

2003 – 2008 MILITARY PROGRAMME BILL OF LAW

The strategic context is evolving in a series of deep transformations. These changes are first of all characterised by an international situation that has strongly deteriorated and is marked by unpredictability. It is also characterised by a large growth in the risks due to the ongoing proliferation of weapons of massive destruction, and in threats that have recently taken concrete form, stemming from terrorism and its change of scale.

The international framework of our defence policy is evolving.

The development of European defence that France is actively encouraging to allow the European Union to manage crises autonomously is now committing us more to the construction of European military capacities than in the past.

The new strategic orientations adopted by the United States are based on the willingness to develop and use one's own prevention and action capacities everywhere and under all circumstances, independently of all alliances and support but without excluding them. These capacities encompass all the pertinent military instruments, from anti-missile defence to global mastery of intelligence.

The change in our defence policy matches the changes affecting its strategic context. Our country intends both to preserve its freedom of assessment and choice, and to diversify its capacity to act within coalitions - European, allied or ad hoc - under less foreseeable circumstances.

The purpose of the reform of our defence system, as decided in 1996 by the President of the Republic, was to renovate our military means by adapting them to the new environment and to the anticipated changes until 2015. The 1997-2002 programme was a first step in implementing the professionalisation of the armed forces. The programme law for 2003-2008 aims to:

- ensure the security of the French people and defend our interests better by affirming our strategic autonomy and giving France a driving role again in Europe and thereby in the world, by participating effectively in operations to establish and maintain the peace;
- restore the availability of equipment to improve the forces' operational level;
- make an overall effort to modernise our forces, especially in the strategic fields of situation evaluation, command, projection and deep action means, and to equip the professional army with the new-generation hardware needed to accomplish missions corresponding to the new strategic context;
- increase the research effort to integrate the technological developments that will make it possible to face the variety of threats effectively.

The military programme for the next six years also provides for a set of essential measures for consolidating the professional army after the deep changes in the 1997-2002 phase, by guaranteeing an adequate force training level and making sure the flow and quality of civilian and military personnel recruitment is maintained.

This bill reflects the Government's determination to meet this changing environment. This takes concrete form with a steeply increased resource envelope amounting to an annual average of € 14.64 billion (in constant 2003 euros) for hardware expenditures, to improve equipment availability and increase the effort to modernise the forces. Under these conditions, a large number of equipment units will enter manufacturing phase and new programmes will be launched.

In the framework of Government policy, and for domestic security missions, the Gendarmerie is now placed under the responsibility of the Minister of the interior, of domestic security and local freedoms. The Gendarmerie conserves its military status and its organic attachment to the Defence ministry.

The additional means allocated to the Gendarmerie by the 2003-2007 domestic security orientation and programming law are integrated into the 2003-2008 bill.

The necessary rise in the defence effort, both in operational and equipment terms, meets a strong requirement: continue the reform and modernise our forces. This should be accomplishable over time, with the benefit of ensured resources. On the other hand, the use of these resources should be optimised by developing all the spending efficiency.

General framework of our defence policy

Understanding our Defence and Security Environment

In accordance with the analyses mentioned in the 1994 White Paper, the evolution of the strategic context throughout the nineties has shown that our country now enjoys a strategic depth of thousands of kilometres to the east. This is the first time this has happened in our history. However, against all expectations, crises and conflicts have continued in the world, involving often unusual and unexpected rationales, environments and players, creating fragmented, multiple and often asymmetrical threats, which are exercised by state or non-state entities, having lesser military potential at their disposal and looking to bypass our defences and take advantage of our weaknesses by any means possible, including non-military ones. Depending on the circumstances, these threats can take the form of terrorism, intra-state conflicts based on complex rationales, ballistic, nuclear, radiological, biological or chemical proliferation, organised criminal activities or schemes as numerous as they are varied.

Threats Concerning French People directly

Through the scale of their violence and the number of victims, the period beginning with the 11 September 2001 attacks has sanctioned the emergence of mass terrorism. These attacks have opened the way to different types of conflicts, without battlefields and without clearly defined armies, where the enemy, ready to use weapons of mass destruction, clearly aims at civilian populations. France is a highly developed open society with a high level of technology. France is, therefore, particularly vulnerable to these new kind of threats. Furthermore, with her various political ties, communities of interests and alliances, she represents a potential target.

The increase of our vulnerability within our borders, as far as infrastructure, decision centres and populations are concerned, must be taken into account in all their aspects. The technological advances and the urbanisation of our society makes us more easily open to attacks, be it through concentration of population, interconnected networks (water, electricity, and telecommunications) and the astonishing development of the use of computers.

The Distinction between internal and international terrorism is becoming blurred.

Networks are transnational, with cells or support abroad but also in western countries. They have major financing, coming in part from organised crime; they have a freedom of action and are motivated by a deeply felt hostility towards the West. They exploit the frustrations of certain sections of the population, frustrations based on regional crises - historic, economic or social -, as well as the difficulties encountered by certain elements of the immigrant communities to become integrated into our countries.

Counting on surprise or even saturation, these networks can launch several massive attacks simultaneously on the same space or territory. The people are, therefore, threatened as much outside the country (French nationals abroad) as inside it, by individuals settled either in our country or in remote and hard to identify areas.

The shrinkage of distance, the opening of borders, and the development of terrorism into a kind of war, all contribute to a blurring of the line between internal and external security.

An Unpredictable World in the Long Term

International instability factors are here to stay for the foreseeable future. The transitional societies at the borders of Europe will still be marked by severe tension, aggravated by economic difficulties and extensive migration. The security interests of European countries will be

affected. Instability in these regions as well as in others further away, will continue to be reflected in violent identity-searching reactions, coloured by nationalism or religious fundamentalism.

Dysfunctional states,

resulting from political, social or economic disintegration, unable to control their territory and to assume their sovereignty, tend to become havens where illegal activities flourish (drugs and human trafficking, criminality) creating internal destabilisation that sometimes spreads to neighbouring countries, generating in certain cases humanitarian disasters, or even exporting particularly threatening violence under diverse guises.

The end of the nineties has witnessed *accelerated development of ballistic capabilities and weapons of mass destruction* in certain particularly sensitive regions of the globe. At the same time, the disarmament process has slowed down and the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remains inadequate.

Strategies used in asymmetrical threats

adopted by state or non-state players, can target the nation as well as military forces in the field. Associated risks include attacks against information systems, proliferation, terrorist threats on a strategic level and development of organised crime.

Western military supremacy renders direct confrontation unlikely. In order to bypass our defences, potential adversaries will, from now on, aim to develop every other possible kind of provocation, beyond the constraints of international law. For example, they will be ready to exploit the potential of our own civilian infrastructure or use hijacked weapons of mass destruction against civilian population within our own society. They could, one day, have nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical weapons. The swift transmission of techniques and knowledge (Internet) and the availability of materials (dual-use technologies, especially in the fields of missiles and chemical precursors) will give them easier access to these capabilities.

Changing Strategic Environment

Since 1996, the international framework of our defence policy has changed.

European defence has assumed another dimension since the initiatives taken by France and its principal partners. The proposals submitted to and approved by the EU 15 have made it possible to positively establish the institutional foundations of the European Security and Defence Policy and set the military objectives of a European crisis management capability.

