

INDIAN ARMY DOCTRINE

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PART - I

PROMULGATION

1. The Indian Army Doctrine is structured as a two-part document. The main part contains subjects for widespread dissemination in the Army, the second part is the classified adjunct to it and is intended for very restricted circulation.

2. Having been approved by Army Headquarters, the main part of the Indian Army Doctrine is hereby promulgated for information, guidance and implementation by all concerned.

3. Part I will be reviewed every five years and updated, as necessary. The Doctrine will be re-issued every ten years.

Shimla

22 October 2004

(K Nagaraj)
Lt Gen
GOC-in-C ARTRAC

CODE OF THE WARRIOR

"I am a Warrior; defending my Nation is my dharma.
I will train my mind, body and spirit to fight,
Excel in all devices and weapons of war –
present and future,
Always protect the weak,
Be truthful and forthright,
Be humane, cultured and compassionate,
Fight and embrace the consequences willingly.
God, give me strength that I ask nothing of you"

– The Bhagawad Gita

General NC Vij
PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, ADC

FOREWORD

"How can man die better, than facing fearful odds,
for the ashes of his fathers and the temples of his Gods."

Like all other modern armed forces, the Indian Army has been considerably influenced by the Revolution in Military Affairs and the great strides being made in technology development. This has necessitated a transformation in strategic thinking along with a paradigm shift in organization and conduct of operations. As a consequence, military doctrines, weapon systems and force structures need to undergo a review. Our vision for the twenty-first century is to have a well equipped and optimally structured army, enabling it to respond effectively to varied situations and demands whilst it continually adapts itself to meet future challenges.

Such a vision places emphasis on the ability to augment existing strengths, develop new skills, think imaginatively and attempt innovative approaches to cope with the emerging environment. The challenges that we will be confronted with require us to visualize what our Army of the future should look like and accordingly develop suitable approaches to structures, equipping and training to emerge with flying colours in future conflict situations. The impetus for change must come from within and flow through the entire Army.

The Indian Army has to maintain a high level of readiness for war in varied terrain conditions and should have the capability to operate in the complete spectrum of conflict. The Indian Army Doctrine (hereinafter referred to as the 'Doctrine') outlines a framework for a better understanding of the approach to warfare and provides the foundation for its practical application.

Funds scarcity or shortfall is a challenge faced by all armies of the world and hence there is a need for improved operating cultures and optimization of resources. The winning armies of the future will not necessarily be the ones that have greater combat power but ones that can visualize and comprehend battles more clearly. There will invariably be technological gaps between the systems that we possess and those developed up to that point in time. Notwithstanding this gap we have to continuously utilize all available resources imaginatively and effectively.

The emergence of Information Warfare as a major force multiplier points clearly towards the imperatives of network-centric warfare. Additionally, present trends indicate a marked shift towards the manoeuvre style of warfare and directive style of command. Concurrently, the requirement for joint operations and the need for greater integration and inter-dependence amongst the three Services are viewed as being essential for success.

This Doctrine emphasizes that the profession of arms is a calling. The hallmark of a good soldier entails having a sense of responsibility, professional expertise and loyalty to the Nation and the Army. The ethos and moral code set forth principles and ideals; these exhort every man in uniform to abide by his duty without regard to personal safety. This ethos forms the bedrock of the Army's preparedness in peace and is the key to its effectiveness in war.

Indian Army officers would do well to develop a broad-based, all-inclusive understanding of warfare and not become

overly reliant on rigid adherence to prescriptive rules. The nature of this Doctrine is enduring and yet dynamic; it drives development of both, the art and science of war. In the Army it provides the focus for constructive debate within well-informed and professional circles and acts as a guide to the younger generation. Training in the Army should focus on management of change and operational adaptation to change. Towards this end, providing the kind of ambience that encourages and facilitates intellectual development should be an unceasing endeavour.

18 **October 2004**

(NC Vij)
General

"Not by action Not by progeny

Not by wealth But by sacrifice alone

Can Immortal Goal be achieved."

– The Bhagawad Gita

“And speak not of those who are

slain in Allah’s way as dead,

Nay, (they are) alive but ye perceive not”.

– **Sureh Bacarah, Ayat 154,**
The Holy Quran

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CHAPTER 1

GEO-STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT AND THE INDIAN ARMY

SECTION 1 : DOCTRINE, CONCEPT AND STRATEGY

SECTION 2 : ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT

SECTION 3 : THE INDIAN ARMY

SECTION 1 : DOCTRINE, CONCEPT AND STRATEGY

"Doctrine is indispensable to an army. Doctrine provides a military organisation with a common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose, and a unity of effort".

– General George H. Decker, 1960.

Doctrine

1.1 Military doctrines have provided the basic approach to all important aspects related to war for armies of most nations over the past few centuries. Prevailing strategic realities, threats, challenges, visualised opportunities and national aspirations are the major factors which have a strong influence on the formulation of military doctrines. A doctrine is generally a written document; it could also be a widely accepted understanding without being specifically enunciated. In the Indian context the need for formulating and enunciating a comprehensive military doctrine has gained momentum with advancements in military technologies and the changing nature of war in our times. Military doctrine is neither dogma nor does it replace or take away the authority and obligation of the commander on the spot to determine a proper course of action under the circumstances prevailing at the time of decision.

1.2 In simple words, military doctrine is a particular policy taught or advocated; a set of principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of national objectives. Military doctrine can be defined as 'a formal expression of military knowledge and thought that an army accepts as being relevant at a given time, which covers the nature of current and future conflicts, the preparation of the army for such conflicts and the methods of engaging in them to achieve success'. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application. The illustration below depicts the inputs that traditionally contribute to the formulation of a military doctrine and outputs that flow from its enunciation.



Concept

1.3 A concept is defined as 'a general notion or statement of an idea, expressing how something might be done or accomplished, that may lead to an accepted procedure'. In the nascent stage a concept may be nebulous; however, it crystallises as it develops. In the Indian military context a concept is generally enunciated at the strategic and operational levels. It articulates, in very broad terms, a visualisation of the manner in which operations are to be conducted, and focuses on the principal elements which will drive them.

Strategy

1.4 Strategy is the art and science of developing and using elements of national power including political, economic, psychological, technological capabilities and military forces, as necessary, during peace and war to achieve national objectives. Military strategy is derived from the overall national or 'grand' strategy.

"Winning Strategists are certain of triumph
Before seeking a challenge.
Loosing Strategists are certain to challenge
Before seeking a triumph".

– Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*.

SECTION 2 : ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT

"There can be four dangers to a state;
That which is of external origin and of internal abetment;
That which is of internal origin and of external abetment;
That which is of external origin and of external abetment;
and that which is of internal origin and of internal abetment".

– Kautilya.

General

1.5 India is a country of continental size with land borders shared with a large number of countries, 1197 islands and a coastline of 7516 kilometres with a vast Exclusive Economic Zone. Despite her historically developed racial, cultural, linguistic and religious diversity, India is a nation with an innately all-embracing, secular polity that has welcomed and assimilated various cultures into her existing milieu. Her modern values are rooted in democratic governance and profound respect for human life. We remain peaceful without being pacifists and have a vision for the future with a measure of confidence in ourselves as we strive for economic progress and integration in the global environment. Defending India calls for defending her physical, economic and cultural identity in the prevalent geo-political milieu.

The Geo-political Environment

1.6 The geo-political scenario is fast changing and is likely to continue to do so in the coming decades. Although the USA remains the only super power today, the world is witnessing the emergence of various centres of power, with India emerging as one of the leading global players. Each centre of power is attempting to achieve a 'balance of interest' as opposed to the erstwhile 'balance of power'. Greater reliance is being placed on democracy as a factor contributing to conflict prevention and increasing emphasis on bilateral or multi-lateral groupings as a means to deter aggression against weak nations. There is also a growing concern about the

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the spread of terrorism. Energy security and control of scarce resources are assuming trans-national proportions.

1.7 As part of the Southern Asian Region, India has considerable interests in the areas stretching from West Asia through Central Asia and South Asia to South East Asia. The Indian Ocean region is of great importance to India and it assumes strategic significance due to the high volume of Indian and international trade transiting through the Indian Ocean. Existing and emerging regional groupings give rise to competitiveness with the attendant possibility of increasing instability due to inter and intra-regional conflicts. The region also includes a number of nuclear weapon or nuclear-capable states. In addition, this region is witnessing an unprecedented proliferation in small arms and narcotics trafficking which, in turn, threaten the stability of states and societies. Trans-border migration on economic grounds also raises serious security concerns.

1.8 India is a member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the Association for South East Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF) and the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC). By virtue of her size and strategic location in the Indian Ocean region, India is expected to play her rightful role to ensure peace and stability in it.

The Economic Environment

1.9 With market forces playing an important role, economic strength is likely to become the currency of power. National economies are undergoing liberalisation to cater to globalisation. The dominance of the developed world over the global economy is, nonetheless, likely to continue. Even so, China and India have been acknowledged as emerging economic powers. Economic linkages and inter-dependence amongst countries are likely to result in mutual security becoming an important issue. Water, energy sources (mainly oil) and even environmental issues may emerge as causes of future conflict between states.

The Security Environment

1.10 The security challenges facing India are varied and complex. India has two unsettled borders. The country has experienced four major conventional border wars besides an undeclared war fought in Kargil in 1999. She is engaged in an externally abetted proxy war for the last several years in Jammu and Kashmir and has been combating terrorism perpetuated by militant and terrorist groups sponsored by a foreign State. At the same time, a number of insurgencies, spurred by tribal and ethnic aspirations in addition to left wing ideologies are being tackled in various parts of the country. A number of nuclear weapon states are in India's neighbourhood; hostile, radical or fundamentalist elements gaining access to and posing a threat with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is also a possibility. It is in such an environment that the Indian Army is required to fulfil its roles in varied operating conditions across the entire spectrum of conflict.

Nature of Future Warfare

1.11 Like terrorism today, the likelihood of 'asymmetric wars' becoming the form of warfare of tomorrow is being discussed quite widely. Nonetheless, the fact that all countries continue to lay emphasis on preparedness for conventional war, underscores the predominant view that asymmetric wars cannot replace conventional wars, even though they can very much become an adjunct of and influence conventional wars themselves.

1.12 Future wars are likely to be characterised by: -

- Emerging at short notice, being of short duration and being fought at high tempo and intensity.
- Non-linear conduct of operations.
- Deeper and wider combat zones due to increased reach of integral firepower and surveillance resources, including space-based systems.

- Added emphasis on the all-arms concept and need for increased jointmanship between the land, naval and air forces.
- Enhanced reliance on a variety of surveillance systems and, resultantly, greater availability of information contributing to increased transparency of the battlefield.
- Improved accuracy, lethality and stand-off capability of weapons leading to greater destructive capability.
- Ascendancy of Network Centric Warfare (NCW), Information Warfare (IW) and conduct of operations under the glare of the media.
- Threat from enemy special forces, insurgents and terrorists to rear areas which will necessitate earmarking of troops to provide security to lines of communication.

"Let him who desires peace, prepare for war".

– Vegetius, *De Re Militari,iii,*378.

SECTION 3 : THE INDIAN ARMY

"My Indian Divisions after 1943 were among the best in the world. They go anywhere, do anything, go on doing it, and do it on very little".

– Field Marshal Sir William Slim, *Defeat Into Victory*, 1956.

1.13 **Role of the Indian Army**. The Indian Army is the land component of the Indian Armed Forces which exist to uphold the ideals of the Constitution of India. As a major component of national power, along with the Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force, the roles of the Indian Army are as follows :-

- **Primary Role.** Preserve national interests and safeguard sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of India against any external threats by deterrence or by waging war.
- **Secondary Role.** Assist Government agencies to cope with 'proxy war' and other internal threats and provide aid to civil authority when requisitioned for the purpose.

1.14 **Command and Control of the Indian Armed Forces.** The President of India is the Supreme Commander of the Indian Armed Forces. As in all democracies, the Indian Armed Forces are controlled by the elected political leadership of the nation (Government of India). Executive control is exercised sequentially through the Union Cabinet, the Defence Minister, the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) and the Chiefs of Army, Naval and Air Staff of their respective Services. The Ministry of Defence handles matters related to personnel, financial and resource management.

