to the regional situation.
In January 2004, the Defense Ministers of both countries signed Memorandum Relating to Defense Cooperation to develop bilateral defense exchanges in various sectors, thereby advancing the two countries' resolve to promote defense exchanges at all levels and in various fields. Moreover, in April 2012, when British Prime Minister Cameron visited Japan, he and Prime Minister Noda issued a joint statement entitled "A Leading Strategic Partnership for Global Prosperity and Security", in which they announced the start of negotiations on a government to government information security agreement, their endorsement of the signing of the Defense Cooperation Memorandum, and the identification of appropriate defense equipment for joint development and production.

2. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchange

In October 2011, the British Secretary of State for Defence visited Japan and held talks with the Japanese Defense Minister, at which they agreed to commence work on formulating a new Japan-U.K. Defense Cooperation Memorandum, aimed at achieving more concrete cooperation between the two countries in the future. At the talks between Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Watanabe and British Minister of State for the Armed Forces Harvey during the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2012, the two vice-ministers exchanged memorandums and agreed to facilitate close cooperation between Japan and the UK in various fields, based on this memorandum.
Moreover, in August 2011, as well as a visit to Japan by the British Chief of the Air Staff, exchange began in specialist fields, including participation by the Ministry of Defense of Japan in an international

conference on cyberspace hosted by the U.K. Furthermore, in October 2011, an MSDF participated in a minesweeping exercise in waters off the coast of Bahrain, which was organized jointly by the U.K. and U.S.A. Participation in this exercise was very meaningful, as it contributed to improving the minesweeping skills of the MSDF, as well as to the promotion of cooperative relationships with the U.K. and U.S.

(See Fig. III-3-2-8)

8. Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with European and Other Countries

Europe shares fundamental values with Japan such as democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and capitalist economy. Moreover, it serves as the central core in working to address shared challenges to global security, focusing primarily on non-traditional security areas such as counter-terrorism and combating piracy, as well as international peace cooperation activities. Therefore, developing defense cooperation and exchanges with the countries of Europe provides a foundation for Japan to actively take part in global challenges, and is important for both Japan and Europe.

Based on this awareness, Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Watanabe held talks with French Defense Minister Le Drian during the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2012, at which the two ministers agreed that their countries would proactively contribute to regional and global security issues. Moreover, director general level talks have been held with Turkey, Sweden and Georgia, in which lively exchanges of opinions took place regarding the regional situation and global security issues.

In June 2012, Minister of Defence of Italy, Admiral Di Paola, visited Japan. Minister of Defense Morimoto had talks with his Italian counterpart. They signed on the Statement of Intent, and exchanged views on various issues including regional situation and defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and Italy.

In addition, Japan has developed the foundations for information sharing, concluding the agreement between Japan and NATO on the security of Information and material in June 2010, and the Agreement between Japan and France on the Security of Information in October 2011.

Furthermore, with regard to exchanges with other countries, in January 2012, then Minister of Defense Ichikawa visited Mongolia and held talks with Mongolian Defense Minister Bold, at which they exchanged opinions concerning the regional situation and agreed on the promotion of defense cooperation and exchange between their two countries. After the talks ended, they signed a memorandum on defense cooperation and exchange between Japan and Mongolia.

In August 2011, the Canadian Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence visited Japan and held the first vice-ministerial-level "2+2" dialogue between Japan and Canada, which also included the foreign affairs authorities; during these talks, the participants agreed to start negotiations aimed at the conclusion of an ACSA, due to the importance of promoting collaboration between the SDF and the Canadian

military.

In April 2012, Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense of Japan and His Highness Khalifa of Bahrain signed a memorandum on Japan-Bahrain defense exchange.

During the June 2012 Shangri-La Dialogue, Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Watanabe and New Zealand Minister of Defence Coleman held talks during which they exchanged opinions concerning bilateral defense cooperation and the regional situation, as well as agreeing to proactively cooperate in the ADMM-Plus Military Medicine Expert Working Group (EWG) and Peacekeeping Operations EWG, of which Japan and New Zealand are the respective co-chairs.

(See Fig. III-3-2-9)

Part III Measures for the Defense of Japan

Chapter 3 Multi-layered Security Cooperation with the International Community

Section 3 Counter-piracy Initiatives

Acts of piracy are a grave threat to the maintenance of public safety and order on the seas. In particular, for Japan, which depends on marine transport for the majority of the resources and food that form the foundations of our country's existence and prosperity as a maritime nation, it is an issue that cannot be ignored. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea[1] states that all nations shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy, so it is necessary for Japan to actively fulfill its international responsibilities.

1. Basic Approach

The Japan Coast Guard, as a police organization, is primarily responsible for responding to acts of piracy. However, in case that it is deemed extremely difficult or impossible for the Japan Coast Guard to respond to a situation, Self-Defense Forces will respond.

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1 See the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea <http://www.mofa.go.jp/Mofaj/Gaiko/Kaiyo/law.html>

2. Occurrence Status of Acts of Piracy and Initiatives by the International Community

In recent years, there have been frequent incidents in waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, involving pirates armed with machine guns and rocket launchers, and the number of such incidents is increasing rapidly. Piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden is a threat to the international community, including Japan, so it is an issue that should be dealt with as a matter of urgency.

(See Figure III-3-3-1)

In successive resolutions[1], such as United Nations Security Council Resolution No.1816, which was adopted in June 2008, various countries have called for action to be taken to deter acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden; in particular, calls have been made for the dispatch of warships and military aircraft.

To date, approximately 30 countries[2], including the U.S., have dispatched warships to the waters off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. Moreover, in December 2008, the European Union (EU) decided to commence an anti-piracy operation (Operation Atlanta), escorting vessels transporting supplies for the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) and patrolling the waters in the area; in addition, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commenced its own anti-piracy operations (Operation Ocean Shield) in August 2009.

All countries continue to treat piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden as a matter of serious concern, even now, and both the EU and NATO decided in March 2012 to extend the time frame of their activities to the end of 2014.

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1 Also, resolutions Nos. 1838, 1846, and 1851 in 2008, No. 1897 in 2009, Nos. 1918 and 1950 in 2010, and Nos. 1976 and 2020 in 2011.

2 As well as the U.S., these countries include the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Greece, Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Norway, Belgium, Canada, Russia, Turkey, Singapore, India, China, South Korea, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Kenya, Australia, Pakistan, and Bahrain.

3. Japanese Initiatives

1. Legislation Concerning Anti-piracy Activities

In March 2009, after receiving the approval of the Prime Minister based on a Cabinet decision under the provisions of Article 82 of the Self-Defense Forces Act, the Minister of Defense gave the order for patrols to take place at sea (maritime patrols) in order to protect Japanese-affiliated vessels from acts of piracy, and to take all necessary action.

Following this order, two Japanese destroyers (*Sazanami* and *Samidare*) departed Japan and began escorting Japanese-affiliated vessels in the same month. Moreover, to conduct more effective anti-piracy operations over an extensive marine area, an order was given in May that year to dispatch P-3C fixed-wing patrol aircraft and these aircraft commenced warning and surveillance operations in the Gulf of Aden in June the same year.

In order to deal appropriately and effectively with acts of piracy by punishing, deterring and cracking down on such acts, irrespective of the nationality of those involved or the flag state of the vessels concerned, in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Japan subsequently enacted the Act concerning the Punishment of Acts of Piracy and Measures to Deal with Acts of Piracy (the Anti-Piracy Measures Act) in July 2009. Based on the Act, after obtaining the approval of the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense decided that anti-piracy operations should be carried out for one year.

In the Maritime Security Operations patrols that were initially ordered, it was only possible for the Self-Defense Force personnel to protect vessels with an association with Japan, but this law made it possible to protect the vessels of all nations from acts of piracy[1], irrespective of their flag state; moreover, it became possible to use weapons to the extent that is reasonably necessary, in the event that there is no other means of halting the passage of vessels engaging in acts of piracy, such as approaching civilian vessels.

(See Fig. III-3-3-2)

References 22, 23, 54

2. Activities by the Self-Defense Forces

(1) Record of Activities

The two destroyers currently overseas escort civilian vessels back and forth through the Gulf of Aden. The escort method firstly involves admitting the civilian vessels to be escorted to the determined meeting point (established in two locations, one on the east of the Gulf of Aden and one on the west). In doing so, in order to effectively protect civilian vessels with different capabilities from pirates, arrangements are

made to ensure the optimal formation. When the escort convoy sails across the Gulf of Aden, the destroyers protect the front and back of the convoy, while helicopters on board the destroyers also monitor the area around the convoy from the skies. In this way, the ships take around two days to sail across the Gulf of Aden, all the while making absolutely certain that the convoy is safe and secure, day and night. Moreover, there are eight coast guard officers aboard the destroyers[2] and the Self-Defense Forces cooperate with the Japan Coast Guard to enable them to conduct judicial police activities, as required. As of May 31, 2012, not a single vessel has come to any harm from pirates under the protection of the destroyers that had escorted 2,672 vessels, and they have passed safely across the Gulf of Aden. In this body of water, which is a major artery for the economy not only of Japan, but also of the whole world, the escort activities undertaken by the Self-Defense Forces provide a tremendous sense of security.

During the non-monsoon season (March - May, September - November), when the area within which pirates are active expands because the seas are calmer, the escort route is extended by approximately 200km to the east. (See Fig. III-3-3-3)

In addition, the maritime patrol aircraft (P-3C) based in the Republic of Djibouti make use of their cruising capacity in conducting warning and surveillance operations in the Gulf of Aden, which covers an area as large as the territory of Japan. The P-3Cs taking off from Djibouti carry out checks of the countless vessels sailing through the Gulf of Aden, to ensure that there are no suspicious vessels among them. At the same time, they provide information to the destroyers engaged in escort activities, the naval vessels of other countries and civilian vessels sailing through the area, and provide a finely-tuned response, conducting immediate checks to ensure that the surrounding area is safe, if requested to do so. The Self-Defense Forces, which have dispatched two P-3Cs, conduct warning and surveillance activities almost every day, while cooperating with other countries that have also dispatched maritime patrol aircraft to the area.

The intelligence gathered by the Self-Defense Forces P-3Cs is shared with the units dispatched to the area by countries such as the U.S. and relevant institutions engaged in anti-piracy activities, and is making a significant contribution to deterring acts of piracy and disarming vessels suspected of being pirate ships. As collaboration with the navies of various countries is important in conducting effective anti-piracy activities in these waters, the dispatched units take every opportunity to promote interaction with them, including exchanges of opinions and intelligence.

Since commencing operational flights in June 2009, the aircraft had flown 689 missions as of May 31, 2012, and their flying hours totaled 5,330 hours. Approximately 53,000 ships have been identified and intelligence has been provided to vessels sailing through the surrounding area and other countries engaged in anti-piracy operations about 6,200 times.

Moreover, in conducting these anti-piracy operations, as well as guarding the P-3Cs and other equipment at the operational facility, Ground Self-Defense Force personal also serve as personnel at the headquarters of the air corps, forming the first integrated force in the history of the Self-Defense Forces. In addition,

the Air Self-Defense Force has formed an airlift squadron to support these activities, consisting of transport aircraft (C-130) and multipurpose support aircraft (U-4).
(See Fig. III-3-3-4)

(2) The Necessity of Continuing Anti-piracy Operations

In the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, acts of piracy such as hijackings have continued in 2012, as in the previous year, and pirate attacks on Japanese-affiliated vessels have been made, so the situation remains unpredictable. Moreover, requests to continue to take all possible anti-piracy measures are still being received from organizations such as the Japanese Shipowners' Association, while in the international arena, NATO and the EU have decided to continue their operations, so there is no great change regarding the situation in which Japan must carry out anti-piracy operations.

(3) Running the Self-Defense Forces Operational Facility in Djibouti

In order to run the air corps conducting anti-piracy operations in an efficient and effective manner, the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces established an operational facility in the northwestern zone of Djibouti-Ambouli International Airport, and the facility commenced operations in June 2011. This operational facility consists of offices for the headquarters, living quarters for the troops, maintenance hangars, an aircraft parking apron (with a capacity of three aircraft); as well as the air corps, it is used by troops from the naval unit.
In order to ensure the stable running of the Self-Defense Forces Operational facility in Djibouti, the units dispatched to the country endeavor to maintain collaborative relationships by such means as the regular exchange of information with government institutions in Djibouti and the U.S. military stationed there, as well as seeking to deepen interaction with the people of Djibouti through voluntary activities.

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[1] An act of piracy prescribed in the Anti-Piracy Measures Act is defined as any of the following acts committed for private ends on the high seas (including exclusive economic zones as stipulated in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) or territorial sea as well as internal waters of Japan by the crew or the passengers of a ship (except for warships and other ships owned or operated by the government): (1) seizing another ship in navigation or taking control of the operation of another ship by rendering persons irresistible by assault, intimidation or any other means; (2) robbing property on board another ship in navigation or obtaining or causing others to obtain an unlawful profit by rendering persons irresistible by assault, intimidation or any other means; (3) kidnapping a person on board another ship in navigation for the purpose of taking the person hostage to demand a third person to deliver any property or to take any other unobligated action or to waive that person's right; (4) demanding a third person to deliver any property or to take any other unobligated action or to waive that person's right by taking a person, on board a robbed ship or a ship whose control is taken or kidnapped on board another ship in navigation, hostage; (5) breaking into or damaging another ship in navigation for the purpose of committing the acts of piracy as referred to in subparagraphs (1), (2), (3) or (4) above;

(6) operating a ship and approaching in close proximity of, beleaguering or obstructing the passage of another ship for the purpose of committing the acts of piracy as referred to in subparagraphs (1), (2), (3) or (4) above;

(7) preparing weapons and operating a ship for the purpose of committing the acts of piracy as referred to in subparagraphs (1), (2), (3) or (4) above.

2 If required, they conduct judicial police activities, such as arresting and questioning pirates.

4. Praise for Japan's Endeavors

The anti-piracy activities conducted by the Japan Self-Defense Forces have been highly praised by the international community, including national leaders, who have expressed their gratitude. Moreover, the Maritime Self Defense Forces engaged in anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden have received many messages from the captains and shipowners of vessels that they have escorted, expressing their gratitude that the ships were able to cross the Gulf of Aden with peace of mind and asking them to continue escorting ships there. From the first to the tenth unit, a total of 2,040 messages have been received.

Thus, in the escort activities conducted by the Self-Defense Forces to date, they have carried out their duties while maintaining complete safety, with no acts of piracy taking place whatsoever.

Part III Measures for the Defense of Japan

Chapter 3 Multilayered Security Cooperation in the International Community

Section 4 Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities

One of the roles of Japan's defense capability set forth in the 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) is undertaking "efforts to improve the global security environment." The NDPG also states that Japan will promote diplomatic efforts including the use of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in order to resolve the fundamental causes of conflict, terrorism, and other problems, and will proactively undertake international peace cooperation activities in tandem with such diplomatic efforts.
This chapter explains the Japan's efforts to support international peace cooperation activities.

1. Frameworks for International Peace Cooperation Activities, etc.

1. Frameworks for International Peace Cooperation Activities

The international peace cooperation activities undertaken by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF to date are as follows: 1) international peace cooperation duties such as cooperation with peacekeeping operations (PKO); 2) international disaster relief operations to respond to large-scale disasters overseas; 3) activities based on the former Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq; and 4) activities based on the former Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law, and following the lapse of that law, the former Replenishment Support Special Measures Law.
(See Figs. III-3-4-1, 2)
See References 22, 23, 55

2. Significance of Stipulating International Peace Cooperation Activities as One of the Primary Missions of the SDF

Amid the current security environment, the peace and security of the international community is considered to be closely linked to the peace and security of Japan. Based on this notion, one of the roles of the defense capability was stated in the NDPG in and after JFY 2005 to be to "voluntarily and actively participate in activities to enhance the international security environment."In order to carry out this role appropriately, international peace cooperation activities, which used to be regarded as supplementary activities[1], were positioned in 2007 as one of the primary missions of the SDF[2], alongside the defense of Japan and the maintenance of public order.

3. Continuous Efforts to Promptly and Accurately Carry Out International Peace Cooperation

Activities

In order to undertake international peace cooperation activities proactively, the SDF must continue peacetime efforts to establish various systems. Since July 2007, the GSDF has designated candidates from regional armies in rotation for possible mission assignments, in order to maintain a posture allowing them to respond promptly and continuously to operational requirements. In March 2008, the GSDF established the Central Readiness Regiment under the Central Readiness Force, so that the advance unit can quickly carry out preparations for deployment for the main unit that is to follow it.

Since 2008, the SDF has implemented, once every year, drills to ensure preparedness for deployment of personnel to international cooperation missions, with the objective of maintaining and improving the capacity to implement swift overseas operations and the ability to precisely execute duties abroad. The successful deployment of PKO personnel in the aftermath of the massive earthquake that struck Haiti in January 2010 only about two weeks after the request from the United Nations for dispatch of SDF troops is seen as a result of such drills and other efforts for establishment of a framework for participation in international peace cooperation activities.

In 2009, Japan participated in the United Nations Stand-by Arrangement System (UNSAS)[3] in order to participate more actively in U.N. peacekeeping operations. As of the end of June 2012, Japan has registered its preparedness to provide SDF personnel capable of providing logistic support for the following activities and operations: 1) medical care (including epidemic prevention measures); 2) transportation; 3) storage (including stockpiling); 4) communications; 5) construction; 6) SDF units capable of logistic support for installation, inspection, and repair of equipment and devices; 7) military observers; and 8) HQ officers.

The SDF also promotes the improvement and enhancement of equipment for international peace cooperation activities. The GSDF has improved a range of vehicles fitted with bulletproof glass and run-flat tires[4] as well as high capacity generators to enable troops to carry out operations in areas with underdeveloped infrastructure. And, in order to ensure that activities can be carried out under diversified environments, the engines of transport helicopters (CH-47JA) are upgraded. Sniper locator device to detect firing points of sniper rifle and rifle is also under development. The MSDF has improved transport ships and helicopter-carrying destroyers that could be base of helicopter operations overseas. The MSDF is also promoting the portability and deployability of the Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS) to facilitate the effective operation of fixed-wing patrol aircrafts overseas. The ASDF promotes the acquisition of aviation satellite phones in order to maintain the command communication between aircraft and the ground controllers, and countermeasure dispensers for transport aircraft. These equipment items are also useful for responding to domestic contingencies.

The GSDF is promoting communication among the deploying units and their families to ensure the readiness of units and their personnel for their international peace cooperation activities with peace of

mind. The International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit (unit assigned to Central Readiness Force) at Camp Komakado (Shizuoka Prefecture) conducts education to GSDF personnel to be deployed to international peace cooperation activities, and also supports training related to international peace cooperation activities.

In addition, the International Peace Assistance Center (IPAC) established by the Ministry of Defense as a new educational institution for peacekeeping under the Joint Staff College in March 2010 will launch basic training courses on international peace cooperation activities from October 2011. Furthermore, from FY2012, specialized education is being provided to officers in charge of planning and policy-building for management and implementation of international peace cooperation activities and staff officers deployed at the headquarters of U.N. missions. The SDF is exploring the possibilities of making such education available not only to SDF personnel, but also to staff related to international peace cooperation activities in relevant ministries and agencies, as well as international institutions, and NGOs.

4. Guidelines for Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment etc. in Contributing to Peace and International Cooperation

On December 27, 2011, the Chief Cabinet Secretary's statement on Guidelines for Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment etc. was issued. The Guidelines made it possible to undertake cooperation more actively and effectively through providing defense equipment in cases involving peace contribution and international cooperation, in light of requests from counterpart countries and the security environment. Hitherto, when the SDF has been dispatched on peacekeeping operations, Japan has received requests from the governments of counterpart countries for providing armor-plated heavy machinery used by the SDF, but it was difficult to meet those requests, as it would have been considered arms export. Here after, in light of the Guidelines, it will be possible to provide support for local reconstruction, for example, after the SDF's peacekeeping operations end, through providing the heavy machinery and helmets used by the SDF, in response to requests from the governments of counterpart countries.