At the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, the Europeans indeed established the objective of having concrete military capabilities to cover all of the so-called Petersberg missions (especially peacekeeping and peace restoration) in order to enjoy an autonomous capability to decide, launch and lead military operations under their own direction in response to international crises where Nato, as such, is not involved. This European commitment takes the following shape:

- a global capability objective in which the member States must, by 2003, be able to deploy a military force of up to 60,000 men, with associated naval and air cover within 60 days and maintain it for at least a year;
- collective capability objectives, especially in command and control, of intelligence and strategic transport, which will rely on national or multinational initiatives.

The operational declaration adopted at Laeken in December 2001 highlights the political and military capability of the Union to act. The contributions of the Member States, announced during the capability commitment conferences, have given shape to the build-up of this military capability. Our commitment to European Defence is conceived in harmony with our transatlantic solidarity. Actions taken to reinforce European capabilities contribute to the progression of those of the Alliance. Whilst remaining the foundation of collective defence of the continent, *the Atlantic Alliance* has started in-depth thinking about its structure, capabilities and mission development. The analyses currently taking place in Nato and the future development of the role of the EU in European Defence will have an influence on the future of our defence policy.

The *United States* is changing its strategic choices. Witness its decision to complete its defence arsenal with defensive (antimissile) and offensive, conventional and nuclear resources. Following September 11, 2001, the US has announced that the transformation of its forces will be accelerated.

For the US, faced with unpredictable threats that can menace it directly, it is a matter of having at its disposal a large range of rapidly deployable capabilities for reaching any theatre under any circumstances and ensuring a total command of intelligence from the USA, especially using its satellite networks.

One of the essential elements of this new American approach resides in the willingness to act alone, if need be, without the constraints linked to alliances or multilateral commitments. However, this strategy does not rule out coalition operations.

This global intention demands a massive reinforcement of the defence effort, which in turn benefits research and development of new defence systems, increasing the technological and military gulf between Europe and the United States.

Increasing our Defence Effort

To ensure the security of French interests, to pursue the reform of our armies in the best way possible, and to strengthen France's place in the construction of European Defence and in the world, an increase in our defence effort is necessary. Our defence strategy will need to include an increase in defence spending, as opposed to what has occurred over the last ten years.

The foundation of our defence policy remains pertinent: global concept of defence, strategic autonomy, transatlantic and European ties. It rests on a national consensus.

The "2015 Armed Forces model" and the choice of professionalisation of the Armed Forces decided in 1996 are confirmed. An adaptation of the capabilities and an acceleration of certain programmes are necessary in light of the evolving threats and the lessons learned from the action of our forces.

Ensuring the Security of the French People and the Defence of National Interests

In the face of the evolving international situation, the main objective of our policy is the defence and security of the French people and of their interests at home and abroad (there are 1.5 million nationals abroad). We might have to mount, most often in coalition, war operations outside of our borders, especially to prevent or fight against asymmetrical threats. Moreover, in accordance with the choices made in 1996 concerning professionalisation and the definition of the new Armed Forces, and considering the requirements stemming from our participation in European and Atlantic solidarity, we must:

- *protect our autonomy of decision and action* in order to choose freely whether to take part in operations with our partners or allies, including the ability of acting alone should it be necessary. Maintaining this autonomy implies that we have the resources to dissuade any enemy from attacking our vital interests, that we are aware and can decide in due time, and that we have the means necessary to act within a national framework.
- *preserve our influence in alliances and coalitions*, which implies that we have the capability of a "lead nation" (1) to lead a European operation and sufficient military capabilities to contribute to a spectrum of military actions, especially in high intensity operations.
- *maintain necessary technological know-how* to ensure, through time, the credibility of nuclear deterrence, to develop the resources of protection against new threats, and to preserve an industrial base, essentially European, to manufacture our major defence systems.

(1) "Lead nation" Depending on specific operational circumstances, it may become necessary in a coalition situation to rely more especially on a "lead nation" that can unite the other members around its own national capabilities.

These ideas form an indivisible whole and cannot be conceived without a major effort *to increase the level of operational preparation of the Armed Forces and the availability* of their equipment in order for them to be able to fulfil their mission effectively.

Strengthen the Role of France in Europe and in the World

Europe has become our main political and geographical focus.

France's objective, which is to allow the EU to rapidly obtain military, technological and industrial capabilities, takes on an increased importance. This aim was realized in part with the commitments agreed upon at European summits since 1998.

For France and its partners, it already entails a certain number of responsibilities as a result of progress achieved. Indeed, France has undertaken to satisfy a fifth of the global objective of Helsinki, whilst contributing decisively to structural strategic resources: especially strategic and operational headquarters, communications and intelligence information systems.

Furthermore, the conference of November 2001 on the improvement of capabilities highlighted the persistent gaps that exist especially in strategic capabilities, which the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) aims to fill. France will continue to play an important role in activating this plan. The main thrusts retained in the defence programme are consistent with the deficiencies in the European capability areas: in terms of command, intelligence and communication, reduction in capability deficiencies for projection and force mobility, accelerated modernisation of long range strike capabilities and reinforcement of methods for protecting Armed Forces deployed abroad. Within this framework, we must:

- *develop the capabilities that allow us to assume the role of "lead nation",* especially the multinational aspect of our planning and command structures, to allow the conduct of European operations covering the whole spectrum of the Petersberg missions, including high intensity combat operations;
- *support already existing bilateral or multilateral cooperation,* aimed at optimising forces and the mutual support of Member States, and to create new forces with Member States prepared to make the requisite financial efforts, to prepare and start the necessary new programmes;
- *reinforce the interoperability* of our Armed Forces with those of our partners and allies, and improve our command of intelligence, which has become essential to guarantee our superiority and control of the situation in real time in theatres of operation.

For Europeans as a whole, maintaining freedom of analysis and choice and upholding a capability for action when they choose to work side by side with their American partners requires a renewed defence effort. Without starting a technological competition which does not necessarily match their needs, they must improve the credibility of their military equipment if they wish to take part in crisis management operations, to take part in the restoring and keeping peace and to sustain the associated international multinational processes.

The global approach in developing a European Defence is an enormous task. It will require greater defence efforts by Member States who wish to play a decisive role. It is fully consistent with our commitment to the Atlantic Alliance, whose capacity reinforcement objectives display numerous similarities with those of Europe. Both concepts reinforce each other to meet the challenges of the future.

Beyond the European and transatlantic circles of unity, France, one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, will continue to support the role of the UN as well as multinational processes and multinational commitments. The credibility of the UN remains a key element of international stability.

France will also be vigilant in retaining the capability to act on her own to ensure the defence of sovereign territories and be able to act, on a national or multinational basis, to meet her defence agreements in Africa and the Middle East.

Main Strategic Functions and 2015 Model Adaptation

The Armed Forces must be able to act as a deterrent under all circumstances, and to play a permanent role in protecting and securing our population, our territory and its approaches, including against new forms of attacks. They must be able to implement our defence agreements and contribute to peacekeeping or peace restoration operations mandated by the UN, within the EU, the Atlantic Alliance or in coalition. They must, now more than ever, be able to undertake long range in-depth action operations employing a variety of plans to suit the situation.

Defined in the report annexed to the 1997-2002 defence programme, the 2015 Model is confirmed. The present law includes the necessary changes in light of the complexity of the threat and the lessons learned in recent operations. It is presented from now on more analytically by force capabilities.

Strategic Functions

The major strategic functions that make up our Armed Forces model remain valid: deterrence, prevention, projection - action and protection. On this basis, in today's context of foreseeable risks and threats, we must pay greater attention to missions of protection and to the means that allow the prevention or foiling of aggression within the framework of prevention and projection.