1.15 **Tasks of the Indian Army**. The Indian Army serves as the ultimate instrument for maintaining the unity and the integrity of the nation in the face of external threats and

internal unrest and disturbances. The major tasks of the Indian Army are as follows: -

- Effectively project deterrence and dissuasion through the medium of strong, well-structured combat capability.
- Be prepared to engage in and conduct all types of military operations, singly or jointly, in the entire spectrum of conflict.
- Provide the requisite land forces component of the Strategic Forces Command.
- Provide aid to civil authority when called upon to do so for maintenance of law and order, humanitarian aid and assistance during disasters and calamities or any other circumstances including maintenance of essential services.
- Participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations in consonance with India's commitment to the United Nations Charter.
- Be prepared to render military assistance to friendly countries when required to do so.

"***It is not big armies that win battles; it is the good ones"*.**

– **Maurice de Saxe, *Mes Reveries*, 1732.**

CHAPTER 2

UNDERSTANDING WAR

SECTION 4 : PEACE, CONFLICT AND WAR

SECTION 5 : TYPES OF WAR

SECTION 6 : PRINCIPLES OF WAR

SECTION 4 : PEACE, CONFLICT AND WAR

"There never was a good war or a bad peace".

– Benjamin Franklin, 1773.

The States of Peace, Conflict and War

2.1 At any given point in time, a country will be in a state of peace, conflict or war or a combination of these. Nations act in their own self-interest which includes the pursuit of political, economic, ideological or cultural objectives. When the interests of nations or a group of nations are in harmony, or at least pose no real or perceived threat to each other, there is peace. However, when the actions or policies of one nation are viewed as a threat to the vital interests of another, a condition of conflict arises. Conflict may escalate to war. The illustration below depicts the entire spectrum of peace, conflict and war.



2.2 **Peace**. Peace is defined as the absence of violence – direct or indirect, manifest or posed as a threat. Peace is often viewed as a temporary and fleeting condition. To be enduring and genuine, it must be based on mutual respect, shared interests and common values. Peace is most often the result of a balance of power and agreed political spheres of interest between nations or one nation manifesting a superior political will. This is invariably backed by preponderance of force which is militarily unchallenged by others. In either case, peace is ultimately sustained by, and is dependent upon, the willingness of states to use force to preserve it as well as restore it when lost.

2.3 **Conflict**. The essence of conflict is a clash, usually violent, between opposing human wills, each trying to impose itself on the other. In, both, inter-state and intra-state conflicts, the means to impose one's will could include diplomatic, economic and political mechanisms as well as the application or threat of violence by military force. Military action is just one instrument, amongst several, which may be used to impose a nation's will. Armed conflict is synonymous with war. Today international mechanisms, including the influence exercised by major powers, are in place to resolve or limit conflicts because of their potential to lead to undesired war.

2.4 **The State of War**. War occurs when diplomatic and other negotiation mechanisms for resolving conflict or achieving desired political objectives either fail or are not operative. In such circumstances political aims and strategies are pursued by the use of armed force. War is prosecuted by the employment of strategy which aims at breaking the enemy's will to fight. Disengagement from war is difficult because it develops its own dynamics and pace, which in themselves are unpredictable and could spin out of control. While war is always to be avoided, democratic societies must, nonetheless, be prepared to engage in it to safeguard their national interests.

"O friend, behold my chariot through which I am always decidedly victorious. Courage and tenacity are its wheels, immutable truth and character are its flags. Strength, discrimination, self-control and charity are its horses. Forgiveness, mercy and equanimity are the reins and devotion to the Lord is its charioteer. O friend, whoever possesses such a chariot can never be defeated."

– Lord Rama, *Ramayana*.

SECTION 5 : TYPES OF WARS

"War is an act of violence whose object is to constrain the enemy to accomplish our will".

– Clausewitz, *On War*, 1832.

CONVENTIONAL WAR

2.5 Conventional war conforms to the traditional image of war and is fought to achieve strategic and military objectives. It does not include the use of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) weapons. It may be total or limited in terms of duration, the range of weapon systems employed, scope, objectives and its ultimate outcome. Given the prohibitive costs in terms of human lives and material, as well as the rising lethality of modern weapons, conventional war may be of short duration. Regional wars arise out of regional issues. The Gulf War (1991) and the Kosovo conflict (1995) are two such examples even though they had repercussions at the international level. A global or general war is a major unrestricted conflict fought between major powers involving some or all their allies. Initially it is likely to employ conventional weapons but may then escalate to the use of weapons of mass destruction to deny victory to the opponent(s). An extended global war of the Second World War pattern is highly unlikely.

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

2.6 Operations Other Than War (OOTW) encompass a wide range of activities where military power is used for purposes other than large scale combat operations normally

associated with war. These include sub-conventional and non-combat operations; they usually involve the combined and coordinated effort of government (civil and military) and non-government agencies. In essence, OOTW activities assist to deter war, resolve conflict and promote peace and well being with use or demonstrated threat of use of force.

Sub-Conventional War

2.7 **Low Intensity Conflict (LIC)**. LIC is a generic term encompassing all kinds of armed conflicts that are above the level of peaceful co-existence amongst states and below the threshold of war. These include proxy war, terrorism and insurgencies; border skirmishes also fall within this category. It involves protracted struggle of competing principles and ideologies. Low Intensity Conflict Operations (LICO) figures at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict and is characterised by one or all of the following conditions : -

- Asymmetry of force levels between the regular forces and the irregular opposition force.
- The force applied and the violence generated depends on the code of conduct and the capabilities of the weaker side.
- Laws of the land impose restrictions on the actions of security forces.

2.8 **Proxy War**. Proxy war is a war conducted between nations utilising non-state players to fight on their behalf. At least one of them employs a third party to fight on its behalf. The extent and type of support provided by the states involved in proxy war will vary but financial and logistic support are normally always provided. An example of a proxy war is the foreign sponsored terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir.

2.9 **Insurgency.** Insurgency is an organised armed struggle by a section of the local population against the State, usually with foreign support. The many possible causes of an insurgency include nationalistic, ethnic, linguistic, religious or cultural separatism, poor governance, economic deprivation, corruption, discrimination and oppression. Its goals may be seizure of power and replacement of the existing regime or

even liberation of a defined area. Employment of military force may not be able to stamp out an insurgency but may help to contain it. In most cases, it is a combination of military force backed by appropriate political and economic measures which can adequately resolve such situations. The latter part acquires even more importance than the use of force.

2.10 **Irregular War**. Irregular war may take many forms of which terrorism and guerrilla war are two important ones. Terrorism is the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against people or property to terrorise, coerce or intimidate governments or societies; this is most often resorted to with the aim of achieving political, religious, or ideological objectives. Terrorism thrives on a fear psychosis and could be achieved by arson, sabotage, hijacking, hoaxes, maiming, bombing, seizure, kidnapping, assassination, taking hostages, raids, ambushes and the threat to use or use of WMD. Guerrilla war is an irregular form of warfare which includes acts of subversion, assassination, attack on supply lines and terrorism. Terrorism and guerrilla warfare can be employed across the entire spectrum of conflict**.**

Non-Combat Operations and Aid to Civil Authorities

2.11 Non-combat operations are defined as military operations where the use of force may not be necessary but, at times, the most minimal use of force, or threat to use force, may be required. Non-combat operations include aid to civil authorities, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations.

NUCLEAR CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

2.12 **Nuclear Warfare**. A conventional war may escalate to a nuclear war when any of the belligerents decide to use nuclear weapons through any means of delivery to avoid defeat in the sphere of conventional warfare or to safeguard its vital national interests or even with the aim to bring the war to a decisive end. World opinion is against the use of such weapons. India is a nuclear weapon state and pursues a policy

of ‘Credible Minimum Deterrence’ and ‘No First Use’. India’s nuclear policy clearly states that she will not use or use the threat of use of nuclear weapons against those states which do not possess nuclear weapons or are not aligned with nuclear weapon powers. India reserves the right to retaliate with nuclear weapons in case of a strike against her by adversaries with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons.

2.13 **Biological and Chemical Warfare.** International conventions, to which India is a signatory, along with a large number of other countries, have banned the use of biological and chemical weapons. However, their use by adversaries and non-state actors cannot be ruled out. Chemical weapons are relatively easy to produce without any elaborate infrastructure. As a consequence, our forces must be prepared for operations in a biological and chemical weapons environment. Both, active and passive defensive measures are being instituted to cater to this requirement.

“*Slain, you will obtain heaven;*
Victorious, you will enjoy earth;
Therefore, stand up, O son of Kunti,
Resolved to fight”
***– The Bhagawad Gita*.**

INFORMATION WARFARE

"Information Warfare, in its most fundamental sense, is the emerging 'theatre' in which future nation-against-nation conflict at the strategic level is most likely to occur".

– George J. Stein, *Cyber War*, 2000.

2.14 IW can be defined as actions taken to achieve 'information superiority by adversely affecting the adversary's information, information-based processes, information systems, and computer-based networks whilst simultaneously protecting one's own information, information-based processes, information systems and computer-based networks'. Correct and timely information made available to commanders at all levels contributes directly to effective Command and Control (C^2) and helps in shortening the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) Cycle (also known as the OODA Loop). IW has a vital impact upon the first three activities of the OODA Loop by disrupting the enemy's observation and surveillance systems, corrupting his orientation and misguiding his perception and thereby inducing him to arrive at wrong decisions.

2.15 **Objectives of IW.** The basic ingredients of IW are collection of data, sifting (to extract relevant information), analysis and assimilation of information to create intelligence which will help to achieve the objectives of IW. These objectives are:-

- Develop and maintain a comprehensive information base of the capabilities of adversaries and forecast their likely actions.
- Deny information about own and friendly forces to adversaries.
- Influence perceptions, plans, actions and the will of adversaries to oppose own and friendly forces by offensive employment of IW techniques.

- Influence non-combatant and neutral organisations to support friendly missions or, at least, not to resist friendly activities.
- Protect friendly decision-making processes, information and information systems.
- Degrade the information systems of adversaries.

Forms of IW

2.16 The seven forms of IW are Command and Control Warfare (C^2W), Intelligence Based Warfare (IBW), Electronic Warfare (EW), Psychological Warfare, Cyber Warfare, Economic Information Warfare and Network Centric Warfare (NCW). These are discussed in succeeding paragraphs.

2.17 **Command and Control Warfare.** The aim of C^2W is to influence, deny information to, degrade or destroy enemy C^2 capabilities while protecting own C^2 systems against such actions. C^2W is a dominant component of IW in the military arsenal. C^2W operations integrate and synchronise the capabilities of EW, military deception, physical destruction, psychological operations and operational security.

2.18 **Intelligence Based Warfare.** IBW is a traditional component of IW and occurs when intelligence is directly fed into operations (notably targeting and battle damage assessment) to bring transparency to the battlefield rather than being used as an input for overall C^2. IBW is the direct application of battlefield intelligence instantaneously into the battle and aims at creating an asymmetry in the level of transparency or situational awareness in relation to the enemy.

2.19 **Electronic Warfare**. EW is a set of military actions taken to deny the use of the electro-magnetic spectrum to hostile forces while retaining the ability to use it oneself. This basically implies that the endeavour is to deny, degrade, delay or disrupt information in order to create a false picture so that the enemy is duped into making incorrect assessments and taking wrong actions. EW involves the use of electro-magnetic and directed energy to control the electro-magnetic spectrum

or to attack the enemy. One of the most important developments in the field of EW has been the introduction of automated and integrated EW systems, which provide a high degree of information in addition to interception, direction-finding and jamming activities.

2.20 **Psychological Warfare.** Information is one of the several means to target the human mind. Psychological warfare is achieved through mass media such as newspapers, radio and television broadcasts and distribution of leaflets. The prevailing state of information technology allows effective psychological warfare to be conducted in a very subtle manner. In order to be effective, psychological operations need to be conducted in conjunction with other operations. During peace time and in LIC operations, this effort can be termed as “psychological initiatives”.

2.21 **Cyber Warfare.** This entails techniques to destroy, degrade, exploit or compromise the enemy’s computer-based systems. Cyber warfare includes exclusive attacks, known as hacking, on enemy computer networks. Computer hacking has evolved to a stage wherein information stored or passing through computer networks is interfered with to degrade the adversary’s C^2 structure.