See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 6

5. Welfare and Mental Health Care of Dispatched SDF Units

It is extremely important to make necessary arrangements so that dispatched SDF personnel, who are expected to fulfill their assigned duty under severe working conditions while being far away from their home country and their families, can effectively carry out the assigned duty while maintaining both their physical and mental health.

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF have taken a series of measures to ease the anxiety of SDF members dispatched overseas for participation in international peace cooperation activities and the

anxieties of their families in Japan so that the members can devote themselves to their assigned duties with peace of mind. Welfare services are provided for the deployed SDF members to support them to maintain close bonds with their families in Japan.

Specifically, direct communication between the dispatched SDF members and their families in Japan is ensured via video conference systems, and they can also communicate through recorded video correspondence. Moreover, briefing sessions for families of the dispatched members are held to provide them with a variety of information, and family support centers and family counseling rooms have been established to respond to various questions raised by the families.

The SDF also offers mental health care services, such as a course on stress reduction methods for SDF members with scheduled dispatch when engaging in overseas missions, and dispatched SDF members can consult with designated counselors who have completed specialized training. Such counselors provide dispatched members with sufficient mental care. The Ministry of Defense is prepared to assign medical officers to the SDF units engaged in overseas missions and send qualified psychiatrists (mental healthcare support teams, etc.) from Japan on a regular basis and provide education on methods to deal with stress on the ground and points of caution in communication with families or fellow force members after return to Japan. Upon completion of the mission or return of mission personnel, ad-hoc special health examinations and mental health checks will be conducted.

6. Discussions Concerning Approaches to International Peace Cooperation

From October 2010, meetings of the Roundtable Conference on Approaches to PKO began to be held, chaired by then Cabinet Office Senior Vice Minister Shozo Azuma, with the participation of the relevant Vice Ministers from the Cabinet Secretariat, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense, with the objective of providing an overview of Japan's assistance in peacekeeping operations, etc. and examining approaches to future cooperation by Japan in this area; the interim summary compiled by the panel was published in July 2011[5]. As a basis for further deliberations, the interim summary listed a wide range of issues concerning legislation and capabilities that should be dealt with in order to facilitate more proactive international peace cooperation. Moreover, in recent years, there has also been debate in the Diet, among other venues, concerning a law to govern international peace cooperation activities, also known as the “general law”.

While no specific actions have been taken so far by the Government toward enacting a “general law,” it is necessary to examine various issues in order to determine what specific actions to take and conduct cooperative activities aiming at bringing about stability and peace in international community.

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[1] Activities prescribed in title 8 of the Self-Defense Forces Law (a miscellaneous provision) or supplementary provisions

[2] Missions defined in Article 3 of the Self-Defense Forces Law. The primary mission is to defend Japan. The secondary missions are the preservation of public order, activities in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan and international peace cooperation activities.

[3] This is a system adopted by the United Nations in 1994 in order to make mobilized deployment possible for U.N. peacekeeping operations. The system aims to enable the United Nations to request, in a swift and smooth manner, dispatch of troops from member nations in the event of peacekeeping operation deployment, by having member nations register beforehand their available scope of contribution, number of personnel for dispatch, and time required for dispatch. However, even when the United Nations approaches member nations with a request for dispatch based on the registered information, it is up to each country to decide whether to actually dispatch personnel or not.

[4] Tires that allow vehicles to maintain mobility, even when punctured and deflated

[5] Roundtable Conference on Approaches to PKO "Interim Summary" See <http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_J/info/pdf/20110704.pdf>

2. Efforts to Support U.N. Peacekeeping Operations, etc.

As a way to maintain peace in the world's regions of conflict, the United Nations is conducting 16 peacekeeping operations including ceasefire monitoring, election monitoring, and reconstruction assistance and 13 political and peace building missions (as of the end of June 2012).

International organizations, such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), governments and non-governmental organizations (NGO) conduct relief and reconstruction activities for the victims of conflicts and large-scale disasters from a humanitarian perspective and from the viewpoint of stabilizing affected countries.

Japan, in a bid to fulfill a role commensurate with its international status and responsibilities, has been cooperating both in terms of funding and personnel, with global efforts being led mainly by the United Nations to build a peaceful and stable international community.

In order to improve global security environment, based on the International Peace Cooperation Law, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF are actively engaging in international peace cooperation activities.

1. Outline of International Peace Cooperation Law

The International Peace Cooperation Law, enacted in 1992, is designed to allow Japan to actively contribute to global efforts led mainly by the United Nations to achieve international peace by establishing a structure for Japan to appropriately and swiftly cooperate in ① U.N. peacekeeping operations[1], ② humanitarian international relief operations[2], and ③ international election monitoring activities. The law also enables Japan to implement measures for providing assistance in the form of supplies in response to each of the three activities listed above.

The law stipulates a set of basic guidelines (so-called five principles for participation) for Japan's participation in a U.N. peacekeeping force.

(See Figs. III-3-4-3, 4)

See References 22, 23

2. The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)

In Sudan, the Sudanese Government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005. Based upon this agreement, UNMIS was formed to support the implementation of the CPA, and to facilitate and coordinate the return of refugees and internally displaced people to their homes. In addition to the military section that monitored the ceasefire, etc., UNMIS had a civilian component in charge of election support and humanitarian assistance coordination. UNMIS was a multi-functional, large-scale U.N. peacekeeping operation involving more than 10,000 people.

The Cabinet decided to dispatch SDF personnel to UNMIS headquarters, with two SDF officers dispatched to serve as members of UNMIS headquarters (logistics[3] staff and intelligence staff) from October 2008; UNMIS ended its mission in July 2011, when South Sudan became independent.

The strong sense of discipline and sense of responsibility of the officers dispatched, and their faithful execution of their duties were highly praised by UNMIS personnel on the ground.

3. United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)

(1) Background to the decision to dispatch personnel to UNMISS

In response to the independence of South Sudan, the United Nations Security Council adopted United Nations Security Council Resolution 1996, with the objective of consolidating peace and security and helping to establish conditions for development of South Sudan, from the perspective of strengthening the capacity of the Government of South Sudan to govern effectively and democratically and to establish good relationships with neighboring countries; as a result, the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) was established on July 9, 2011.

In August 2011, during a visit to Japan, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon asked then-Prime Minister Kan to cooperate with UNMISS, particularly in the dispatch of GSDF engineer units. The Government conducted a number of field investigations in South Sudan, Uganda and Kenya, from late September to late October 2011. In November 2011, a Cabinet decision was made to dispatch two personnel to serve at the headquarters (logistics staff and intelligence staff), and in December the same year, the Cabinet decided to dispatch SDF engineer unit and a Coordination Center to UNMISS, as well as an additional personnel to serve at the headquarters (engineer staff).

The newly-independent state of South Sudan is located in Central Africa and shares borders with six countries, such as Sudan, so peace and stability of the country is essential for stability of Africa as a

whole; moreover, it is a crucial issue that should be dealt with by the international community. Accordingly, it is necessary for Japan to cooperate in building up the nation, as the Ministry of Defense and SDF have previous experience accumulated through the peacekeeping operations carried out to date, and we believe that it is possible for Japan to make its mark in the nation building of South Sudan, by providing personnel-based cooperation in infrastructure development, in response to the high hopes held by the United Nations.

Moreover, the mission to South Sudan fulfills one of the roles of a dynamic defense as set forth in the New NDPG, namely that of improving the global security environment, as well as providing opportunities to demonstrate to other countries, etc. the high level of capability of the SDF, including its strict discipline, thereby increasing trust in Japan.

Thus, dispatching the SDF to UNMISS is of profound significance, and when Japan decided to dispatch units, many international organizations and countries welcomed this decision and expressed their great hopes for the mission.

(See Fig. III-3-4-5)

(2) Activities by the Self-Defense Forces

In response to the Cabinet decision on December 20, 2011, the Minister of Defense issued the order for the dispatch of the SDF units, including the engineer unit, which began to be deployed in January 2012.

The dispatched units consist of Coordination Center and engineer unit. Since January 2012, the Coordination Center has been in Uganda and the South Sudanese capital city Juba, coordinating the activities that the dispatched engineer unit will carry out. This Coordination Center is the first such initiative in the history of the SDF's peacekeeping operations. It is thought that, the Coordination Center will make it possible for Japan to engage more proactively than hitherto, by such means as forming proposals for the activities to be undertaken by the SDF troops; it is also believed that, by extension, Japan will be able to provide more effective cooperation in supporting nation building, which is one of the characteristics of UNMISS.

With regard to the dispatched engineer unit, the first unit (approximately 210 personnel), consisting mainly of personnel from the Central Readiness Regiment, began to be deployed in January 2012; while constructing an encampment within the United Nations facility adjacent to Juba Airport, they made preparations to carry out activities, with activities focused on the development of facilities beginning in March the same year, including the installation of drainage facilities within the United Nations facility. The deployment of units and transport of equipment and materials to South Sudan was carried out smoothly, through a combination of civilian sector transport capacity and ASDF transport aircraft, and the deployment of the personnel for the first unit was completed by the end of March 2012. From April 2012,

activities outside the United Nations facility began, in the form of the development of an access road to the water supply point at the Bahr al Jabal River.
On May 11, 2012, the Minister of Defense issued the order for the dispatch of the second SDF unit. The second engineer unit consists of around 330 personnel, and will continue to carry out activities in and around Juba for the time being.
(See Figs. III-3-4-6, 7)

(3) Characteristics of the UNMISS deployment

Consolidating peace and stability and establishing environment for nation building in South Sudan are part of the missions of UNMISS; the infrastructure that will serve as the cornerstone of the country's development has not yet been sufficient. Accordingly, it is anticipated that Japan will make a contribution to the self-sustaining development of South Sudan through infrastructure development that utilizes the expertise of the SDF. Moreover, this deployment involves activities in inland areas of Africa, so as well as overcoming the environment in Africa, which differs from that in Japan, it is necessary to maintain long-distance transport activities using the various means of transport offered by the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, in order to deploy the units and provide them with logistical support. Executing these duties will help the SDF improve their capabilities further.
(See Fig. III-3-4-8)

4. United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)

(1) Background of Dispatch to UNMIT

Timor-Leste had been a scene of conflicts for its independence for years, but in April 1999 a peace consensus was reached, and successive U.N. missions were established. Timor-Leste became independent in May 2002. In 2006, however, the security situation deteriorated again, so the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) was established in August 2006 with the objective of restoring and maintaining stability.
In- May 2010, the Government received a request for the dispatch of military liaison officers from the U.N. to UNMIT, and in September the same year, the dispatch was decided at a Cabinet meeting. As a result, Japan dispatched two GSDF officials to UNMIT as liaison officers.
(See Fig. III-3-4-9)
(See Fig. III-3-3-5) (Map of Timor-Leste and the Surrounding Areas)

(2) Activities Implemented by Dispatched Personnel

UNMIT was established to restore and maintain public order. Under this mission, civilian police officers provide local police with assistance through training and other activities while military liaison officers monitor the security situation until the national police have been reconstructed. As of the end of May 2012, the scale of UNMIT encompasses 1,242 civilian police officers and 33 military liaison officers. As part of this mission, the two military liaison officers dispatched by Japan participate in unarmed operations are deployed in various zones across Timor-Leste to visit leaders of local administrative bodies, the international security forces deployed by Australia and New Zealand, the national forces of Timor-Leste, the national police, and the national armed forces of Indonesia in order to collect intelligence on issues such as the security situation in Timor-Leste, and the state of the economy, education, medical care, and social infrastructure.

The fourth personnel took over duties in March 2012 and, as of the end of June 2012, is engaged in activities on the ground in Timor-Leste.

5. United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)

(1) Background of Dispatch to MINUSTAH

A major earthquake struck Haiti in January 2010, causing the deaths of over 300,000 people. In response, Japan dispatched a Japan Disaster Relief Medical Team the day after the disaster, consisting primarily of civilian doctors, as well as the SDF international disaster relief medical unit.

The same month, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1908 to increase the strength of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) to support efforts for immediate recovery, reconstruction, and stability following the earthquake, and requested member states to dispatch troops. Japan responded to the United Nations that it was prepared to dispatch an SDF engineer unit to the mission. After receiving a formal request from the UN to dispatch SDF engineer unit, the Japanese Government decided to dispatch GSDF engineer unit (approximately 350 personnel) to MINUSTAH, as well as two personnel to serve at the MINUSTAH headquarters (logistics staff and engineer staff), with Cabinet approval in February the same year. (As of the end of May 2012, logistics staff and engineer staff were deployed.)

(See Figs. III-3-4-10, 11, 12)

(2) SDF Activities

The first personnel, which was organized primarily from the GSDF Central Readiness Force, began to deploy from Japan to the disaster site after the order was issued the following day, February 6, 2010. The

first personnel began its relief operation as one of the U.N. PKO units on February 16.

Past operations for participation of SDF troops in U.N. PKO have required a preparation period of several months. In this case, however, the first detachment departed from Japan approximately two weeks after the Minister of Defense issued instructions for launch of dispatch preparations. Such a speedy dispatch was made possible by 1) the fact that an SDF medical unit engaged in international disaster relief operations in Haiti provided a clear picture of the situation on the ground; 2) the experience accumulated through numerous overseas missions; and 3) the fact that the unit was organized primarily from troops of the GSDF Central Readiness Force, which implements drills for swift dispatch and advance preparation activities, including inoculation, on a daily basis.

The GSDF unit began its relief operation as one of the U.N. PKO units, while constructing their own camp adjacent to the combined campsite of the PKO troops in Port au Prince, the capital of Haiti. As of the end of June 2012, the operation is still continuing. The deployment of the units in Haiti was carried out smoothly through private transportation means, as well as aircraft including ASDF C-130 military transport aircraft.

The GSDF unit is equipped with heavy machinery such as bulldozers, and is assigned with recovery and reconstruction tasks, such as removal of the massive amounts of rubble from the earthquake, building and repairing camps for evacuees, repair of roads along the border with the Dominican Republic, disposal of the rubble from city roads and destroyed government buildings, and construction of facilities for orphaned children. Haitian people from the disaster-stricken areas and U.N. officials have expressed their gratitude for the industrious efforts of the personnel.

Moreover, the unit has been cooperating with the forces of other countries in the recovery and reconstruction support efforts in Haiti. For example, they have been working in partnership with forces from ROK in operations for dismantling of schools and medical centers and removal of rubble, and have also engaged in exchange activities, such as mutual camp visits. The unit has also been cooperating with Brazilian, Chilean, and Ecuadorian engineer units. Regarding the relations with the U.S. forces, the SDF has, as a member of MINUSTAH, participated in and cooperated in humanitarian assistance initiatives of the U.S. forces, engaged in dispatch and replacement of personnel, and has promoted operational cooperation and coordination such as in the use of U.S. bases in California as relay bases between Haiti and Japan.

In light of the fact that collaboration with NGOs and ODA is prescribed in the 2010 NDPG in order to respond efficiently and effectively to international peace cooperation activities, the unit attaches importance to collaboration with the U.N. and international organizations in carrying out its duties and engages in close exchanges of information with NGOs and other bodies at all times.

6. United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)

(1) Background of Dispatch to UNDOF

UNDOF is a U.N. peacekeeping force active in the Area of Separation (AOS) established in the Golan Heights following the agreed ceasefire between the Israeli and Syrian forces. Its function is to supervise the ceasefire between the two countries and the status of implementation of the disengagement agreement. The SDF provides logistic support to these activities.

For Japan, which imports most of its petrol supplies from the Middle East, the stability of this region is extremely important, and the participation in the UNDOF operations has the significance of humanitarian cooperation provided to the efforts of the international community for peace in the Middle East. It is also an important effort for fostering of human resources for international peace cooperation activities.

In December 1995, the Government of Japan decided to dispatch SDF unit, etc. to UNDOF, and the first transport unit composed of 43 members was dispatched to the Golan Heights in February 1996 to replace the transport unit of Canada. Since then, replacement teams have been dispatched every six months until February 2008, when the SDF changed the dispatch format to replacing only the team members while maintaining the unit, and reorganized the transport unit dispatched to the Golan Heights.

(See Figs. III-3-4-13, 14)

(2) SDF Activities

As of June 2012, the 33rd SDF transport unit is deployed and conducts transportation of daily commodities for UNDOF activities from ports, airports, markets and others to each camp. It also provides logistic support for repair of roads and snow clearing at mountainous ranges with an altitude of over 2,800 m. Since March 2006, the SDF transport unit has been sharing a camp with an Indian unit and has been implementing joint food provision operations. The ASDF dispatches C-130 military transport aircraft and U-4 multipurpose support aircraft once every six months to ship goods for the SDF transport unit. Moreover, three staff officers at UNDOF headquarters carry out planning and coordination relating to logistical support fields, such as transport, as well as duties relating to PR and budgeting for UNDOF activities. The staff officers are replaced every year or so and the 17th personnel is deployed as of the end of May 2012.

In consideration of strong requests from the U.N., coupled with the fact that the efforts of Japan’s personnel had been highly praised by both the United Nations and other countries, and the significance of such humanitarian cooperation for the Middle East peace process and others, the SDF unit has been engaged in UNDOF.

7. Dispatch of SDF Personnel to the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations

The Ministry of Defense/SDF dispatch one personnel member to the Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs of the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations[4] to proactively contribute to the U.N. efforts for international peace, and the experience gained by the dispatched personnel is leveraged for Japan's peacekeeping operations and others. The dispatched personnel member is involved in U.N. peacekeeping policy decision making, developing standards, and creating plans for a two-year period starting in January 2011.

See Reference 61

8. Dispatch of Instructors to the PKO Center in Africa

In order to assist in self-supporting endeavors by African countries to undertake peacekeeping operations, the Ministry of Defense and SDF dispatch lecturers to African peacekeeping training centers, in order to educate and train peacekeeping personnel; by strengthening the functions of these peacekeeping training centers, Japan is contributing to peace and stability in Africa. Starting with the deployment to the Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) in November 2008, a total of eight SDF personnel (six deployments in total), including one female SDF officer, were dispatched over the period to November 2011. As well as delivering lectures concerning the importance of building relationships with local residents in international peace cooperation activities and the international disaster relief activities that the SDF had experienced, the dispatched SDF personnel participated as instructors in table-top exercises related to peacekeeping operations; as a result, they were highly commended by local staff as well as the audience.

(See Fig. III-3-4-15)

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1 Conflict-related activities carried out under the jurisdiction of the United Nations based on a U.N. Resolution to maintain international peace and stability including ensuring the observance of agreements between combatants regarding the prevention of the recurrence of armed conflict, support for the establishment of governing bodies through democratic means carried out following the end of conflict, and others

2 Activities being conducted by the United Nations, other international organizations, or countries based on a humanitarian spirit for the relief of victims of military conflicts, and reconstruction activities in connection with war-related damage. Such activities are initiated in accordance with a U.N. Security Council Resolution or requests from international organizations

3 A general term that refers to functions that support combat, and that maintain and enhance the fighting capabilities of units, such as supply, equipment, retrieval, transport, hygiene, construction, real estate, labor, and staff work

4 Since the legal framework for the dispatch of (then) Defense Agency personnel to the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping with the revision of the (then) "Act on Treatment of Personnel of the Defense Agency Dispatched to International Organizations, etc." (Law Number 122 of 1995) in November 2001, an individual from the GSDF was dispatched from December 2002 to June 2005, and from November 2005 to November 2008.

3. International Disaster Relief Operations

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF have engaged in global disaster relief operations proactively from the viewpoint of humanitarian contributions and improvement of the international security environment for the purpose of contributing to the advancement of international cooperation.

To this end, the SDF maintain their readiness to take any necessary action based on prepared disaster relief operation plans, whenever a situation in which their operations are deemed necessary arises. The SDF has been proactively conducting international disaster relief operations which fully utilize the capabilities of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, while taking into consideration specific relief requests by the governments of affected countries and disaster situations in these countries.