Nuclear deterrence is still our fundamental guarantee. At the same time, general military strategy consists of prevention, protection, and projection-action in order to address other kinds of threat with the necessary flexibility. The Armed Forces must be able to conduct the necessary military actions to guarantee the security of our interests and of our citizens, at home or abroad. Their protection is imperative. Amongst other things, it is built on the development of a theatre anti-missile capability.

Outside our borders, within the framework of prevention and projection-action, we must be able to identify and prevent threats as soon as possible. Within this framework, possible preemptive action is not out of the question, where an explicit and confirmed threat has been recognized. This determination and the improvement of long range strike capabilities should constitute a deterrent threat for our potential aggressors, especially as transnational terrorist networks develop and organise outside our territory, in areas not governed by states, and even at times with the help of enemy states.

On our national territory, in terms of protection, we must increase the capabilities of our Armed Forces to fulfil their protection missions in the air and on the sea. Moreover, all military formations and resources may be called upon to help in surveillance and protection missions and to take part in operations following a major attack.

*** Deterrence**

Deterrence is at the heart of the capabilities that guarantee the strategic autonomy which is one of the essentials of France's defence policy. It is an important factor of international stability and is a fundamental guarantee against threats against our vital interests - threats that could come from major military powers driven by hostile intentions and ready to resort to any means in order to realize them. It must allow us to confront threats to our vital interests made by regional powers endowed with weapons of mass destruction, due to ballistic proliferation and the development of new nuclear, biological or chemical weapons.

In our strategy, the concept of no first use is the main characteristic of deterrence. This implies that we have different resources to ensure its credibility against evolving threats, wherever they might be and whatever their nature. It uses ballistic missiles launched from nuclear submarines and also airborne missiles carried by aircraft. The development of simulation technology will maintain the progress of nuclear forces to meet development in technology and thus preserve their credibility and durability. Finally, this deterrent must contribute to the security of Europe when considering the ever increasing unity within the countries of the Union.

• Prevention

Prevention is the first step in the implementation of our defence strategy, whose choices have been confirmed by the appearance of the asymmetric threat phenomenon. It is also a tool of our foreign policy objectives in the quest for peace and international stability. It is a permanent necessity against the reappearance of large direct or indirect threats, the development of crisis situations or of conflicts liable to involve our security and interests and those of our partners in the EU and the Atlantic Alliance. Through intelligence, it must have the capability to anticipate and assess any situation autonomously.

Therefore, prevention requires continued efforts in human and technical intelligence, as well as systems for collecting intelligence at the strategic level and in the operational theatres. In terms of the fight against terrorism, inter-ministerial coordination of analyses and actions will be pursued.

The capacity for surveillance and warning must be coordinated not only at a European level, particularly through exchanges and increased reciprocal support, but also at an international level, to keep watch on the new networks of transnational players. Moreover, intelligence is crucial to assist in the ongoing adaptation of our defence resources and organisation, and to orient the preparation of the future.

Prevention requires access to appropriate intelligence, command and control for understanding a situation and preparing for action. The tools developed must permit the exchange of intelligence and analysis with our partners.

An important part of prevention is also defence diplomacy, through the development of defence and security relations with our foreign partners, whether by strategic dialogue, intelligence exchange, military aid or cooperation. A coordinated approach of our defence diplomacy with our allies will be given preference.

Prevention relies also on maintaining a joint system of permanently or temporarily pre-positioned forces, thus facilitating situation analysis, intelligence analysis and immediate response in the regions under consideration.

- **Projection – Action**

Projection and action are the basic conceptual structure of the Armed Forces model. The key points are a capability to project force, whether in Europe or outside the European continent, a capacity to rapidly engage joint forces that can impose their superiority rapidly in a theatre and a capacity to sustain them over the long term. It is a question of deploying groups of joint forces, complete with associated support and logistics, under joint command in a national or multinational framework over distances of many thousands of kilometers.

In order to do this, the lessons learned from recent crises and operations have confirmed the need to have an autonomous capability for the initial land, air and sea thrust, allowing a rapid positioning of the first elements. These must generally be highly specialised and extremely mobile. The stabilisation period then requires deployment of more versatile and more numerous troops which can overlap during the period of reconstruction. Here we need very specialized personnel, mainly from the reserve. These actions must be preceded, completed or enforced by operations, including long range strikes. Efforts are made to improve specific capabilities that will allow France to play a framework-nation role within a coalition and to remove any gaps that might compromise the operations.

Following an analysis of simultaneous durable deployments, the objectives to be achieved will allow us to keep our commitments to a European operation. They are described as follows for each of our Armed Forces:

The Army must be able to commit:

- up to 20,000 men, simultaneously for an unlimited period in several theatres, whether in a national operation (1,000 to 5,000 men) or in a European operation (12 to 15,000 men). This level can reach 26,000 for a period of up to one year, taking into account average activity rates of units that do not exceed four months of annual deployment;
- more than 50,000 men, without relief, to take part in a major conflict within the Atlantic Alliance.

The Navy must be able to commit:

- a naval force consisting of the Fleet Air Arm and its support, an amphibious group capable of projecting a light armoured group of 1,400 men, as well as nuclear attack submarines.

The Air Force must be able to commit:

- A strike air force of a hundred fighter aircraft (seventy five of which can be involved in a European operation) and associated support, a transport group able to send 15,000 men to a distance of 5,000 kilometers in three days, as well as command, control, detection and air control resources and the necessary air bases.

For the Gendarmerie:

- in accordance with the decisions of the European Council for the development of police capabilities, a quota of 600 Gendarmes may be engaged outside our borders for support and peace restoring operations, and as specialised and support elements of the main forces.

- **Protection**

Protection of individuals, institutions and the territory is a permanent requirement. The home territory must be protected under all circumstances.

The emergence of diverse threats (terrorism, proliferation, trafficking and major criminality) gives protection a renewed meaning. It is a matter of being able to wage war at any time against blackmail, reprisals or aggression against the territory or the population. It also means being able to react as quickly as possible, with appropriate resources in order to limit the consequences of an asymmetric attack.

The Armed Forces are in charge of protecting national air space (detection and interception, including against ballistic threats). They contribute to the surveillance and the protection of maritime approaches (anti-pollution, maritime rescue, anti-trafficking) and take daily part in security and protection measures on national territory.

In case of crisis or serious disaster and in exceptional circumstances, security forces may be reinforced - as currently planned by the Armed Forces, in particular by the Army. Every formation with its military capabilities must be able to offer its support to the civilian population in case of asymmetric attacks. The Ministry of Defence (DGA, Health Service) has unique expertise in associated areas (nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical) at its disposal.

Moreover, it is a confirmed principle that the Armed Forces provide their support to protect and ensure civil security, especially in cases of natural or technological catastrophe. Such an involvement entails an awareness and training of all the civilian and military actors recognising the importance of the mission. In any case, the optimised use of military resources for internal security, protection and civil security purposes will be sought in order not to overload the Armed Forces projection capabilities.

The best possible relationship is sought between civilian authorities and the military territorial command. The resources of cooperation between military and civilian capabilities are reinforced, thanks especially to the new defence zone headquarters. As an essential element of the protection system, special attention must be paid to the rising influence of the operational reserve.