2.22 **Economic Information Warfare**. This form of warfare uses information as power to destabilise the economy of the adversary. Since all revenue-generating industries of a country such as aviation, transport, power, banking and the like use computer-based systems, IW at the strategic level can play havoc with the national economy of the adversary.

2.23 **Network Centric Warfare**. NCW focuses on the combat power that can be generated by the effective linking or networking of the war-fighting machinery and organisations. The basic elements necessary to generate the requisite shared battle-space awareness that can be exploited through self-synchronisation to achieve the overall objective are given below: -

- A virtual sensors grid that would provide a ‘grid of capabilities’ overlaying the battle-space instead of

series of independent single sensors. This grid is termed as the Surveillance Grid.

- To leverage the strength of the worldwide telecommunications infrastructure, all communication networks could be viewed as virtual grids overlaying the tactical, operational and strategic areas. This grid is referred to as the Communications Grid.

- An abstract grid that comprises weapons available, sorted by suitability and availability against a hostile order of battle is termed as the Tactical Grid.

SECTION 6 : PRINCIPLES OF WAR

"There exists a small number of fundamental principles of war, which may not be deviated from without danger, and the application of which, on the contrary, has been in all times crowned with glory".

– Jomini, *Precis de l' Art de la Guerre*, 1838.

2.24 The Principles of War are broad guidelines which influence the conduct of war at every level of military operations. They are based on past experience wherein their application with judgement led to victory. They are not rules; yet disregarding them involves risk and could result in failure. These principles are outlined briefly in succeeding paragraphs.

2.25 **Selection and Maintenance of Aim**. The aim is expressed as an intention, purpose or end state. It should be selected carefully, defined clearly and stated simply and directly. Once selected, it must be maintained.

2.26 **Maintenance of Morale.** Morale is one of the more important elements of war. High morale fosters the offensive spirit and the will to win.

2.27 **Offensive Action.** Offensive action is the chief means of achieving victory. It results from offensive spirit and helps in the seizure and maintenance of initiative.

2.28 **Surprise.** Surprise implies catching the enemy off balance thereby forcing him to give battle in circumstances unfavourable to him.

2.29 **Concentration of Force**. Concentration of superior force at the chosen place and time ensures success in battle**.**

2.30 **Security.** Security relates to the physical protection of ground, troops, equipment, material and documents. It also involves denial of information.

2.31 **Economy of Effort.** Economy of effort connotes balanced deployment and judicious employment of forces to ensure success with minimum casualties.

2.32 **Flexibility.** Flexibility is the capability to react appropriately to changing situations.

2.33 **Cooperation.** All agencies involved have to work jointly towards achievement of the overall aim to achieve success in war. Jointmanship leads to cooperation; cooperation produces synergy.

2.34 **Administration.** Placing the resources required at the right place and time to help commanders at all levels to achieve their respective objectives is the function of administration.

2.35 **Intelligence.** This is an addition to the widely accepted principles of war because of its pre-eminence in any future conflict. Military Intelligence involves acquisition and exploitation of information about the enemy. Informatics plays a major role in ensuring that intelligence is available in time and in the desired form.

"War should be made methodically for it should have a definite object; and it should be conducted according to the principles and rules of the art".

– Napoleon, *Maxims of War*, 1831.

CHAPTER 3

OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVES

SECTION 7 : ELEMENTS FOR OPERATIONAL SUCCESS

SECTION 8 : OPERATIONAL READINESS AND EFFECTIVENESS

SECTION 9 : SURPRISE AND DECEPTION

SECTION 10 : IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON OPERATIONS AND THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

SECTION 7 : ELEMENTS FOR OPERATIONAL SUCCESS

"War is an art and as such is not susceptible of explanation by fixed formula."

– General George S. Patton, Jr, *War As I Knew It,* 1947.

3.1 **Operational Success**. War is a national undertaking that is coordinated from the highest levels of policy-making to the basic levels of execution. The objective of military forces in war is to achieve early and decisive victory over the opposing forces with minimum casualties to own forces. The major aspects that contribute towards operational success are: -

- Understanding the various perspectives of war.
- Employing operational art.
- Judicious application of combat power.
- Efficient exercise of C^2 in the battlefield.

Perspectives of War

3.2 The perspective of war varies based on which level it is viewed from even though the objectives to be achieved at strategic, operational and tactical levels would flow downwards from the top. For clarity of understanding of the complex nature of operational scenarios, it is imperative that the commanders at all levels recognize the fine differences between the three levels of perspective given in succeeding paragraphs. These perspectives are, however, not mutually exclusive and do tend to overlap at the fringes.

3.3 **Strategic Perspective.** Viewed from the strategic perspective, war is a continuum to secure national policy objectives in concert with defined or perceived national security goals. The end state of a war must provide the

desired political advantage. Military activity at the strategic level will thus be clearly influenced by political and national considerations. At the strategic level, military power is one of the elements of national power available to a state to achieve its goals and enforce its policies. A military commander at the strategic level would be required to render advice to political leaders which should be in the form of strategic inputs through the established chain of command. Strategy itself has various levels. At the apex there is 'grand' or national strategy which coordinates the overall approach pertaining to each element of national power, such as national will, economic, political, geographic and military power. Whereas military strategy is only concerned with military operations, grand strategy must, of necessity, take a long-term view and therefore encompass all elements of national power. Military strategy has been defined as the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil ends of national policy. A more modern definition could be 'the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure policy objectives by the application of force or threat of use of force'. In formulating military strategy it is important to note that it encompasses the following salient aspects: -

- Identifying aims and objectives in a theatre of war.
- Outlining the general course of major operations and campaigns.
- Understanding the restrictions placed on military operations based on national policy.
- Allocating adequate resources for successful conduct of operations.

3.4 **Operational Perspective.** The operational perspective focuses on achieving military aims or objectives at the theatre level and coordinating the effort of the land, air and naval forces where and when applicable. The operational level uses tactical results to achieve strategic objectives. It involves planning of a campaign within the specified time and space to achieve desired strategic goals. Viewed in comparison to the tactical level, it covers larger areas of conflict, has a larger time and space horizon and has a more critical impact on theatre

level operations. Major elements of the operational level of war are: -

- Substantial combat power is kept out of contact till the opportune time. This is in sharp contrast to the tactical perspective wherein opposing forces actually see and engage each other and is thus more narrowly focused on specific military objectives.

- The operational perspective provides a wide enough view for the commander to enjoy independent command of military forces but is narrow enough to be relatively free of having to coordinate with the other elements of national strategy.

- Nonetheless, there is a need for a clear understanding of the strategic perspective.

- An operational perspective prevents a commander from over-identification with tactical battles. It is concerned with translation of abstract strategic aims to achievable tactical objectives through the design, organisation and conduct of major operations.

3.5 **Tactical Perspective.** The tactical perspective, having the narrowest view in the hierarchy of war, essentially concerns itself with optimising the application of military forces to achieve specified objectives. This level focuses on the application of combat power to defeat the enemy in combat at a particular time and place. It includes the employment of firepower and manoeuvre, the integration of different arms and the exploitation of success. Commanders at this level concern themselves with purely military objectives laid down for them, such as destroying enemy forces, seizing specific objectives or denying specific pieces of ground and so on. The means used in tactics are combined-arms formations and the ends are tactical victories. These engagements may be more than one, running concurrently in a theatre of operations spread over hundreds of kilometres. Seemingly disjointed in application of force, they are, nevertheless, bound to a common higher goal. A link is required to bring these various tactical pieces together to create the military conditions that can achieve strategic goals. That link is the operational level and it is for this reason

that tactical battles are built and fought around an over-arching operational design.

3.6 **Level of Conduct**. In our context, the operational level of war is generally at the Theatre or the Command level, while tactical level operations are conducted at Corps and lower levels. However, in certain cases where a Corps has been allocated an operationally strategic objective, it would be deemed to be conducting operations at the operational level. At times, depending upon the spectrum of conflict such as in LICO, there could be situations where even commanders subordinate to Theatre (Command) and Corps will have to work on an operational perspective as their activities may directly influence the achievement of strategic objectives in a theatre of operations.

3.7 **Operational Art**. In seeking to structure major operations, battles and engagements in pursuit of objectives, the operational level commander should design his campaign plans around a number of building blocks which help him to visualise as to how the operation would unfold. His skills at this stage form the essence of operational art. Based on the desired end state, he derives operational objectives, decides upon the 'centres of gravity', 'lines of operation' and 'decisive points' and analyses the options thrown up by the conclusions drawn from these. He must also keep in mind the importance of 'shaping the battlefield' by the employment of firepower and manoeuvre, maintaining the tempo and factoring in operational pauses when drawing up plans.

End States

3.8 **Conflict Termination**. Conflict is either resolved or terminated; military force contributes by the defeat of an opposing force. Defeat is defined as 'diminishing the effectiveness of the enemy to the extent that he is either unable to participate in combat or, at least, not being able to fulfil his intention'. Conflict termination describes the point at which the principal means of conflict shifts from the use of force to other means of persuasion. Conflict termination may take several forms; for example, the adversary may surrender, withdraw or negotiate an end to the conflict. Commanders and

staff must plan for conflict termination requirements when developing campaign plans.

3.9 **Exit Policy**. Victory may not always be an appropriate term to describe the desired outcome of an operation; it may have to be defined in other terms such as reconciliation, stabilisation (acceptance of the status quo) or acceptance of an agreed peace plan. Where such acceptance is hesitant or reluctant, the prospect is of protracted involvement. While planning conflict termination it will be prudent to plan a suitable 'exit policy' which should cater to various contingencies related to politico-military aims.

Application of Combat Power

3.10 **Combat Power.** Combat power defines an army's ability to fight. It's three basic components – conceptual, moral and physical – have been dilated upon in Section 8. Overwhelming combat power is achieved when all combat elements are brought to bear simultaneously with violence, giving the enemy no opportunity to respond in a coordinated or cohesive manner, and thereby achieve victory at least cost.

3.11 **Modes of Application of Combat Power.** In combat the intention is to bring about strategic dislocation of the adversary by causing psychological paralysis amongst its decision-makers. In the physical and logistical planes this is produced by a combination of IW, securing or isolation of critical objectives, threatening other objectives, capture of high value territory and selective destruction of the adversary's combat potential. The means to achieve such a state include the following: -

- **Destruction.** Physical destruction of the enemy's capability to fight is but one of a number of means to defeat him. This would require focused and coordinated application of decisive combat power.

- **Attacking the Enemy's Will**. Conflict is subject to political, economic, ethical and moral constraints. These limit the freedom of military action. In this context, attempting to destroy the enemy's will solely by direct attack on his forces may be, both, costly and, at

times, counter-productive. He must be made to feel constantly off-balance by one or more of the means enumerated below: -

- **Pre-emption**. To pre-empt the enemy is to seize an opportunity, often fleeting, before he does, in order to deny him an advantageous course of action. Its success lies in the speed with which the situation is subsequently exploited. Pre-emptive operations rely on rapid decision-making and surprise rather than ponderous preparation.
- **Dislocation.** To dislocate the enemy is to deny him the ability to bring to bear his strengths. Unlike pre-emption, dislocation is a deliberate act, and is critically dependent on sound intelligence rather than intuition. Its purpose is much wider than the frustration of the enemy's plan; it is to render his strength irrelevant. It seeks to avoid fighting the enemy on his terms and can be achieved by either avoiding his strengths or by so fixing them that they cannot be used effectively. 'Posturing,' deep penetration thrusts and envelopment are classic forms of dislocation.
- **Disruption.** To disrupt is to attack the enemy selectively, to break apart and throw into confusion the assets which are critical to the employment and coherence of his fighting power. Its purpose is to rupture the integrity of the enemy's fighting potential and to reduce it to less than the sum total of its constituent parts. The enemy's moral and physical cohesion can be shattered by manoeuvring in a manner which surprises him, using firepower selectively to attack targets that contribute to his cohesion and by imposing on him the effects of tempo and simultaneity.

Command and Leadership

3.12 Command is the legal authority exercised by the commander over his troops to accomplish his mission. It carries with it the responsibility for planning, organising,

training, directing, coordinating and controlling military forces to accomplish assigned, implied or inherent missions together with administrative responsibility for supply, health, welfare, morale, discipline, assignment and relief of personnel.