(See Fig. III-3-4-16)
See Reference 55

1. Outline of the Law concerning the Dispatch of International Disaster Relief Teams

Since the enactment of the International Disaster Relief Law[1] in 1987, Japan has engaged in international disaster relief activities in response to requests from the governments of affected countries and international organizations.

In 1992, the International Disaster Relief Law was amended to enable the SDF to participate in international disaster relief operations and to transport its personnel and equipment. Since then, the SDF has maintained its readiness for international disaster relief operations in an independent manner with the use of its own equipment, organizations, and the benefits of regular training.

See Reference 22

2. International Disaster Relief Operations by the SDF and the SDF's Posture

Judging from the past experience of SDF dispatched to various disaster sites in Japan, the SDF's capabilities in international disaster relief operations encompass 1) medical services, such as first-aid medical treatment and epidemic prevention, 2) transport of goods, patients, and disaster relief personnel by helicopter, and 3) ensuring water supplies using water-purifying devices. Also, the SDF uses transport planes and transport ships to carry disaster relief personnel and equipment to the affected area. International disaster relief operations conducted by the SDF may take different forms according to factors such as the scale of the disaster, the degree of damage, and the requests of the governments of affected countries or international organizations. For example, it provided air transport and medical support after the major earthquake in Haiti in January 2010, after receiving a request from the Government of Haiti and consultations with the Foreign Minister.

The Central Readiness Force and regional units of the GSDF maintain their readiness to ensure that they can carry out international disaster relief operations in an independent manner anytime the need arises. The MSDF and ASDF maintain their readiness to dispatch fleet and air support units, respectively, to transport supplies to units participating in international disaster relief operations, including their own, as the need for disaster relief arises.

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[1] The Law concerning the Dispatch of International Disaster Relief Teams
See <http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S62/S62HO093.html>

Part III Measures for the Defense of Japan

Chapter 3 Multi-layered Security Cooperation with the International Community

Section 5 Looking Back Over 20 Years of International Cooperation by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF

Over the two decades that have passed since the dispatch of minesweepers to the Persian Gulf in 1991, the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces have conducted a variety of activities in various areas of the globe, including United Nations peacekeeping operations and international disaster relief activities. In conducting such activities more proactively in the future, it will be necessary to make even greater efforts to secure the understanding of the Japanese people concerning the importance of international cooperation on the part of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF. Accordingly, this section looks back over the 20 years since the Ministry of Defense and the SDF commenced international cooperation and explains the advances made within the international community.

1. The Path of International Cooperation by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF

In April 1991, after the Gulf War, a Maritime Self-Defense Force minesweeping unit was dispatched to the Persian Gulf. It was the first time since the establishment of the Self-Defense Forces that they got involved in activities within the international community. In addition to the goal of ensuring the safety of Japanese marine vessels navigating in that area, this dispatch was significant as a kind of international contribution and international cooperation in the form of personnel, with the peaceful, humanitarian objective of reconstructing a disaster-stricken country.

About 20 years have passed since then, but during this time, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have engaged in a variety of activities in the international community, carrying out their assigned duties by trial and error amid harsh environments, and have built up an excellent reputation, both within Japan and overseas.

Amid the international environment since the end of the Cold War, the provision for more assistance in United Nations peacekeeping operations and greater international cooperation in rescue activities following large-scale disasters overseas became a national issue in Japan. In order to make a more active international contribution, particularly in the form of personnel, the Government undertook various deliberations and in the autumn of 1991, it submitted to the Diet the International Peace Cooperation Bill and the reform bill concerning the Act on Dispatchment of the Japan Disaster Relief Team, which would pave the way for the SDF to undertake international peace cooperation activities.

Various discussions took place regarding these bills and, after the International Peace Cooperation Bill was partially revised, both laws were enacted in 1992; in June the same year, based on the International Peace Cooperation Act[1], the Japan Defense Agency (as it was at the time) dispatched a Ground

Self-Defense Force engineer unit to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), which was the first time that the Self-Defense Forces had participated in United Nations peacekeeping operations. One can say that this marked the beginning of a new era in Japan's endeavors focused on international peace. The deployment in Cambodia was the first experience of international peace and cooperation activities for the SDF and although there were aspects in the preparations and actual implementation of duties where they were effectively feeling their way in the dark, they were able to achieve great things in their duties, including the repair of roads and bridges. Thus, it can be said that the skills, experience and organizational functions of the SDF, which had been cultivated through rigorous training around the clock in order to enable them to fulfill their fundamental duty of defending the nation, were also adequately utilized in the arena of international cooperation.

Since then, up to the end of May 2012, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have undertaken a total of 14 international peace and cooperation operations, including those currently underway, in a range of places in the Middle East, Central America, Asia and Africa. Since the 1992 revision of the Act on Dispatchment of the Japan Disaster Relief Team, the SDF have also steadily built up a good record of international disaster relief activities, while making arrangements to enable them to fulfill their normal duties. In order to provide relief in the aftermath of the hurricane that hit the Central American country of Honduras in October 1998, it was decided to dispatch a SDF unit to provide medical care and prevent an epidemic. Although this was the first international disaster relief activity undertaken by the SDF, they responded to local requests amid harsh post-disaster conditions in that remote Central American location, and achieved splendid results for which both the Government of Honduras and the local people were grateful, so this can be said to have been an extremely significant first step.

Since then, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have been involved in a total of 13 operations to date in various parts of the world; moreover, in light of their actual achievements, the SDF have made successive improvements in their preparations, with the objective of achieving swifter dispatch and more effective relief activities.

At the same time as building up this solid record of achievement in United Nations peacekeeping operations and disaster relief activities, the SDF have also provided support and cooperation in the fields of logistics support and humanitarian and reconstruction assistance for initiatives occasionally required to be undertaken by the international community due to world affairs at certain times, where it has been determined that it is necessary for Japan to make a voluntary, proactive contribution while putting in place the institutional infrastructure; these activities have included cooperation with initiatives focused on dealing with international terrorism and initiatives aimed at the reconstruction of Iraq.

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, Japan has conducted counterterrorism initiatives in a variety of fields, one of which involved the MSDF engaging in mid-ocean refueling operations in the Indian Ocean to assist ships from countries engaging in counterterrorism activities, including the U.S., the U.K., France, Germany and Pakistan; these activities were based on the former Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law[2]

(known as the former Replenishment Support Special Measures Law[3] after the act was revoked). Such activities carried out by various countries in order to prevent the movement of terrorists or narcotics have been somewhat effective in restricting the freedom of movement of terrorists within Afghanistan, as well as constraining their activities, such as the procurement of supplies and funding. In addition, these activities have confirmed that the mid-ocean refueling technology of the MSDF is extremely reliable; moreover, they have made it possible to build up and share with a range of other countries know-how and knowledge concerning various operations, as well as improving the ability to carry out continuous mid-ocean refueling over long periods of time.

See References 56, 57

Since May 2003, in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 and the subsequent Security Council resolutions, the international community has been actively supporting the reconstruction of Iraq.

Based on the former Action Special Measures concerning Humanitarian Relief and Reconstruction work Security Assistance in Iraq[4] enacted in July the same year, Japan dispatched SDF units to Iraq between December 2003 and December 2008. The SDF have provided support through medical care, the supply of water, the restoration and reconstruction of public facilities such as schools and roads, and the transportation of humanitarian and reconstruction supplies, and have contributed to initiatives aimed at the autonomous reconstruction of Iraq. Moreover, to provide cooperation in the reconstruction and stability of Iraq, ASDF units have provided airlift support for GSDF units, United Nations personnel and Multi-National Force troops dispatched to Muthanna Province. Such cooperation by Japan in the reconstruction of Iraq has been highly praised by both the international community and the people of Iraq, and has been significant not only because it has increased trust in Japan, but also because conducting activities in partnership with the USA has made US-Japan cooperation in the field of security even closer and more effective.

See Reference 58

As well as initiatives that are required of Japan as a member of the international community, there are activities that Japan must deal with from the perspective of maintaining public order by protecting the lives or property of the populace. Since 2008, the number of cases of piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden has increased sharply and it has become a major international problem. Amid this situation, there have been instances of pirate attacks on Japanese-affiliated vessels, so the Ministry of Defense and the SDF dispatched two destroyers in March 2009, followed by two P-3C maritime patrol aircraft in May the same year, in order to escort civilian vessels in those waters, and began warning and surveillance activities in the area; since July 2009, these activities have continued on the basis of the Anti-Piracy Measures Act. In light of the severe threat that acts of piracy pose to the maintenance of public safety and order on the sea, these activities are being carried out because Japan believes that it is necessary to actively fulfill our international responsibilities, as well as maintaining public safety and

order on the sea for ourselves; accordingly, in terms of engaging in international cooperation and making an international contribution in the form of personnel, these activities have a similar significance to the dispatch of the MSDF minesweeping unit to the Persian Gulf.

(See Fig. III-3-5-1)

2. Overview on Reaching 20 Years Since the Commencement of International Cooperation

As outlined above, during the two decades or so since the MSDF minesweeping unit was dispatched to the Persian Gulf, the SDF have undertaken various activities, including peacekeeping operations and other international peace cooperation activities, as well as anti-piracy activities. Over these 20 years, both the content and the location of the activities of the Self-Defense Forces as part of the international community have expanded. Moreover, through these activities, Japan has built up a high reputation - both within Japan and overseas - for contributing to the maintenance of peace and safety of the international community, while also accumulating experience in joint operations, such as conducting transport operations and working as part of a team composed of ground, maritime and air units, and striving to improve the abilities of our own units by making successive improvements to unit dispatch arrangements and systems. In peacekeeping operations, while conducting activities in collaboration with units from other countries, such as the U.S., not only have Japanese forces been highly praised for their abilities, but these activities have also contributed to increasing trust in Japan. We in the Ministry of Defense and the SDF will endeavor to be even more proactive in our activities in the international community, while continuing to seek understanding and support, both within Japan and overseas[5].

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1 Act on Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations
See <http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_J/data/law/law_data02.html>

2 Act on Special Measures concerning Measures Taken by Japan in Support of the Activities of Foreign Countries Aiming to Achieve the Purposes of the Charter of the United Nations in Response to the Terrorist Attacks Which Took Place on 11 September 2001 in the United States of America as well as concerning Humanitarian Measures Based on Relevant Resolutions of the United Nations
See <http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/hourei/houritu/tero_h.html>

3 Act on Special Measures concerning Implementation of Replenishment Support Activities towards the Anti-Terrorism Maritime Interdiction Operation
See <http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/hourei/houritu/kyuuyu_sinpou.pdf>

4 Act on Special Measures concerning Humanitarian Relief and Reconstruction Work and Security Assistance in Iraq
See <http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/hourei/houritu/iraq_h.html>

5 In order to seek the understanding of the populace regarding the importance of international cooperation, the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces held the Symposium Commemorating 20 Years of International Cooperation by the Self-Defense Forces in December 2011.

Part III Measures for Defense of Japan

Chapter 3 Multi-layered Security Cooperation with the International Community

Section 6 Efforts for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation

In recent years, a strong awareness has developed concerning the risks posed by weapons of mass destruction, the missiles that serve as their means of delivery, and related equipment and materials proliferating among terrorists and countries of concern. Accordingly, non-proliferation efforts for controlling this situation and strictly regulating exports have become an urgent challenge to maintain the peace and stability of today's international community.

Moreover, from a humanitarian perspective, there is growing international public opinion that certain conventional weapons should also be regulated. For this reason, dealing with the issue of regulating certain conventional weapons while taking into account the need to maintain the balance with defensive requirements has become an important challenge for each country.

One effort to deal with these issues is the development of a framework for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, based on cooperation between countries.

(See Fig. III-3-6-1)

In light of the above, Japan has been playing an active role in efforts to create a world without nuclear weapons by taking realistic and progressive measures for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation as well as in international endeavors for disarmament and non-proliferation relating to other weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that serve as their delivery systems, not to mention in the problem of regulating certain conventional weapons.

This section explains the commitments taken by the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces in regard to efforts on the part of international organizations, including the United Nations, for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.

1. Efforts on Treaties Relating to Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation in Regard to Weapons of Mass Destruction, etc.

1. Nuclear Weapons

From the perspective of strengthening disarmament and non-proliferation frameworks, Japan has been making continuous efforts aimed at the early enforcement of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the reinforcement of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Moreover, Japan is actively participating in meetings examining better ways to operate the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and in discussions held in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

See Reference 59

2. Biological / Chemical Weapons

(1) Efforts on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), etc.

In 1980, the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces started to dispatch experts in the field of chemical protection to the negotiations of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) when required. They made contributions toward drafting the convention as a member of the Japanese delegation. Moreover, since 1997 when the convention came into effect, Japan has dispatched GSDF experts on protection against chemical weapons to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), located in Hague the Netherlands, in order to implement the verification measures stipulated in the convention following its entry into force. Currently a Ground Self-Defense Force officer is serving there.

See References 60, 61

Small quantities of chemical substances subject to regulation under the convention are synthesized at the GSDF Chemical School (Saitama City), in order to conduct protection research. So the chemical school has undergone a total of eight inspections since its establishment, in accordance with the convention regulations.

Moreover, the whole government is working on projects aimed at disposing of abandoned chemical weapons in China, according to the CWC. The existence of abandoned chemical weapons has been confirmed over a wide area, from Heilongjiang Province in the north of China to Guangdong Province in the south; it is estimated that approximately 300,000 - 400,000 tons of chemical weapons abandoned by the former Japanese Army are still buried at Haerbaling District, in the city of Dunhua, Jilin Province. The Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces have seconded seven personnel, including Ground Self-Defense Force officers, to the Cabinet Office, which is in charge of disposing of the abandoned chemical weapons in accordance with the CWC. Since 2000, Ground Self-Defense Force specialists in chemicals and ammunition have been dispatched to the relevant sites for excavation and recovery projects on a total of 11 occasions. In 2011, from August to September, seven Self-Defense Force officers participated in an excavation and recovery project conducted by the Cabinet Office in the Lianhuapao district, Dunhua, Jilin Province, China, providing the Chinese workers with guidance concerning such matters as the identification of shells, checking whether or not pollution had occurred, and managing the safety of workers.

(2) Efforts on the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)

With regard to the Biological Weapons and Convention (BWC), The Ministry of Defense has sent medical officers and instructors who are experts in pharmaceutical and medical science to relevant meetings to work in cooperation to strengthen BWC.

(3) Efforts on the Australia Group (AG)

Since 1994, the Ministry of Defense has dispatched personnel to these meetings each year and cooperates in endeavors aimed at increasing the effectiveness of AG regulations and agreements.

3. Delivery Systems (Missiles)

Since 1992, the Ministry of Defense has dispatched personnel to the meetings of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) each year and cooperates in endeavors aimed at increasing the effectiveness of MTCR regulations and agreements.
See Reference 62

2. Efforts on Treaties Relating to Arms Control of Certain Conventional Weapons

1. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)

The CCW is a convention that prohibits or restricts the use of conventional weapons such as land mines, booby traps, incendiary weapons and laser weapons that are considered to be excessively injurious or whose effects are indiscriminate; as well as the framework convention stipulating procedural matters, it consists of five additional protocols, each focused on a different type of weapon. Japan has adopted Protocols I-IV.
Regarding the CCW, discussions continued to deal with problems associated with unexploded ordnance, particularly cluster munitions (ammunition containing multiple sub-munitions in themselves), and at the Meeting of the CCW States Parties in November 2007, it was decided to conduct negotiations aimed at swiftly addressing humanitarian concerns regarding cluster munitions. However, discussions ended at the meeting in November 2011, without reaching an agreement.
With regard to the problem of cluster munitions regulations, as well as efforts for the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Japan believes that it is important to formulate an effective protocol regarding cluster munitions within the CCW framework, in which countries that are major producers and owners of cluster munitions - including the United States, China and Russia - participate; accordingly, in the future, Japan will continue to actively contribute to negotiations once a decision on renegotiation has been made.

2. Convention on Cluster Munitions

Outside the CCW framework, as a result of negotiations in 2008 at a series of international conferences (Oslo Process)[1] with the objective of formulating an international agreement prescribing the prohibition of cluster munitions, the Convention on Cluster Munitions[2] was adopted by 107 participating countries, including Japan, in May 2008. In December the same year, 94 countries including Japan signed the convention in Oslo, and Japan submitted the acceptance of the convention in July 2009.

In February 2010, the 30th instrument of ratification, etc. required to make the convention effective was deposited with the United Nations Secretary-General and the convention entered into force on August 1 that year. As a result, the use, etc. of all Cluster Munitions in the possession of the Self-Defense Forces was immediately prohibited. Meanwhile, however, countries such as the United States, China and Russia, which are major producers and owners of cluster munitions, have not yet signed the convention.

At present, in order to ensure the security of Japan, the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces are introducing precision-guided equipment to immediately supplement some of the functions of cluster munitions.

Moreover, it is prescribed that all cluster munitions held by signatories be destroyed within eight years after the convention enters into force, in principle. Therefore we are safely and steadily disposing of the stockpiles.

3. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa Treaty)

International interest in the problem of anti-personnel mines began to increase from 1999. In 1999, the Ottawa Treaty entered into force and the number of signatories of the treaty has currently reached 156.

By February 2003, the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces had disposed of all anti-personnel mines, apart from the minimum exceptional stocks necessary for technological development and training in the detection and removal of land mines, as permitted under the treaty.

At the same time, in order to ensure the security of Japan, the Ministry is developing an anti-personnel obstacle system that includes directional fragmentation charges[3] as an alternative that does not constitute anti-personnel mines banned under the treaty and which does not pose any risk of harming civilians.

Moreover, only 13 out of the 26 countries participating in the ARF have concluded the treaty, so the Ministry of Defense takes every opportunity to lobby those ARF participants who have not yet concluded the treaty, to conclude it.

Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense actively cooperates in efforts of the international community, focused on the problem of anti-personnel mines, such as submitting annual reports including the data on

Japan's exceptional stocks to the United Nations[4].

See Reference 63

4. United Nations Register of Conventional Arms

As well as registering with the United Nations the number of items of equipment imported each year, the Ministry of Defense voluntarily provides information concerning its holdings domestic procurement of such equipment, as well as the domestic procurement of small arms and light weapons.

Moreover, the Ministry dispatches personnel as needed to governmental expert meetings held in order to improve and strengthen this system.

5. United Nations Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures

The United Nations Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures was established in 1980 with the objective of increasing transparency in regard to military expenditure and reducing the amount of such expenditure. There were three reporting categories: "Personnel, Operation and Maintenance", "Procurement and Construction", and "Research and Development"; the Ministry of Defense submitted its first report in 1982 and has been reporting annually since 1997.

On the other hand, rather than being a means of reducing military expenditure, this system has resulted in a heightened awareness of its effectiveness, as a means of increasing transparency, so in November 2010, for the first time since the system was established, a meeting of governmental experts was held concerning this instrument and discussions took place regarding the revision of the instrument. In order to ensure the effectiveness of this system as an international confidence-building measure, it is important to increase the number of participating countries and improving the quality of the information provided, so, following deliberations at a number of meetings, recommendations for the revision of the report forms, etc. were drawn up at the third meeting of the Group of Governmental Experts, which took place in May 2011; as a result, from 2012, the forms were changed to incorporate four categories: Personnel, Operations and Maintenance, Procurement and Construction, and Research and Development[5].

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1 As well as Norway, this process was initiated by the sponsor countries (such as Peru, Austria, New Zealand and Ireland) and NGOs, and many developing countries in Central and South America and Africa are also participants in the process

2 See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/treaty/pdfs/shomei_37.pdf>

3 Explosives used in anti-infantry combat to obstruct the approach of enemy infantry. In order to ensure that civilians are not harmed indiscriminately, soldiers activate these visually recognizing a target, and they are not designed to explode due to the presence of, approach by or contact with a person.