The Gendarmerie is a versatile military security force, present throughout France, with 50,000 easily recalled reservists available. It is a daily player, essential for security. Placing it within the Ministry of the Interior for domestic security missions and local law and order reinforces the protection of individuals, institutions and territory and coordinates State resources better. It contributes to the State's continued response to threats to domestic and defence security. Lastly, as a direct consequence of the freedom of movement of people and goods within the EU, protection of the territory comes more and more within the framework of reinforced cooperation with our neighbours and allies. Protection must also be viewed on a European scale.

2015 Armed Forces Model

The 2015 Armed Forces model, which is a general framework of major objectives and practical measures possible within this time horizon, complies with an in-depth strategic analysis in which certain trends were detected as early as 1996: the absence of direct military threat close to our borders; the existence of dangerous instability with rapid deterioration possible in many parts of the world, requiring external military intervention within a coalition; the increase of risks due to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the possible emergence of asymmetric threats, including terrorism.

Today, the main themes of this analysis remain pertinent. The identified risks and threats, some of which have been reinforced and have been realised since then, constitute the basis of the scope and the structure of our Armed Forces model.

Recent developments in European defence, the lessons learned from our operation in the Gulf War and in the Balkans, the September 11, 2001 crisis, the rise of terrorist attacks and the involvement in Afghanistan, reinforce the major guidelines, and call for some adjusting, deepening or accelerating of the choices made. This strengthening and these adjustments are all the more necessary since the 1997-2002 defence programme, undertaken under severe budget constraint, has slowed down the realisation of the model.

The updated model centers on four themes stemming directly from the evolution of the strategic context, notably, from the need to take part in the investment efforts which determine the future of the European project:

- *Command, intelligence, and resource assessment.*

This field is the subject of significant development and growth over the 1997-2002 law. It clearly comes within the scope of a European perspective and is closely linked with the capability objectives accepted at the Helsinki Summit in 1999. It consists, notably of the already "multi-nationalisable" command resources at the tactical, operational and strategic level (operations command centre, GFIM joint command centre, command of land, sea and air components); the imaging intelligence now consisting of drone systems (HALE, MALE and MCMC programmes), an all weather satellite image reception capability and a very high resolution imaging capability (programme Helios).

The model also includes, in the field of satellite navigation, a contribution to the security function of the Galileo system, and seeks to digitize the battle space all the way down to single units; it also includes computer warfare, both defensive and offensive.

- *The decrease of the projection and force mobility capability deficit.*

The operations of these last few years prompt us to retain reinforced objectives. They will concern the improvement of air transport capabilities (Airbus A310 and CASA 235, multi-role, long-range, in-flight refueling MRTT fighters, transport aircraft), as well as the modernisation of maritime projection, with the addition of slightly improved command and health support capabilities, adding two projection and command ships to the four planned ships containing landing docks;

- *Increase of long range action and strike capabilities.*

Again, adjustments to the model derive from knowledge of the most recent military actions, especially in the Balkans and in Afghanistan. The main objectives are: a permanent Fleet Air Arm group at sea, under the command of a second aircraft-carrier, delivered before 2015; the development of a new precise, long range strike capability from the sea, with the development of naval cruise missiles on board frigates and SNAs; the acquisition of an all weather capability for precision air-ground weapons; the reinforcement of special force capabilities with the creation of a new unit at the brigade level, the acquisition of specialized helicopters, with secure transmission equipment; as well as the acquisition of new elements of offensive electronic warfare (offensive jamming pods).

- *Reinforcement of protection resources.*

Following the increased threats due to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially biological, and their possible use in a terrorist attack, a number of measures have been taken to improve the protection and the safeguarding of the Armed Forces: introduction of a first step in deployed force protection capability against short and middle range (600km) ballistic missiles; the adoption of a biological defence capability objective to support the forces, allowing the individual protection of 35,000 men and collectively of 10 planned sites; consideration of infantry protection needs (combat armoured vehicles - new medium tracked, programme FELIN) and the reinforcing of the capacity to survey and safeguard the approaches of the air and sea spaces of our territory (Girafe Radar, improvement of the semaphore signal chain).

In order to increase efficiency and optimisation, the development of various human and technological resources that produce an operational result is now studied in terms of a global "force system". To assess the Armed Forces model, these are mainly federative, consistent capability elements. This approach is vital insofar as all operations now have joint-force characteristics. It promotes the capability of the forces to operate together and aims at the rationalisation of equipment use.

Within this rationale, eight force systems have been defined:

- Deterrence;
- Command, Communication, Control and Intelligence (C3R);

- Projection and Mobility;
- Long Distance Strike;
- Mastery of the Air/Land environment;
- Mastery of the Air/Sea environment;
- Mastery of the Aerospace environment;
- Preparation and Maintenance of operational capability.

The vital capabilities of the revised 2015 model are presented in the tables on page 29, where resources appear in each capability to which they contribute (resource versatility).

Consistent equipment effort

The modernisation effort must be accelerated during the period of the present law in order to make up the time lost in achieving certain programmes.

Substantial research effort

A continuous and high level research and technology effort is vital to prepare future armament programmes in order to define and realise the future weapon systems our forces will need in 2015.

The increased research effort is meant to:

- Detect as early as possible technological breakthroughs that can challenge our defence system concepts;
- Launch, without delay, the armament programmes which will be decided when the forces' new equipment needs appear and can be pinpointed;
- Control costs and technical risks inherent in realising these programmes.

As the bulk of the defence effort for the period 2003 - 2008 is committed to acquiring equipment, it is important to provide enough research funds to prepare the development and acquisition of future systems, and, also the modernisation of existing systems.

The future needs of our forces can be identified in advance through prospective studies. Choices will be adjusted, when necessary, to actual changes.

In order to reduce the cost for the State and compare the most varied ideas that favour innovation, this effort will be conducted with the concern of developing European cooperation, favouring reciprocal spin-offs between civilian and defence research, and developing the contribution of small and medium enterprises.

The emphasis will be on building technology demonstrators, which are experimental mock-ups or computer simulations that include a set of new technologies. These offer the advantage of materializing expected results, ensuring mastery of new technologies, and providing a precise basis for cooperation.

The expertise in the technologies necessary for these future equipments will have to be sought nationally for the nuclear deterrent, and on a European level for most of the other principal systems.

Pursuing reform, guaranteeing resources, and optimising their use

The reform of our defence capability decided in 1996 by the President of the Republic was intended to renew our military resources while adapting them to the new environment and to the changes expected by 2015. The military programme for 1997 to 2002 followed two objectives: the implementation of professionalization and the reorganization of the Armed Forces on the one hand, and the pursuit of their modernisation on the other.

The effective success of the Armed Forces professionalisation process has become an example for the general process of reform implemented by the State, witnessed by the reaction of the personnel involved, the speed of implementation and the major rationalisations resulting from it. At the end of this first step, it is necessary to maintain the dynamics of recruiting and of renewing the personnel on the one hand and of pursuing the optimisation of resources on the other.

Demands of professionalisation

- *Perpetuation of the professional Armed Forces*

Military service was ended at the end of 2001. Professionalisation of the Armed Forces will be totally achieved by the end of 2002. However, we have not yet attained the necessary complement that was felt to be necessary during periods of intense Armed Forces commitments in foreign operation theaters as well as at home.

Adjustments will make it possible to take into account the needs revealed by the lessons learned through recent operations and events, and to reach the planned format for 2002, thereby allowing a reduction in the pressure on the complement.

Planning and programming for the next six years follow the need to maintain the number and the quality of civilian and military recruited personnel.