3.13 **Exercise of Command in Battle.** The art of command lies in conscious and skilful exercise of authority through visualisation, decision-making and leadership. Effective battle command demands timely and correct decisions based on the accurate and skilful judgement of battle situations. Effective decision-making combines judgement with information as an element of combat power. The commander must be able to perceive the plan being implemented and the critical junctures where his personal decision-making will facilitate success. Clear thinking and level-headedness in trying situations greatly help in recognising the practicability of possible courses of action before embarking upon one of them.

3.14 **Leadership in Battle.** Yet another essential quality of a commander is effective and enlightened leadership. He should be fully cognizant of the strengths and vulnerabilities of the force that he commands. Closely overseeing and monitoring critical junctures in battle, being up forward to read the situations, offering encouragement and making on-the-spot decisions, particularly in adverse situations are the hallmarks of good leadership. Military history is replete with excellent instances of how great battles were won because of inspiring and decisive leadership.

3.15 **Command and Control.** Command has two components – the commander and the C2 systems. Communication systems, surveillance systems and computer networks form the backbone of C2 systems and enable commanders to lead from any point on the battlefield. Reliable communications are central to such systems. Sound C^2 should ensure unity of effort, provide for centralised direction and de-centralised execution, provide an environment for applying common doctrine and ensure inter-operability. Centralised direction and de-centralised execution are two key prerequisites for successful C^2. Centralised direction is provided by the national leadership at the national-strategic level. This is then converted to a joint-services plan cojointly by

the three Services and following which directives are transmitted to theatre commanders for execution. Information-gathering and decision-making must be centralised to enhance coordination and control over subordinate forces albeit with requisite freedom of action for subordinate commanders.

"War is a science which depends on art for its application."

– Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart, *Strategy in Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1929.

SECTION 8 : OPERATIONAL READINESS AND EFFECTIVENESS

"The sword drawn to prevent the drawing of swords".

– Samuel Purchas, *Purchas His Pilgrimage*, 1612.

3.16 Operational readiness is the state of preparedness of an organisation to perform the mission for which it is organised or designed. Military effectiveness is the standard by which the Army, from the platoon to the highest levels, is judged in peace and war. The efficiency with which operational readiness and effectiveness is achieved also needs to be optimised to ensure availability of maximum possible combat power when and where required. The level of operational readiness and effectiveness of a force has a major bearing on its ability to launch and successfully conduct operations. Ensuring operational readiness and effectiveness is a command responsibility.

Combat Power

3.17 The term 'combat power' defines an army's ability to fight. Combat power has three basic components and their inter-relationship is shown in the figure below :-



3.18 **The Conceptual Component**. This can be described as the thought process behind the ability to fight. It is a vital component in that, commanders at various levels have the benefit of the concepts and doctrines evolved over a period of time as well as the experience of their predecessors. It also helps commanders to imbibe a common understanding of principles and yet allows the freedom of exercising individual styles of command. The conceptual component comprises principles of war, military doctrine and development. The contribution of principles of war and military doctrine towards accomplishing operational readiness and effectiveness has already been amplified in earlier sections of this book. Development requires knowledge, an innovative approach and a mind open to all aspects of warfare; this includes force organisation, structuring and equipping of

various types of units. Commanders also need to keep abreast of developments taking place in the environment and should have adequate knowledge of management of change so that they can work as facilitators. The higher the level of a commander, the wider should be his knowledge horizon so that he can understand the necessity to implement the desired change.

3.19 **The Moral Component**. The moral component concerns the ability to get people to fight. Maintenance of morale is a principle of war and, as such, embraces the moral and physical aspects of combat power. High morale stems from sound training, confidence in equipment and good administration as well as confidence in commanders, discipline, self-respect and clear knowledge of what is going on and what is required. Yet the ability to get people to fight is not just a question of morale; it also involves the following aspects:-

- **Basic Morality.** It is extremely important that the basic morality of individuals in the Indian Army is always above board. Professional honesty, courage of conviction, integrity, tolerance to accept reality and differing points of view are some of the essential qualities which should always be encouraged. The higher the position in the hierarchy, the greater should be the commitment to moral values. In addition, a commander should posses the courage to take hard decisions.

- **Motivation**. Soldiers who are well motivated, and well led work as a team. Teamwork breeds comradeship which, in turn, leads to pride in belonging to a team and fosters *esprit de corps*. Motivation thrives on a continuing sense of purpose and it is the job of the commander to instil this purpose. Although national will, reflected in Government directives, serves to give the soldier this sense of purpose, it is the responsibility of the commander to make soldiers fully identify with these. It must be clearly understood that leading soldiers in pursuit of causes that they do not understand is a daunting task.

- **Leadership.** There are many definitions of military leadership. However, most simply defined, military leadership is the projection of personality and character by the leader to get soldiers to do what is required of them. Skill in the techniques of leadership is the foremost quality in the art of command and contributes very largely to success at all levels of war.

- **Management**. Good management can have considerable bearing upon morale and on military effectiveness. It involves making the best use of available resources in accomplishment of the mission. Management skills are essential elements of good and efficient military leadership.

3.20 **The Physical Component.** The physical component is the means to fight. It is defined as the total means of destructive or disruptive force which a military unit or formation can apply against the opponent at a given time. The 'total means' include the organising and provisioning of the main elements of combat power which are manpower, equipment, logistics, training and national assets.

Operational Readiness

3.21 Readiness of the Indian Armed Forces to meet national emergencies is a facet of national level endeavour. It calls for a synergised effort by all instruments of the Government to ensure that these forces are moved to their areas of operations, fully-equipped and within an acceptable timeframe. The Government, on its part, would indicate and maintain a clear and strong resolve to go to war when it orders a general mobilisation. There may also be other methods of preparation for war even without ordering general mobilisation. On the part of the Armed Forces, they are responsible for ensuring that they are operationally ready, troops are in a high state of morale and units are appropriately trained to execute the missions assigned to them.

3.22 Military mobilisation in the Indian context involves considerable effort because of the wide geographical spread of the peacetime locations of our units and formations, the considerable extent of our borders and the multiplicity of agencies that need to coordinate their actions in order to make it effective.

SECTION 9 : SURPRISE AND DECEPTION

"Generally, in a conflict,
The Straightforward will lead to engagement and
The Surprising will lead to triumph".

– Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*.

Surprise

3.23 Surprise in war is a potent force multiplier. The payoffs of surprise are almost always in geometric proportions and it multiplies the chances of achieving quick and decisive military victory. As a decisive factor at all levels of warfare, and duly acknowledged as an autonomous principle of war, surprise allows the side that achieves it to concentrate superior forces unnoticed at the point of decision and to beat the opponent in terms of time, place, method or new technologies. The purpose of surprise, in essence, is to make the enemy react in an irrational and uncoordinated manner.

3.24 Strategic surprise can herald both the beginning and the end of a war. Considering the scope of its effects and the level at which it is planned, the phenomenon of military surprise can be classified as strategic, operational or tactical. However, in practice, the distinction between the strategic and operational and operational and tactical surprise is often hazy and they invariably tend to overlap. With battlefield transparency improving by the day, the ability to effect true surprise is progressively reducing. Military planners, therefore, need to concentrate more on deception, as a good and well-coordinated deception plan would help to achieve surprise.

Deception

3.25 Deception needs to be developed as an integral component of peacetime and wartime national security policy. Deception is intentional, purposeful, calculated and deliberate. The target of deception should be the adversary's decision-making system. Deception should create perceptions and thereafter reinforce them. Deception should aim at misleading an adversary with regard to detectable information, whether

actual or notional, by obscuring it. Often, the best and simplest deception is the presentation of the truth but in such a form that the adversary disbelieves it.

3.26 It must be clearly understood that given today's battlefield transparency, deception, in addition to surprise will be very difficult to achieve in the first instance; retaining the advantage that flows from it for an appreciable period of time will be even more difficult. For that reason alone this is one aspect which will require very thorough study, preparation and conceptualization.

3.27 Military deception operations are an inherent and expected responsibility of command at division level and above. It needs to be coordinated at the highest level to be effective and, should therefore, be indivisible from all other parts of the conception, planning and execution of military operations in peace and war. Deception ought to be intrinsic to and inseparable from all military thought and action, rather than a mere annexure, afterthought or an adjunct. The planning and practice of deception must be systematically integrated into devising a military strategy.

3.28 The process of deception is interactive and follows the sequential steps of planning, evaluation, coordination, integration, approval and execution. On completion of the last step of execution the situation needs to be re-analysed and process repeated, if required. The advent of IW offers unprecedented opportunities for deception operations in scope, effect and imagination. It is imperative that deception operations are planned as meticulously as actual operations, if not more. Deception plans may even be implemented by designated headquarters, supported by suitable allocation of resources. Nothing should be left to chance as an unfounded or unacknowledged assumption, supposition or assertion. Those charged with planning, approving, and executing deception operations, as well as the operators, must be absolutely adept in all the processes that these involve. Training and exercises should integrate the aspect of deception and appropriate resources should be instituted to develop and refine the art.

"Modern technology provides battlefield transparency and hinders concealment; audacity of plans and speed of operations could be potent instruments to gain surprise".

– General NC Vij.

SECTION 10 : IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON OPERATIONS AND THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

"Information Warfare has the potential not only, to be a force multiplier, but also to be a force equaliser".

– Michael Loescher, *Cyber War*, 2000.

Impact of Technology on Operations

3.29 **Emphasis on IW**. With the induction of better communication systems and the creation of a networked environment, our ability to collect, collate and analyse diverse inputs received from various agencies has been greatly enhanced. However, the vulnerabilities of such systems to disruption by the enemy have also increased and its resultant impact on conduct of operations would be magnified in proportion to the dependence on it. Due to the dependence of military forces on such systems, the role of technology in future warfare has expanded considerably, thereby enlarging our earlier concept of EW to C^2W, which incorporates all functions of command dependent on communications and computers. Thus in a network-centric environment, the emphasis will shift to IW and the various active and passive measures which form part of it.

3.30 **Increased Battlefield Transparency and Situational Awareness**. Today newer and better systems are available for the conduct of surveillance, identification and monitoring of the enemy and these have improved situational awareness. The nature of sensors and their platforms have extended the range of observation and enhanced the resolution thereby providing greater accuracy and detail in a shorter timeframes. The overall aim is to create a technological asymmetry so as to be in a better position to see, locate and monitor enemy forces and to plan for their destruction, degradation or disruption. In such an environment newer techniques or methods would be required to achieve surprise and deception.

Increased reconnaissance and surveillance capability will enable manoeuvre force commanders to concentrate superior combat power at points of decision.

3.31 **Enhancement in Degradation Capability**. The range, precision and throw-weight of weapon systems have increased substantially and have greatly enhanced the degradation capability of all forces. These weapon systems, coupled with

air power, will be used in exploiting gains in battlefield transparency to shape the battlefield. Enhanced precision and stand-off engagement capability, along with transparency sensors, will act as force multipliers.

3.32 **Reduced Reaction Time**. The time required for passage of information and orders will be reduced due to improved communications and networking. Accordingly, greater emphasis will have to be placed on directive style of command. The use of Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Information, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C^4I^2SR) systems will result in expansion of the battle-space and compression of the time dimension. However, the adverse impacts of ‘information overload’ on the decision-making process of own forces need to be borne in mind and avoided.

3.33 **Night Fighting**. Technology has significantly improved night fighting capability. The ever increasing availability of new generation night vision devices will impact beneficially on tactical concepts.

3.34 **Deception**. Enhanced battlefield transparency will demand greater emphasis on deception so as to confuse or deceive the enemy about own movement, concentration, aim and intended area of operations. Management of the enemy's perceptions through C^2W would become important in the future. This could well be achieved with modern technology by attempting to reinforce the enemy's beliefs and thereafter employ the tools of IW to blind or mislead enemy surveillance as part of a well coordinated plan.

3.35 **Enhanced Mobility**. Mobility of ground forces, especially in the plains and deserts has improved considerably. Enhanced battlefield transparency will facilitate and even require a shift from the existing attrition-based or positional concept of operations to that based predominantly on manoeuvre in offensive as well as defensive operations.

