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**Breaking Seals, Breaking Commitments:  
Iran's Nuclear Program**

**Presentation by  
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at the Amerika Haus  
Vienna, Austria**

**January 19, 2006**

Last week, at three locations, the government of Iran broke over fifty seals of the International Atomic Energy Agency to gain access to material and equipment necessary for uranium enrichment. In breaking these seals, the Iranian government again broke faith with the world community. Iranian authorities showed their disdain for international concerns and their disregard for international diplomacy. And Iranian authorities took another step toward securing unrestrained access to the technology, material, and know-how necessary to produce a nuclear weapon.

Tonight I will speak about Iran's determined pursuit of atomic weapons -- a pursuit its leaders continue even in the face of growing international concern. And I'll speak about the February 2nd special meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors when Iran, once again, will be on the agenda.

**Preventing a Nuclear-Armed Iran**

At the IAEA here in Vienna, we worry about denying the most deadly of weapons to the most dangerous of countries. Iran is one of our greatest challenges. Iran is ruled by a theocratic regime that suppresses freedom at home, including through political killings and the widespread use of torture. Last year's elections were sadly consistent with this oppressive record. While they had the trappings of democracy, an unelected few denied the candidacy of thousands.

Tyranny at home is matched by terror abroad. Iran tops the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Iran provides funding, material, training, and weapons to a variety of terrorist groups. Its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Ministry of Intelligence and Security have helped plan and support numerous terrorist acts. Among the terrorists backed by Iran are those most

actively seeking to sabotage international efforts for Middle East peace. Allowing this regime to be armed with nuclear weapons is a recipe for political blackmail, regional instability... or worse. A country that threatens “death” to other countries must be denied the most deadly of weapons.

Some argue that Iran has a right to nuclear technology. Some argue that there is no definite proof that Iran is developing nuclear weapons. As a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran *does* have the right to the peaceful use of nuclear power. But Iran also has obligations, which it has ignored. And Iran does *not* have the right to use the *pretense* of a peaceful nuclear program to disguise and pursue a nuclear weapons effort.

Let’s consider a few of the facts:

- Iran has a long record, documented over and over again by the IAEA, of lying, covering up, and withholding information on its nuclear activities. This is not the sign of a peaceful program.
- Iran’s nuclear program has unexplained ties to its military, and there are disturbing indications of weaponization efforts. These are not the signs of a peaceful program.
- Iran obtained equipment and technology from the A.Q. Khan network. This blackest of black markets specialized in secretly providing nuclear weapons technology, equipment, and know-how to countries like Libya and North Korea. This is not the sign of a peaceful program.
- Iran tried to hide its centrifuge enrichment program at a remote, underground facility disguised as an agricultural center. Iran claimed it had no such facility... until forced to admit it in February 2003. Iran then claimed it had conducted no prior enrichment activities involving uranium... until forced to admit them in October 2003. Iran then claimed it had not tried to import components for the advanced “P-2” centrifuge design it received from the A.Q. Khan network... until forced to admit importing thousands of P-2 magnets in May 2004. These are not the signs of a peaceful program.
- Iran claims its enrichment activities are necessary for nuclear power. Yet Iran is now only building one nuclear power plant -- and it will be powered by Russian fuel. Even if Iran builds many nuclear power plants, the international market can supply plenty of fuel at a markedly lower cost than enriching it in Iran. Yet Iran insists on building costly enrichment facilities in the face of international opposition. These are not the signs of a peaceful program.
- Even using the most generous international estimates, Iran does not have enough deposits of natural uranium to enrich into fuel for even a small power program. The deposits are sufficient, however, to enrich into weapons-grade material for a sizeable stockpile of nuclear weapons. This is not the sign of a peaceful program.

## **Breaking Seals**

Iran's breaking of seals is another sign that Iran's intentions are anything but peaceful. As I mentioned at the outset, last week's breaking of seals shows the regime's disdain for international concerns and disregard for international diplomacy. The breaking of seals is also of great significance from a technical standpoint, representing another deliberate step toward nuclear weapons. Iranian leaders have tried to characterize these activities as innocent "research." This is not true. According to what they have told the IAEA, Iran's authorities intend to conduct engineering, manufacturing, and testing activities, including centrifuge operations and pilot-scale enrichment using uranium hexafluoride.

I'm a diplomat, not an engineer. But according to engineers who understand the technology, a pilot-scale operation like the Iranians are talking about is a key milestone toward full-scale enrichment. Enriching uranium is not a simple task. Pilot-scale enrichment allows technicians to master the technology that can then be replicated in a full-scale operation anywhere in the country. Pilot-scale enrichment establishes the ability to produce fissile material at any level of enrichment -- for a reactor or for a weapon -- and at any location -- open or covert.

Once Iran masters the technology through pilot-scale operations, assurances provided by IAEA safeguards are limited. Iran can replicate pilot-scale operations in a full-scale enrichment facility, ostensibly for peaceful purposes. Iran can then break out of IAEA safeguards and reconfigure the facility for the production of weapons grade material. Alternatively, or even at the same time, Iran can replicate a pilot-scale operation in a full-scale operation hidden at one or more smaller, undeclared locations.

Iran's procurement of material and know-how for what it calls "research" would help obscure its efforts to equip these covert facilities. Iran has already made considerable investment toward a full-scale facility in the two vast underground cascade halls at Natanz. And this investment continues, as shown by the continued construction of above ground facilities. The conclusion is clear.

Iran's intended path is not innocent "research." It is the pathway to full-scale enrichment and the production of material for a nuclear weapon.

### **Reporting Iran to the United Nations Security Council**

In September 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors formally found Iran noncompliant with its international safeguards obligations. Under the IAEA Statute, this requires a report to the UN Security Council. The Board found a second reason under its Statute to notify the UN Security Council: the absence of international confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. Despite these two reasons to notify the UN Security Council, the Board decided to defer a decision on the timing and content of a report. The Board called, instead, for Iran to act in three areas:

- first, to cooperate fully with IAEA inspections, cooperation which Director General ElBaradei has said is indispensable and overdue;

- second, to stop again its conversion of uranium ore to uranium hexafluoride, the raw material for uranium enrichment; and
- third, to restart the negotiations which it had terminated with the EU3. Iran has disregarded these calls from the Board of Governors since September.

Over three months later, Iran's cooperation remains woefully incomplete. Rather than stopping its uranium conversion, Iran has now started the next, most critical, step: uranium enrichment.

And Iran has shown no interest in serious negotiations, despite very serious proposals made by the EU3 and Russia. We agree with the EU3 and many others: The time has come to report to the UN Security Council on Iran's noncompliance and the absence of international confidence in the peaceful nature of its activities. The International Atomic Energy Agency, which just won the Nobel Peace Prize for the importance of its work, must now carry out its Statute and demonstrate its integrity.

### **Moving Diplomacy to a New Phase**

A report to the UN Security Council is a means not an end. Our overriding goal is to convince the leadership in Tehran to move off the dangerous course they have set. Thus a report to the Security Council would not be the end of diplomacy. It would be a new phase of strengthened diplomacy.

As this new diplomatic phase unfolds, we will continue to consult closely with the European Union, Russia, China, and the many other countries concerned by Iran's nuclear program. Austria will play an important role, with the EU Presidency. As we meet the proliferation challenge posed by Iran, our strength lies in unity.

Today, we hope Iran's leadership is receiving a message of increasing international concern. We hope that Iran's leaders will listen -- rather than further isolating themselves and their country through strident speeches and threatening acts. The people of Iran deserve better. And none of us -- particularly those of us in range of Iran's growing inventory of missiles -- can risk an Iran armed with nuclear weapons.