The success of professionalisation also calls for improved equipment availability and a significant effort to accelerate the modernisation of the Armed Forces, so that they may benefit from capabilities adapted to a new context.

- *Adjusting the reserves to the security requirements*

In order to fulfil all its missions in a context of strong unpredictability of crises and resources needed, the professional Armed Forces require non-permanent but motivated and prepared reinforcements. The reserves play this role in a framework of a general search for rationalizing resources.

The role of the reserves will be adapted mainly so that they can provide the Armed Forces with necessary support, maintain or increase some of its capacities in use elsewhere, or bring necessary expertise in specific fields. Even more so than in the past, the reserves will have to fulfil missions at home, as a complement or substitute for operational personnel occupied elsewhere, and thus constitute a pool at the disposal of the government according to arrangements defined in an inter-ministerial framework, for the support of civilian/military operations as well as protection and security operations at home.

At the beginning of the programme, the effort will be to meet the actual needs of the Armed Forces by better using the reserves, to give the Armed Forces a better capacity to react and the possibility of being committed over a long term. Arrangements must be made to improve the attractiveness and recruitment of operational reserves, considering the professional, social and cultural realities of French society.

Development of efficiency factors

- *Consistency of effort directed towards internal and external security*

Protecting the territory and the citizens calls for a consistent effort directed towards internal and external security. The new and complementary resources allocated to the Gendarmerie, in particular in terms of personnel and equipment, through the Domestic security orientation and programme law are outlined in the military programme law.

- *Development of synergy among the Armed Forces*

The consistency of effort applies also to the Armed Forces. Whilst keeping specificities relating to their own environment (land, sea and air), the Armed Forces must be able to develop their capabilities within an increasingly "joint forces" context. These efforts will be pursued, as a priority, on fundamental subjects such as command, support, personnel training and organisation. Synergy among forces, services and organisations will be actively pursued.

- *Rationalization and transparency of management methods*

Management methods will be rationalised and modernised, together with the State's reform efforts. Direction by management control will be applied throughout the ministry. Quality will continue to be sought in the control and realization of armament programmes. This group of concrete measures must clarify and render more readable the portioning out and utilisation of the Defence budget allocations within the framework of the organic programme on financial laws.

- *Contracting out*

The Ministry's externalisation policy of the last few years will be pursued and increased. In order not to immobilise a portion of its personnel, the Armed Forces may lighten the burden of tasks that are not directly operational or are non-essential in time of crisis by contracting out to civilians (public or private). As far as operations are concerned, they may use outsourcing for capabilities they do not have, or in a limited manner for force implementation, support or disengagement.

- *Alternative to asset acquisition*

The acquiring of assets is not always the answer to functional or operational needs, nor is it always financially optimal. During the programme period, it seems opportune to look at new solutions based on known experiences, in France as well as abroad. These solutions could lead to

experiments in certain significant areas such as armament programmes, real estate operations or purchases of services, or even capabilities.

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2003-2008 Military programme objectives

Essentially, for the 2003-2008 programme, based on the general outline of our defence policy described above, the updated objectives of the 2015 Army model consist of :

- consolidation of the various aspects of the professional army, including its activities, operational training and operation.
- re-establishment of materiel availability and the modernization of the equipment used by the professional forces. This modernization will particularly be pursued, considering France's commitment to the construction of European defence, and the dynamics of military co-operation with our partners.

Field of Programming

The 2003-2008 law sets out the number of personnel and equipment funds. The perimeter of each annuity excludes the development finance for Polynesia and the recapitalisation of government enterprises, notably GIAT and DCN.

Beyond 2003, the share of the civil research budget taken up by the Defence Department and the costs resulting from the restructuring of the Direction des Constructions Navales, to the exclusion of recapitalisation, will be mentioned during the annual budget discussions.

The dismantling of fissile material production installations, which is not within the perimeter of this programme, will have to be financed by the fund set up before the summer of 2003. The 2003-2008 military programming law includes the personnel and investment credits of the Gendarmerie Nationale including those attributed by the orientation and programming law for domestic security.

Personnel

The civil and military personnel working for the Defence Ministry, 436,221 jobs under the initial finance law for 2002, will total, for a constant perimeter, 446,653 in 2008, representing an increase of 10,432 jobs over this period, 7000 of which come under the domestic security orientation and programming law (LOPSI).

The purpose of this increase is to:

- address needs stemming from army projection objectives, the improvement of the health service situation and the strengthening of our intelligence services capabilities;
- take into consideration the Gendarmerie personnel provided for under LOPSI;
- achieve the format provided for in 2002.

Operating funds

Unlike the previous programming law, the 2003-2008 law does not program all the funds allocated to section III operating expenses.

However, it includes two specific arrangements concerning section III.

Professionalisation consolidation fund

Eventually, the success of professionalisation depends on the ability of the Defence Ministry to attain a sustainable format and maintain the necessary numbers and quality of its personnel, in an unprecedented context of renewal of the number of civil service employees and a dynamic labour market.

To achieve this, a special fund will be created, known as the Professionalisation Consolidation Fund, totalling €572.58 M2003 over the period, designed to finance measures to strengthen the job-loyalty of military personnel and make recruiting more attractive.

Operational reserves

A system will be set up to make it more attractive to sign up in the operational reserve force, with a budget of € 85.83 M2003 for this period.

Activity and current operating funds

For the 2003/2008 period, activity and operational training indicators will be proposed, as well as an objective for the operating plan, making it possible to monitor these particularly important aspects with respect to the professional army, and develop them (see paragraph 3.2).

Equipment funds

The means intended for the development and acquisition of military materiel are programmed as payment credits. The policy of multi-annual ordering will be maintained with a twofold concern of providing the companies involved with the visibility they need and favouring a reduction in programme costs.

In terms of payment credits, the military materiel credits are set at 14.64 billion constant euros expressed in 2003 euros as an annual average for the duration of the law.

On these bases, the 2003 annuity is set at €13.65 B 2003. An additional financial effort will be made in 2004 with an annuity raised to €14.60 B 2003. Beyond that, the rate of growth of the annuities will be 0.8%.

Equipment credits	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
€ B 2003	13,65	14,60	14,72	14,84	14,96	15,08

Modernising and Adapting Armed Forces Equipment

Force Modernisation

In accordance with the efforts defined previously, the following measures will be implemented regarding the eight fighting force systems.

"Deterrent" force system

The resources assigned to this force system (€ 2 825 M on average each year) will allow renewed modernising of our forces and ensure the development of our simulation programme. In line with the French deterrent doctrine, the volume and characteristics of these means will be set at the level of what is strictly necessary.

As far as the ballistic component is concerned, during the 2003-2008 period, the new generation nuclear missile-launching submarine *SNLE NG* No. 3 will be launched in 2004, and the production of *SNLE NG* No.4 will continue for entry into active service in 2010, carrying the new *M51* missile. The construction of *SNLE NG* No.4 and the development of the *M51* missile are one of the main elements in the modernisation of the strategic oceanic force.

The airborne component will be renovated with the 2007 delivery of the new *ASMPA* missile, which will first be carried by the *Mirage 2000N*, provided necessary adaptations are undertaken, then, at the end of the programme, on the *Rafale*.

The transmission system specific to the nuclear forces will be renovated to improve its reliability. The development of simulation means will make it possible to adapt the nuclear forces to technological progress and therefore contribute to the credibility and sustainability of the deterrent force. Simulation must offer the means of checking the reliability and security of the means during

development. In particular, these means will depend on the construction of the Megajoule Laser, and the installation of very high-performance computation facilities.