3.36 **Enlarged Battle Area**. Better surveillance capabilities, enhanced mobility of forces in the tactical battle area, longer ranges of weapon systems, state-of-art communication systems, information technology enabling effective C^2 of forces over vastly extended areas have enlarged the battle-space. The ability to conduct non-linear and simultaneous operations at greater depths adds to the battle-space over which a commander needs to exercise C^2.

Revolution In Military Affairs (RMA)

3.37 Recent conflicts have highlighted the dramatic impact of technology on warfare. This has caused a significant shift in the very nature of war-fighting and is bringing about a RMA. Although we may not have the wherewithal to draw full benefits from it at present, the underlying message is unambiguous – technology gives a clear edge and needs to be exploited to our advantage. We need to conceive and work towards a 'homespun' RMA that meets our needs and gives us an edge over our potential adversaries. Towards this end it will

be essential to institutionalise methods for assimilating technology and adapting, and even anticipating, changes in doctrine, tactics and organisations. In so doing, special attention needs to be paid to the impact of RMA on LIC and asymmetric warfare waged by non-state actors.

3.38 RMA is termed as ‘a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of new technologies, which, combined with the dramatic changes in military doctrine, operational concepts and operations, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military operations’.

3.39 The main constituents of RMA are doctrine, technology, tactics and training. Although the revolution is driven by technology, changes in doctrine, tactics and training are equally if not more important. Thus, the RMA, apart from the aspect of routine evolution that an Army undergoes in the process of modernisation, involves a transformation in the nature and conduct of military operations. It is the synergetic outcome of advances in technology suitably absorbed and applied by armed forces. There is a need, therefore, to focus on emerging technologies available to the armed forces to meet the strategic, operational and tactical requirements of the future and analyse the effect of cutting-edge technologies on future requirements. While doing so, aspects relating to orchestration of human resources and re-orientation of training, which are imperative for unleashing the full potential of emerging technologies, must be factored in as technology alone can not influence the course of war unless there is a transformation in the manner armed forces think, train and fight.

3.40 The backbone of RMA is a C^4I^2SR system which facilitates dominant battle-space awareness and will therefore constitute a major thrust area. Five major components of RMA are IW, dominant manoeuvre, precision engagement, full dimensional protection and focused logistics. Advances in C^4I^2SR also make possible a new concept in war fighting viz NCW.

3.41 Analysis of major components of RMA indicates that they have great applicability in our context. We may however, have to follow an incremental approach in embracing these principles and acquiring the relevant technology. IW will form a key component of our war fighting doctrine. The excellent support base and infrastructure in information technology that is available in the country should be optimally exploited.

3.42 NCW has great potential in our context. We need to evolve our concept based on our security compulsions. Investment in '*infostructure'* is an absolute imperative. This must be done jointly in conjunction with other Services so that seamless operations can be undertaken. As we progress to higher levels of technology, our ability to undertake NCW operations can be further refined. The advantages of operating with geographically dispersed forces must be fully exploited particularly in the backdrop of a nuclearised environment.

3.43 Meeting the challenge of RMA may demand substantial changes in our concepts, organisational philosophies and, most of all, attitudes. Concepts and organisational structures for exploitation of RMA would need to be evolved as the inevitable move towards greater use of high technology takes place.

3.44 RMA will have a dramatic effect on the Army and conduct of warfare through trends like lethality and dispersion, volume and precision of fires and their effects, processing and use of information, invisibility and detectability. Technologies that would need to be invested in are in the spheres of projecting and protecting the force, decisive operations, shaping of the battlefield and integrated logistics. Indigenous development of technologies to achieve self reliance will need sufficient investment to keep pace with RMA.

3.45 The impact of RMA on LIC is not as dramatic as in the field of conventional conflict. This does not imply that RMA has little to do in LIC; on the contrary, technology can play a significant role in LIC. We need to constantly refine our doctrines, concepts, organisations and tactics so as to optimise the effect of RMA in LIC.



"The instruments of battle are valuable only if one knows how to use them".

- Ardant du Picq, *Battle Studies,*1821-1870.

PART- II

CHAPTER 4

CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

SECTION 11 : OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

SECTION 12 : SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS

SECTION 13 : JOINT OPERATIONS

SECTION 11 : OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

"Never forget that no military leader has ever become great without audacity".

– **Clausewitz, *Principles of War*, 1812.**

Planning Considerations

4.1 **Strategic Level**.

- **International Environment**. There exists a strong international public opinion against war between nuclear weapon states on account of the attendant risk of triggering a nuclear weapons exchange. Hence, any intended military action requires careful calibration of international support. Pro-active and aggressive diplomacy plays a pivotal role in preparing a suitable political environment prior to launching operations. Aspects such as economy, trade and commerce also come into play in such circumstances.

- **Synergy Between Diplomacy and Military Action**. Military conflict is usually the outcome of a diplomatic failure to ensure peaceful resolution of disputes. While coercive diplomacy may necessitate deployment of military forces as a prelude to offensive action, large-scale mobilisation of forces would normally follow a firm decision at the highest level to adopt the military option with minimum loss of time.

- **Conflict Termination**. Conflict termination requirements and a viable exit policy should be incorporated at the national and appropriate military levels as part of overall campaign plans.

4.2 **Operational Level**.

- **Relation to Military Strategic Objectives**. Operational level activity must directly contribute to achieving defined military strategic objectives.

- **Freedom of Action**. The operational level commander will dictate the nature of major operations, battles and engagements. Freedom of action to deploy reserves, assigning priorities and allocation of combat and logistic elements is, therefore, of critical importance. This freedom of action will, however, be within the confines of political and military constraints. While recognising these constraints, the commander will convey a clear statement of his intent which outlines his concept and establishes the objectives to be achieved by subordinate commanders within his theatre of operations.

- **Resources.** The resources made available to a commander to accomplish his operational objectives may be tangible (such as formations and units, combat and services support assets) or intangibles (such as delegated authority to achieve the given objectives). These give him freedom of action to exercise various options. Resources must be held at the level which ensures their most effective employment. Operational commanders must also utilise all civil infrastructure and resources available in their respective theatres to enhance their combat potential.

- **Civil Affairs.** The operational level commander will have certain explicit or implicit responsibilities for civil affairs within his theatre of operations. Movement of refugees and minimizing damage to civil infrastructure will have to be considered, in addition to his legal and moral obligations to minimize civilian casualties. Once operations have ended, initially the military may be the only organ available to exercise authority in the area and, therefore, responsibilities relating to civil affairs will assume greater importance. All formations entrusted with offensive operations in enemy territory will have an integral civil affairs element to handle tasks relating to control of the civilian population, management of resources and ensuring stability in captured territory. However, aspects pertaining to the transition to civil control must be built

into operational plans and be put into effect at the very earliest. This will ensure that fighting units are relieved at the earliest to carry out their primary roles.

4.3 **Tactical Level.**

- **Employment of Firepower and Mobility.** Commanders at the tactical level should ensure optimum employment of all the resources available to them and employ them effectively to fight decisive battles.

- **Earmarking Objectives.** All objectives at tactical level should lie well within the 'culmination point' of the forces earmarked to achieve such objectives. They should be in concert with, and part of the commander's overall operational design. Success should be achieved with overwhelming asymmetry and the use of firepower and force multipliers and with least cost to life and material.

Methodology of Conduct

4.4 **Strategic Level.**

- **Aim**. The military aim of war must be derived from the national aim and be clearly defined apart from being decisive and attainable. Each operation and battle must contribute to attainment of the overall military aim.

- **Terrain Considerations**. Since the Indian Army has to operate along vast borders of greatly varying terrain, it is important that planning for war, training and development of infrastructure is based on such terrain. Terrain is not neutral since it either helps or hinders the mobility of a force. The advantages and limitations of terrain should be identified and exploited for furthering own operations. 'Terrain appreciation' is, thus, a vital component in formulating plans. Military leaders must develop the ability to use terrain skilfully and should be able to visualise own and enemy forces on a given piece of terrain for maximizing own potential and

degrading that of the enemy. Implications of terrain on different operations of war are available in various General Staff publications.

- **Warning Period**. While it would be difficult to lay down any fixed warning period preceding a war, there will always be indicators and periods in which anticipatory action can be taken. All planning should aim to mobilise forces in the minimum possible time in order to take advantage of the many benefits that such a step offers.

- **Maximising Force Potential**. Ideally, this implies placing all available resources under one commander at each level. However, due to paucity, these may have to be placed under a commander only for particular phases of an operation or for a specified duration. Nevertheless, jointness is a prerequisite at the operational and theatre levels.

- **Balanced Force**. A force must be so composed and structured that its full combat power can be brought to bear in the most effective manner to achieve assigned objectives in the stipulated time.

- **Favourable Air Situation**. A favourable air situation over the tactical battle area, as well as the operational level battle area prior to launch of own operations is a decided advantage. Strategic constraints, however, may dictate the need for achieving objectives in a short timeframe, wherein both land and air campaigns may have to be fought concurrently. As a consequence a favourable air situation may not always be available.

4.5 **Operational Level**.

- **Force Projection**. This includes mobilisation, movement and deployment. Mobilisation encompasses marshalling of manpower, equipment, stores and training as also activating part or all reserve components as required. This involves preparation of well-designed mobilisation schemes which should be

frequently practiced and rehearsed. Anticipation of mobilisation helps the Army to be physically and mentally prepared. Flexible logistic support is a prerequisite for force projection and should be catered for accordingly.

- **Shaping the Battlefield**. The purpose of shaping the battlefield is to create conditions which will facilitate the success of own operations keeping the ultimate aim in view. In the human dimension, psychological operations serve to unbalance the enemy, create discord and weaken his will to fight.

- **Decisive Operations**. Military operations which force the enemy to submit to one's will are decisive operations. These are most effective when the application of combat power and force multipliers is well-orchestrated and fully integrated throughout the battle-space. Enemy vulnerabilities should be targeted to achieve a clear-cut victory. Such operations will invariably be joint operations.

- **Protection**. This relates to the ability to conserve troops, information and equipment so that these can be utilised at the decisive time and place. It has relevance in both defensive and offensive operations.

- **Sustainment**. This is a continuous process which starts with mobilisation and continues till the end of hostilities. Towards this end there is a need for operational plans to be co-related to the available logistic support infrastructure.

- **Intelligence**. Sound and timely intelligence is critical for successful prosecution of war aims. It includes the entire gamut of obtaining information from various sources, converting it to intelligence by passing it through stages of synthesis and analysis, and the timely dissemination of processed intelligence to the user.

Offensive Operations

4.6 Offensive operations are a decisive form of winning a war. Their purpose is to attain the desired end state and achieve decisive victory. Offensive operations seek to seize the initiative from the enemy, retain it and exploit the dividends accruing from such actions. These operations end when the force either achieves the desired end state or reaches its culmination point.

4.7 **Planning an Offensive.**

- **Enemy Information**. Every possible means of acquiring intelligence and conducting surveillance must be employed to get accurate and timely information about the enemy. Of particular relevance will be his strategic thought process, intention, grouping of formations, deployment and location of reserves.

- **Joint Planning**. No operation launched in isolation can be expected to succeed in future offensive scenarios. Planning and coordination for operations should be undertaken jointly by all three Services and each should complement the strengths and offset the vulnerabilities of the other while formulating a joint plan.

- **Surprise and Deception**. With the availability of modern day high-technology surveillance means, achieving complete surprise will be difficult. Accordingly, more than the element of surprise, it is deception at the strategic and operational levels which need to be given greater importance as this could, more easily, contribute to success.

- **Simplicity of Plans**. Even at the highest level, plans for offensive operations, must be simple. A common sense approach with minimum complexities will help in making the plan workable and thereby ensure better coordination and flexibility. This is especially relevant while planning joint operations.

- **Nuclear Factor**. Future operations will be conducted against a nuclear backdrop; all planning should take this important factor into account.

- **Terrorism and Insurgency**. Similar to the nuclear backdrop, a war in Jammu & Kashmir may have to be fought against the backdrop of terrorism and hence appropriate measures for rear area security will have to be inbuilt into operational plans.

4.8 **Preparation for Offensive Operations**.

- **Mobilisation**. Offensive forces should mobilise within the shortest possible time in keeping with the prevailing operational environment.

- **Force Posturing**. 'Posturing' by offensive forces should be planned at the highest level to aid deception and pre-empt the enemy.