4 Between 1999 and December 2006, the Ministry of Defense nominated retired Self-Defense Officials to the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), to support anti-personnel mine removal activities in Cambodia; these retired Self-Defense Force members were dispatched to the Cambodian

Mine Action Center (CMAC) as maintenance and transport advisors within JICA's long-term expert dispatch framework.

5 As a result of this revision, problems with the Standardized Reporting Form and the Simplified Reporting Form - particularly the fact that disparities emerged in the total amount of expenditure due to a lack of consistency between these two forms - were improved. And also, reporting categories that were difficult to complete due to the various circumstances of each country were rethought, making the forms more user-friendly. As a result, it is anticipated that the quality of the reported content and the number of participating countries will increase.

3. International Initiatives Aimed at Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, etc.

1. Security initiatives focused on proliferation

(1) The Background to Formation

In December 2002, the USA, which had grave concerns about the development of weapons of mass destruction and missiles by countries of particular concern in regard to proliferation, such as North Korea and Iran, announced its National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, which advocated a comprehensive approach focused on three main pillars: nonproliferation, counter-proliferation, and management of the consequences of the use of weapons of mass destruction.

As part of this, in May 2003, the U.S. announced its Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)[1]; as a result of the U.S. seeking the participation of other countries, it has become an international initiative supported by approximately 100 countries, including Japan, as of June 2012.

Under this initiative, 37 PSI interdiction exercises have been held as of the end of June 2012, in order to improve the ability of participating countries to thwart the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, etc.; the initiative also encompasses meetings held to consider various issues relating to policy and legislation.

(2) Initiatives to Date by the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces

The Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces believe that it is necessary to collaborate with relevant organizations and countries and utilize the abilities of the Self-Defense Forces in order to participate in PSI. Accordingly, since the 3rd PSI Meeting in Paris (September 2003), as well as dispatching Ministry of Defense staff, including Uniforms, to the various meetings, the Ministry has also dispatched observers to PSI interdiction exercises conducted overseas and sought to gather relevant information, and since 2004, Japan has continuously participated in these exercises.

To date, Japan has held PSI maritime interdiction exercises twice with the collaboration of relevant organizations, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Police Agency, the Ministry of

Finance and the Japan Coast Guard. In addition, Japan will hold PSI air interdiction exercise for the first time in July 2012. In light of the cases of proliferation in areas surrounding Japan, the Ministry of Defense sees PSI as a security question that encompasses a broad range of issues, including defense, diplomacy, law enforcement and export controls, so we believe that it is necessary to strive constantly to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, etc. Accordingly, the Ministry will continue to devote its energies to activities aimed at strengthening nonproliferation frameworks, including PSI, as well as participating in and holding various meetings and exercises, with the objective of improving the ability of the Self-Defense Forces to deal with such matters.
(See Fig. III-3-6-2)

2. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 Regarding the Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

In April 2004, based on Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 Regarding the Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, concerning appropriate, effective action to deal with the threat posed to the peace and safety of the international community by the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery; the content of the resolution included the following:

(1) That States should refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, etc. weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery;

(2) That States should adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit the manufacture, etc. of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery by terrorists in particular; and

(3) That States should establish border controls and export control measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

In light of the risk posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, etc. to the peace and stability of the international community, including ourselves, Japan supports the adoption of this resolution, based on the awareness that preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, etc. amongst non-State actors such as terrorists is a pressing issue for the international community, and hopes that all United Nations member countries will comply with this resolution.

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[1] The Proliferation Security Initiative is an initiative that seeks the strengthening of relevant domestic

laws by each country, as far as possible, as well as considering the measures that participating countries can take jointly while complying with existing domestic and international laws, in order to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related materials, etc.

Part III Measures for Defense of Japan

Chapter 4 The Relationship between the Japanese People and the Ministry of Defense and the SDF

"Defense capability" is the last bastion in defending the safety of the country, and no realistic alternative exists to replace it.

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF, which bear the responsibility for Japan's defense capability, are made up of many different organizations, but in order for those organizations to fully exercise their functions, not only must they possess personnel with excellent capabilities and cutting-edge equipment and systems, but also the basic foundations for these, in the form of the technological capability to create such equipment and systems. Moreover, securing the understanding and cooperation of the populace and the local community regarding the efforts of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF is absolutely essential.

From this standpoint, Section 1 of this chapter explains the organizational structure of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF and "the human foundation" such as hiring of personnel, training and exercises, and human resources policy. Section 2 explains issues and efforts regarding the acquisition and preparation of equipment used by the SDF. Finally, Section 3 explains the various activities of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF that are being carried out with local communities and the country to obtain the understanding and cooperation of the populace.

Section 1 The Human Foundation and Organization That Supports the Defense Force

For the Ministry of Defense and SDF, which play the most fundamental role in Japan's existence, namely its defense, it is absolutely vital to enhance the organization and "human foundation" that support its ability to demonstrate its defense capability to the fullest extent possible.

After describing the organization of the MOD/SDF, this section explains the efforts being made to enhance the "human foundation", such as the recruiting and hiring of SDF personnel, as well as day-to-day education and training.

1. The Organizational Structure Supporting Defense Capability

1. The Organization of the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces

To fulfill their mission of defending Japan, the MOD/SDF[1] consist of various organizations, including not only the Ground, Maritime and Air Self Defense Forces, but also a number of other organizations including the National Defense Academy, National Defense Medical College, National Institute for Defense Studies, Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH), Technical Research and Development Institute (TRDI), Equipment Procurement and Construction Office, and the Inspector General's Office of

Legal Compliance.
(See Figs. III-4-1-1, 2)

2. Systems to Support the Minister of Defense

The Minister of Defense is responsible for issues related to the defense of Japan as the head of the Ministry of Defense and is in overall charge of the SDF in accordance with the provisions of the Self-Defense Forces Act. The Minister is supported by the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense and two Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense. There are also Special Advisors to the Minister of Defense who advise the Minister of Defense and the Defense Council in deliberations concerning general policies related to the MOD. Furthermore, there is an Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense who organizes and supervises administrative affairs to support the Minister of Defense.
In addition, in order to enhance the support system for political appointees led by the Minister of Defense, the "Administrative Deputy Minister of Defense"[2] is to be created in FY2012 who will carry out the overall coordination of duties concerning external relations at the Ministry of Defense.
Moreover, the Internal Bureau, Joint Staff, the Ground Staff Office, Maritime Staff Office and Air Staff Office have been established as organizations to support the Minister of Defense. The Internal Bureau is responsible for basic policies relating to the work of the SDF. The Directors-General of the Bureaus, as part of their own responsibilities, support the Minister of Defense when the Minister of Defense gives instructions and authorization to the Chief of Joint Staff and the Chiefs of Ground Staff, Maritime Staff, and Air Staff. The Joint Staff is a staff organization for the Minister of Defense concerning SDF operations. The Chief of Joint Staff supports the Minister of Defense by providing unified military expert advice on SDF operations. The Ground Staff, Maritime Staff, and Air Staff are the staff organizations for the Minister of Defense concerning their respective services except operations of the SDF, with the Chiefs of Staff for the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF acting as the top-ranking expert advisors to the Minister of Defense regarding these services.
See Part II, Chapter 1, Section 3

3. Base of Defense Administration in Regional Areas

The relationship between the Ministry of Defense and local communities is crucial from the standpoints of disaster response, efforts to protect the populace, and the stable utilization of defense facilities. Consequently, in September 2007, the Ministry of Defense established Regional Defense Bureaus as local branch offices to create a base for comprehensive defense administration in regional areas.
In order to smoothly and efficiently carry out general administrative duties pertaining to the Ministry of Defense, the Regional Defense Bureaus carry out various duties focused on explaining the Ministry's

measures and US military reorganizations to local citizens, as well as implementing coordination with the local community in relation to the development of defense facilities (administration relating to securing regional cooperation), thereby obtaining the understanding and cooperation of both local government and local citizens.

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[1] The Ministry of Defense and the SDF form a single organization for national defense. Whereas the term "Ministry of Defense" refers to the administrative aspects of the organization which manages the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, the term "SDF" refers to the operational aspects of the organizations whose mission is the defense of Japan.

[2] With the changes in the security situation, the functions of MOD/SDF, as a policy-making government ministry especially to handle foreign affairs, have been increased. In response to these changes, the Administrative Deputy Minister of Defense is to be established as the new position that collectively coordinates the affairs beyond the boundaries of bureaus in Ministry of Defense at a high level and steadily negotiates with top-level government officials from the U.S. and other countries about important policies that involve the Ministry as a whole.

2. Reform of the Ministry of Defense

1. Background of the Reform

The purpose of the reform of the Ministry of Defense (MOD reform) is to secure the public trust and shape the MOD as an organization that is capable of adequately performing the missions assigned to it. The MOD has made every effort to this end, such as the prevention of scandals and the reorganization of the central organization.

As a reaction to the numerous scandals which damaged public trust in the MOD/SDF in recent years, the Council for MOD Reform took place in the Prime Minister's Office several times in 2007, and a report was submitted in 2008. In accordance with the basic directions stipulated in this report, the MOD made various efforts aimed at MOD reform, including thorough adherence to rules and regulations, and the establishment of operational management that prioritizes the execution of duties, with the aim of total optimization, as well as the establishment in law of the Defense Council and the Special Advisor to the Minister of Defense, in order to strengthen civilian control.

See Reference 69

2. Principles of MOD Reform Under the New Administration

After the administration change in September 2009, the new administration decided to reconsider MOD reform from the new administration's perspective. In order to realize new MOD reforms under the new administration, the political appointees, headed by the Minister of Defense, examined the MOD reform plans made under the former administration and also held meetings with experts. In June 2010, "Direction

by the Minister of Defense on MOD Reform (Pillars of Deliberation)", which presents the new direction of MOD reforms under the new administration, was promulgated.

The outline of "Pillars of Deliberation" is as follows:

In promoting MOD reform, the new government must, of course, not only work from the perspective of preventing any recurrence of scandals, but also further advance reform from the viewpoint of effectively and efficiently promoting defense administration in response to the environment surrounding the MOD, while ensuring the effectiveness of civilian control.

(1) Reform of the Central Organization

Civilian control is the foundation of the defense policy, and to secure this, a support system is required in which the Minister of Defense, the principal instrument of civilian control and a policy-maker, is supported by civil and SDF personnel, each of whom makes full use of their expertise to achieve this mission. It is considered adequate in this light to employ a structure in which internal bureaus collect opinions of the Ministry, while the Minister listens to the opinions from the civilian and SDF personnel which reflect their expertise. From this perspective, new deliberations should take place concerning the unification of the internal bureaus and the staff offices, as well as the integration of civilian and SDF personnel, in the areas of operational and defense planning divisions.

At the same time, deliberations will take place aimed at rectifying defects stemming from the two-dimensional organizational structure, in the form of the internal bureaus and staff offices. In the operational division, in order to avoid the duplication of duties with the internal bureaus and staff offices, and ensure cooperation between civilian and SDF officials, while speeding up the decision-making process, deliberations will take place concerning approaches to duties, while carrying out simulations for each situation. Moreover, in the defense planning divisions, consideration will be given to approaches to duties aimed at constructing truly practical defense capability, while taking into account endeavors to make defense planning more efficient and avoid budget rigidity.

(2) Procurement Reform

Comprehensive discussions should be made to ensure fair contracts and transparency of transactions, and moreover to duly consider the procurement and maintenance of equipment, and securing of infrastructure of the defense industry and technology base.

(3) Securing and Developing Human Resources

Deliberations should be focused on measures to secure high quality personnel and develop them to be

equipped with an ethical mind, a broad viewpoint, and high levels of discipline.

(4) Handling of Measures Implemented in the Past to Prevent Scandals

The measures to prevent scandals implemented in the past should continue to be carried out. In addition, deliberations should also be made concerning the necessity of further measures based on recent cases of scandals in the MOD/SDF.
See Reference 70

3. Current Progress

In order to promote MOD reform in accordance with the "Pillars of Deliberation," the "Council for the Promotion of MOD Reform" was established and first held in August 2010 as a ministry-wide framework to promote reform encompassing internal bureaus and each Staff Office, as well as the political appointees and the Special Advisor to the Minister of Defense. At the first meeting, specific measures were organized based on the "Pillars of Deliberation." (See Fig. III-4-1-3)
The MOD is now making efforts to achieve specific measures organized at the Council for the Promotion of MOD Reform. These measures include the implementation of simulations of SDF operations in various situations as part of the reform of the central organization, hosting the Defense Production and Technical Foundation Research Group's meeting as part of procurement reform, preparations for introducing a four-year nurse training system as one of the measures to secure and develop human resources, and the implementation of measures to prevent the recurrence of scandals such as the implementation of remedial actions and the protection of information based on the results of the investigation into the bid-rigging case relating to the procurement of office furniture in the ASDF 1st Depot.
Furthermore, the "Committee for Promotion of Structural Reform of Defense Capability" and other bodies are coordinating closely with the Council for the Promotion of MOD Reform to carry out their own measures.

3. Recruitment and Employment of Personnel in the Ministry of Defense and the SDF

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF need highly qualified personnel in order to fulfill their missions. Uniformed SDF personnel and other personnel of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF are recruited and employed under various systems[1].
See Reference 71

1. Recruitment

Due to the nature of the SDF's mission of defending Japan, it is necessary to widely recruit personnel with superior abilities and a strong desire to join from around Japan from among those with an interest in the SDF or who wish to become SDF personnel, while explaining to them the role of defending the country, the duty and training, and the particular life environment (life on base, etc.) in detail. For this reason, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF maintain Provincial Cooperation Offices in 50 locations throughout Japan (four in Hokkaido, and one in each prefecture) to which SDF personnel with unit assignment experience in the GSDF, ASDF, and MSDF are deployed as PR Officers to handle the individual needs of applicants and carry out recruitment activities to secure even more high-quality personnel with the understanding of educators regarding the SDF as a workplace and with the support of recruitment counselors.

Moreover, local public organizations are also required to carry out the part of administrative recruitment activities, and the MOD allocates local public organizations the budget necessary for this purpose. Since recruitment of the SDF personnel is likely to become more difficult with the declining birth rate in Japan, it is essential to strive for cooperation in recruitment activities with local public organizations that are firmly rooted in the community.

2. Employment

(1) Uniformed SDF personnel

Uniformed SDF personnel are recruited under various categories based on the voluntary system (individuals join of their own free will). General Officer Candidates and General Enlisted Candidates (Upper) are assigned the status of SDF personnel after employment[2], whereas Candidates for Enlisted (Lower)[3], students of the National Defense Academy, and Technical High School students[4] are trained and educated without such status and are assigned the status of SDF personnel after training and education are completed. It should be noted that there is a program to employ Technical High School students from among those scheduled to graduate from junior high schools in order to train them to control and operate advanced computerized equipment and cultivate them as SDF personnel who can act with confidence in the international community.

Due to the nature of the job, personnel management of uniformed SDF personnel differs from that of other civilian government employees[5]. In order to keep the SDF forces strong, two points that are significantly specific to SDF forces are the introduction of the "Early Retirement System", and the " Fixed–Term System" in which the employee is employed only for a fixed term of two or three years period. Upon employment, the uniformed SDF personnel who enlist in each SDF service complete their basic education and training in a training unit or at a school that belongs to each SDF service. Each

personnel are assigned to their jobs based on each individual's choice or aptitude during their education and training, and after they have completed their course, they get appointed to units and positions all around the country.

See References 72-75

(2) SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, SDF Reserve Personnel, and Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel

The number of SDF uniformed personnel should be expanded promptly in the event of a crisis, to meet the needs of each contingency. To fulfill such needs promptly and systematically, the Ministry of Defense maintains three systems[6]: the SDF Ready Reserve Personnel system, the SDF Reserve Personnel system, and the system for Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel[7].

See Reference 76

a. SDF Ready Reserve Personnel System

The SDF Ready Reserve Personnel introduced into the GSDF become SDF personnel as part of the basic defense force framework in the event of muster orders for defense, civil protection, security, and disasters, and carry out their mission together with active-duty SDF personnel as part of pre-designated frontline units.

SDF Ready Reserve Personnel are selected from retired SDF personnel based on their application. They muster for a total of 30 days of training per year at the designated unit to maintain the necessary preparedness while working in their own jobs as civilians under normal conditions.

b. SDF Reserve Personnel System

SDF Reserve Personnel become SDF personnel in the event of muster orders for defense, civil protection, and disasters, and serve as personnel for logistical support and base guard duties.

SDF Reserve Personnel can be employed from retired SDF personnel based on their application, or can be employed after completion of all of the SDF Reserve Personnel Candidates' training. They are engaged in their own jobs and maintain preparedness by mustering for five days of training per year.

c. SDF Reserve Personnel Candidate System

The SDF Reserve Personnel Candidate system was established to strengthen and expand the foundation of defense for those with no experience as SDF personnel to secure a stable source of SDF reserve personnel, and to make good use of exceptional technical specialists from the civilian sectors, with expertise in areas such as medicine and foreign languages. There are two employment categories in this system; general and technical. In the latter category, medical professionals and qualified personnel in such fields as foreign languages and information processing are recruited.

SDF Reserve Personnel candidates are assigned as SDF Reserve Personnel after completing the necessary education and training to work as SDF personnel. However, in recent years, they are being utilized in various fields. For instance, SDF Reserve Personnel candidates hired for their qualifications as medical workers have participated in joint disaster prevention exercises after assignment as SDF Reserve Personnel, and SDF Reserve Personnel candidates hired for their language qualifications have served as interpreters in Japan-U.S. Joint Unified Exercises after assignment as SDF Reserve Personnel.

d. Cooperation with Companies Employing Reserve Personnel

As SDF Reserve Personnel are involved in their own jobs, they must participate in muster for exercises and training to maintain the level of skills required, by either adjusting their work schedule or using days off from work. Therefore, the understanding and cooperation of the companies that employ these SDF Reserve Personnel are essential for the smooth operation of the program. In particular, SDF Ready Reserve Personnel are supposed to attend training for 30 days per year, so the necessary cooperation in regard to their employees is sought, such as allowing Ready Reserve Personnel to take a leave of absence.

To enable reserves to participate in training sessions with peace of mind, the Ministry of Defense has taken into consideration the burden on companies employing Ready Reserve Personnel and provides a special subsidy to companies which allow such personnel to attend training sessions.

(3) Administrative Officials, Technical and Engineering Officials, Instructors, and Other Civilian Personnel

There are approximately 22,000 civilian personnel — administrative officials, technical and engineering officials, instructors, and others — in addition to uniformed SDF personnel, in the Ministry of Defense and the SDF. These civilians are mainly employed through the Recruitment Examination for National Public Officials Level I, or the Class I, II, or III Examination for Defense Ministry Civilian Personnel. After participating in the same training course, civilian personnel who have passed Level I and Class I and II undertake a wide range of work[8].

Administrative officials are engaged in policy planning in the Internal Bureau, and analysis and research at the Defense Intelligence Headquarters as well as a variety of administrative work (budget, public relations, military facilities-related activities, etc.) at the SDF bases and the Regional Defense Bureaus throughout the country.

Technical and engineering officials play a key role in constructing various defense facilities (headquarters, runways, magazines, etc.), as well as carrying out R&D concerning and pursuing the effective procurement of equipment such as fighter aircraft and vessels.

Instructors conduct advanced research on defense-related issues and provide high-quality education to SDF personnel at the National Institute for Defense Studies, the National Defense Academy, the National

Defense Medical College, and other organizations.

As of the end of March 2012, there were 661 Technical and Engineering Officials and Instructors with PhDs.

In addition, in various organizations where these civilian personnel are the main workforce, uniformed SDF personnel of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF work together with such civilian personnel in fields where the specialized knowledge of uniformed SDF personnel is required.