Nuclear deterrent

SNLE-Commissioning of *SNLE NG* No 3 (new *NG* generation nuclear missile launching submarine) in 2004 and of *SNLE NG* No 4 in 2010

M51 Commissioning of *M51* in 2010 on *SNLE NG* No 4

ASMP Commissioning at the end of 2007 on *Mirage A 2000N* and starting from 2008 on *Rafale*

C3R force system

During this programming law, France will produce a complete chain of command from strategic level through to tactical level, including the joint forces theatre (operative) command, the importance of which has been more than confirmed by experience on operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan. France will be capable of acting as a "Lead nation" for the political-military consulting, planning and control tasks of a wide scale operation by the European Union.

The resources assigned to this force system will cover the production of the necessary information processing and distribution capabilities.

They will offer the means of developing by 2004 new satellite communications capabilities (*Syracuse III*) which will form the heart of the future strategic networks then, by 2006, of initiating a second stage aimed at boosting transmission rates and extending the coverage of the operating zones.

Intelligence capabilities will be improved by the production of the second generation Hélios satellites (launched in 2004 and 2008) providing France with a good situation evaluation capability with very high resolution images, in the visible spectrum, complemented by infrared images. In addition, the capability to access the very high resolution radar satellites of our European partners and the exploitation of their images, will broaden the spectrum of intelligence, thanks to all-weather observation capabilities.

Moreover, efforts will be made to establish greater European co-operation. A major upstream design effort will be made as soon as this law is enacted, to ensure the control of every technology concerning the future satellite platforms and their ground segments.

With regard to intelligence in the theatre of operations, capabilities will be improved toward the end of the programme by commissioning new airborne sensors (new generation airborne reconnaissance pod) and long endurance and tactical drones offering the possibility of almost permanent observation of certain zones. These drones should be a privileged field of action for European co-operation. In the area of electromagnetic intelligence, our strategic capabilities, based on mobile means like the Sarigue *NG* aircraft and the *MINREM* listening ship, and fixed means like advanced listening centres, will be maintained. The *MINREM* means and listening centres will be refurbished technically during the programme period.

Projection and mobility force system

For airborne activities, the resources covered by the law will allow the delivery of the first three *A400M* units in 2008. The acquisition of two very long radius-of-action transport aircraft will allow the two *DC-8s* to be replaced with the eventual added benefit of a multirole capability.

For maritime operations, the replacement of two landing craft carriers (*TCD*) by two Projection and Command Ships (*BPC*) in 2005 and 2006, will offer amphibious action capabilities to deliver a light armoured joint forces group of 1400 men from the sea.

To address demands for theatre mobility and the constant need for heliborne transport in every type of mission (presence and sovereignty, crisis or public service), in-depth renovation will be implemented on the Cougar and on a significant share of the Puma units to give them full operational aptitude with respect to protection and standardisation, while awaiting the first army NH90 helicopters

which will not be delivered before 2011. An initial segment of 34 units of this type will be ordered during this programme.

Deep strike force systems

To maintain permanent presence of the Air-Navy strike force, the project for a second aircraft carrier will be launched during the period, exploring the possibility of cooperation with the United Kingdom. Fifty-seven *Rafale* aircraft will be delivered to the air force during the period. The first three squadrons will be put into operational service in 2006, at the beginning of 2008 and by mid-2009. Until 2008, nineteen *Rafale* aircraft will be delivered to the Navy including four two-seater *Rafale* planes.

France will have the capability of firing the *Scalp/EG* airborne missile from the *Mirage 2000D* in 2003 and from the *Rafale* in 2006. Five hundred missiles will be delivered starting from 2003. The diversification of the cruise missile carriers will gradually be developed through this period: multi-mission frigates will be equipped with them starting in 2011, and the new generation nuclear attack submarines starting in 2015.

The conventional precision of our aircraft's firing capability will be improved in terms of the laser guidance component (Damocles pods). This capability will be enhanced by the arrival of the decametric version of the modular air to ground armament system (*AASM*) in 2005 and the day/night fair weather metric system in 2007. At this time, the development of the all-weather metric version (*AASM/TT*) will be initiated.

Development of an electronic offensive jamming capability will be launched, while seeking European cooperation.

Lastly, the action capabilities of special forces will be boosted significantly with the delivery of 10 "*COUGAR Mk 2*" helicopters and the launching of a programme aimed at improving the communication means of the units.

Air-ground environment mastery force systems

During the programme period, efforts will be made to improve the protection of the onboard infantryman with the acquisition and initial set up of new infantry armoured vehicles, the delivery of 272 *VBCI* (armoured vehicles) to equip three regiments starting in 2006, along with a new order for 157 articulated tracked vehicles (*VAC*). In addition, the renovation of the *VAB* (armoured vehicle) fleet, the delivery of five hundred additional light armoured vehicles and the renovation of the *AMX 10 RC* tanks will be maintained. In parallel, 14,000 units of the *FELIN* system will be commissioned, equipping two-thirds of the units during this period.

With the delivery of the last 117 *Leclerc* tanks, the armoured vehicle action capacity will achieve a level tailored to the changing threats (eight groups of forty tanks on the line). The *Leclerc / VBCI* system will restore the consistency of the components devoted to coercive actions which was lost when the *AMX 10P* became obsolete.

The commissioning of the first "support-protection" version of the *Tigre* helicopters will give France a new capability to address future combat conditions.

With continued efforts toward interoperability and the capability of fitting in with allied systems, the tactical information application systems will be improved and two major units will be digitised. An effort will be made for means to assist deployment in the field, and terrain development with broader capabilities to deal with the requirements of long-lasting crisis management. These means may also be used to provide aid to population groups within the national territory, in particular for natural or technological catastrophes.

Air-sea environment mastery force systems

In this area, priority means focusing on the renewal of all the Navy frigates and attack submarines, and contributing to the acquisition of a permanent Fleet Air Arm group, if possible by cooperation. During this law, the improved anti-aircraft capability will begin with the delivery of the first two *Horizon* type frigates in 2006 and 2008. Unless there is another overall commissioning programme, the third frigate will be ordered in 2007.

Eight multimission frigates and two *Barracuda* class nuclear attack submarines will be ordered so that the first ships will enter into service in 2008 and 2012.

In the field of maritime approach surveillance and protection, modernizing some of the dedicated means is intended and enhancing their capacities, more particularly for action against terrorism, illegal traffic and the battle against pollution.

Air-space environment mastery force systems

The means of acquiring airborne superiority will be enhanced by the commissioning of the first *Rafale* units and the delivery of the *MICA* missiles. The modernisation of the *SDCA (AWACS)* detection and command systems and the 2003 delivery of the third *Hawkeye* will enhance airborne operations control and command capability. Furthermore, the development of an enlarged-envelope interception missile will continue, as a European co-operation venture, throughout the period of the law.

The very close and close-range components of the ground-to-air defence system will be enhanced.

The additional expenditure will, by the year 2010, permit the establishment of an initial site protection capability against missile threats with an action radius limited to 600 km. This capability will mean developing a consistent group of warning, detection (especially radar) and tracking means, and progress in anti-aircraft missiles.

The radar coverage over the national territory will be strengthened by the acquisition of two *Girafe* radars, to protect sensitive national points.