- **Reliable and Foolproof Communications**. Reliable and secure communications, with inbuilt redundancy, provides flexibility in employment of forces and assists the commander in influencing the outcome of battle.

- **Combined Arms Battle Concept**. The capabilities of all available forces must be understood and the cumulative strength of every Arm and Service must be exploited fully to achieve optimum results. Similarly, their weaknesses must also be known so that they can be mitigated through appropriate employment or deployment; this will obviate the possibility of the enemy taking advantage of weakness, if any.

- **Directive Style of Command**. Offensive operations throw up unexpected scenarios and fleeting opportunities which should be exploited to advantage. A directive style of command gives best results in offensive operations.

4.9 **Conduct of Offensive Operations**.

- **Shaping the Battlefield**. Adequate time and resources must be set apart for 'shaping the battlefield' before any offensive is launched. The results achieved will be dependent entirely upon the ingenuity with which firepower is delivered; this includes counter air operations and battlefield air interdiction, artillery

engagements and strikes by surface-to-surface missiles. Offensive IW, including psychological operations, must be exploited optimally to demoralise and degrade the adversary.

- **Creation of Superiority at Points of Decision**. Absolute superiority across the board will be hard to achieve. Forces should, therefore, be deployed for the offensive in such a manner that they create force superiority at well-selected points of decision. Overwhelming combat superiority or advantageous asymmetry reduces the time required for achieving success.

- **Indirect Approach**. The essence of operational art lies in planning an 'indirect approach' to the objective. Concepts such as the 'turning move', 'envelopment' and 'infiltration' provide dividends out of proportion to the force employed when seen in contrast to direct, frontal or head on operations.

- **Tempo of Operations**. An offensive should generate such a tempo that it should unbalance and paralyse the adversary. The design of operations should ensure that leading elements reach their objectives before the enemy reserves can be brought to effectively bear on them.

- **Employment of Forces**. Pivot or holding corps should be prepared to undertake offensive operations. Accordingly, only the minimum essential forces should be committed to holding vital areas and the remainder should be grouped, positioned and tasked to conduct offensive operations to improve the defensive posture and create 'windows of opportunity' for development of further operations. A few salient aspects are outlined below:-

  - **Strike Corps**. Strike corps should be capable of being inserted into operational level battle, either as battle groups or as a whole, to capture or threaten strategic and operational objective(s) with a view to cause destruction of the

enemy's reserves and capture sizeable portions of territory.

- **Contingency Planning**. Formations should be prepared to switch from one theatre to another in the shortest possible time. Equipment commonality and pre-planned, tailor-made logistic support should be ensured to facilitate such switching.

- **Employment of Heliborne, Airborne and Amphibious Forces**. These will primarily be employed to augment the offensive capability of conventional ground forces. They could also be employed for security of island territories, offshore resources and maritime trade routes.

Defensive Operations

4.10 Destruction of the enemy's armed forces and breaking his will to fight is the basic aim of war. This can be achieved by major offensive operations. Defensive operations are, nonetheless, necessary to ensure the security of own forces, provide the base for strike forces and to create a favourable situation for offensive operations to be undertaken. Defensive operations must, therefore, be basically aggressive in design and offensive in conduct.

4.11 **Planning for Defence**.

- **Importance of Intelligence**. Acquisition of intelligence about the enemy is as important for defensive operations as it is for offensive operations.

- **Offensive Defence**. Defensive plans at every level must be offensive in nature. This implies that the enemy should be engaged effectively from the earliest available opportunity with every possible means in a planned manner. It also implies taking offensive action at every level, as part of a coordinated plan, to wrest the initiative from the enemy at every stage during war. A pre-emptive strike on his likely launch pads would completely upset the enemy's strategic design, cause imbalance in the disposition of his forces and wrest the initiative from him right from the beginning of

operations.

- **Pragmatic Appreciation for Defence**. Defensive plans must be made after a very detailed and deliberate appreciation of the enemy's capabilities, intentions and interests, starting from the strategic and operational levels and culminating in the identification of threat at the tactical level. The emphasis at operational and tactical levels should be on effective surveillance, gauging of enemy intentions and retaining strong reserves rather than holding every inch of ground.

4.12 **Conduct of Defensive Operations**.

- **Accurate Reading of Battle**. Accurate and continuous reading of battle by commanders at every level is a vital ingredient for fighting a successful defensive battle. Availability of real time information at all levels is essential for this purpose.

- **Improvement of Defensive Posture**. Every formation must have well-coordinated plans for improvement of its defensive posture. Depending on terrain conditions, these could range from expansion of its forward zone to capture of likely launch pads and dominating heights. Objectives for these offensive actions should be selected in a manner that ensures that these operations do not jeopardise and unbalance the subsequent defensive plans of the formation.

- **Heavy Attrition**. Once the enemy offensive has been discerned, all available firepower including air, armour, artillery and other weapon systems must be employed in a coordinated manner to cause heavy attrition and seriously degrade the enemy offensive.

- **Employment of Reserves**. The key to conduct of a successful defensive battle is timely and skilful employment of reserves to thwart the enemy offensive at the critical juncture in battle.

"Hard pressed on my right. My centre is yielding. Impossible to manoeuvre. Situation excellent, I am attacking".

– Ferdinand Foch, *message to Marshall Joffre*, *Battle of the Marne*, 1914.

SECTION 12 : SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS

"If your bayonet breaks, strike with the stock; if the stock gives away, hit with your fists; if your fists are hurt, bite with your teeth".

– General Mikhail I. Dragomirov*, Notes for Soldiers*, 1890.

Special Forces

4.13 **Characteristics**. The Special Forces are specially selected troops who are trained, equipped and organised to operate in hostile territory, isolated from the main combat forces. They may operate independently or in conjunction with other forces at the operational level. They are versatile, have a deep reach and can make precision strikes at targets of critical importance. They are particularly valuable in the early stages of a campaign when they can create conditions for decisive operations.

4.14 **Concept of Employment**. Allocation of tasks to Special Forces should be handled at the appropriate level. Special Forces will have access to the maximum possible intelligence inputs relevant to the task and absolute security will be maintained at all times relating to their intended employment. The principle of 'direct control and mission command' should be exercised. Special Forces units will be tasked to develop 'area specialisation' in their intended operational theatres to achieve optimum effect.

4.15 **Missions**. Missions that could be assigned to the Special Forces are given below:-

- **Conventional War**. Strategic and tactical surveillance of vital targets, early warning of enemy activity in depth areas, denying strategic or operational assets and terminal targeting by precision munitions.
- **Low Intensity Conflicts**. 'Seek and Destroy' missions including trans-border operations.

- **During Peace**. Hostage rescue, anti-terrorist operations and assistance to friendly foreign governments.

4.16 **Planning Special Operations**. Keeping in mind the capabilities and far-reaching consequences of Special Forces operations, it is imperative that planning is conducted meticulously in order to ensure success. Various aspects of planning include the following:-

- **Purpose**. Commanders should specify the desired effect rather than courses of action.

- **Selection of Targets**. While the objectives are decided at the strategic level, commanders in the theatre of operations will evolve additional objectives for specific operational plans. Simultaneous assessment will be carried out by the air force and naval elements in case they too are involved.

- **Intelligence.** Intelligence agencies will be required to provide feasibility assessments prior to final acceptance of the task. Success will result from the precision with which Special Forces are employed against correctly identified enemy weaknesses.

- **Joint Planning**. Plans must be evolved jointly in conjunction with the Air Force and Navy where employment of their resources is involved.

- **Surprise**. In any operation, the force ratio would invariably be against the Special Forces; accordingly, achieving surprise will be essential for success.

- **Flexibility**. Special Forces operations are characterised by great flexibility. This is fostered and enhanced by improvisation, self-containment and detailed contingency planning.

4.17 **Equipping**. Because of the nature and gravity of their tasks with inherent risks, Special Forces need to be equipped with the very best of equipment and armament. The process of identifying needs and the pace of acquiring equipment for the Special Forces should, accordingly, be different from the rest

of the Army in order to ensure that they are always suitably equipped.

Conduct of Operations

4.18 Security of plans, appropriate navigation aids and the support of air defence elements for aircrafts utilised to insert Special Forces into enemy territory should be ensured. Battlefield air strike and electronic support measures during landing will also form an important part of the conduct of operations.

4.19 **Insertion, Extraction and Recovery**. Special Forces will be trained for insertion by air, land, sea and inland waterways and detailed plans for extraction and recovery after accomplishment of missions are vital. Special Forces will be

prepared and trained for exfiltration and extraction from the area of operations employing various means.

"It is just as legitimate to fight an enemy in the rear as in the front. The only difference is in the danger."

– John S. Mosby, *War Reminiscences*, 1887.

SECTION: JOINT OPERATIONS

"It is not so much the mode of formation as the proper combined use of the different arms, which will insure victory".

– Jomini, *Precis de l Art de la Guerre*, 1838.

4.20 The nature of future warfare requires harmonious and synergetic application of land, sea and air forces. Joint operations are the most essential requirement of future wars and have to focus on the seamless application of all available resources to shock, dislocate and overwhelm the enemy. This necessitates an intimate understanding of the capabilities and limitations of each Service by the other two.

4.21 Optimal impact is achieved by evolving a joint operational plan which effectively integrates all designated resources. Joint operations encompass all actions required to successfully achieve a designated joint objective and involves activities relating to marshalling, deploying and employing the allotted forces. It also includes the intelligence, communication and logistic functions in support of such operations.

Principles of Joint Operations

4.22 **Objectives**. Joint operations will be planned and directed towards clearly defined, attainable and decisive objectives so that the combat potential of all components is exploited to obtain optimal effect.

4.23 **Centralised Planning and Decentralised Execution**. It is important to retain the freedom of action of own forces. Towards this end, while planning and coordination must be centralised, there should be adequate decentralisation of command and decision-making to the lowest practical level.

4.24 **Unity of Effort.** Planning for joint operations integrates the combat power of the three Services and their activities in time, space and purpose. Joint operations produce maximum application of the overall combat power at the decisive point towards attainment of common objectives.

4.25 **Speed.** Modern weapons, equipment and communications continue to accelerate the pace of warfare. The joint planning and execution process must facilitate rapid decision making and action.

4.26 **Joint Focus**. Jointness in training, intelligence, planning, execution and logistics foster inter-operability and commonality of purpose in operations. Inter-operability of equipment particularly that of communications needs special emphasis.

Planning for Joint Operations

4.27 Planning for joint operations commences at the level of the COSC and involves allocation of objectives and missions to designated successive levels of command of the Armed Forces.

4.28 **Joint Planning Process**. The COSC will nominate the Service Headquarters responsible for the overall conduct of joint operations and issue a directive defining the objectives, terms of reference and allocation of resources. An Overall Force Commander will also be nominated by the COSC. Thereafter, planning at various levels will be conducted as under:-

- **Theatre Level**. A Joint Operations Centre at the designated Command Headquarters will analyse the directive and will refer back unresolved issues, if any, to the COSC for a final decision. Thereafter, plans for surprise, deception and IW will be evolved and commanders in the theatre will issue their operational directives to subordinate formations.

- **Operational Level**. The directions of the Overall Force Commander will be analysed to decide on tactical objectives, lines of operations and decisive points. Joint staff at each successive level will facilitate optimisation and synergisation of joint resources.

Land-Air Operations

4.29 Recent conflicts have demonstrated that spectacular successes can be achieved by well-coordinated and integrated joint operations. Though the extent of involvement of each Service would depend on the missions assigned to it and the prevailing circumstances, the inherent speed and reach of combat air power allows rapid engagement of enemy ground targets within and outside the tactical battle area in conjunction with ground operations. Air operations in support of land forces will be planned jointly to obtain synergistic effect in the specified theatre or area of operations. However, all such air operations should contribute towards achievement of the overall military goal.

4.30 **Land Operations**. These will be undertaken with the aim of capturing designated objectives and destruction of enemy forces. Availability of intelligence, deception, attainment of surprise, speed of operations and concentration of combat power at the points of decision will be critical for success of land operations.