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1 See <http://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/jieikanbosyu/> for details on the recruitment of uniformed SDF personnel.
For details on employment information, see <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/saiyou/index.html>

2 Until FY2006, the SDF had two "enlisted (upper)" recruitment systems for candidates between the ages of 18 and 27: the "Student Candidate for Enlisted (Upper) System and the "Enlisted (Upper) Candidate System." In FY2007, the two recruitment systems were reorganized and unified into a new appointment system, the "General Enlisted Candidate (Upper) System." This new system adopts the beneficial features of both the "Student Candidate for Enlisted (Upper) System" and the " Enlisted (Upper) Candidate System", which raises the awareness of being an " Enlisted (Upper) Candidate" and place importance on each personnel's competence in personnel management.

3 Fixed-term SDF personnel, prior to their formal employment as a private (GSDF), seaman apprentice (MSDF), or airman third class (ASDF), will be employed as candidates for uniformed SDF personnel and receive education and training to foster their sense of mission, responsibility, unity, discipline, and compliance. This system was adopted from July 2010.

4 Starting with those employed for FY2011, a recommendation test system was adopted in which, in addition to the general test, appropriate applicants would be chosen to be technical high school students from among those who had received a recommendation from the principal of the lower secondary school. See <http://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/jieikanbosyu/recruit/10.html>

5 SDF personnel must perform duties such as defense operations as specified in the Self-Defense Forces Law. They are, therefore, designated as special national government employees under Article 2 of the National Civil Service Law, and personnel management of SDF personnel is conducted independently from that of general civilian government employees.

6 See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/saiyou/yobiji/index.html>

7 Many countries other than Japan also have reserve personnel systems.

8 Until FY2011, the Ministry of Defense conducted the Class I, II and III Examinations for Defense Ministry Civilian Personnel separately from the Level 1 Examination for National Public Officials run by the National Personnel Authority. However, due to the introduction of a new examination system in FY2012, it has been decided to abolish the Class I, II and III Examinations for Defense Ministry Civilian Personnel and to employ personnel from among those who have passed the Examination for National Public Officials for either career track or general staff run by the National Personnel Authority. In addition, positions in the examination categories of "foreign languages" and "international relations", which were previously filled by those who passed the Class II Examination for Defense Ministry Civilian Personnel, will now be filled from among those who pass the Examination for Defense Ministry Professional Civilian Officials.

4. Daily Education and Training

In order to accomplish its missions, at the heart of which is the defense of Japan, the SDF needs to ensure that its commanding officers and other members are highly knowledgeable and skilled, as well as being in a high state of readiness. This enables the SDF to deal with various situations immediately and appropriately, and serves as a deterrent to any country with the intention to invade Japan.

Education and training[1] are crucial for the SDF to strengthen its capabilities to accomplish its missions by developing its human resources. For this purpose, the SDF is making efforts amid various constraints to educate/train its personnel and its units to ensure that they are a powerful force, while paying careful attention to safety.

1. Education of Uniformed SDF Personnel

(1) Present Status of Education

Enhancing the ability of each of the SDF uniformed personnel who comprise SDF units is essential for the latter to perform their duties. At its schools and training units, therefore, the SDF provides opportunities for systematic phased education according to rank and duties in order to nurture the necessary qualities and cultivate the knowledge and skills of personnel.

For instance, a long period of education is needed in order to cultivate pilots and air traffic controllers, and this also requires the provision of trainers with special skills/equipment/educational facilities. Thus, considerable investment in terms of personnel, time, and funding on the part of the Ministry of Defense/the SDF is necessary in order to provide this education.

In the event that personnel need to further improve their professional knowledge and skills, or it is difficult for them to acquire them within the SDF, they may study at external educational institutions[2], including those abroad, as well as domestic companies or research institutes.

See Reference 77

(2) Joint Educational Programs

In order to further improve the joint operational framework, knowledge and skills regarding joint operations are essential, and providing the requisite education is vital for this. Therefore, the three services of the SDF have enriched education on joint operations at their respective service educational facilities including the Staff Colleges[3]. Additionally, a joint educational program system has been set up, mainly at the Joint Staff College[4], where SDF officers who will become senior unit commanders and senior staff can receive joint education[5].

2. SDF Training

(1) Training by Each Self-Defense Force

There are two main types of training within units in the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF: training for individual SDF personnel to improve their proficiency in their respective fields, and training for units to conduct systematic operations. Training for individuals is conducted one-on-one in stages based on occupational classification and individual ability. Training for units is conducted by size of unit, from small to large, and large-scale comprehensive training is also carried out to ensure that overall abilities can be exercised.
See Reference 79
In addition to such training for national defense, training is given on the diverse roles required of the SDF in recent years, such as peacekeeping operations and large-scale disaster relief operations.

(2) Joint Exercises

In order to ensure that each of the SDF branches work together organically as a unified force, responding to developments in various situations, various joint exercises are conducted, in order to further strengthen joint operations. Moreover, as well as maintaining and improving the capabilities of each branch of the SDF, in order to strengthen joint operations and responses to various situations, efforts are being made to expand the scope of bilateral and multilateral joint exercises involving individual branches of the SDF, as well as those based on joint operations between all branches[6].

(3) Restrictions on Training and Responses to These

SDF training is carried out under conditions that are as close as possible to actual combat situations. A variety of facilities and equipment exist for this purpose, yet many restrictions are imposed on their usage[7]. Particularly, restrictions[8] in maneuver areas, waters and airspace, and firing ranges where training is carried out tend to have a major effect on the training, along with the modernization of equipment and other changes. Such areas are not sufficient in size, are unevenly dispersed across the country, and are limited to certain time periods and times of day. Furthermore, training under an electronic warfare[9] environment—conducted as practical training—is limited by the need to avoid radio wave interference.
To deal with these restrictions, each SDF branch makes maximum use of its limited domestic maneuvering areas. They also strive to carry out more practical training by conducting live-firing training and Japan–U.S. joint exercises in the United States and waters off the United States where there are training conditions not available in Japan.

See Reference 80

3. Safety Management Initiatives and Issues

(1) Safety Management

Because the primary mission of the SDF is to defend Japan, SDF training and activities are inevitably accompanied by risk. However, accidents that cause injury or loss of property to the public or the loss of life of SDF personnel must be avoided at all costs.

Continuous safety reviews and improvements are vital, and must be jointly handled by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF. The Ministry of Defense and the SDF take great care to ensure safety under normal conditions such as military vessel and aircraft traffic firing training during daily training, and prepare aeronautical safety radio facilities and equipment for prevention and rescue in the event of marine accidents.

In addition, in light of the lessons learned from the collision incident where the destroyer *Atago* collided with the fishing boat *Seitoku Maru* on February 19, 2008, the SDF, which is responsible for defending the lives and property of the Japanese people, is striving to prevent recurrence of a similar accident[10].

(2) Initiatives Relating to the Accident in Which a Fuel Tank Fell off an F-15

On October 7, 2011, an accident occurred in which a fuel tank fell off an F-15 near Komatsu base. The Ministry of Defense conducted an investigation of the cause of the accident and, as well as publishing an outline of the results, efforts are being made to ensure even more thorough safety management.

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1 Details on education and training can be found on each SDF website: GSDF at <http://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/>, MSDF at < http://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/>, and ASDF at <http://www.mod.go.jp/asdf/>.

2 Such external educational institutions in FY2012 include the Tokyo Institute of Technology and Waseda University in Japan, and the National Defense University (United States) and Harvard University (United States) overseas.

3 Institutes of each SDF service where SDF officers of each service and others receive training on security, defense strategy, and other subjects.

4 In addition to reviewing the educational content at the Staff College of each SDF service after clarifying joint educational needs, efforts were made to achieve effective joint education such as strengthening collaboration with the Joint Staff College.

5 The Joint Staff College is part of the Joint Staff Office and educates SDF officers on joint operations.

6 Training includes SDF Joint Exercises, Japan–U.S. Combined Joint Exercises, and Ballistic Missile Response Exercises to prevent and remove direct threats to Japan, training such as International Peace Cooperation Exercises and Joint International Humanitarian Operation Training, in which the handling of prisoners is practiced, in preparation for international peace cooperation, and related activities.

7 For example, the GSDF has a Command Post Exercise Center for carrying out command and staff activities at the division/regiment level, and the Fuji Training Center and urban warfare training

facilities for company-level training.

[8] For example, some firing and launch training involving tanks, anti-tank helicopters, missiles, long-range artillery, surface-to-air guided missiles (improved Hawk and Patriot System), surface-to-ship missiles, torpedoes, and other weapons cannot be carried out at some firing ranges in Japan, or are prohibited in Japan as ranges exceed domestic limits. There are also various restrictions on exercises by large-scale units that require larger areas, minesweeping training, and submarine rescue drills that are carried out in relatively shallow sea areas, and early-morning and nighttime flight training.

[9] Activities to detect, exploit, and reduce or cancel out the effects of enemies' electromagnetic waves, while securing the use of electromagnetic waves by friendly forces.

[10] The preventive measures prepared by the MSDF Ship Accident Review Committee chaired by the Vice Chief of Staff of the MSDF in May 2009 are as follows:

1) Strengthen watches and reporting/communication systems
2) Strengthen teamwork for safe navigation
3) Strengthen the navigational system by improving personnel capabilities
4) Thorough instruction by the commanding officer

Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense has already taken measures to try to prevent a recurrence, such as the formulation of basic guidelines for the use of autopilot equipment, the enhancement of simplified sound recording equipment for the bridge of the vessel, and the development of appropriate warning and communication systems.

5. Measures Aimed at Enhancing the Human Foundation

In order to provide an appropriate response to such recent challenges as the declining birth rate, the growing tendency for young people to enter higher education, and the diversification of the duties of the Self-Defense Forces, it is necessary to make effective use of the human resources which form the foundations that enable Japan to demonstrate its defense capability. Accordingly, the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces are undertaking various initiatives to secure and develop high-quality personnel.

1. Reforms relating to human infrastructure

The Ministry of Defense acknowledges the significance of maintaining high-quality human resources, and has implemented various measures for the upcoming new era.
(See Fig. III-4-1-4)

At the same time, with regard to the personnel structure of Self Defense Forces, the number of privates has been decreasing. The first reason is the shift in focus of personnel structure towards securing highly-skilled and professional personnel in order to respond to the diversification and internationalization of SDF activities, as well as to respond to the sophistication of equipment, amid the reorganization of units and reduction in personnel taking place since the enactment of the 1995 National Defense Program Guidelines. The second reason is the decline in the number of newly-employed Self-Defense officials, while ensuring the level of promotion from lower to upper-level enlisted personnel from the perspective of duties and cultivation. In the background of the decline in the number of newly-employed officials lay the following reasons. Firstly, the number of retired officials has decreased as the result of the decrease in the number of officials reaching the mandatory retirement age. Secondly, the number of personnel (effective strength) which is set as the limit of assignment for budgetary reasons has been reduced due to the reform aimed at cutting total personnel costs.

Since privates consist of many young personnel, the decline in the number of privates has resulted in the aging of the personnel structure of all Self Defense Forces (In 1990, the average age of the SDF personnel as a whole was 31.8, but in 2011, it has increased to 35.6,) and it has now become necessary to review the strength of the SDF from the aspect of age.
(See Fig. III-4-1-5)

In light of this situation, the 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines and the 2011 Mid-Term Defense Program intends to review the SDF personnel management system drastically aiming at controlling and making efficient personnel costs along with increasing the strength of the SDF by lowering the average

age. All this will improve the structure of the defense budget which has the high proportion of personnel costs and is putting pressure on unit activity expenses.

The Ministry of Defense established the Human Resource Base Reform Committee chaired by the Senior-Vice Minister of Defense, in December 2010. This committee is intended to review and implement comprehensive measures related to the human resources base of the SDF, in accordance with the directions mentioned in the 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines and the 2011 Mid-term Defense Program. At present, this committee based on the discussions concerning human aspects of defense capability carried out in the past[1], reviews the following measures: managing the personnel quotas for each rank and reviewing the rank and age structure according to the characteristics of each SDF service by increasing the number of privates and so on, introducing a new appointment system, measures to revitalize the ranks of officers, warrant officers, sergeants, and privates, and measures related to the early retirement program and recruitment and those regarding support for reemployment. The outlines of these measures are as below:

(1) Review of rank and age structure

In light of the fact that the average age of the Self-Defense Forces as a whole is increasing, since FY2011, efforts have been made to curb the promotion of officers, warrant officers and sergeants in order to increase the number of privates and to adjust the rank and age structure of existing personnel. According to the plan, the total number of officers, warrant officers and sergeants will decline at about 9,000 during the period of the 2010 NDPG. Furthermore, while the regulation to manage the number of personnel by rank is experimentally formulated, deliberations on operational procedure of personnel management are underway.

(2) Early retirement system

The early retirement system is a system under which Self-Defense Officials are retired earlier than the mandatory retirement age. It contributes to increasing the strength of the SDF by ensuring appropriate personnel management and improving the age structure, so consideration is being given to this system in conjunction with measures focused on support for reemployment. At present, in light of deliberations by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications concerning the introduction of a voluntary retirement scheme, consideration is being given to the requisite preferential measures and operating methods.

(3) New appointment system (backline appointment system)

The new appointment system involves giving precedence to younger personnel in assignment to front-line units while applying an optimum level of salaries and other terms to personnel engaged in other duties. (backline appointment system); currently, detailed deliberations are taking place on narrowing down the list of duties and the forming of an appropriate type of system.

(4) Measures to invigorate all ranks, such as officers, warrant officers, sergeants and privates

Deliberations concerning measures to achieve the invigoration of all ranks, such as officers, warrant officers, sergeants and privates are continuing. These measures have been reviewed as part of the comprehensive reforms in the personnel field of the Defense Force since 2006.

(5) Measures relating to recruitment and support for reemployment

Based on an awareness of the fact that it is necessary to develop a system for recruitment and reemployment support amid a harsh recruitment environment, consolidation is taking place in regard to the duties and roles of the Provincial Cooperation Offices (50 locations) nationwide, which recruit Self-Defense Officials and provide reemployment support, and there are plans to adjust this system further in the future.
See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 2

2. Reform of the National Defense Academy

(1) Background to and progress of reform

The National Defense Academy seeks to cultivate personnel who become officers' material and the graduates play an active role throughout Japan, primarily as SDF officers, after they complete GSDF, MSDF or ASDF officer candidate school. However, as it is anticipated that the recruitment environment will become increasingly difficult, with the falling birth rate bringing about a rapid decline in the number of 18-year-olds among the population, the question of how to secure high-quality students and cultivate high-caliber SDF officers is becoming extremely important. Consequently, the Committee on the Reform of the National Defense Academy was established in September 2010 on the instructions of the Minister of Defense, in order to conduct the necessary deliberations; the Committee submitted its report to the Minister in June 2011 and reforms have been proceeding since then, in line with the direction of reforms set forth in the report.

(2) Key points concerning the direction of reforms

a. The new roles of the National Defense Academy

① The provision of education that aims to achieve well-balanced development of knowledge, morals and physical health remains unchanged, as does its mission to put into practice the cadet code of honor, courage and propriety.

② Cultivating the flexible thinking and intellectual foundation that are essential in order to carry out a wide range of duties in a global environment.

③ Dissemination among society of knowledge concerning security, through extension courses, lectures and publications.

④ Ensuring that the National Defense Academy is a source of pride for the local community and, based on that understanding, collaborating with the community in order to fulfill its role as an institution of higher education and a research institute.

b. Clearly demonstrating its educational philosophy

① Nurturing SDF leaders who protect the peace and independence of Japan and contribute to the stability of the international community.

② Cultivating the richness of spirit appropriate to a leader, to ensure that they become true ladies and gentlemen, and true warriors. The cadet code of honor, courage and propriety is the mainstay of this.

③ Fostering fundamental education that achieves a good balance between developing knowledge, morals and physical health. Particular importance is attached to the development of a broad outlook and scientific thinking.

④ Establishing a strong will and sense of duty in regard to taking on responsibility for Japan's defense capability in the international community, and acquiring the basic skills and abilities required as an SDF officer.

c. Measures aimed at securing personnel

① Reform of the entrance examination system

○ A new comprehensive entrance examination is being introduced from the FY2012 examinations, with selection emphasizing not only performance in terms of knowledge, but also candidates with an excellent records in terms of morals and physical health, while also attaching importance to their intentions in entering the Academy and desire to be commissioned as an SDF Officer.

○ In addition to the current general entrance examination, a new-style general entrance examination held in March is being introduced from FY2012, in order to provide more students with the opportunity to take it.

② Securing diverse personnel

Measures are being considered that focus on incorporating students who have graduated from technical colleges that provide a high level of education in science and engineering into a science-focused three-year program of general education, similar to that provided at ordinary universities, with a view to the introduction of this system in FY2013 at the earliest.

d. Enhancement of education, training and research

In order to enhance basic education, as well as strengthening instruction in basic academic skills and guidance in basic physical fitness, efforts will be made to improve education focused on character-building. Moreover, the output of the Academy as a hub for education and research concerning defense and security will be disseminated. Furthermore, as well as tailoring the content of education to our increasingly globalized, internationalized society and strengthening foreign language education, efforts will be made to strengthen exchange with military academies in other countries. Efforts will also be made to enhance and improve training, such as giving consideration to female cadets in the management of training.

e. Reform of the management and structures of the National Defense Academy

In addition to strengthening functions that cut across departments within the National Defense Academy, such as academic affairs and training, efforts will be made to expand the fixed-term employment of lecturers and the appointment of visiting lecturers. Moreover, measures will be implemented with a view to having cadets bear the cost of degree examination fees.

3. Enhancement of Pay and Conditions

The duties of the SDF make no distinction between night and day. The work assigned to uniformed SDF personnel can be extremely demanding, involving various operations onboard aircraft, long-term service on ships or submarines, or parachuting. To instill SDF personnel with pride and allow them to concentrate on their duties without anxiety, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF strive to provide salaries and allowances, medical care, welfare, and other benefits that reflect the special nature of their duties. Furthermore, as SDF dispatched to respond to the Great East Japan Earthquake carried out disaster relief activities in harsher conditions than normal, adhering to the 2010 NDPG, efforts were made to significantly increase the amount and scope of disaster dispatch allowances so as to ensure proper treatment of personnel that engage in tough and dangerous missions.

4. Efforts for Further Utilization of Female SDF Personnel

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF open their doors wide not only to men but to women as well to fulfill their duties. While there are still limitations to certain assignments due to the requirement for protecting motherhood and securing privacy, female SDF personnel carry out numerous jobs, and their roles are expanding even at the nucleus of the SDF such as the staff offices and headquarters.

In order to continue to expand recruitment and promotion of female SDF personnel, the Ministry of Defense and SDF drew up the "Basic Plan for Gender Equality in the Ministry of Defense (FY2011-FY2015)"[2] in March 2011. The plan calls for the consideration and implementation of numerous measures to allow female SDF personnel to lead a balanced life between work and family without having to quit their job, and to further expand their opportunities for involvement. For example, initiatives include the active participation of female SDF personnel in planning and proposals when they have the desire and capability, further use of female SDF personnel in international peace cooperation activities, and the proactive operation of a program for replacement personnel for child care leave.

In the future, the Ministry will make steady efforts to work on various measures with persistence to further utilize female SDF personnel.

5. The Promotion of Measures to Support Child-Raising

In consideration of the continuing decline in the birth rate of Japan, the Law for Measures to Support the Development of the Next Generation was enacted in 2003 to contribute to the development of a society where the children, upon whom the next generation of Japanese society will rest, can be born healthy and be educated decently. In response, the Defense Agency (at the time) established the Committee to Promote Measures to Support the Development of the Next Generation in 2004, and decided on the "Action Plan to support a good work-family balance of the Defense Agency" in 2005 to cover the period from April 1, 2005 to March 31, 2010.