For public protection, the supply to the Air Force of *Cougar RESCO* helicopters, specially designed for the rescue of aircraft crews under combat conditions, will substantially improve the peacetime capabilities regarding the rescue of aircraft in difficulty.

"Preparation and operational control" force systems

Operational control

The national effort made from the beginning of the programme will aim at restoring the availability level of equipment. Financial flow improvement has been implemented to re-establish the stock of spares at the necessary level to deal with the ageing inventories before modernisation and in consideration of premature wear due to foreign operations. To do this, the annual equipment programmed maintenance (EPM) average annuity has been set at 2 379 €2003 M, excepting cover for maintenance in operational condition (MCO) which is included in the programmes.

To reach full efficiency, it will be based on the rationalisation, already underway, of the organisations in charge of maintenance (SIMMAD, SIMMT, SSF) and will be associated with stringent management inspection. This approach will help ensure the level of support preparation and quality needed for a professional Armed Force.

Protection of the forces

The improvement of unit protection has been the focus of specific new measures.

For biological defence, the research, development and equipment acquisition effort undertaken as part of the programme will begin protecting our forces against some of the components of this threat, strengthening France's international position in this area.

Resources will be allocated to improve the health support for projected forces: maintaining the service level of the army hospitals calls for extensive infrastructural works. Furthermore, an entirely new hospital will be commissioned in 2007 in Toulon (Hôpital d'Instruction des Armées St Anne).

Decision-making aid

The resources assigned to the force systems will ensure the development and installation of computer systems to instruct the joint forces and multinational staff in the preparation and control of operations.

Research Efforts

In terms of Research and Technology (R&T), the effort programmed during the 2003 - 2008 period will ensure the consolidation or acquisition of the technologies needed to produce the weapon systems of the future. It will help achieve the technological capability model planned for 2015.

To this end, the principal undertakings will be:

- in the field of deterrent forces, studies to improve the performance of the M51 during its midlife renovation;
- in the field of C3R, work on improved resolution spatial optical observation and hyperspectral observation on the very high rate laser links between space and mobile systems, and on space transmissions at extremely high frequency (EHF); terrestrial space surveillance in a theatre of operations will continue to be the subject of in-depth upstream studies;

- In the field of missiles, studies to acquire anti-missile ballistic capability using a medium range ground-to-air missile system (SAMP/T), a space alert capability regarding missile firing and research into micro-drones;
- in the terrestrial field, robotics research for the operational air-terrestrial "bubble";
- in the naval field, studies of battle management, acoustic detection, hypervelocity torpedoes and submarine drones;
- in the aeronautical field, studies leading up to the construction of a stealth platform, and designed to reduce the cost of ownership of the Rafale engine;
- in the field of generic technologies, studies of new detection, interception and electromagnetic signal processing techniques.

To fulfill all these goals, a global amount of € 3815 M will be required for the period covered by the programming law.

This financial effort will also provide support for the high technologies of our country, thus improving its global competitiveness, by developing corporate innovation capabilities.

In addition, the programme provides for direct financing of research organisations like ONERA, the Saint-Louis Franco-German Institute and contributions to the main engineering schools under the aegis of the Ministry of Defence. Finally, through the CEA, the nuclear world will be getting funds for specific research projects as well as investments into means of experimentation and simulation, like the Megajoule Laser in the Aquitaine Scientific and Technical Research Centre (CESTA).

The overall investment of the Defence Ministry into research will amount to € 7 072.7 M2003, independently of the civil research and development budget (BCRD).

Domestic security

As a major player in the field of domestic security, the Gendarmerie will benefit from improved means to deal with the new challenges facing it. The military programme law includes the additional means provided by the domestic security orientation and programming law (LOPSI).

In all, the gendarmerie will be granted € 3 177 M2003 for the period 2003-2008, including € 1 033 M2003 allocated under the LOPSI law (for the years 2003 to 2007).

The funds will finance de-centralised infrastructure expenses (construction of more than 10 000 housing-units), clothing, renewal of the territorial brigade vehicle fleet, road traffic control, operational computer equipment, the delivery of 14 emergency rescue helicopters starting in 2003, and orders for 15 surveillance and liaison helicopters starting in 2006. They will also be used to replace the Gendarmerie wheeled armoured vehicles (with 122 new generation VBRG units), modernise and renew Mobile Gendarmerie vehicles (more than 1,000 buses and more than 500 cargo vans), and network the territorial brigades.

Environment

The Defence Ministry contributes to environmental protection by reinforcing pollution standards, and protecting sites,

The programme to eradicate old chemical munitions (SECOIA) will offer a nominal destruction capability of 20 tons/year starting in 2007, and the possibility of a maximum of around 80 tons/year.

Starting in 2006, new destruction campaigns will take place as part of the installation qualification phase.

Considering the demands of professionalisation Consolidating the professionalisation process

With the professionalisation of the Armed Forces, the Defence Ministry now recruits about 30,000 young people each year. This is an ambitious venture in terms of both quality and quantity. The demands of the military profession, the limited duration of the contracts, and the need to select candidates, all mean developing measures to make the Armed Forces more attractive to French youth.

This recruiting requirement goes hand in hand with a need to keep military personnel on for a sufficiently long duration.

To achieve these major goals, which are the guarantees of success in Armed Forces professionalisation, the human resource flows have to be managed harmoniously by targeted actions. This is the goal of the professionalisation consolidation system.

Personnel and their development

Army

The increasing number and duration of operational engagements require appropriate Army forces ready for intensive use. This applies especially to the rank and file, who are the bulk of the recruits. Therefore, it is intended to increase the number of recruits in the army (EVAT) to 2500, and compensating for 2000 of these by eliminating more than 3000 volunteer positions. Essentially, this adjustment will be in favour of infantry units, intelligence units and units specialising in NRBC protection whose importance was highlighted by the events of September 11 2001.

Armed forces health service

The Armed forces health service will acquire more personnel to face its deep involvement in external operations and its participation in the public hospital service.

The substantial reduction in average service term of doctors over the last few years will require the implementation of an early promotion capability. The increase in the recruiting of doctors, by creating 220 trainee officer positions in the 2003-2008 period, should address this initial objective. Furthermore, by creating 350 NCO positions, military nurse and military hospital technician positions (MITHA) in 2003 and 2004, it should be possible to increase the number of managers in the armed forces health service hospitals and meet the military hospital accreditation standards.

Intelligence services

One of the lessons of crisis management is the fact that there is a need for better anticipation and interpretation in the collection and use of intelligence, both on the human and technical levels. A hundred or so positions will be created to meet this demand.

Gendarmerie

The number of Gendarmes will evolve according to the provisions of the Domestic security orientation and programming law (LOPSI).

Professionalisation consolidation to support human resources policy

To meet the demands of the dynamic and prospective human resources policy, two orders of measures will be implemented:

- an innovative setup: the professionalisation consolidation fund that brings together the specific measures constituting the loyalty and attractiveness policy that the Defence Ministry will need to maintain constantly if it is to enjoy the services of a professional army;
- The maintaining of measures that encourages officers and non-commissioned officers to leave the Armed Forces, and the extension of the restructuring accompaniment system, which, on the one hand, guarantees compliance with the pyramid of age and rank suitable for operational activities, and, on the other, benefits civilian personnel mobility.

Professionalisation consolidation fund

Loyalty measures

- *Recognition and reward of potentials and exercised responsibilities*

The technical nature of modern armed forces means that qualification levels are high. A professional army has to draw constantly on some of the elements in greatest demand on the labour market.