4.31 **Air Operations**. During joint operations, air power is employed for conduct of air operations in support of land forces operations. The objective of air operations will be to degrade the enemy's air power and reduce its capability to interfere with the operations of own land forces, deny enemy land forces the ability to move unhindered, create an imbalance in his force disposition and destroy or severely damage his surface communications and logistic means. Air operations will be the most effective means of disrupting the move of reserves and substantially reducing their potential before they arrive at their point of application. Air operations include tactical reconnaissance, counter air operations, battlefield air interdiction, counter surface force operations, air defence, air transport (including strategic and tactical airlifts), airborne and heliborne assault operations.

4.32 **Joint Planning for Air Operations**. All Army and Air Command Headquarters jointly set up Joint Army Air Operations Centres (JAAOC). Air support requirements of the

land forces plan are intimated by JAAOC to the controlling Air Command in the form of targets to be engaged and degree of neutralisation required along with the timeframe in which to achieve these missions. Joint Operations Centre (JOC), at the level of Corps headquarters is the interface with designated air bases for providing air effort and liaison with JAAOC for allotment of air effort. Joint planning and execution facilitates quick response to air support demands of land forces to bring about synergised effect on the battlefield.

Airborne Operations

4.33 **Characteristics.** Airborne operations are conducted in hostile territory for executing an assault landing from the air. These may be conducted at the strategic or operational levels, either independently or in conjunction with other operations. With its inherent air mobility, an airborne force is an important means to achieve simultaneity of force application and gaining a foothold across obstacle systems in circumstances in which other forces would require considerably much more time to be effective. Airborne operations can be launched at any stage of a battle.

4.34 **Missions**. Due to their inherent flexibility, airborne forces are capable of being employed on various missions whether these are strategic or operational. Operational missions are generally in furtherance of land forces plans and involve close cooperation with them. Though launched independently into the depth areas of the enemy, a quick link-up by ground forces is essential for the success of an airborne operation.

4.35 **Planning Airborne Operations**. The sequence of planning of an airborne operation is illustrated below.



4.36 **Conduct of Airborne Operations.**

- **Command and Control**.

  - **Army**. During flight, the air transport force commander will be the overall commander; after landing, the ground force commander will regain command of the land forces component.

  - **Air Transport Force**. The overall control of the air transport force will be with Air Headquarters, represented by the Air Command in the theatre which, in turn, will nominate a task force commander.

- **Conduct.** During the execution phase, attention needs to be paid to creating a favourable air situation and taking appropriate air defence measures. Suitable

deception measures and a rapid link-up are vital to the success of a mission.

Amphibious Operations

4.37 Bearing in mind India's extensive coastline and many island territories, an effective amphibious capability is essential for safeguarding national interests and creating deterrence so as to ensure peace and stability in the Indian Ocean.

4.38 **Tasks and Employment Scenarios**. Our amphibious forces have the capability to project a sustainable presence in coastal and offshore areas. Amphibious tasks are essentially categorised as assault, demonstration, raid and withdrawal operations. These tasks could be undertaken in various scenarios including conventional war, defence of island territories, assistance to friendly littoral states in the region, peacekeeping under the United Nations Charter and any other special operations necessitating employment of an amphibious force.

4.39 **Command and Control**. On the basis of the overall situation, content and objective of the operations the COSC will designate the Theatre Commander concerned who will be responsible for the overall campaign. He will function with an integrated staff from all component Services. The three Services will nominate their respective component force commanders, ie the Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF), Land Force Commander (LFC) and Air Force Commander (AFC). Though the CATF will be the coordinator among the three Services during the planning phase, the CATF, LFC, and AFC will function with individual and independent access to the Overall Force Commander. However, during the embarkation, movement and assault phases, and until the ATF is dissolved, the CATF will exercise command authority over the ATF. Besides, the CATF will have command authority over all forces operating in the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA) including those that are not part of the ATF.

4.40 **Planning**. On receipt of the operational directive from the COSC, the Theatre Commander will issue an initiating

directive to the CATF, LFC and AFC. This initiating directive is, in essence, an amplification of the operational directive and contains the information necessary to carry out the task. Thereafter the tri-Service planning staff will prepare detailed plans based on which a formal operational order is issued; this constitutes the basis on which the three Services components would make their detailed plans.

4.41 **Conduct**. The assault phase encompasses the preparation of beaches for assault by naval guns, ship-to-shore movement of the landing force, link-up between surface and air-landed assault forces and landing of the remaining elements of the landing force for accomplishment of the mission. Detailed planning, preponderance of firepower, and coordination for speedy landing of tanks, guns, vehicles and infantry in correct sequence are vitally important for success of amphibious assault. Air defence and maintenance of logistic support throughout the assault also need to be ensured.

"A landing against organised and highly trained opposition is probably the most difficult undertaking which military forces are called upon to face".

– General C Marshall, *Planning for Sicilian Landings*, 1943.

CHAPTER 5

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR



SECTION 14 : LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT OPERATIONS AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

SECTION 15 : NON-COMBAT OPERATIONS

SECTION 16 : UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

SECTION 14 : LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT OPERATIONS AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

"Low-intensity conflict is armed conflict for political purposes short of combat between regularly organised forces".

– Rod Paschall, *LIC 2010*, 1990.

Strategic Framework for LICO

5.1 **Aim of Military Operations**. When employing the Army in LICO, conflict management rather than conflict resolution will be the political objective. Therefore, operational objectives and intensity of operations should be oriented towards achieving a qualitative improvement in the situation which may not necessarily be possible in a short timeframe. It will be preferable to aim at low profile and people-friendly operations rather than high intensity operations related only to body and weapon counts.

5.2 **Timeframe**.

- **Precedence of Occurrence**. LICO may have to be undertaken prior to, simultaneously with or after the occurrence of a conventional war. In certain cases, these may be the initial step in the escalatory ladder of conflict that may have to be waged with an adversary bent on promoting and fuelling a proxy war. In other situations such operations may have to be undertaken after a conventional conflict while consolidating gains in captured territory.

- **Duration of Operations**. In order to ensure that the Army's efforts are effective and proportional to the task, LICO will generally be prolonged and will see a large number of changes in policy and directional imperatives. Commanders and troops executing the

mandate will move on after completing their tours of duty during the conduct of such operations to be replaced by others. It should be ensured that this should not result in an almost fresh start in any given area. Additionally, any tendency to resort to quick and seemingly efficient military-like actions which may appear to resolve an immediate local issue but, in all probability, may seriously hurt long-term objectives and future stability should be curbed without exception.

5.3 **Higher Direction**. The apex body of the higher defence organisation will be responsible for conducting reviews of the military aspect of LIC and advise the Government on the application of the military instrument of power. It will lay down clearly stated objectives to Army theatre commanders, coordinate functioning with other government and non-governmental agencies and monitor current and future changes in the nature of LIC with a view to re-calibrate the nature and tempo of own operations. In addition, Theatre Commanders may also receive direct inputs from the local administration. As distinct from conventional war, clear-cut directions in a LIC scenario may not always be available. Military commanders must, therefore, possess a high degree of tolerance for operating effectively in an environment of ambiguity.

Principles of LIC/Counter-Insurgency (CI) Operations

5.4 The well-established principles of war are equally applicable to combat operations conducted within the overall ambit of LIC. Some other principles will need to be modified for the military environment. The commander on the spot will balance the application of each principle depending upon the nature of each specific operation. The commonly understood principles of CI and counter-proxy war operations are given below:-

- **Primacy of Overall Aim**. The scope and intensity of CI operations relate to the probability of finding political solutions. Therefore operational objectives will need to be oriented towards achieving a

qualitative improvement in the situation. Clearly stated operational and tactical objectives should be directed towards an equally unambiguous overall strategic aim.

- **Unity of Effort**. This will be equally applicable to intra-force as well as inter-agency efforts. Apart from the Army, a large number of police and paramilitary forces are often also committed in CI operations. As such, it will be essential to harmonise the efforts of each element and therein lies the importance of unity of command. Loosely defined, yet responsive, command arrangements may also need to be made within own forces.

- **Popular Support**. Popular support is the cornerstone of all CI operations. All actions, including military operations, should be undertaken to seek the voluntary and willing support of the people in the affected area. Winning the Hearts and Minds (WHAM) of the population through low profile and people-friendly operations is the most essential aspect of successful CI operations. In many a way they contribute even more than the actual operations.

- **Dynamic Conduct**. The conduct of military operations should break free from set patterns, stereotyped plans and rigid responses. The insurgents will invariably enjoy the support and sympathy of the local population and, thereby, remain ahead of the security forces in terms of information. As a consequence, security forces operations will generally be reactive. It is, therefore, of utmost importance that imaginative and innovative variations in time, scope and manner of force application forms the basis of all CI operations, to dominate the area, keep the insurgents on the run and gain physical and moral ascendancy.

- **Public Relations**. The broad spectrum of all military actions must be projected in a transparent, honest and positive manner for maximum psychological gains. The action of the Army should aim at respecting and protecting human rights, reducing the threat to the

people and inspire a sense of security. Any excesses by the troops, provoked or otherwise, or errors of judgement of commanders, must be candidly and promptly admitted and swift corrective actions taken in a free and fair manner whilst guarding against any adverse effect on the morale of own troops. It needs to be noted that the role of the media is critical in achieving a positive projection of military actions.

- **Code of Conduct**. The military code of conduct must be strictly observed by all ranks. Guidelines, issued by the Chief of the Army Staff, are given below:-

  - Remember that the people you are dealing with are your own countrymen; your behaviour must be dictated by this single most consideration. Violation of Human Rights, therefore, must be avoided under all circumstances, even at the cost of operational success.

  - Be compassionate, help the people and win their hearts and minds.

  - Operations must be people-friendly and it should be ensured that least possible inconvenience and harassment is caused to the populace.

  - Minimum force should be used and collateral damage should be avoided.

  - Operations should not be undertaken without a police representative. All operations against women militants or terrorists should be conducted only in the presence of women police personnel.

  - Be truthful, honest and maintain the highest standards of integrity, honour, discipline, courage and sacrifice.

  - Sustain physical and moral strength, mental robustness and motivation.

  - Train hard, be vigilant and maintain high standards of military professionalism.

- Synergise your actions with the civil administration and other security forces.
- Uphold *dharma* and be proud of your country and the Army.

- **Guidelines for Operating under Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1958**. Detailed instructions promulgated by the Adjutant General Branch, Army Headquarters for conduct of operations under this Act, will be strictly adhered to. Salient aspects which need special attention are outlined below :-
  - Strictly adhere to the laid down rules, regulations and standard operating procedures when opening fire, conducting searches, arresting and seizing arms, ammunition, explosive and other incriminating material.
  - Accounting and disposal of apprehended persons and material must also be conducted scrupulously as per prescribed rules.
  - Provisions of procedure laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure must be adhered to while effecting arrest, search of women and searching places occupied by women.
  - Provide immediate medical aid to all persons injured during operations
  - Maintain detailed records of all actions taken during operations.
  - Promptly attend to the directions and instructions of civil courts. When summoned by a court, ensure dignified conduct and maintain decorum of the court.

Elements of CI Operations

5.5 **Intelligence**. Superior manpower and weapons have to be supported by efficient intelligence back-up for success in CI operations. Concerted efforts are required to establish an intelligence grid; this is a long-term process and,

hence, continuity must be maintained even if units rotate through turnovers.

5.6 **Psychological Initiatives.** Psychological initiatives play a major role in a CI environment. The planned management of information and other measures are important to influence the opinion, emotions, attitude and behaviour of hostile, neutral or friendly groups in support of current policies and aims. Themes for psychological initiatives should be chosen objectively taking into account the perceptions of the selected target audience.

5.7 **Information Management**.

- **Media**. Media caters to various needs of the people in society in peace and war. With its unlimited capabilities and reach, it is an effective force multiplier. Since insurgency is a battle for the hearts and minds of the people, media is the most potent weapon for conducting psychological initiatives.

- **Electronic Warfare**. EW plays a key role in supplementing intelligence. Timely and actionable intelligence is vital. This will go a long way in isolating scattered pockets of insurgents and depriving them of direction and coordination from their controllers and supporters.

5.8 **Winning Hearts and Minds**. Security forces must seek popular approval for their presence in insurgency-prone areas. WHAM involves actions to gain the confidence of uncommitted elements of the population in addition to obtaining, preserving and strengthening support from ‘friendly’ insurgents. WHAM focuses on undertaking civic action programmes to present the Army’s human face. These include providing education, creating medical facilities, construction and development projects in addition to social activities aimed at improving the quality of life and promoting better understanding and cooperation with local residents. Further, due consideration needs to be accorded to minimize inconvenience to the populace during conduct of operations apart from safeguarding human rights.