In March 2010, with the expiration of the aforementioned action plan the "Action Plan to support a good work-family balance of the personnel of the Ministry of Defense" (FY2010−FY2014)[3] was formulated. In particular, the plan focuses on measures aimed at actively encouraging male personnel to take child care leave and other special leave relating to child-raising, such as compiling a handbook for male personnel and organizing lectures to educate them about these leave systems.

6. Discipline-related initiatives

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF make efforts to uphold discipline within the SDF on a daily basis, through the initiative of SDF officers, providing instruction regarding the upholding of regulations preparing and widely disseminating numerous documents for use in leadership, thereby seeking to increase compliance with laws and other regulations, as well as raising awareness of these. Also, in

March 2012, the Ministry and SDF distributed the “discipline reference material,” which explains the gist of instructing subordinates, in order to develop well-disciplined personnel.
Moreover, campaigns such as the “Anti-Drug Abuse Month” and the “Self-Defense Forces Personnel Ethics Week” have been established, with the objective of instilling in personnel an awareness of compliance with the law.

(1) Measures to Prevent Drug Abuse

In 2005, there was a series of illegal drug-related offenses in the SDF. The Ministry of Defense taking those incidents very seriously established the “Committee to Consider Measures for the Drug Problem”, chaired by the then Vice Minister of State for Defense to put the point at issue and preventive measures[4] together and decide to steadily implement those measures.
However, incidents that violated the drug-related laws have continued to occur, and one SDF member was arrested in 2011. Since FY2010, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF are carrying out such initiatives as 1) thorough education, 2) strengthened inspections of personnel quarters, and 3) the development of a system for effective drug inspection, focusing on younger personnel, to prevent the recurrence of and eliminate drug crimes, in addition to the aforementioned preventive measures.

(2) Prevention of violation of the Self-Defense Forces Personnel Ethics Act

Against a background of repeated misconduct by officials and incurred severe social disapproval, aiming to secure the trust of the citizens for official duty, the Self-Defense Forces Personnel Ethics Act and Ethics Code that took effect in April 2000 stipulate the prohibition of acts that may bring about suspicion or distrust from the citizens, such as receiving of any gifts or entertainment from interested party by SDF personnel, by clearly defining the scope of interested party.
Specific initiatives include designating the last week of January as Ethics Week, during which, in addition to carrying out education for all personnel, efforts are made to spread and instill an awareness of ethics through public relations and awareness activities.

7. Efforts to Prevent Suicide among SDF personnel

In 1998, the annual number of suicides in Japan exceeded 30,000 people and has since maintained a high level. This is a serious social problem in Japan. The same is true for the SDF, and while a record was set in FY2004, with 94 SDF Regular Personnel suicides, subsequent figures have shown a decline, with 80 suicides in 2009, 77 suicides in 2010, and 78 suicides in 2011.
The suicide of a member of the SDF is truly a great tragedy for both the persons committed suicide and

their bereaved families, and it represents a great loss to the Ministry of Defense and SDF in terms of the loss of capable personnel. The Ministry of Defense and SDF are taking ongoing measures to prevent suicide, including the following initiatives

○ Expansion of the counseling system (internal/external counselors, and a 24-hour telephone counseling hotline, etc.)[5]

○ Promoting education among commanders and education aimed at raising enlightment, such as mental-health education for enlisted personnel

○ Establishing a campaign period for enhancing mental health measures, ensuring thorough efforts by commanders to closely monitor the mental condition of subordinates whose environment has been changed due to personnel transfers, etc., and providing various reference materials

8. Commemorating Personnel Killed in the Line of Duty

Since the establishment of the National Police Reserve in 1950 and through its evolution via the National Safety Force and the Coastal Safety Force into the SDF today, SDF personnel have been striving to accomplish the noble mission of protecting the peace and independence of Japan. They have accomplished this by devoting themselves unstintingly to training, day and night, to live up to the expectations and trust of the Japanese citizens, regardless of danger, and with a strong sense of responsibility. During this time, however, more than 1,800 personnel have lost their lives in the line of duty.

In the Ministry of Defense and the SDF, funeral ceremonies are carried out by each SDF unit to which the personnel killed in the line of duty belonged in order to express condolences. Moreover, in order to eternally recognize the achievements of the SDF personnel killed in the line of duty, and to express deep honor and condolences, memorial ceremonies are carried out in various forms, and support is provided to the families of the deceased[6].

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[1] As a wide-ranging review of the human aspect of the defense force was necessary in light of changes to the security environment and to social structure such as changes in the role of the SDF, the drop in the birth rate, and the aging population, the "Panel to Examine Comprehensive Reforms in the Personnel Field of the Defense Force" was held with the Minister of State for Defense (at the time) acted as the chair. Results were collated in June 2007 and a report prepared. The report may be viewed at the following URL: <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/others/jinji/index.html>

[2] The plan calls for expanded recruitment and promotion of female administrative officials in addition to female SDF personnel, as well as the consideration of measures for the involvement of male staff in child raising and nursing. For more on efforts for gender equality, see: <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/others/jinji/gender/index.html>

[3] For more on the promotion of next-generation child raising support, see: <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/others/jinji/kosodate/index/html>

[4] It was decided to quickly and steadily implement as preventative measures ① the enforcement of leading service discipline and education, ② the adoption of post

recruitment drug testing (urine testing), and ③ the coordination of various counseling and reporting hotlines. Note that inspection regarding the use of drugs has been carried out at the time of recruitment since 2002

[5] See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/others/jinji/mentalhealth/index.html>

[6] The Monument for SDF Members Killed in the Line of Duty was constructed in 1962, and reinforced in 1980, due to aging through weathering. Later, when the headquarters of the then Defense Agency was moved to Ichigaya in 1998, the Memorial Zone in its current form was located on the east side of the memorial area with the Monument for SDF Members Killed in the Line of Duty and other monuments. A memorial ceremony for SDF members killed in the line of duty is held annually at the Memorial Zone. This ceremony is attended by surviving family members of the honored dead, and also attended by the Prime Minister and high-ranking officials of the Ministry of Defense and SDF including the Minister of Defense, former Directors-General of the Defense Agency, and others. At the Monument for SDF Members Killed in the Line of Duty in the Memorial Zone, there is an iron plate containing the names and other information of personnel killed in the line of duty. When foreign dignitaries such as Defense Ministers visit the Ministry of Defense, they make offerings of flowers, expressing their respect and condolences to personnel killed in the line of duty. Memorial ceremonies are also held at individual SDF posts and bases.

6. Retirement and Outplacement of Personnel

1. Dealing with Retirement and Outplacement of SDF Personnel

There is an early retirement system and a fixed-term service system for SDF uniformed personnel to keep the forces strong. Unlike private-sector and civilian government employees, many SDF uniformed personnel retire by their mid-50s (personnel serving under the early retirement system) or their 20s (most uniformed personnel serving under the fixed-term service system), and many must become re-employed after retirement in order to secure their livelihoods.

It is the responsibility of the nation (the Ministry of Defense) as the employer to support this re-employment. In addition to resolving concerns that SDF uniformed personnel may have about their future so they can work diligently without any worries while in service, ensuring that they can lead stable lives after retirement is also understood to be essential for boosting morale and securing high-quality human resources, and support measures such as training helpful to re-employment is being carried out for this reason[1].

Also, as the Ministry of Defense is not authorized to work on its own as an intermediary between job seeker and prospective employer, the SDF Personnel Support Association provides free job consultation to retired SDF personnel with permission from the Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare and the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism. As the employment environment is expected to remain harsh, the further improvement and strengthening of re-employment support for retired SDF personnel is necessary.

The 2010 NDPG and 2011Mid-Term Defense Program also stipulate the promotion of policy regarding reemployment assistance so that measures are steadily implemented to ensure that retired personnel are effectively utilized in society and are received in the public sector.

See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 2

Each retired uniformed SDF personnel possesses abilities for planning, leadership, faculty, cooperativeness, responsibility gained by work performance and education and training through wide-ranging types of job/occupational fields. Furthermore, they have various qualifications and licenses acquired through their work or occupational training. For these reasons, they are active in a broad range of sectors, including the manufacturing and service industries, in addition to finance, insurance, real estate, and construction industries, where they are highly evaluated by their employers regardless of occupational type or field. These personnel are also employed by local governments as staff charged with risk management and disaster prevention.

(See Fig. III-4-1-6)

2. Regulations on Reemployment of Retired SDF Personnel

Reemployment of SDF personnel is regulated[2] in order to ensure public service impartiality. When SDF personnel get jobs at private companies within 2 years of retirement, and if that company had a contract with the Ministry of Defense within five years before that SDF member's retirement, the approval[3] of the Ministry of Defense or other delegated authority must be sought in accordance with the regulation. In 2011, the Minister of Defense approved 87 cases (87 individuals) of reemployment of SDF personnel by private companies.

3. Reappointment system

The reappointment system is a system through which those who have the desire and ability to continue serving as troops even after reaching the mandatory retirement age are employed once more. This system makes it possible to actively utilize elder but capable personnel, and achieve harmony between the employment and pension systems. As of the end of March 2012, the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces had 759 staff who had been reappointed under this system. Moreover, with the objective of cultivating an environment in which Self-Defense Officials, who reach the mandatory retirement age earlier than ordinary civil servants, can devote themselves to their duties with peace of mind, the reappointment system makes it possible for Self-Defense Officials to be appointed for fixed terms of up to three years before the age of 60.

(See Fig. III-4-1-7)

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1 For further information on re-employment support for each branch of the SDF, see:
GSDF: < http://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/retire/>
MSDF: <http://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/formal/engo/engotop.html>
ASDF: <http://www.mod.go.jp/asdf/recruit/taishoku_jieikan/>

2 An amendment to the Self-Defense Forces Law is included in the bill to amend the National Public Service Act submitted to the 177th Diet session in 2011. The legislation stipulates regulations regarding reemployment of retired SDF personnel in line with regulations on reemployment of other public officials of the government. This includes regulations on outplacement of the personnel by other SDF officials, on seeking position by SDF personnel in interested companies while in service, and on requesting favors by personnel from active SDF personnel.

3 "Seclusion from private companies" is stipulated in Article 62 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

Part III Measures for Defense of Japan

Chapter 4 The Relationship between the Japanese People and the Ministry of Defense and the SDF

Section 2 Defense Production, Technological Bases, and Acquisition of Equipment

In order that our defense capabilities can demonstrate their function sufficiently, not only are the organizational and "human resource bases" described in the previous section important; so too is constant review of the frameworks behind "material bases" (including the various types of equipment and the defense production and technological bases that support them) and the acquisition of equipment and materials that are intimately related to the efficient upgrading of defense capability.

This section will describe efforts to enhance and strengthen "material bases" of this kind.

1. Defense Production and Technological Bases

1. The Importance of Defense Production and Technological Bases

The term defense production and technological bases are defined as human, physical and technological bases for development, manufacturing (purchase), operation, maintenance, remodeling, and refurbishment of defense equipment required for Ministry of Defense and SDF activities. For example, by maintaining defense production and technological bases domestically, not only does it become possible to acquire an operational concept suitable to the special characteristics of Japanese territory and the security environment surrounding Japan, as well as equipment and materials which satisfy the performance requirements, but Japan can then secure independence in our security and demonstrate deterrent effects in the form of potential defense capability, through the effective and efficient maintenance and upgrading of equipment and materials in a short time. These bases have significance in areas such as ensuring bargaining power against other countries when procuring equipment and materials from abroad and when participating in international joint development and production, as well as facilitating the acquisition of equipment and related technologies at terms beneficial to Japan.

Defense production and technological bases are essential to the upgrading of the defense capability of the Ministry of Defense and SDF, as well as their activities, but with equipment becoming increasingly high-performance and more complex, it is anticipated that the degree of reliance on defense production and technological bases in many areas will grow as the demand for readiness, mobility, flexibility, durability and versatility to support a dynamic defense force increases. Consequently, the question of how to maintain, foster and upgrade our defense production and technological bases is an extremely important policy issue.

See Reference 75

2. Initiatives to Maintain , Foster Upgrade Defense Production and Technological Bases

In light of the current status of defense production and technological bases and its importance, which will be described below, the Ministry of Defense compiled a report in September 2010, entitled “Future Direction of Acquisition Reform.” In this report, the Ministry indicated its belief that it is necessary to identify critical defense production and technological bases that should retained at home from the perspective of their importance to security and achieving greater competitiveness in domestic industry, and to channel energy into maintaining and developing these fields (“selection and concentration”).

Furthermore, both the 2010 NDPG and the 2011 Mid-Term Defense Program state that the Strategy on Defense Production and technological bases (hereinafter referred to as “the Strategy”) will be formulated in order to develop and maintain defense forces in a stable manner from the medium- to long-term perspective.

Against this policy backdrop, the Ministry of Defense hosted a meeting involving the Study group on Defense Production and Technological Bases[1] in November 2010, membership of which includes academics, representatives of defense business-related organizations, and deliberations concerning approaches to the Strategy.

(1) Deliberations Concerning the Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases

In June 2012, the Study group on Defense Production and technological bases compiled a report entitled “Final Report of the Study group on Defense Production and Technological Bases”, outlining the outcomes of its deliberations to date, and submitted its recommendations to the Ministry of Defense, to serve as a point of reference when formulating the Strategy. The outline of the report is as follows:

(a) Current status of and issues concerning defense production and technological bases in Japan

In Japan, there is no national arsenal (state-owned munitions factory), so the defense industry handles almost all of the functions and roles of the defense production and technological bases. In order to avert the risk that their management will be governed largely by fluctuations in defense-related expenditures, most defense-related companies are not so-called "specialized defense manufacturers", but have rather maintained their defense-related business through flexible management resources and civilian sector business within the same company. However, amid a worldwide recession triggered by the Lehman Shock in the autumn of 2008 and the ongoing appreciation of the yen, the civilian business that supports defense business finds itself in a severe predicament, so it is becoming difficult to maintain defense business in a form reliant upon civilian demand, as has hitherto been the case.

Moreover, with defense-related expenditures demonstrating a downward trend due to the harsh fiscal situation, inversion began to take place in FY2005 in regard to expenditures relating to the purchase of

major equipment and the expenditures required to maintain this equipment, so the feasibility of the defense industry based on manufacturing is declining. Furthermore, the current status of the Japanese defense industry is such that market mechanism does not always necessarily function adequately in that environment, so one cannot expect an efficient, effective bases to be fostered if this is left up to market mechanism.

In addition to this situation, in the field of advanced equipment, which is becoming increasingly high-performance and more complex, in light of the fact that there is a major trend towards international joint development and production, in order to curb development and production costs, while using advanced technology from allies and friends, one has to say that from the perspective of both finances and technical strength, it will be difficult to keep the whole of Japan's defense production and technology infrastructure within Japan in the future.

Consequently, while taking international joint development and production into consideration, ① ascertaining which areas of the defense production and technological bases should be retained fully within Japan; and ② taking measures to maintain and cultivate them, as well as increasing their sophistication, are becoming pressing issues in relation to the stable maintenance and upgrading of Japan's defense capability in the medium- to long-term and promoting the maintenance of, fostering and upgrading the defense production and technological bases required to support the activities of the Ministry of Defense and SDF.

However, when thinking about the environment surrounding defense production and technological bases in Japan, we must recognize the following as “given conditions”:

○ Finance: Under the increasingly severe fiscal conditions, it is difficult to expect a large increase in defense spending.

○ Macro economy: As long as the predicament of the manufacturing industry continues, it will be difficult to run defense business relying on civil business. Furthermore, it is imperative for the entire company as well as defense business to become more competitive internationally amid the ongoing globalization.

○ Market: It is apparent that, being restricted by regulations, the defense industry is not in an environment to make decisions based on economic rationality; there is a limit to their business efforts. Moreover, it is difficult for Japan to adopt a policy to promote arms export that has been adopted by other developed countries.

○ Technology: It will become more difficult for a single country to develop and manufacture defense equipment with growing performance and complexity. Licensed productions will be more difficult to be permitted or the ratio of permission for licensed production will decline.

(b) The Direction of the Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases

In light of the above, it is appropriate for Japan to seek to maintain, foster and upgrade defense production and technological bases, through a combination of "measures for qualitative improvement of the industry", "measures for an industrial structure to optimize allocation of resources", and "measures to support the industry through the expansion of demand both within Japan and overseas", within a scope that contributes to the security of Japan; accordingly, the Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases should encompass initiative relating to these measures. In doing so, the core initiatives will be as follows:

① Defense Production and Technological Bases to be kept in the country

In order to realize the stable and medium-to long term defense capabilities, it is necessary to select the defense production and technological bases to be retained in Japan (hereinafter referred to as "key fields"), in accordance with the following approach:

○ Selection and concentration of the nation's resources

Ensure the maintenance of stable and medium-to-long term defense capabilities through "selection and concentration" by selecting "Key Areas" and focusing on maintaining, fostering and upgrading them based on "the Strategy."

○ Selection and concentration of management resources of defense-related companies

"The Strategy" should be able to serve as a guideline for the defense industry to improve its managerial predictability, control its revenue risk and work on equipment investment, research and development and human resource development from a long-term perspective.

○ Defense equipment cooperation with our security partners

Create an environment for Japan to efficiently participate in international joint development/production conducive to our security by indicating the area of possible international joint development/ production.

○ Grouping in "Key Areas"

Based on the above, it is appropriate to divide "Key Areas" into the area of "all-Japanese" equipment that should be (or need to be) manufactured within the borders using our own technologies and the possible area of "international joint development/production" in the sense that there is an option to conduct research, development and manufacturing in collaboration with other countries or "made-in Japan under

license from other countries.”

② Organization of the defense industry

It is important to consider what kind of organization would be effective in each of the fields in Japan's defense industry. Industrial alliances and restructuring, such as business collaboration and the integration of sectors, can be effective methods.

③ Defense technology

When focusing on elemental technologies, such as those relating to defense equipment, as well as conducting technological research from a medium- to long-term perspective, it is important to gain an understanding of trends in technology which is becoming increasingly borderless and oriented towards dual use, as well as gaining a clear picture of the relationship between the maintenance, cultivation and increased sophistication of defense production and technological bases, and dual-use and general-purpose technology.

④ International joint development and production

In addition to indicating the potential field to become the focus of international joint development and production in the key area, it would be desirable for the Ministry of Defense to set forth the approach that it will take when considering participation in international joint development and production, such as the technological advantages and the cost-related advantages.

⑤ Measures that the Government should take

○ Measures that the Ministry of Defense should implement

There are a number of improvements that could be made in the structure of the competitive environment and procurement (contract) techniques, in order to maximize the effect and outcomes of the resources invested.

In particular, efforts should be made to pursue methods that will increase the efficiency of acquiring equipment, such as improved systems for contracts and procurement that will result in a win-win relationship for Japan's national security policy and defense industry.

○ Necessary regulations and constraints

Due to the nature of the defense industry, there are also constraints and necessary regulations that must be considered. These “given conditions” on which Japan's defense production and technological bases

should be verified and clearly set forth in the Strategy.
However, considering the current state of our Defense Production and Technological Base, in addition to clarification of "Key Areas" and study of how the industrial organization should be, "the Strategy" may need to come up with new approaches to regulations and limitations depending on the situation, including encouraging the industry's ingenuity and efficiency improvement efforts concerning limitations and regulations, and showing the government's active commitment to international joint development/production.

○ Collaboration among relevant ministries and agencies and industry- academia- government collaboration

As a means of ensuring the optimal resource allocation among stakeholders, with a view to achieving increased productivity as a consequence, it is important to promote collaboration among ministries and agencies and between industry, academia and government.