By allocating a fair pay level, recognising and rewarding the responsibilities involved, and granting an adjustable, reversible premium scheme for critical speciality areas, the armed forces will make it possible to preserve the skills that are essential to this institution.

- *Accompanying mobility*

High professional and geographical mobility is one of the specific aspects of military life, and one of the components of human resource management. Today, the methods used for covering the travel concurrent with training and reassignment are no longer suitable. They slow down the necessary mobility, both for the needs of the institution and for the professional career of the soldier.

The system we are considering will offer a better deal to military personnel in training, and improved coverage of military transfers.

Similarly, to make it easier for personnel to set up home, individualized help will also be improved.

A specific line of credit and an annual grant, issued under Section V, will be created for the implementation of moderate-rent housing construction programmes in the Paris area.

Attractiveness measures

- *Recruiting aid*

Because of job market competition, the armed forces sometimes have recruiting difficulties.

Shortages may arise in specialities that are in demand, but also for jobs that do not call for any particular initial qualification but that fall out of favour temporarily. The system is based on adjusting the induction premiums to speciality and type of engagement, or by allocating a specific induction premium for some personnel categories.

This will also help finance recruitment policy communication actions.

- *Accompanying job conversion*

The right employment conversion policy will guarantee a high standard of recruiting. Additional leave will be granted and financed for job conversion during inactive periods, and suitable collective or individualised training will be provided. It will indeed be necessary to make a specific long term training effort among military personnel who reach the end of a contract with a purely military speciality that is difficult to transpose into the civil context.

Mesures d'attractivité

€ M 2003	200	200	200	200	200	200	Tota
	3	4	5	6	7	8	l
Total measures, of which € 7.93 M each year are due to Section V.	18,93	45,93	71,93	115,93	146,93	172,93	572,58

The extension of the incentive system encouraging officers and NCOs to leave the service, and of the restructuring accompaniment measures.

The necessary departures of high-ranking officers to conserve the age pyramid and maintain attractive career perspectives for lower-ranking officers are not sufficient as they stand. That is why the system provided for in articles 5 and 6 of Law No 75-1000 of 30 October 1975 and the special leave granted to colonels and general officers by article 7 of Law No 75-1000 of 30 October are extended .

By virtue of Law No 70-2 of 2 January 1970 (article 3), 2% of officers and NCOs leave the service each year and enter the civil service directly after a temporary secondment designed to establish their aptitude for the job in view. This measure offers openings for conversion to personnel who have no desire to carry through their military career to the end, but who have a potential that is likely to interest the public community. The provisions of Law No 70-2 are therefore extended for the 2003/2008 period.

Finally, in measures aimed at optimising the general organisation of the Armed Forces, the extension of the restructuring effort accompanying the system (the "training - mobility" programme) will make it possible to complete the operations that were launched up until 2002, under favourable conditions for civilian personnel. This prorogation will take place under conditions designed to facilitate the mobility of civil personnel whose employment is one of the essential keys to the new format of the Armed Forces.

Measures linked to the suspension of national service

Finally, steps will need to be taken because Book II of the national service code will be suspended as of 1 January 2003. The situation of young French citizens who have not yet been drafted between 1 July 2001 and 31 December 2002 will have to be regulated by executive order. Provisions concerning the status of armed forces paymasters and joint postal personnel will also have to be inserted into the law of 13 July 1972, covering the general military status, and the legal basis of the reform commissions will have to be renewed.

Why it is essential to prepare the Armed Forces

Operational preparation of the Armed Forces (training standards)

These quantitative standards will go hand in hand with the greater qualitative content of operational training in three different areas:

- * Development of specific know-how by increased participation in qualifying exercises, with part of these carried out in cooperation with foreign countries
- * Systematic shooting practice to approach real combat conditions;
- * Increased participation in joint forces training to ensure the efficient insertion of armed forces into joint forces, national or allied forces: these exercises will concern more particularly the key headquarter personnel at strategic and theatre levels.

Objectives in operational terms

During the period, the goal is to move gradually toward the operation described in Section III, excluding the programmed equipment maintenance (EPM) of 20% in 2008.

Continued rise in reserve forces

The reserve forces offer essential complementary capacities to support the regular armed forces should there be a substantial increase in their assignments, or a temporary shortage in some specialty areas.

The system derived from the law of 22 October 1999 makes it possible to replace mass reserves by employment reserves. It is better suited to the new defence assignments through its three principles that form this approach's originality : voluntary service, induction into active forces and partnership between Government, the Reserves and civil employers. The law gives two assignments to the reserves, managed by way of two different components: operational reserves in charge of reinforcing the capabilities of the armed forces, and civil reserves more specifically assigned to maintaining, intensifying and developing the links between defence and society.

The operational reserves must be capable of supplying the reinforcements needed to guarantee territorial security when the units are massively posted to outside theatres. In the future they should participate more specifically in the territorial protection and security and in protecting people from risks related both to terrorism and to natural or technological crisis situations.

The operational reserves are also a means of providing the armed forces with a backup of specialised support forces for outside operations but also for domestic actions, especially for joint military-civil operations.

The reserves should give the gendarmerie the source of personnel they need to cope with their many missions and activity peaks, while first dealing with their primary assignments of general surveillance. For the 2015 Army model, operational reserve numbers have been set at 100,000 persons with the goal of reaching 82,000 in 2008, according to the following table and for an average activity period of around 25-30 days each year.

	Army	Air	Navy	Gendarmerie	Health	Fuels	Total
Numbers	28 000	8 000	6 500	32 000	7 000	500	82 000

The rising importance of the operational reserves is based on the enrolment of volunteers who have subscribed to a reserve call-up contract (ESR) for between one and five years on a renewable basis.

The goal of this programming law is to add a further impulse to the military reserves policy.

First of all, it will be a way of facilitating the use of trained operational reserves personnel, by specifying the role of the reserves, both for the projection of armed forces and for territorial protection and security assignments. To achieve this, volunteers will need high quality training although the available mass of reserves will increasingly consist of volunteers who have never had any previous military training.

It will then be necessary to meet operational reserve requirements in terms of personnel numbers, by moving the emphasis onto the attractiveness of signing up and serving as a reservist, while ensuring that the reserves remain available to the system.

The number of operational reserve officers and NCOs is now increasing satisfactorily. We now need to make a specific effort to attract potential candidates into the ranks : to do this, a fund amounting to

€ 85.83 M2003 will be attributed to the period, implementing several types of measures aimed at developing the attractiveness of the reserves (incentive bonus for volunteers, financing of an initial military training system).

		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Total
Reserves attractiveness	(in M€ 2003)	10,2	11,9	14,7	15,3	16,3	17,1	85,8
		7	1	6	8	5	6	3

Finally, particular actions will be organised to ensure that citizen reserve forces act as an efficient relay for the armed forces in society.

Improvement of military status

The military's status will have to be examined regularly to prevent troops from being isolated from the rest of society and to compensate for the demands of military life.

The previously described measures to consolidate professionalisation are part of a global human resources policy to which precise objectives are assigned. As for the measures to improve military conditions, they have a general bearing and are outside this bill's sphere. They are designed to reinforce the social positioning of the military within the national community. The measures decided on during the first quarter of 2002 will meet these demands and be implemented until 2008, with the greater share of the work being completed by 2005.

This effort will go hand in hand with thinking about the social position of the military.