5.9 **Human Rights and Legal Framework**. With the Army's prolonged deployment in CI operations, there is a need to develop due respect for human rights, notwithstanding the tense, stressful and turbulent situations at the grass roots level. In this regard the Ten Commandments issued by the Chief of the Army Staff, as given earlier will be strictly followed.

5.10 **Leadership**. Good leadership is very important and will prove effective in ensuring that troops are convinced that the cause they are fighting for is just. Leaders need to display great tact and patience in coping with the difficulties in insurgency situations.

Conduct of Operations

5.11 CI operations need to be conducted in two different geographical contexts, more so in proxy war situations. The first is at the border or LC itself through which the insurgent cadre infiltrates. The second is in the hinterland, both urban and rural, wherein insurgents establish bases and hides from which strikes are launched. Therefore, it is essential that well-coordinated operations need to be conducted to, first, check infiltration and then to deprive the freedom of action enjoyed by insurgents in the hinterland; this isolates them from their support base.

5.12 **Checking Infiltration and Exfiltration**. The porosity of our borders, difficult terrain and inclement weather conditions provide ideal conditions for infiltration. All possible measures must be undertaken to check infiltration and exfiltration. Incisive appreciation of terrain will help identify the likely infiltration and exfiltration routes, along which a multi-tiered surveillance grid should be established. Quick reaction teams should be based on surveillance centres to respond swiftly to any attempted infiltration and egress. In the long run, the success rate of infiltration attempts should be reduced so drastically that insurgents do not consider it cost-effective. Whenever an obstacle, such as a fence, is created, it should be backed by surveillance equipment and troops physically guarding it from both sides. 'Jungle bashing' by large bodies,

in the absence of intelligence, is the least effective method of operating in such conditions.

5.13 **Operations in the Hinterland**. These encompass the urban, rural and forest areas. Each of these has its own peculiarities which dictate the deployment pattern and density of troops in a given area. While inhabited urban areas will require firm but humane measures for population and access control and selective surgical operations based on specific inputs, more vigorous combat operations will be necessitated against well-established camps in rural areas and forests. The Army is more suited for the second category of operations. The deployment pattern and density of troops will be dictated by the overall number of insurgents operating in the area, their tactics and motivation, demographic realities, public attitude and terrain in addition to the prevailing political, economic and social conditions. It will be imperative to ensure own security and undertake measures to prevent the insurgents from exploiting vulnerabilities and, if they do so, to respond swiftly so that post-strike get away is prohibitively expensive for the insurgents.

5.14 **Small Team Operations**. Resources of the security forces will invariably be stretched over a large area of responsibility. In such an environment, operations based on small teams backed by good or specific intelligence increase the chances of contact with and success against insurgents.

Helicopters can be very effectively employed for various tasks in CI operations. CI units ferried by helicopters should be employed for tasks of decisive nature where speed and surprise are of paramount importance particularly in remote or inaccessible areas.

5.15 **Minimizing Casualties**. Unlike conventional war, CI operations are seldom time-bound. Casualties occur when operations are conducted without adequate intelligence, poor or inadequate standard of basic infantry skills and neglect of fundamentals. No effort should be spared to minimize casualties to own troops so as to maintain moral ascendancy over the insurgents.

"*Counter insurgency operations must, of necessity, be an intimate mix of military operations, civic actions, psychological operations and political/social action".*

– **Lt Gen SC Sardeshpande, *War and Soldiering*, 1993.**

SECTION 15 : NON-COMBAT OPERATIONS

"He who knows when he can fight and when he cannot will be victorious".

– Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, 400-320 BC.

Types of Operations

5.16 As mentioned earlier, non-combat operations are conducted primarily to assist the civil administration to meet sudden challenges to internal peace and tranquillity due to local disturbances initiated by a segment of the population or due to natural or manmade calamities. The suddenness and intensity of the event may catch the civil administration unprepared or unable to meet the immediate challenge, while the Army will be able to deploy speedily, provide relief and bring the situation to a state manageable by the civil administration. It must be noted that management of disasters is primarily a State subject.

5.17 **Maintenance of Law and Order**. Amongst all the duties generally performed by the Army in aid to civil authority, maintenance of law and order is the most important and sensitive. The lethality of weapons and the levels of violence encountered on such commitments have been progressively escalating with a corresponding increase in the frequency of the Army's deployment. Under such conditions, deployment and conduct of the Army has to be thought through and planned meticulously bearing in mind prevailing sensitivities. The Army should work on the well established principles of good faith, the use of minimum force and prior warning to the people when compelled to take action.

5.18 **Disaster Relief**. The Indian sub-continent is vulnerable to floods, droughts, cyclones, earthquakes and accidents. Disasters include earthquakes, landslides, floods, cyclones, wildfires, and epidemics on the one hand and accidents and man-made disasters on the other. The impact of these disasters is more predominant in under-developed and

remote areas, where facilities to handle such calamities do not exist.

5.19 **Humanitarian Assistance**. These programmes consist of assistance provided in conjunction with military operations and training exercises. Humanitarian assistance should enhance national security interests and increase the operational readiness of units performing such missions. These may include provision of medical care, basic sanitation facilities, repair of public amenities and facilities, education, training and technical assistance.

Planning for Non-Combat Operations

5.20 **Levels of Planning.** The Army carries out planning for disaster management at the national, state and field levels. The Ministry of Defence, including Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff and the three Service Headquarters are involved at the highest level. Command, Area or Sub Area Headquarters will interact with the civil administration, police and other organisations at the State level, through periodic `civil-military conferences'. Activities related to surveillance, preparedness and prevention should, nonetheless, continue even during normal conditions.

5.21 **Full Utilisation of State Resources.** All military commanders approached to provide aid must advise the civil administration to first fully utilise their own resources. They should synergise these with those of the Army once deployed. This is particularly applicable for duties involving maintenance of law and order particularly in circumstances when the State

Government may be of the opinion that the task is beyond its capabilities. Though this may result in the Army having to step into an already deteriorated situation, it is necessary to maintain its long-term credibility and effectiveness and hence need to avoid high-handedness will be the key guiding principle.

5.22 **Preparation.** In order to be able to respond to any call in aid of civil authorities, it is important for all command echelons in the Army to be fully aware of the availability and deployment of State resources as also have complete understanding of the existing infrastructure in their areas of responsibility. Equally important is visualisation of the likely role that the Army may be assigned in a specific area, given its physical and social peculiarities. The capability of the Army to undertake various non-combat operations will require an in-depth analysis and standard operating procedures should be worked out in consultation with civil administration. This will ensure that minimum time is lost in deployment of troops and that necessary training is imparted to own troops in advance for the purpose. The Army has charted out detailed allocation of responsibilities in all areas and all civil administrative officials are kept informed.

Requisitioning of Aid

5.23 **Pre-Planned Aid.** In cases where rendition of aid can be planned, the civil authority will project its demands through the State Government and Ministry of Home Affairs to the Ministry of Defence which shall consider the demand. To enable local military authority to make necessary preparations, State Governments should keep the appropriate Army formation headquarters informed regarding ongoing developments and details of requests projected to the Ministry of Defence. Such formations or units will then carry out necessary preparations and make outline plans for the task, including allotment of troops, equipment and movement. Army Headquarters shall always be kept fully apprised of such details.

5.24 **Aid in an Emergency**. When time is short the designated civil authority may make a direct requisition to the nearest military authority for maintenance of law and order or for disaster relief. Local military authority will provide the necessary help without reference to the higher headquarters in exceptional cases where speed is essential to save human lives and property. However, in cases of a sensitive nature, prior clearance of the Army Headquarters will be obtained telephonically by the Command Headquarters concerned. The sanction of

the Union Government will be obtained at the earliest even in such cases by the concerned State Governments. During natural calamities and other serious emergencies when time does not permit obtaining sanction of the Union Government, the local commander may, at his discretion, comply with the request of the civil authority to the best of his ability. In such circumstances, the civil and military authorities will immediately report their actions to the Union Government.

"Internal security related operations have assumed an equal significance as the primary task of the Army and these have now to be recognised as such".

– General NC Vij.

SECTION 16 : UNITED NATIONS (UN) PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

"The United Nations, as a neutral intervening force and honest broker, remains an important factor in peace-keeping and confidence building".

– Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *The Blue Helmets*, 1996.

5.25 India has an enviable record of participating in UN peacekeeping missions, having earned the respect and admiration of all parties for the impartial and professional manner in which our forces have discharged their duties. As a stable and mature democracy it is incumbent on India to continue contributing to peacekeeping efforts of the UN.

5.26 A UN peacekeeping mission is formally established after a resolution is adopted by the Security Council and a mandate to that effect is issued. Based on the mandate, missions can be classified as peace-keeping (Chapter VI) or peace-enforcement (Chapter VII) as spelt out in the UN Charter. Chapter VI deals with the settlement of disputes by the Security Council by negotiations, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resorting to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means. Chapter VII covers the actions to restore international peace and security with respect to threats to peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggression. These actions may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations or means of communications and severance of diplomatic relations, and if these fail, resorting to operations (demonstration, blockade and other operations) by air, sea or land force of member countries of the UN. When deciding to operate under Chapter VII, the consent of the parties involved need not be obtained.

5.27 **Principles of Peace-Keeping.** The basic principles of peace-keeping are consent of the parties involved, international support, unity of C^2, impartiality, mutual respect, legitimacy, credibility and coordination of effort.

5.28 **UN Mandate.** A mandate emerges from a Security Council resolution and will be the basic document for the mission and invariably include the following elements : -

- Components of the mission and their tasks.
- Ceasefire or other agreements.
- De-mobilisation and re-integration of the groups and forces involved in the conflict.
- Maintenance of forces during de-mobilisation.
- Final disposition of the forces and groups and disposal of their weapons and equipment.
- Discontinuation of foreign military aid to all parties.

5.29 **Rules of Engagement.** This is an important document which spells out the quantum and type of force that may be used and the circumstances in which it is to be used. Unit commanders of the mission must ensure that all ranks clearly understand these rules. When applying the rules of engagement the basic tenets of minimum force, proportionate action and minimum collateral damage must be ensured.

5.30 **Mission Directives and Instructions.** A military contingent operating under UN auspices is issued 'directives' by the Force Commander and 'instructions' by his staff. All ranks must understand these.

5.31 **Functions of Military Personnel.**

- **Under Chapter VI.** Military personnel may function as observers or as part of a contingent. The primary task of military observers is to collect and disseminate information in the mission area. A contingent should be prepared to perform tasks such as security, protection, civic action and logistics. The contingent could be called upon to carry out non-military tasks also.
- **Under Chapter VII.** In such a situation the tasks (demonstrations, blockade or other operations) and functioning of the contingent would be similar to that while functioning as part of a multi-national force.

5.32 **Preparatory Activity**. Once the decision to participate in a UN mission is taken by the Government, detailed planning and preparation of the contingent will be a prerequisite prior to deployment. This will include reconnaissance, equipping, assembly and staging forward of the force, induction, supply of the force in the mission area and de-induction. Various staff branches at Army Headquarters undertake these responsibilities and the overall effort necessitates a high degree of coordination and cooperation for smooth execution of the mission. Detailed guidelines and instructions will be laid down by the branches concerned.

5.33 **Training.** There are some differences in the methodologies of functioning, as compared to standard practices in the Indian Army, when operating under the UN flag and the earmarked contingent must train for these. The contingent will be briefed in detail regarding the nature of mission and envisaged tasks. Before induction, contingents will train for aspects such as peace-keeping operations and CI operations in addition to language training (if required). Other subjects to be covered are:-

- Interpretation of directives such as Rules of Engagement.
- Contingent management at unit and sub unit levels.
- Public relations, media management and interaction with non-government organisations.
- Human rights, humanitarian affairs and legal matters.
- Logistic planning and contingent profiling under the new UN policies of wet and dry lease systems.

Pay and allowances including method of reimbursement.

"He who is unattached to everything, and on meeting with good and evil neither rejoices nor recoils, his mind is stable".

– ***The Bhagawad Gita*.**