(2) Initiatives Aimed at Maintaining and fostering Production and Technological Bases for Aircraft

(a) Fighter aircraft production and technological bases
With regard to fighter aircraft, which are one of the main pieces of equipment of the SDF, the last F-2 fighter was delivered to the Ministry of Defense on September 27, 2011; this marked the end of the production of fighter aircraft in Japan for the foreseeable future. Due to the hitherto continuous production of fighter aircraft in Japan, as well as the R&D, improvement, and repair necessary to use them, domestic production and technological bases have been maintained and improved, and three elements which are absolutely vital to the use of fighter aircraft, "maintaining a high availability," "capability increase appropriate to use by Japan," and "maintaining safety", have been secured.
There is a risk that the recent suspension of the production of fighter aircraft will bring about a decline in operational support for areas such as improvement and repair of fighter aircraft, and give rise to difficulty in maintaining and improving the level of technology required for R&D relating to future fighters.
With regard to what impact this blank period will have, the interim report[2] published in December 2009 by "The Meeting on the Nature of Production Technological Bases for Fighter Aircraft" indicated three challenges that should be addressed in regard to the future of the production and technological bases for fighter aircraft.

○ Close examination of the bases which must be maintained domestically in the future for the use of fighter aircraft, from the perspective of maintaining domestically the vital bases behind the three elements, "maintaining a high availability," "capability increase appropriate to use by Japan," and "maintaining

safety."

○ Formulation of a vision for fighter aircraft-related R&D in the future, from a medium- to long-term viewpoint.

○ Consideration and promotion of measures including the conversion for civil use of technology cultivated during the development of SDF aircraft, given that some of the production and technological bases for fighter aircraft are maintained by the development and production of other aircraft.

(b) The concept of future fighter aircraft

The "R&D Vision concerning Future Fighter Aircraft"[3] which dealt with the concept of future fighter aircraft and necessary matters for review was prepared and announced in August 2010 in order to allow development at the required time of review of acquisition of the F-2 fighter's successor to be considered as a possible option. Moreover, because it is important to share an awareness of the direction that should be taken with the defense aircraft industry, the Joint Public-Private Sector Research Group on Future Fighter Aircraft was established, thereby beginning regular sessions of opinion exchange with Japan's defense aircraft industry.

(c) Adapting aircraft for civilian use

A study in collaboration and cooperation with concerned ministries is proceeding not only concerning maintaining and strengthening defense production and technological bases but also concerning civilian use of aircraft developed by the Ministry of Defense, which can expect a reduction in the procurement prices of SDF aircraft and other equipment. A policy was compiled regarding such issues as how corporations that use such aircraft are to pay usage fees to the national government and the disclosure and use of technology-related materials possessed by the Ministry of Defense, with the aim of establishing a concrete system design for converting aircraft to civilian use in August 2010[4] The Ministry of Defense has since taken steps toward encouraging civilian use such as setting up in the Ministry in 2011 a system for accepting applications from private enterprises interested in civilian use[5].

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1 For an overview of Study Group on Defense Production and Technological Bases Study Group, see <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/meeting/seisan/gaiyo.html>

2 For the Interim Summary of the Panel on Approaches to the Production Technological Base for Fighter Aircraft,

see <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/meeting/sentouki/houkoku/houkoku.html >

3 For an outline of the R&D Vision concerning Future Fighter Aircraft, see <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2010/08/25a.html>

4 For details regarding the Conference on the Civilian Use of Ministry of Defense Developed Aircraft, see <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/meeting/kaihatsukokuki/houkoku/houkoku.html>

[5] The first application submitted by a company under this system was approved in August 2011. See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/meeting/kaihatsukokuki/sonota/kaiji_201108.html>

2. Acquisition of Equipment and Materials

1. The Current Status of the Acquisition of Equipment and Materials

Appropriate and efficient acquisition of defense equipment is of extreme importance to improvement of the defense capability of Japan. Hitherto, in the committee meeting regarding Promoting Comprehensive Acquisition Reform, which was held in September 2003, the Ministry of Defense has made efforts to consider and implement the necessary measures, such as streamlining and rationalizing the procurement and supply of equipment and materials, due to changes in the acquisition environment in the form of higher prices, as a result of the increasingly high-performance nature of equipment and the recent harsh fiscal situation.

Moreover, from the perspective of fulfilling our obligation to ensure adequate accountability to the people with regard to the use of their taxes, effective measures have been put in place to control risk and cost, and facilitate the acquisition of superior equipment, while maintaining fairness and transparency in equipment acquisition.

For example, in the acquisition of equipment, the Ministry is continuing to promote acquisition reform that incorporates such new concepts as rethinking systems relating to acquisition and contracts in order to take into account the entire life-cycle of equipment, looking at the elements required to operate it after it has been acquired, rather than focusing on measures aimed solely at achieving temporary price reductions.

2. Initiatives Concerning the Acquisition of Equipment, etc.

In 2007, the Comprehensive Acquisition Reform Promotion Project Team was established at the instruction of the Minister of Defense. The Project Team was formed to address the need for effective and efficient acquisition of equipment and materials in order to keep up with trends in military science and technology, promote integrated operation and meet the needs of forces, all of which required an acceleration of comprehensive acquisition reform. To date, the committee has considered various issues, as outlined below, and is currently engaged in deliberations in conjunction with the “Study of Structural Reform to Improve the Effectiveness of Defense Capability” framework.

(1) Strengthening[1] Life Cycle Cost (LCC) Management

The main equipment and materials are used for extended periods after procurement, so it is of extreme importance to promote efficient and rational management during the entire life cycle of such equipment, from concept, development, production, and operation (including maintenance, repair, and upgrades)

through to disposal. Appropriate management of cost throughout the life cycle of equipment, beginning with decision making based on judgment of cost effectiveness at the juncture of launching into development and production, contributes to the acquisition of effective and efficient equipment.

In March 2008, the Ministry of Defense commenced a trial of LCC management. and from April 2010, based on the results of the trial so far, it carried out cost calculations and cost management, while continuing to advance the application of LCC management. The latter focused on areas such as consideration of cost comparisons for equipment selection and acquisition format, tradeoff studies between performance and cost, and cost reduction.

(2) Expansion of the Incentive Contracts System

When the Ministry of Defense concludes contracts, it commonly uses a contract method to decide the prices paid, after inspections have been carried out of performance figures based on the implementation of the contract. In such cases, even if a company achieves cost reductions through efficiency efforts in the process of executing the contract, the fruits of this are not returned to the company in question, because the contract is amended to reflect the reduced price, having deducted the reduction from the originally contracted amount. This furthermore leads to a decrease in future contracted amounts and profits, from the next contract onwards. Hence, it is difficult to encourage companies to address the issue of cost reduction. On the other hand, if costs overrun, the contracted amount is not increased, which is also often displeasing to companies.

The Incentive Contracts System aims to reduce the cost of equipment through the promotion of proactive cost reduction activities among companies by sharing between the Ministry of Defense and corporations a percentage of the cost reductions generated in regard to contracted equipment through the efforts of civilian companies with which contracts have been concluded, as an incentive to increase profit. The cost reduction activities of companies contribute to increased productivity, strengthening and promoting a low-cost structure, and, by extension, it would seem to lead to stronger defense production and technological bases.

The Ministry of Defense introduced a price reduction proposal system in 1999, and undertook a full-scale review of the Incentive Contracts System in 2008, following which the scope of targets was expanded to companies' cost-reduction activities across the board, and a new system was implemented to increase effectiveness, in areas including improvement of the examination procedures for business proposals. As of January 2012, it has been used four times.

(3) Efforts to Curtail Costs

In order to curtail expenditures related to the R&D, procurement, maintenance, and management of

defense equipment, we are striving to apply a range of techniques including the short-term intensive procurement in an individual year, of equipment and such planned for procurement over multiple fiscal years, the lump-sum purchase of equipment for two or more Self-Defense Forces, the part commoditization and sharing of methods during development, promoting the use of commercial items, private sector outsourcing, and the streamlining of maintenance and improvement costs. Since fiscal year 2007, the results of such efforts have been compiled, and the performance in reduction compared to fiscal year 2006 organized and published (See Fig. III-4-2-2). Furthermore, as a new initiative in 2012, the Ministry of Defense is striving to curtail its expenditures by implementing the lump-sum purchase of vessel equipment with the Japan Coast Guard.

(4) Efforts to Increase Fairness and Transparency

The Ministry of Defense aims to increase fairness and transparency in relation to the acquisition of equipment and materials, and has thus far implemented a variety of measures from the view of making contracts more appropriate, and strengthening checking functions.

Recently, as a part of the effort to make public procurement more appropriate across the whole of government, a number of measures are being tackled in the Ministry of Defense, including the introduction and expansion of a comprehensive evaluation bidding system[2], the increase of multiple-year contracts, making bidding procedures more efficient, and reviews of sole source contracts. Alongside these measures, in July 2006, a deputy chief in charge of auditing was established at the Equipment Procurement Office[3] (as it was then named), as was an auditing division in the Internal Bureau, working toward strengthening checking functions.

In 2008, in light of cases such as Yamada Corporation's falsification of estimates by foreign manufacturers in order to overcharge the Ministry of Defense, a number of measures were put in place, including the establishment of special contract terms for general import procurement, the introduction of import procurement surveys, and an increase in the number of import procurement specialist officers resident in the United States.

Furthermore, in May 2009, based on the Bid-Rigging Information Manual, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Defense notified Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) of the instances of unusual bidding in the procurement of office furniture and other office supplies by the ASDF 1st Depot for Office Supplies, which were detected as a result of the 2008 Defense Survey. In June 2009, JFTC conducted an on-the-spot investigation of suppliers and the ASDF, and issued a cease and desist order and a payment order for surcharge to related suppliers in March 2010 under Anti-Monopoly Act and requested the Minister of Defense to implement improvement measures.

In response to circumstances such as these, the Ministry of Defense held an "Exploratory Committee Meeting for Bid-Rigging Issues in the ASDF 1st Depot for Office Supplies such as Office Furniture," as a

result of which, disciplinary actions were taken against a total of 50 people involved in these irregularities. Moreover, in order to prevent the recurrence of similar incidents, it was decided to implement a number of improvements, such as revising the replenishment and upgrading system in the ASDF, outsourcing the procurement of office supplies, such as office furniture, and strengthening oversight functions in regard to budget execution.

(5) Overhaul of Central and Regional Procurement

The Ministry of Defense is purchasing in the Equipment Procurement and Construction Office, mainly warships, aircraft, weapons, vehicles, and other important equipment and materials, and items common to all forces (hereinafter referred to as central procurement). It is focused on purchasing mainly things closely associated with the execution of duties by units in each Self-Defense Force and other organizations (hereinafter referred to as regional procurement),

Central and regional procurement differ in character in terms of the items dealt with and procedures. However, as part of review efforts, in order to increase the transparency of the procurement procedure further, since July 2008, the high price sole-source contracts of regional procurement (under the same criteria of 150 million yen and greater, as central procurement) became items requiring approval by the Minister of Defense.

Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense decided to leverage cloud computing starting at the end of fiscal year 2010 to manage data on central and regional procurement in a unified manner, using the functionality for various projects including the planning for bulk purchase.

(6) Overhaul of Central and Regional Procurement Further Efficiency in the Acquisition of Equipment

The approach to deliberations aimed at achieving further efficiency in the acquisition of equipment, which was compiled in September 2010, is as follows.

a. Equipment acquisition by means of the IPT (Integrated Project Team) system[4]

In order to review equipment acquisition taking full account of maintenance, education and training, and skill improvement from the equipment concept stage, it is necessary to expand and advance acquisition methods using the Integrated Project Team (IPT) system, which brings together various concerned departments. Moreover, it would be necessary to forge long-term public-private partnerships with participation by private enterprise for the future.

b. Cost management system

In order to maximize cost effectiveness, including cost associated with the operation of equipment, the

control system for accurately determining the LCC of equipment must be expanded.

c. The introduction of PBL (Performance Based Logistics)

It is necessary to consider the possibility of introducing PBL, which involves paying a certain amount in exchange for achieving equipment performance in terms of availability and safety, and to seek long-term cost reductions while maintaining and improving equipment quality.

Accordingly, in July 2011, the "Ministry of Defense PBL Introduction Guidelines" were formulated and published; these set forth the definition of PBL to be used by the Ministry of Defense, as well as the points of contention that should be resolved when visualizing and considering methods of introducing PBL.

In addition, using the special transport helicopters (EC-225LP) being acquired by the GSDF from FY2012 as a pilot model to facilitate the smooth introduction of PBL, the Ministry plans to conclude a comprehensive contract concerning the acquisition and repair of airframe parts.

(d) Improving Procurement Techniques

Procurement methods must be improved in order to improve efficiency in terms of such factors as the labor and hourly cost required in the procurement process (e.g., blanket procurement in a single contract over several years).

3. Review of the System concerning Contracts for the Procurement of Equipment and Materials

(1) Background to the review

In order to cope with the increasingly harsh environment surrounding the procurement of equipment and materials, the Ministry of Defense is faced with the growing necessity to accept new ideas and promote the reform of acquisition in a more forceful way.

Based on this background, the Ministry of Defense held the Contractual Systems Study Group Meeting[5] in 2010, to formulate new measures from a wide-ranging perspective.

In its deliberations concerning such matters as contracts relating to equipment procurement, this Contractual Systems Study Group has not stopped simply at curtailing procurement costs from the government’s point of view, but has taken a medium- to long-term perspective, keeping in mind improving the advantages of companies’ participation in the defense business and building “Win-Win” relationships to reward those who have made efforts to improve efficiency. After considering various issues, the Contractual Systems Study Group published its first interim report in August 2010, and its second interim report in April 2011.

(2) Measures to improve systems relating to contracts for defense equipment

(a) Improvement of the provision requiring the return of excessive profit

The provision requiring the return of excessive profit is a contract provision which stipulates that, in the event of any excessive profit remaining after the execution of a contract, companies must return this to the Government. This provision is applied in the event that a large portion of the cost of the equipment is difficult to forecast, including in general competitive contracts, and it is a characteristic contract provision in the procurement of defense equipment with low marketability.

For the Government, this provision is not only aimed at preventing the counterparty of the contract from generating excessive profits; it also has the advantage of enabling the collection of cost information through an audit after performance of the contract, as well as the advantage for the company that, because cost is allowed by the government, it forms the basis for the prices of similar contracts concluded in the future.

On the other hand, with contracts that include this provision, cost reductions due to the companies' efforts and other excessive profits generated are subject to return, diminishing the effectiveness of cost reduction incentives for the company. Furthermore, careful evaluation is required concerning the appropriateness of imposing the excessive profit return provision in regard to projects with multiple bidders, where substantial competitiveness is acknowledged to exist.

Accordingly, in March 2012, the Ministry of Defense improved the regulations, as a result of which, this provision is not applied in the case of competitive contracts in which real competiveness is ensured. At present, further deliberations are continuing concerning the method of calculating the planned price of equipment in the Ministry of Defense, including the approach to cost confirmation methods, the creation of databases for cost information, and the improvement of cost control capability.

(b) Improvement of the contract system to generate cost reduction incentives

The Ministry of Defense has undertaken a variety of initiatives in order to produce cost reduction incentives for companies to date, including the operation of an Incentive Contracts System. Since being introduced in 1999, however, these incentive contracts have only been used for four projects. Furthermore, the rationalization of public procurement now requires that competitive procedures, such as an open tender, be conducted for each contract, even for equipment and materials where in effect only a single supplier will bid.

As a result, in most cases only a single supplier has responded to a tender, which indicates that these procedures have in fact lost their substance. Accordingly, the Ministry of Defense improved the "System to promote the streamlining of work processes"[6] in April 2012 and, at present, as well as relaxing the existing Incentive Contracts System, it is undertaking deliberations focused on the medium- to long-term challenges of expanding intensive procurement, rethinking the open tender system, and promoting cost

reductions in regard to contracts where it is clearly evident that only a single supplier will bid, by means of single tendering contracts that bypass the open tender procedures.

(c) Reducing procurement costs further through multiple-year contracts that actively utilize the PFI (Private Finance Initiative) Promotion Act[7]

In order to reduce costs, long-term contracts that are consolidated to a certain degree are essential. However, the upper limit for acts resulting in Treasury liability is five years and it does not make business sense for companies to invest in such short-term contracts, so it seems that they refrain from investment that could lead to cost reductions and, furthermore, do not accept orders, in order to avoid risk.

Accordingly, as well as realizing the planned acquisition and execution of budgets using standardized investment amounts, it is anticipated that implementing long-term multiple-year contracts through the active utilization of the PFI Promotion Act and the Public Service Reform Act[8] will give rise to such benefits as cutting equipment procurement costs by reducing risks for those accepting orders, and promoting the entrance of new suppliers. From this perspective, in regard to the project focused on the enhancement of the X-band communications satellite, the Ministry of Defense is actively utilizing the PFI Promotion Act[9],[10] which was revised in 2011, over the 19 years from the manufacture of the satellite until the end of its service life. Moreover, in PBL contracts, consideration should be given to utilizing the Public Service Reform Act, which permits the use of long-term contracts up to a maximum of ten years, if contracts are required that exceed the upper limit for acts resulting in Treasury liability (five years). However, in the case of long-term contracts, it is necessary to give adequate consideration to the risk that budget rigidity or inefficiency may arise as a result of technological innovation. In addition, it is necessary to examine the contract method and the calculation method, etc., since a PBL contract is a form of contract where compensation is paid based on performance.

4. Deliberations on Measures Concerning Changes in the International Environment Surrounding Defense Equipment

Advanced equipment is becoming increasingly high-performance and expensive, so in its development and production, there is a growing tendency to participate in international joint development and production, which curbs development and production costs, while utilizing the advanced technology of allies and friends[11]. In light of the fact that the New NDPG stipulated that consideration should be given to measures that respond to the major changes taking place in relation to such defense equipment, a statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary concerning the Standards for the Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment, etc. was published on December 27, 2011. These Standards have made it possible to engage in joint development and production with the U.S.A. and other countries with which Japan has a cooperative security relationship, based on the premise of stringent management. As well as ① making

it easier to procure advanced equipment, ② it is anticipated that this will have the advantage of reducing the unit costs of production by curbing development costs and increasing production volume, and also ③ further support the construction of a dynamic defense force through the maintenance and increased sophistication of the defense production and technological bases.

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[1] Costs required throughout the life cycle of a product, from its design, development, mass production, and operation (including maintenance, repair and upgrading), through to its disposal

[2] Unlike in the automatic bid system, which focuses only on price, this is a system in which the successful bidder in determined on the basis of a comprehensive evaluation that includes both the price and other elements, which is used in cases in which it is important to carry out an evaluation of the technological elements, etc.

[3] The Equipment Procurement Office was reorganized to create the Equipment Procurement and Construction Office in September 2007

[4] As an example, in the selection of the F-X, the next-generation fighter plane of the ASDF, an IPT was established with the participation of representatives of multiple related departments and bureaus within the Ministry of Defense, which was involved in all facets of the model selection process, including conducting the evaluation in order to facilitate selection. In addition, cross-departmental reviews are also being conducted for the GSDF's new multipurpose helicopter, the successor to the FH-70 towed howitzer, and the MSDF's escort ship, as an IPT has been established for each.

[5] For a summary of the Contractual Systems Study Group, see <http;//www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/meeting/keiyaku_seido/gaiyo.hmtl>

[6] A system jointly involving the public and private sectors to investigate whether there is room for streamlining work processes in which a fact-finding survey and analysis of work processes is performed by the Ministry of Defense utilizing consulting companies, in order to raise the efficiency in the execution of contract counterparty duties.

[7] Act on Promotion of Private Finance Initiative

[8] Act on Reform of Public Services by Introduction of Competitive Bidding

[9] In June 2011, the PFI Promotion Act was revised and rental housing, marine vessels, aircraft and satellites were added to the list of facilities subject to the Act

[10] In May 2011, the Ministry of Defense established the X-Band Satellite Communications Upgrade Program execution Group in order to promote the project to acquire and operate the X-band SATCOM network using the PFI method with an integrated contract running from design to disposal, utilizing the funds, management abilities and technical knowledge of civilian companies; since then, deliberations have been ongoing, with this Group at the forefront.

[11] As an example of this, nine countries, including the U.S.A., the U.K., the Netherlands and Italy, are participants in the joint development of the F-35, the model selected as Japan's next-generation fighter aircraft.

3. Research and Development of the Technical Research & Development Institute (TRDI)

TRDI engages in research and development that emphasizes the operational demands of units by incorporating the latest scientific techniques[1]. Since FY2009, TRDI has conducted a research program as "operationally demonstrative research" on the personal gear of troops that makes it possible for the unit to share information with each of its members via a network. In order to reflect user feedback concerning improvements in operability and lighter weight, research is conducted in cooperation with units using the outcomes of unit tests[2] to acquire various evaluation data assuming real operation.

In addition, from the perspective of integrated operation, TRDI is developing a highly functional digital data link system for fighters in order to achieve organized combat by creating a network that links military capabilities.

From the perspective of optimizing cost, schedule and performance through the entire life cycle of equipment, TRDI thoroughly analyzes and compares multiple proposals concerning performance, cost and all in the conceptual study, research and development stages, as well as conducting research of modeling and simulation, such as integrated air defense system simulations and initial review and assessment technologies for ships, as a tool for the analysis and comparison. Further, in order to prevent surge in unit cost of procured equipment, TRDI and the Equipment Procurement and Construction Office (EPCO) have been cooperatively conducting cost estimates as part of the life cycle management even in development phase of defense systems.

The TRDI exchanges technical information with various organizations within Japan, including the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency and universities. The Ministry intends to further strengthen studies of technological trends both within Japan and overseas and make even greater efforts to promote the application of the technology held by institutions and private companies in Japan to its own research and development. Moreover, in light of the Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on Guidelines for Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment, the Ministry will promote technological exchange with countries with which Japan has a cooperative security relationship. In addition, as well as working on the development of new decontamination sets and the research into unmanned aerial vehicles, on the basis of the lessons learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake, the Ministry will promote research and development of equipment based on the outcomes of various technological innovations by remarkable progress in science and technology in private sectors, such as information and communications technology and cyber attacks countermeasures technology.

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1 "Operationally demonstrative research" has been introduced. In this type of research, the SDF service (the future operator) will evaluate the prototypes of the equipment. The evaluation will be reflected in later R&D, procurement, and related operations. Further "Evolutionary development" has been introduced. At the start of the development phase, the performance requirements to be achieved are left undecided. Even after the start of the development phase, the required performance can be

updated, and state-of-the-art military science technology can be introduced.

[2] Experiments conducted by the GSDF using specific units, for the purpose of specifying the "New Way of Fighting Based on Information Supremacy" and the effective development of command and communications equipment.

Part Ⅲ Measures for Defense of Japan

Chapter 4 The Relationship between the Japanese People and the Ministry of Defense and the SDF

Section 3 Interaction between the Ministry of Defense and the SDF, and the Local Community and Japanese Citizens

The various activities of the MOD and the SDF cannot be carried out by the MOD and the SDF alone. They are only possible with the understanding and cooperation of each and every citizen, local governments, and other organizations.

Moreover, the MOD and the SDF have been conducting various cooperation activities to support the lives of the populace, as well as striving to minimize the impact of the establishment and operation of defense facilities[1] on the lives of surrounding citizens. Such activities are further deepening the mutual trust between the local community and the people, and the SDF, and contributing to the enhancement and strengthening of social infrastructure.

From this perspective, this section explains the daily interaction between the Defense Ministry and the SDF, and the local communities and the people of Japan, and activities undertaken to gain public understanding and cooperation.

1. Activities in Civic Life and Contributions to Society

The SDF is carrying out welfare support activities for local residents in a number of fields linked with the Japanese people's livelihood, based on requests from local governments and relevant organizations. These activities further deepen mutual trust between the populace and the SDF, while giving the troops a sense of pride and confidence in the fact that they are playing a useful role in the daily lives of the Japanese people.

See References 76, 77

1. Activities under Normal Circumstances

Even today, the GSDF still handles the disposal of unexploded ordnance found throughout Japan. In FY2011, there were 1,578 such cases, weighing about 38 tons in total. In particular, cases handled in Okinawa Prefecture accounted for 60% of the total. Furthermore, the MSDF continues to clear and dispose of underwater mines and other dangerous explosives. In FY2011, there were approximately 510 explosives, totaling about 4.4 tons. In addition, most of the SDF camps and bases in Japan open their facilities to local authorities and neighboring residents upon request, unless the requests interfere with unit activities. They, as a result, also contribute to the vitalization of local activities. Furthermore, SDF

musical bands visit brass bands of local schools to give them instruction, thus striving to foster friendly interaction with local residents.

2. Activities Relating to the Great East Japan Earthquake

As part of their disaster relief activities, the SDF provided support to civilians by supplying water and bathing facilities, as well as visiting evacuation shelters, interacting with local children, and holding concerts at which SDF musical bands performed to cheer up disaster-affected citizens, thereby providing support for both the bodies and minds of local citizens. Moreover, even after their withdrawal from the region, some troops have continued to engage in exchange activities with people in disaster-afflicted areas.

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[1] The generic term for facilities used by the Self-Defense Force and the facilities and areas used by the U.S. forces in Japan based on the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty. It refers to training areas, airfields, ports, communication stations, barracks, warehouses, ammunition depots, oil bunkers, and so on.

2. Cooperation from Local Public Organizations and Other Related Organizations for the SDF

1. Cooperation in Recruitment of Uniformed SDF Personnel and Support for Outplacement

Amid the recent harsh recruitment environment and employment situation, the cooperation of local public organizations and relevant organizations is vital to secure highly qualified personnel and to assist the outplacement of uniformed SDF personnel who retire at relatively younger ages.

2. Support and Cooperation for SDF Activities

SDF camps and bases are located in all prefectures, and maintain close relations with the local communities. Various forms of cooperation and support from the local communities are indispensable for the SDF to conduct diverse activities. The SDF has also received words of encouragement from the people including local residents and relevant organizations. Moreover, some of the local authorities hosting camps and bases have commented that the presence of the SDF in their communities helps to support the local economy and employment in the region.

In addition to this kind of support and cooperation from the local communities, many letters of encouragement are sent by the people to SDF personnel engaging in international peace cooperation activities, which raise the morale of SDF personnel and reinforce their awareness of serving the people of Japan.

3. Measures for Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas

1. Scale and Features of Defense Facilities

The uses of defense facilities can be extended in various ways such as maneuver areas, airfields, ports, and barracks[1]. Many defense facilities require large areas of land. Due to Japan's geographical characteristics, there are some cities and industrial facilities that must coexist with defense facilities on narrow plains. In particular, problems related to restricted presence and operations of defense facilities have emerged due to the urbanization of areas around many defense facilities as a result of economic development. Also, noise related to frequent takeoffs and landings by aircraft, firing, bombing, gunshots from artillery, tank operations, and so on, raise concern in the affected residential communities.

(See Figs. III-4-3-1, 2)

2. Work on Various Measures Relating to Defense Facilities

Defense facilities, as bases which support the defense capabilities of Japan and the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements, are indispensable to the country's security. The MOD has been securing harmony between the defense facilities and surrounding areas in order to fully maintain those capabilities, and working to obtain the understanding and cooperation of the local residents, as it is necessary to constantly maintain conditions for stable utilization. For that purpose, the MOD has taken the measures shown in Fig. III-4-3-3, Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas since 1974 based on the Law Concerning Adjustment, etc. of the Living Environment in the Environs of Defense Facilities (Living Environment Improvement Law).

See Reference 84

(1) Review of the Measures of the Law Concerning Adjustment, etc. of the Living Environment in the Environs of Defense Facilities (Living Environment Improvement Law)

The Law Concerning Adjustment, etc. of the Living Environment in the Environs of Defense Facilities (Living Environment Improvement Law) was enacted in 1974 from the viewpoint that it is unfair for only the local citizens living near defense facilities to bear the burden of the impacts of aircraft noise and other problems resulting from operations of defense facilities which include the activities of SDF and U.S. military forces or operations of airfields, as well as the strong requests from related local public entities to take adequate measures for such negative impacts. The MOD, based on the above law, has developed measures to prevent, reduce, and mitigate those impacts.

However, as social conditions have changed and the lifestyles and values of Japanese nationals have diversified, there have been requests by related local public entities to review the current system for wider and more flexible application of the law for specified defense facilities environs improvement adjustment grants and aid to public facilities for the stabilization of people's lives, as well as expanding the areas eligible for residential sound insulation work. Moreover, in November 2009 the Government Revitalization Unit directed that "grants be reviewed to enhance their effectiveness by improving flexibility in the use of grants and making the grants more convenient for local communities," and also that residential sound insulation work be prioritized, as much as possible.

Accordingly, in April 2011, the MOD partially revised the Living Environment Improvement Act and made it possible for the specified defense facilities environs improvement adjustment grants to be applied to so-called soft projects, such as aid for medical expenses, as well as their conventional purpose focused on the improvement of public facilities, in order to make the measures more effective and more convenient for the related local public entities. In addition, considering effects of establishment and

operation of defense facilities on living environment of neighboring areas, measures were taken in which the calculation method of the specified defense facilities environs improvement adjustment grants was reviewed and more defense facilities were designated to be specified defense facilities.

(2) Considerations for Future Harmonization of Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas

The MOD is fully considering ways to more effectively and efficiently develop measures to harmonize defense facilities and surrounding areas, in light of the severe fiscal situation, based on requests by related local public entities and directions from the Government Revitalization Unit.

(See Fig. III-4-3-5)

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[1] The land area of defense facilities, as of January 1, 2012 is approximately 1,400 km^2 (the sum of the land area of SDF facilities (approximately 1,087 km^2), the land area of the facilities and areas (for exclusive use) of the U.S. forces in Japan (approximately 309 km^2), and the land area of facilities other than SDF facilities which the U.S. forces in Japan are jointly using under the Status of Forces Agreement (approximately 4 km^2)), which accounts for approximately 0.37% of the country's land. Of which, approximately 42% of the land area of SDF facilities is situated in Hokkaido. Divided by use, approximately 75% of which is maneuver areas. Meanwhile, 76 km^2 of the land area of the facilities and areas (for exclusive use) of the U.S. forces in Japan is jointly used by the SDF under the Status of Forces Agreement.

4. Public Relations Activities, Information Disclosure, and Related Activities

1. Various Public Relations Activities

The activities of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF to protect the peace and security of Japan cannot be carried out without the understanding and support from the people of Japan. For this reason, it is important to be proactive in undertaking easily-comprehensible public relations activities and to secure the trust and cooperation of the public.

Moreover, the public expectations and evaluation have been increasing as the scope of SDF activities has expanded both domestically and internationally, including international peace cooperation activities in the Republic of South Sudan, anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, and domestic disaster relief activities in relation to the Great East Japan Earthquake.

With regard to this point, in a Public Opinion Survey conducted by the Cabinet Office (survey conducted in January 2012), in relation to a question about their impression of the SDF, 91.7% of respondents – the highest rate since the survey began - replied that they "Have a positive impression of them"[1]; in addition, 97.7% responded that they " Appreciate"[2] the SDF in relation to their disaster relief activities associated with the Great East Japan Earthquake, while 87.4% responded that they "Appreciate"[3] the SDF's activities overseas. Thus, the public expectations and support to the MOD and SDF are at their highest level to date.

In light of this vitalization of the MOD and SDF activities and the high level of expectation and support to the SDF among the public, the Ministry and SDF will continue to conduct a variety of PR activities, thereby striving to ensure better understanding of the current status of the SDF.

See Reference 85

(1) Website, Pamphlets, and Others

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF conduct PR activities using a wide variety of media, including providing information, gathering public opinions, distributing PR videos via the Internet, and broadcasting commercial films for each SDF service[4].

The Ministry of Defense has been making great efforts to provide accurate information on the SDF and national defense to the public more extensively and in a more timely fashion, in the form of the creation and distribution of various pamphlets which explain the policies of the MOD and the activities of the SDF, cooperation with media coverage, and assistance in editing the PR magazine *MAMOR*. Furthermore, as SDF activities outside Japan have increased, people overseas are increasingly interested in the MOD and the SDF. In order to address such a situation, the MOD has been making efforts to get across information

overseas through such activities as publishing the English pamphlet, *JAPAN DEFENSE FOCUS*, which in 2012 switched from quarterly to monthly publication, as well as actively promoting the participation of foreign media in regular press conferences, expanding the English section of the Ministry of Defense website, and publishing English version of the defense white papers, various policy pamphlets, and PR videos in English.

Among those efforts, we have been intensively undertaking PR activities in regard to such activities as the international peacekeeping cooperation activities in the Republic of South Sudan, anti-piracy operations off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, and efforts on Great East Japan Earthquake, all of which have attracted considerable public attention, by posting videos and facts and figures concerning the SDF's performance on special pages on the MOD and Joint Staff Office websites, as well as by publishing special issues of PR magazines, and creating and distributing pamphlets.

(2) Events, PR Facilities, etc.

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF conduct activities to extensively inform the people of the current situation of the SDF[5]. These activities include the annual GSDF Fire Power Exercise conducted at the foot of Mt. Fuji; cruises to experience being aboard MSDF vessels in each region; and demonstration flights and boarding experience on aircraft at open base festivals held at ASDF bases. In addition, at camps and bases throughout the country, events including equipment exhibitions, unit tours, and SDF musical band concerts are held on the anniversary of a unit's foundation. In some instances, they also hold parades through cities both in vehicles and on foot, with cooperation from the local communities concerned. Furthermore, in commemoration of the anniversary of the foundation of the SDF, events such as the SDF Marching Festival, a troop review, a fleet review, and an air review are held. In 2011, the SDF Marching Festival[6] was held at the Nippon Budokan arena, in a spirit of mourning for the deceased of the Great East Japan Earthquake and hope for the recovery of the region and its people, and the event attracted a total of 39,000 visitors. Furthermore, in December that year, in order to promote public awareness of the international cooperation initiatives undertaken to date by the MOD and the SDF, the Ministry held its first symposium on international cooperation, entitled the "20th Anniversary of Launch of International Cooperation."

Concerning annual reviews by the SDF, a troop review, a fleet review, and an air review are hosted in rotation by the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, respectively, at which SDF equipment and achievements of daily training are exhibited to the public. In 2011, an air review was hosted by the ASDF at Hyakuri Air Base, attended by 12,300 people, including during the rehearsal. In 2012, a fleet,review is scheduled to be held by the MSDF.

Each of the Regional Defense Bureaus has organized seminars on defense issues to inform the public and gain their understanding of defense policies and SDF activities, and has been also engaged in Japan–U.S.

friendship programs between Japanese citizens living near the U.S. facilities and areas in Japan and U.S. military personnel and their families by hosting sports events and cultural exchange programs.

In addition to such events, the MOD and the SDF actively promote tours at PR facilities. For example, the PR facilities in the MOD at Ichigaya, including the Ichigaya Memorial Hall, are open to visitors on two guided tours each weekday: one each in the morning and afternoon. Since the tours were launched in June 2000, more than 290,000 people have visited the facilities so far.

Furthermore, each SDF has its large-scale PR facility, and SDF camps and bases throughout Japan also made PR centers and archives open to the public.

See Reference

Furthermore, as the results of the budget screening process of November 2009 decided that SDF's PR programs (large-scale PR facilities and events) should "reduce (their) budget (by privatizing the facilities and collecting admission fees)", a trial run of collecting admission fees was conducted from November 2010 to January 2011 at large-scale PR facilities (GSDF PR Center, MSDF Sasebo Archives, and ASDF Hamamatsu PR Center) with the purpose of examining the effects on changes in the number of visitors due to charging admission fees. As a result, the number of visitors declined considerably (by between 35% to more than 60%) compared with the same period of the previous year. In light of these results, the MOD has been making use of surveys conducted by private sectors with expert knowledge of such matters in terms of whether it can cut expenditures without reducing the publicity effect as far as possible, and has been considering commissioning private sectors to operate and manage some of the exhibitions, who would collect fees from visitors of these exhibitions. The Ministry intends to address this matter appropriately as soon as possible from FY2012 on.

(3) Trial Enlistment Programs

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF offer SDF Life Experience Tours[7] and Enlistment Experience Programs[8] at the request of private companies, etc. These programs are intended to deepen public understanding of the SDF by offering them the opportunity to experience firsthand the daily life and training of the SDF as well as to have direct contact with SDF members, while staying at an SDF camp or base for two to three days. In FY2011, about 170 persons participated in SDF Life Experience Tours. From private sectors, the SDF received about 650 requests for Enlistment Experience Programs and about 9,300 employees experienced SDF life.

2. Appropriate Operation of the Information Disclosure System and Personal Data Protection System

An information disclosure system[9] was established in the MOD, in line with the enactment of the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs in 2001.

The Ministry of Defense discloses administrative documents, and a personal information protection system[10] (in MOD) was also established in line with the Law for the Protection of Personal Information Held by Administrative Organs of 2005. Along with measures to ensure the security of the personal information under its jurisdiction, the MOD also discloses such information in response to requests for disclosure, revision, and termination of use.

For this reason, the receipt and implementation of disclosure applications are instigated at the MOD offices and each Regional Defense Bureau and branch[11].

See Reference 86, Reference

3. Appropriate Operation of the Whistleblower Protection System

In order to develop a safeguard system to protect workers who disclose information in order to serve the public interest, the Whistleblower Protection Act entered into effect in April 2006. In accordance with this act, the MOD set up a system to handle public interest-related information disclosures by its employees and outside workers on issues where the MOD has the legal authority to punish or issue recommendations. Moreover, the MOD and the SDF have established an internal contact desk for information disclosure in the public interest by its employees, and an external contact desk for related disclosure by outside workers. Through the contact desks, the MOD deals with information disclosure that is in the public interest and whistleblower protection[12].

4. Engagement in Policy Evaluation

In 2001, the policy evaluation system was introduced with the aim of improving the efficiency and quality of administration for the benefit of the people. Following that, the Government Policy Evaluations Act (GPEA) came into effect in 2002.

Based on this law, the MOD has been conducting the evaluation of all kind of policies of the Ministry. In FY2011, the MOD conducted 33 policy evaluations, including the evaluation of the “Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake.”

In addition, in accordance with the new “MOD Policy Evaluation Basic Guideline” formulated in March 2011, the MOD is now conducting objective, impartial policy evaluations of measures based on the 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines and the 2011 Mid-Term Defense Program, and is seeking to fulfill its duty of accountability to the public, as well as appropriately reflecting the results of those evaluations in its policies.

5. Other Initiatives

In January 2012, in response to various remarks concerning the lecture held at the Okinawa Regional Defense Bureau, the MOD Committee on the Regulation of Duties was established and investigated appropriateness of the lecture. As a result, the Committee was not able to confirm the facts involving violation of the Self-Defense Forces Act. However in light of the fact that personal information had been handled beyond the scope necessary for the achievement of the objectives, the relevant officials were penalized and the measures to prevent the recurrence have been taken.

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1 The figure for "Have a positive impression of them" is the total for the responses "Have a positive impression of them" and "Tend to have a positive impression of them".

2 The figure for "Appreciate" is the total for the responses "Highly appreciate" and "Appreciate to a certain degree".

3 The figure for "Appreciate" is the total for the responses "Highly appreciate" and "Appreciate to a certain degree".

4 See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/publication/index.html>

5 For details on events, etc.,
see the Ministry of Defense website <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/publication/events/index.html>

6 This was also on broadcast live via the internet.

7 Information on the Summer Tour/Spring Tour for College Students, etc.; Ms. Parsley Tour (trial tour for women in their 20s); and One-Day Visit to SDF for Women is available on the MOD website.

8 Tours to experience the daily life of the Ground, Maritime, or Air Self-Defense Force. To participate in a Enlistment Experience Program, please contact local Provincial Cooperation Offices through the following website: <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/profile/plo/plo.html>

9 See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/info/joho/index.html>

10 See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/info/hogo/index.html>

11 See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/info/joho/johokokai06.pdf>

12 See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/library/koueki_tuho/index.htm>